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Abstract 
 
IT projects have long been problematic, particularly as they have grown in size and 
complexity, frequently integrating several organisational functions, and often 
involving many stakeholders as a result. A common problem with large, complex IT 
projects is stakeholder conflict. Unless conflict is resolved effectively, there is a risk 
that the project will suffer delays and struggle to make progress.  
The purpose of this study is to investigate the role that environmental factors, such 
as culture, power, and history, play in conflict resolution. This study also examines 
how IT project governance can moderate the negative effects of environmental 
factors, and facilitate more successful conflict resolution. A systems perspective is 
used to represent the research framework. A positivist, qualitative research method 
using three case studies is used to examine the nature of conflict resolution in IT 
projects, comparing and contrasting outcomes. IT project governance arrangements 
(policies, authority structures and mechanisms) are found to be critical to the way 
stakeholder conflict is resolved. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Organisations find it difficult to complete large, complex information technology 
(IT) projects within time, budget, and user expectations. A KPMG survey of more 
than 600 organisations across 22 countries undergoing large IT projects found that 
nearly half the respondents experienced at least one project failure over the previous 
year (KPMG, 2006). Furthermore, 86% of respondents reported losses of up to 25% 
of targeted benefits across their project portfolio. 
To the non-IT professional this is often surprising.  After all, resources frequently 
appear plentiful, there are a plethora of methodologies available to guide the conduct 
of a project, there are often experienced and knowledgeable IT personnel involved, 
and many current IT projects share common features with past IT projects. Perhaps 
the relative youth of IT, exacerbated by ever-changing information technologies that 
affect the way information systems are developed and the way work is done, makes 
it difficult to establish stable, universal approaches to IT projects.  
To account for IT projects failures, the IT project process must come under scrutiny. 
If it were simply a matter of following a set of processes, then it should be enough to 
develop a business case, set a budget and timetable, allocate a project steering 
committee, a project manager and other IT professionals, create the project plan, 
design, build and implement the IT ‘solution’, and enjoy the newfound benefits. 
These steps are commonplace today. While they appear to be necessary, they are 
clearly not sufficient. 
The KPMG industry survey report (KPMG, 2006) goes on to explain why it is still 
difficult to get IT projects right. 
• The number of new projects had increased (for 81% organisations); 
• The complexity of projects has increased (for 88% organisations); 
• The total project budgets have increased (for 79% organisations). 
KPMG observed: “Today’s projects are often characterized by increased complexity 
and interdependencies. We have observed an increased volume of cross-divisional 
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initiatives requiring multi-disciplinary teams, aimed at customer-centric 
objectives.”(KPMG, 2006, p. 9) The report emphasised the importance of IT project 
governance.  
The increase in large, complex projects is due, in part, to the general popularity of 
systems that seek to integrate operations across different parts of the organisation, 
including: Business Process Redesign (BPR), Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP), 
systems integration, and more recently, e-commerce and e-business initiatives.  
Large, complex IT projects typically involve a variety of stakeholders, including 
several different user groups. With more stakeholders, the probability of conflict 
between stakeholders over the life of the project should also be greater. Stakeholder 
conflict has been highlighted many times as a potentially serious threat to IT 
projects (Barki & Hartwick, 2001). There is a consequent interest in providing more 
effective means of resolving conflict in IT project settings. 
Stakeholder conflict is defined to be a dynamic process that occurs between IT 
project stakeholders as they experience negative emotional reactions to perceived 
disagreements and interference with the attainment of their goals (Barki & Hartwick, 
2004). This characterises conflict through the use of three dimensions of conflict: 
disagreement between stakeholders; negative emotions between stakeholders; and 
perceived interference with goal achievement between stakeholders. Conflict 
resolution is defined to be the reduction, elimination or termination of such conflict 
(M  Rahim, 2000), and in this study is characterised by the reduction in the levels of 
disagreement, negative emotions and interference.  
Human behaviour in organisational settings has long been recognised as complex 
and difficult to analyse and predict, and this has also been found to be true in IT 
projects. (Winter, Brown, & Checkland, 1995) The problem is how best to address 
conflict and resolve it effectively. One possibility is improved IT project 
governance.  
Increasing attention has been paid to IT project governance as a way to facilitate 
project success and reduce or manage conflict. In this study, governance is defined 
to be the way strategies are set, monitored, and achieved, by employing 
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combinations of the following three arrangements: policies, authority structures and 
mechanisms. 
• Policies are used to interpret strategy in such a way as to guide or constrain 
decision-making.  
• Authority structures outline the responsibilities and allocation of decision-
making rights.  
• Mechanisms, including procedures, processes and methodologies, are tools 
the decision-maker can employ to help facilitate both decision-making and 
decision implementation.  
Thus, IT project governance focuses on the strategies and objectives of the IT 
project, and the policies, authority structures and mechanisms employed to help 
realise them. 
Compared to the rapid rise in academic interest in the governance of the IT function 
in organisations, research into IT project governance has been limited, with most 
studies appearing within the last decade. Some have focussed on IT project 
governance functions, such as: IT project selection, prioritisation, and approval 
(Morrison & Brown, 2004); IT project crisis management (Ivory & Alderman, 2005; 
Montealegre & Keil, 2000); and IT project risk management (Kappelman, 
McKeeman, & Zhang, 2006; Schmidt, Lyytinen, Keil, & Cule, 2001). Others have 
focussed on IT project governance arrangements, such as: IT project policies (Hill, 
2004; Jiang, Klein, & Chen, 2001); authority structures such as the project manager 
(Sumner, Bock, & Giamartino, 2006), the project management office (Hill, 2004), 
and the project steering committee (Larsen, Pedersen, & Andersen, 2006); and 
mechanisms such as IT project lists and scoring tools (Knodel, 2004); situated action 
planning (Rosch, 2002); and implementation methodologies (Fichman & Moses, 
1999). 
However, few studies have taken a broader view. There is a need to develop a more 
integrated approach to framing and analysing what occurs in an IT project over time 
and why. Understanding the complexity of any system, and the impact of change on 
that system, requires consideration of a wide range of factors and their 
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interrelationships (Wollin, 1999). It has been suggested that there is a common 
“deep structure” to organisational systems.  
“A key concept is the nested, multi-level organization of ‘deep structure’, the 
order in a system. This includes culture, technology, operating routines, control 
systems, organizational structure, resources and distribution of power.” (Wollin, 
1999, p. 359) 
In order to understand complex behaviours in organisational systems, we need to 
incorporate the many-faceted ‘deep structure’ of the organisation. In this research, it 
is argued that if IT project governance is to address the unpredictability of 
complexity, particularly in the form of stakeholder conflict, it needs to be framed by 
the characteristics that contribute to the situation’s complexity.  
We note that in addition to factor such as technology and operating routines, the 
‘deep structures’ of systems include human factors such as culture and power. 
Organisations typically see decision-making as a rational process, but human 
decision-making is not always rational, and can be influenced by a number of other, 
less tangible factors such as organisational culture and power (Pfeffer, 1992).  These 
characteristics need to form part of the context for a holistic study of IT project 
governance.  
That IT projects are getting larger, more expensive, and more complex, with the 
need for better project governance, seems reasonable. It also seems likely that 
human factors and conflict are important contributors to the complexity and 
unpredictability of project outcomes. However, it is unclear exactly what kind of 
project governance arrangements would work best in complex situations, and what 
approaches are most effective in managing conflict in IT projects. A better 
understanding of these inter-relationships will ensure that the more appropriate IT 
project governance arrangements could be coordinated, implemented, and 
monitored. 
1.1. Research Overview 
This study focuses specifically on interpersonal conflict between IT project 
stakeholders, and how specific governance arrangements can improve the 
effectiveness of conflict resolution.  
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Stakeholder conflict, as a manifest example of interactive human behaviour, is a 
genuine risk to the IT project. To examine stakeholder conflict through a broad, 
integrative framework, it is argued that a holistic perspective is necessary. Holism is 
based on “…the idea that the properties of a system cannot be determined or 
explained by the sum of its components alone.”(Bellamy, Geyer, & Wilkinson, 
2008, p. 462) In an IT project context, a traditional reductionist view would identify 
project phases, subprojects, tasks and milestones, whereas a holistic view would 
identify elements beyond project control that affect the way the IT project evolves.  
“Holism has been around for a long time, but because of the apparent success of 
the traditional scientific method, has had to take second place to reductionism. 
Holism deserves to be reinstated as an equal and complimentary partner to 
reductionism. It encourages the use of transdisciplinary analogies, it gives 
attention to both structure and process, it provides a powerful basis for critique, 
and it enables us to link theory and practice in a learning cycle.”(M. Jackson, 
2006, p. 647) 
Systems thinking is employed to develop a research framework that provides an 
holistic perspective of conflict in an IT project. Relevant constructs informed by the 
‘deep structure’ of systems are identified from the literature and placed in the 
framework. As a result, a system model focussed on the management of conflict 
resolution is developed and used to frame the research. The research problem is 
expressed in the form of three research questions: 
RQ1:  In what way, and to what extent, do environmental factors affect the 
conflict resolution process and its outcomes? 
RQ2:  In what way, and to what extent, can governance design, monitor, and 
control the management of conflict resolution? 
RQ3:  In what way, and to what extent, can governance moderate negative 
effects of environmental elements on conflict resolution? 
To address these questions, data was collected from three organisations that have 
been recently involved in large IT projects with a variety of stakeholders. 
Employing a case study research methodology based primarily on interviews, each 
of the constructs, and their interrelationships, within the framework were examined, 
thus building up a set of observations and analytical explanations as to why conflict-
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related events unfolded the way they did. These are discussed for each case, and 
then compared and contrasted across all three cases.  
1.2. Structure of the thesis 
In Chapter 2 the literature is reviewed across a wide range of constructs that are 
relevant to IT project related interpersonal conflict and its resolution. The nature of 
IT projects are explored, including current thinking on what makes IT projects 
succeed or fail, why they are becoming increasingly complex, and how taking a 
holistic perspective can help frame and analyse this complexity. IT project 
stakeholders, both as groups and individuals, are considered. Interpersonal conflict, 
and its resolution, between stakeholders are defined and examined both in general, 
and more specifically within IT project settings. Each of the IT project context-
based factors are also explored in the literature, including: stakeholder power, 
culture and history. These are discussed in terms of organisational behaviours and 
their effects on conflict resolution. Finally, the organisational governance literature 
was examined to establish the nature of corporate governance, IT governance, and 
most importantly of all, IT project governance.  
In Chapter 3, systems thinking is employed to integrate the different factors 
identified in Chapter 2, establishing a research framework based on elementary 
systems concepts. The system is based around the conflict resolution process, 
receiving a conflict issue as input, and producing resolution outcomes as output. The 
system environment (incorporating those factors outside the system boundary) 
includes contextual factors like power, culture and history. The system control 
function includes both management decision-makers providing direct control, and 
governance providing indirect control (through management). A system framework 
has the dual advantages of providing for both holistic and reductionist perspectives 
of the system. 
In Chapter 4, an appropriate research methodology is established to test how 
successfully the framework can be applied to an IT project context. A positivist 
approach is selected to reflect the past work of scholars who have identified and 
examined the relevant factors that will make up the major constructs of the research 
framework. A qualitative approach to data collection and analysis, based on case 
study research, is required to gain insights into the complex, interactive human 
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behaviours. The data collection is based on the critical incident method, where 
interviewees are asked to recall specific incidents of conflict that they may have 
encountered or observed over the progress of the project. A critical incident, in this 
study, becomes an incident of conflict, which is set to be the unit of analysis.  
Each of Chapters 5, 6 and 7 begin with a description of a case organisation, the IT 
projects under scrutiny, and the stakeholders involved. Interviewees for each case 
comprised people in key positions, or representing key stakeholder groups, including 
the project manager, user groups, the IT function, management, external vendors 
and contractors. The interviews, focussing on recall of conflict incidents within the 
project, were transcribed and analysed.  
Finally, Chapter 8 compares and contrasts the research outcomes from each of the 
three cases. A series of more generalised findings are presented and discussed, 
culminating in five major emergent themes. The chapter finishes with a brief 
consideration of research limitations, future research opportunities, and research 
contributions. 
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2. Literature Review  
 
Recent trends in practitioner publishing suggest good governance practices – 
particularly IT and project governance – should make a significant difference to the 
way IT projects are controlled. It is argued here that governance practices can make 
a significant difference to the way IT project conflict can be resolved. To test this, it 
is necessary to know more about conflict itself, what factors affect its resolution, and 
how well they can be controlled to increase the likelihood of a positive outcome. 
This chapter begins with a brief examination of significant IT projects in medium to 
large organisations, how complex they are, and the usefulness of a holistic 
perspective to highlight project context. The nature of IT project stakeholders is 
considered, with a particular focus on stakeholder conflict and its resolution. 
Contextual effects, such as power and culture, are examined in both general IT 
project-related terms, and with a specific focus on studies linking these effects with 
conflict. Finally, project control, with an emphasis on governance, is considered, 
including the ways organisations can reduce the negative effects of conflict. 
2.1. IT Project Success and Failure 
For the purposes of this study, an IT project is defined to be any project that has a 
significant IT component, typically requiring some IT expertise.  
Both practitioner and academic writers have invoked worrying statistics on IT 
project failure in their introductory paragraphs. Typically, many express concern 
about the continued lack of maturity in handling IT projects (P. Kelly & Stalnaker, 
2002; Laidlaw, Ross, Threlfall, & Manwani, 2004). 
“We see similar recriminating data year after year reminding us that about 20 
percent of IT projects are cancelled before completion and less than a third are 
finished on time and within budget with expected functionality.” (Kappelman, et 
al., 2006, p. 31). 
However, there is a need to be cautious with such statements. Much depends on the 
definitions used for such polarising terms as success and failure. Beyond the obvious 
outcome of project abandonment, there is subjectivity in evaluation – one person’s 
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failure, may be another person’s success (Lyytinen & Hirschheim, 1987). Another 
difficulty is the timing of evaluation – what may seem successful today, could be 
regarded as a failure tomorrow (Heeks, 2002), and success at one point in time may 
only be loosely related to success at another point in time (Markus, Axline, Petrie, & 
Tanis, 2000). 
Nor is the domain clear. For example, the success of the project itself is often 
confused with the successful realisation of benefits post-project (Aladwani, 2002). It 
has been proposed that ‘project success’ should consist of three success components: 
project selection success; project management success; and project deliverable 
success (Morrison & Brown, 2004). Regardless of the qualifiers applied to project 
success or failure, the concepts of reducing failure and increasing success still apply. 
In the next section, the contribution of complexity in IT projects to project ‘failure’ 
is examined. 
2.2. IT Project Complexity 
Complexity can be defined as “the effort required to understand and cope with 
something” (from Backlund, 2002, p. 30). Large complex systems are characterised 
by: 
“… growing organizational and economic scale, increasingly intensive 
knowledge requirements, tightening patterns of functional interdependence 
within major production or service segments, and expanding networks of 
cooperation and control.” (La Porte, 1994, pp. 269-270). 
Project-oriented change may derail rational approaches in complex settings. 
 “… because of adverse contingent circumstances, change cannot be based on 
plans and projections, but rather on understanding the complexities of situations 
and weighing different options available.” (Stroh & Jaatinen, 2001, p. 162)  
It has been suggested that complexity was related to the trend for offering a greater 
variety of functions, applications and approaches, with correspondingly increased 
complexity in information flows (Backlund, 2002). Instead, Backlund suggested a 
simpler approach, with greater limitations on application variety. 
“There is a certain connection between information loss and the complexity of 
an information system. It is also argued that organisations and information 
systems can benefit from being simple, even if that would mean a decrease in 
variety.” (Backlund, 2002, p. 30) 
But if complexity cannot be reduced, the need to manage it is still an issue.  
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“Complexity must be accepted as a part of the systems development world for 
the future.  … A project that affects the entire enterprise will increase 
complexity. Only when complexity is accepted can it be possible to come to 
grips with managing that complexity.” (H. Ryan, 1999, p. 91) 
It has been shown that large, complex IT projects are affected by a changing 
environment, leading to unpredictable results (Andres & Zmud, 2002; Pich, Loch, & 
Meyer, 2002).  
“… complexity itself is experienced as difficult-to-manage non-linearity, in that 
inputs lead to unexpected outputs, … As a result, complex systems do not reach 
equilibrium states, and can be tipped by small events in unanticipated 
directions.” (Ivory & Alderman, 2005, p. 6) 
Flexible approaches to project planning and management, as a response to a 
dynamic environment, have been proposed (Andres & Zmud, 2002; Fioravanti, 
2006; Newman & Robey, 1992). Some have suggested that uncertainty should be 
embraced, with a focus on dynamic improvisation leading to emergent benefits 
(Orlikowski, 1996; Orlikowski & Hofman, 1997).  
“[Organisations are] turning increasingly away from patterns of stability, 
bureaucracy, and control to those of flexibility, self-organising, and learning.” 
(Orlikowski, 1996, p. 63) 
Large IT projects are typically complex, and complexity, in concert with a changing 
environment, can generate uncertainty and lead to unexpected outcomes – 
sometimes disastrous ones. Therefore, the focus shifts to an examination of the 
project and its environment. The next section examines past research on meeting the 
challenges of IT project complexity by adopting a holistic perspective. 
2.3. A Holistic Perspective on IT Projects 
While much has been published about IT projects, few have embraced the 
complexity inherent in many large IT projects. For example, it was found that both 
project and change methodologies influenced, but did not always predict, decisions 
and actions taken (Goulielmos, 2004). The approach used to control project progress 
overall was drawn from a complex web of factors, both internal and external to the 
project, and internal and external to each of the stakeholders (though the author 
focused mainly on the project team and the clients). This suggests a need to consider 
broader aspects of the IT project, and its context, than is provided by traditional 
methodologies. 
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It appears our ability to learn about developing and implementing IT initiatives may 
struggle to compete with their burgeoning complexity, cost, and likely impact on a 
range of business processes.  
“Preconceived, top-down IS designs will always disappoint in the long term, as 
they do not allow internal complexity to evolve in line with the imposing 
resources, limitations, competitors, tensions, and complexity of their 
environments.” (Benbya & McKelvey, 2006, p. 14) 
This idea of evolving complexity goes some way to explaining the variability of 
research outcomes when focussed on causality in IT projects. Recently it was argued 
that evolving complexity can only be addressed effectively by employing a 
combination of: a reductionist approach, a holistic approach, and a dynamic (time-
based) approach, referred to as complex holism. (Dongping, 2007) Applying 
complex holism to IT project-related phenomena suggests investigation through 
project deconstruction (identifying the project subsystems, phases, tasks or other 
components), project context (identifying the human and organisational factors in 
which the project is situated) and project time (identifying the way the project and its 
context evolves). 
There has been plenty of support for taking a holistic perspective of large, complex 
IT projects (Hepworth, Vidgen, Griffen, & Woodward, 1992; W. King & Pollalis, 
2001; Petkova & Petkov, 2003). When implementing enterprise-level, radical 
change such as business process redesign (BPR), a systemic view, incorporating the 
entire business environment, is seen as essential (R. Galliers, 1997). This applies to 
other large-scale, IT-based change systems, such as enterprise resource planning 
(ERP), customer relationship management (CRM) and supply chain management 
(Huang, Yen, Chou, & Xu, 2003). 
“[These] have brought with them complex technical, organisational, cultural, 
political, and legal issues that have made the integration process a very 
challenging task.” (Huang, et al., 2003, p. 137) 
The organisational, cultural and political issues referred to highlight the fact that 
most large, complex IT projects revolve around groups of people (stakeholders) who 
have an interest in the project or its outcomes. The next section examines the role 
project stakeholders play in IT project success and failure.  
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2.4. IT Project Stakeholders 
There are many definitions of an IT project stakeholder available in the literature. 
For example, 
“[Stakeholders are] individuals, groups or organisations, or a subset of a clearly 
identifiable group of individuals, whom have a contractual, financial, ethical or 
political interest in the decisions or actions of the specific organisation.” 
(Solomon, 2001, p. 257) 
Thus ‘stakeholders’ can be seen to include an individual, an identifiable collective of 
people (stakeholder group), and a subset of a stakeholder group designated to 
represent the group’s interests.  
This study employs a simpler definition. 
“[An IT project stakeholder is] any group or individual who can affect, or is 
affected by, the achievement of the IT project’s objectives.” (Mitchell, Agle, & 
Wood, 1997) 
The more stakeholder groups participate in an IT project, the more likely the need 
for oversight of how they will interact, including organisational responses to conflict 
between stakeholder groups (K. Meyer, 2004). This is a recurrent theme throughout 
this study. 
“[Recent research] has identified stakeholder influences as the key challenge of 
corporate governance. … Where diverse stakeholders have substantial influence 
on management, ‘the critical governance tasks … are to ensure effective 
negotiations, coordination, cooperation, and conflict resolution to maximize and 
distribute the joint gains among multiple parties of interest’ (Kochan & 
Rubinstein, 2000, p. 370)”, quoted within (K. Meyer, 2004, p. 236). 
Many researchers have elevated stakeholder involvement in the project processes to 
be an IT project critical success factor.  
“[Organisations should] convey consistent openness and commitment to gaining 
global stakeholder input. You cannot have true ownership of the change without 
providing the stakeholders ways to influence the outcome.” (Roberts, Cheney, & 
Sweeney, 2002, p. 72) 
For these reasons, it is increasingly common to see stakeholder analysis as a 
requirement in both project management and change management methodologies. Its 
purpose is to first, identify the stakeholders and their backgrounds (organisational, 
technical, political, social, historical, cultural, educational, etc.), and then use this 
knowledge to predict likely behaviours and actions with respect to the IT project 
(Castle & Sir, 2001). The analysis can be broad and formal, including assessments of 
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each stakeholder group’s change readiness, commitment to change, and likely areas 
of resistance (Benjamin & Levinson, 1993). The analysis can also look at individual 
stakeholder representatives, including some useful facts about them as people, their 
level of influence on the project, and suggestions on managing their relationship 
(Schwalbe, 2004). 
This study focuses on the challenges brought on by increasing stakeholder 
involvement in an IT project, and the greater likelihood of conflict as a result. The 
next section investigates the nature of conflict among project stakeholders. 
2.5. IT Project Stakeholder Conflict 
Stakeholder conflict within IT projects is common because “…independent people 
must work together to achieve multiple objectives in an environment of flux, 
ambiguity, and scarce resources.” (Hammer, 1997, p. 165) Thus conflict must be 
resolved within an IT project setting. 
2.5.1. Organisational Conflict 
Organisational conflict has long been scrutinised by organisational behaviourists. 
Since conflict is based on human behaviour, definitions and perspectives vary 
considerably throughout the academic literature. This lack of consensus is summed 
up in the following passage. 
“While a vast conflict literature exists in different fields (e.g. psychology, 
communication, … and marketing), much of this work has focused on conflict 
management and resolution, to the detriment of studying the meaning, 
measurement, and impact of interpersonal conflict per se. This has resulted in a 
literature that lacks an agreed-upon conceptualization or definition of 
interpersonal conflict. Validated measures of interpersonal conflict are also 
lacking. Further, researchers assessing interpersonal conflict have tended to use 
measures that are both limited in focus (with most assessing a single dimension) 
and biased toward a particular dimension (disagreement).” (Barki & Hartwick, 
2001, p. 219) 
Some definitions are based on the differences between the conflicting parties. 
“[Conflict occurs] when two or more people working within the same 
organisation perceive differences in beliefs, values or goals which impact their 
ability to work together and/or affect the work environment.” (Jameson, 1999, p. 
270) 
Other definitions emphasise the resulting behaviours. 
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“A conflict occurs when one or both parties express hostility and interfere with 
each other’s efforts to accomplish objectives.”(Yukl, 1998, p. 111) 
Frequently, conflict has been represented as an organisational process. 
“[This process] begins when one party perceives that the other has negatively 
affected, or is about to negatively affect, something that he or she cares about.” 
(Thomas, 1992) 
Henri Barki and Jon Hartwick provided some of the few studies in the IS domain 
that canvassed the more general organisational conflict literature (Barki & Hartwick, 
1994a, 1994b, 2001, 2004; Hartwick & Barki, 1994a, 1994b). They provided a 
useful definition that encompassed several important perspectives.  
“[Conflict is] a dynamic process that occurs between parties as they experience 
negative emotional reactions to perceived disagreements and interference with 
the attainment of their goals.” (Barki & Hartwick, 2004, p. 234) 
This definition is based on what Barki and Hartwick refer to as the three 
“fundamental properties of interpersonal conflict”: disagreement, interference, and 
negative emotion. These are defined as: 
Disagreement: incompatible differences of opinion between stakeholders 
Negative emotions: “a condition in which [stakeholders] have interpersonal 
clashes characterised by anger, frustration, and other negative feelings.” (Barki 
& Hartwick, 2004, p. 219) 
Interference: “one party perceives that its interests are being opposed or 
negatively affected by another party” (Barki & Hartwick, 2004, p. 219) 
Barki and Hartwick note that most recent conflict studies in the literature 
characterise conflict as possessing elements of all three dimensions. However, this 
study is based on the assumption that the presence of any of the three dimensions, 
individually or in combination, has the potential to damage IT projects. Therefore, 
this study broadens Barki & Hartwick’s definition and adapts it to the IT project 
context. 
Conflict: A dynamic process that occurs between IT project stakeholders as they 
experience any of negative emotional reactions to perceived disagreements or 
interference with the attainment of their goals. 
15 
The effects of conflict on organisational activities has been frequently investigated, 
including the effects of conflict on: top management teams involved in strategic 
decision making (Amason, 1996; Amason & Mooney, 1999); cross-functional teams 
and innovation (Lovelace, Shapiro, & Weingart, 2001); and leadership and job 
performance (M Rahim, Antonioni, & Psenicka, 2001).  
Organisational conflict can be categorised into three types (Jehn & Mannix, 2001): 
• Relationship conflict – “an awareness of interpersonal incompatibilities … 
[This] involves personal issues, such as dislike among group members and 
feelings such as annoyance, frustration, and irritation.” [p.238] It is also known 
as affective conflict. 
• Task conflict – “an awareness of differences in viewpoints and opinions 
pertaining to a group task … [This] pertains to conflict about ideas and 
differences of opinion about the task.” [p.238] 
• Process conflict – “an awareness of controversies about aspects of how task 
accomplishment will proceed … [This] pertains to issues of view and resource 
delegation, such as who should do what and how much responsibility different 
people should get.” [p.239] 
Most studies have focussed on task conflict. Yet, relationship conflict is “…is 
detrimental to individual and group performance, member satisfaction, and the 
likelihood a group will work together in the future.” (Jehn & Mannix, 2001, p. 239) 
Process conflict caused uncertainty (Jehn, 1992), interfered with task content quality 
(Jehn, 1997), and ultimately rendered the team unable to effectively perform their 
work (Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 1999). 
Central to most of Jehn’s published work is the representation of conflict as a 
dynamic process. The frequency of incidents of conflict, their type, level of 
intensity, and the membership involved, may all vary over time. For example, it was 
common for relationship conflict to have an increasingly negative effect as the 
project drew closer to implementation.  
The concept of the target of conflict being any of: relationship based, task content 
based, or task process based, will be used to categorise conflict in this study. 
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2.5.2. Conflict Resolution 
Conflict resolution is the reduction, elimination or termination of conflict (M  
Rahim, 2000).  
Actions that reduce conflict involve reducing the magnitude of any of the three 
dimensions of conflict, such that the negative impact that might have occurred, had 
no action been taken, is lessened. For example, if relationship conflict is causing 
serious project delays, it may be possible to get the relevant parties to put their 
differences aside (reducing negative emotion) and work together (reducing 
interference). This is a pragmatic approach which does not guarantee that the 
conflict will not resurface, but at least the project is no longer stalled.  
Actions that eliminate conflict imply the removal of all three dimensions of conflict. 
Elimination of only one dimension of conflict (e.g. disagreement) would be 
considered partial elimination of conflict. 
Actions that terminate conflict imply the formal cessation of resolution-related 
behaviours. This may happen with or without agreement of the stakeholders 
involved. A decision is made that no further effort will be made to resolve the 
conflict. 
The literature has given considerable attention to conflict resolution within an 
organisational setting. Examples include: seeking conflict resolution best practice 
(Yukl, 1998); creating a typology of approaches to conflict resolution (Lord & 
Maher, 1993); measuring the quality of conflict resolution outcomes in IS 
development projects (Barki & Hartwick, 2001): resolving conflict in 
interorganisational systems (Kumar & van Dissel, 1996); and resolving conflict in 
cross-functional information systems (Cook & Eining, 1993). Specifically, IT 
project-related conflict “has a pervasive negative impact on outcomes.” (Barki & 
Hartwick, 2001, p. 220) 
Barki and Hartwick also found that satisfactory conflict resolution had a significant, 
positive impact on ISD-related performance. Satisfactory resolution may mean 
either a reduction or an elimination of conflict. Their findings emerged from the use 
of structural equation modelling, but the weakness of this quantitative approach is 
that, having identified important links between the data, it cannot tell us much about 
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how they work. These IT project-specific conclusions act as a starting point for a 
more concentrated focus on conflict management within this context. The causal 
links are there, but there is a need to know more about the circumstances behind 
them.  
Several studies have established different ways to measure successful conflict 
resolution. Examples include: win/loss, compromise, or consensus (Conlon & 
Sullivan, 1999; Dove, 1998); the degree stakeholders comply with the resolution 
decision (Conlon & Sullivan, 1999); and competition, collaboration, avoidance, 
accommodation or compromise between either assertive or cooperative stakeholders 
(M  Rahim, 2000; Thomas, 1992).  
In this study, resolution outcomes are evaluated by comparing the levels of conflict 
both before and after resolution decisions were made. Establishing the level of 
conflict will involve evaluating levels of disagreement, negative emotions and goal 
interference. The before-and-after comparison leads to five possible outcomes for 
conflict resolution, where conflict has: escalated, reduced, been eliminated, or 
remained unchanged. 
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2.5.3. Conflict in IT Projects 
Research in IT project-related conflict has been strongest in the area of 
developer/user conflict – particularly with respect to system design and 
implementation. For example, in one study, experienced consultants noted the 
frequency of isolation, even vilification, of the IT Department (Russell & Muskett, 
1993).  
It is these user/developer tensions that led to moves to improve ISD methodologies 
to encourage user participation. However, it was not clear to what degree user 
participation really mattered. Many have sought to link user participation to user 
satisfaction, incorporating a bewildering array of moderating factors (McKeen & 
Guimaraes, 1997). However, only a small handful of studies examined the 
intervening processes of conflict and its resolution. Conclusions include: 
• user involvement led to greater conflict over the evolution of the project 
(Robey & Farrow, 1982).  
• the exercise of influence with user involvement created opportunities for 
conflict resolution (Robey, Farrow, & Franz, 1989).  
• User involvement, influence, conflict and conflict resolution were seen as 
components of a process over the evolution of the project, and both 
involvement and influence varied over time (Robey, et al., 1989).  
• The more influence is applied, the more conflict will arise, and the greater 
the need to be able to resolve it; conflict resolution is a major contributor to 
project success; and participation doesn’t appear, in itself, to be a strong 
contributor to project success (Robey, Smith, & Vijayasarathy, 1993).  
• User participation can be represented by three dimensions: responsibility, 
hands-on activities, and the user/IT relationship (Barki & Hartwick, 1994a).  
• The term conflict should be represented by two constructs: disagreement and 
conflict (Barki & Hartwick, 1994b). This was later challenged in a research 
essay (Robey, 1994). 
• While effective conflict resolution did have some positive effects on project 
outcomes, once conflict ensued, there was no substantial reduction in the 
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negative effects of the conflict itself (Barki & Hartwick, 2001). As another 
commentator on this paper noted,  
“The bottom line of this result is that it is better to avoid interpersonal 
conflict in the first place, than to rely on project leadership to mitigate it.” 
(Olson, 2004, p. 27) 
• User participation is an antecedent to conflict (Hartwick & Barki, 1994a, 
1994b; Hunton & Beeler, 1997; Jordon & Collins, 1997) 
One case study highlighted the lack of guidance on resolving conflict provided by IS 
development methodologies, and the subsequent coercive influence applied by some 
stakeholders: 
“…the ISD method has little to say when groups are locked into…conflict. This 
blindness towards conflict may be a serious contingency problem, because the 
prevalence and possibility of conflict is large in many organizations.” (Chiasson 
& Dexter, 2001, p. 98) 
Considering conflict as a ‘serious contingency problem’ suggests conflict can be 
formally assessed as an IT project risk. Further, in anticipation of conflict, actions 
can be taken to mitigate or even prevent eventual conflict. The idea that anticipating 
conflict can be a part of risk management becomes an important theme in this 
research. 
The next section examines the role that politics, through the related concepts of 
power and influence, plays in terms of conflict resolution in IT projects. 
2.6. IT Project Stakeholder Politics 
Within an organisational context, ‘politics’ is a term that almost everyone 
understands, yet few can define it. Academic writers tend to use the term in their 
introductions and abstracts, but then abandon it in favour of related terms such as 
power and influence once the analysis begins. In fact, work on organisational 
politics is generally referred to as the ‘power’ literature (Jasperson, Carte, Saunders, 
& Butler, 2002).  
A cursory review of the power literature reveals an array of confusing and 
contradictory definitions of power and influence.  Many authors use the same terms 
to mean different things, while others use different terms for the same concepts.  
Some differences stem from the different background disciplines of the authors (for 
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example, management, organisational behaviour, sociology, psychology, or 
anthropology). Others appear to formulate new definitions to suit their research 
methodology. A recent review of the power literature provided conceptualisations of 
power based on five common power ‘themes’ (including authority and influence), 
but noted that “the various concepts of power are frequently mentioned together and 
often intertwined.” (Jasperson, et al., 2002, p. 399) 
2.6.1. Power 
An early perspective on organisational power highlighted dominance: 
“A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something B would not 
otherwise do.”(Dahl, 1957, pp. 202-203) 
This was later expanded to include an explanatory adjunct to the power relationship 
based on power dependencies. 
“It would appear that the power to control or influence the other resides in 
control over the things he values…”. (Emerson, 1962, p. 32) 
Periodically, attempts have been made to bring different perspectives into line. For 
example, one author suggests  
“…most of the treatises dealing with the concept [of power] are in general 
agreement that it has to do with relationships between two or more actors, in 
which the behaviour of one is affected by the other.” (Hall, 1987, p. 127) 
He went on to say that “Power is an act; it is something that is used or exercised.” 
(Hall, 1987, p. 127) This definition is symptomatic of the confusion surrounding 
these concepts – within the same short sentence, ‘power’ is represented both as a 
verb (“an act”) and as a noun (“something that is used”).  
So power is an abstract concept that can be difficult to standardise. In common 
usage, it is often used in a relative way (‘A is more powerful than B’), but power 
does not lend itself to quantitative metrics. Power can be modelled as a zero-sum 
game, where it is seen as a fixed quantity, so that if one person gains power, 
someone else must have lost power. This has been applied to IT project contexts 
(Sillince & Mouakket, 1997, 1998).  
There is no single widely accepted conceptualisation of organisational power. 
However, some patterns of thought can be discerned. The early concept of power as 
a capacity to act has been reinforced by several noted writers on organisational 
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power. Jeffrey Pfeffer referred to power as a potential force (Pfeffer, 1992). He went 
on to define organisational politics to be the exercise of power. George Yukl 
referred to power as a capacity to influence (Yukl, 1998).  
“Power is not a thing or an act, but rather a resource, a capacity, a potential; and 
it does not have to be used.” (Yukl, 1998, p. 28) 
It is this conceptualisation that will be used in this study – power is a capacity to 
influence, a potential force that can “…overcome resistance in achieving a desired 
objective or result.” (Pfeffer, 1981, p. 2) 
2.6.2. Influence 
Many authors use the terms power and influence interchangeably (Pfeffer, 1992).  
Others sought to make a distinction, with varying degrees of success. In this study, 
influence is defined to be the exercise of power (Bloomfield & Coombs, 1992), 
where power represents the capacity, and influence represents the use of that 
capacity. 
Influence can also be seen as a process that seeks to alter a decision-maker’s 
perception of the problem and its context (Beeman & Sharkey, 1987). Beeman and 
Sharkey propose two types of influence are available to those with power: coercion 
and persuasion. Persuasion occurs when those with power seek to convince the 
decision-maker through the use of logic and reason. Coercion occurs when those 
with power seek to force the decision-maker through the use of demands and threats. 
The authors argued that persuasion was a positive approach that generally reduced 
conflict, whereas coercion was capable of escalating conflict (Beeman & Sharkey, 
1987). 
2.6.3. IT, Power and Influence 
Many practitioner publications have included articles focussing on the risks of 
power and influence to IT projects, some with salutary lessons based on grim 
examples of what can go wrong (Cloud, 1990; Inmon, 1992; J. King, 1994; Koenig, 
2000; McDonald, 1997; N. D. Meyer & Gardner, 1992; A. Ryan, 1990; Schrage, 
1993, 1997; Winsberg & Richards, 1992). 
Until the early 1980s, the examination of power and IT only sporadically appeared 
in the IT literature (Bariff & Galbraith, 1978; Kling, 1980; Markus, 1981; Pettigrew, 
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1973). However, since then – perhaps responding to increased political activity as 
projects grew in size and complexity – it has remained a topical subset of the IT 
literature. M. Lynne Markus’ watershed paper on the need to examine user 
resistance to IS implementation within a political (as opposed to rational) framework 
was highly instrumental in igniting this broader interest (Markus, 1983). 
Academics have provided many case studies where power and influence adversely 
affected ISD projects (Bjorn-Andersen & Pedersen, 1980; Drummond, 1996; 
Knights & Murray, 1992; Marx, 1995; McGrath, Dampney, & More, 1994). Some 
writers unequivocally state that politics is inevitable when it comes to large IT 
projects. Because rationality is bounded by time, available information, and 
differences in stakeholder interests, exercising power may be seen ultimately as a 
more efficient way of getting things done (Berghout, Nijland, & Grant, 2005; 
Pfeffer, 1992). User resistance to IT projects, as an exercise of power, has become 
one of the more topical issues in the literature since (Adams, Berner, & Wyatt, 2004; 
Cavaye & Christiansen, 1996; Doolin, 2004; Drummond, 1996; Krovi, 1993; 
Markus & Bjorn-Andersen, 1987; Markus & Pfeffer, 1983). 
2.6.4. Conflict and Power 
Political activity can both generate and exacerbate conflict, leading to negative 
outcomes with serious impacts on the IT project (Bjorn-Andersen & Pedersen, 1980; 
de Laat, 1994; Drummond, 1996; Knights & Murray, 1992). Consequently, there 
have been calls for more effective political analysis of the existing power structure 
in an organisation – to help guide the selection and implementation of appropriate 
conflict management strategies (Drory & Ritov, 1997). Some argue that by actively 
engaging in political analysis, decision-makers will discover new, and possibly more 
effective approaches to conflict resolution (Berghout, et al., 2005).   
This research explores what effects power and influence can have on conflict and its 
resolution, including the application of persuasion and coercion, and under what 
circumstances they may occur. 
The next section examines the role that organisational culture, and corresponding 
subcultures, play in terms of conflict resolution in IT projects. 
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2.7. Culture and IT Projects 
Peters & Waterman’s book In Search of Excellence popularised the ideas that: 
organisations, being collections of people who spend a lot of time together, had 
cultures; that these cultures could affect organisational performance; and that 
cultures could be changed to fit organisational need and improve performance 
(Peters & Waterman, 1982).  
However, changing organisational culture has not proven quite so simple in practice, 
despite considerable attention since the early 1980s. The following examines the 
nature of organisational culture and subcultures, and how they affect conflict within 
IT projects. 
2.7.1. Organisational Culture & Subcultures 
It has been two decades since it was claimed organisational culture could be 
manipulated (Peters & Waterman, 1982) and “…people have been trying to define 
organisational culture, to understand its nature and gauge its influence on 
organisational effectiveness ever since.” (Lewis, 1998, p. 251) 
To highlight this difficulty, Lewis quotes from an early assessment of organisational 
culture, and suggested little has changed since: 
“Some see the term ‘organisational culture’ as a metaphor … Others see [it] as a 
thing … There is disagreement as to where the organisational culture originates, 
whether the unconscious mind plays a role, whether there is a single 
organisational culture or many cultures, whether an organisation’s culture or 
cultures can be managed, whether organisations have cultures or are places to 
study cultures, whether and how organisational cultures can be studied and 
whether they should be studied at all.” (Frost, 1985, p. 18) 
There have been many attempts to assess cultural dimensions, including how 
employees cope with conflict (Pascale, Millemann, & Gioja, 1997). Others have 
focused on cultural typologies and their effects on change (Pearce & Osmond, 
1996). Several typologies of culture have appeared in the literature, and one review 
of these proposed a summative framework based on four culture types (Andersen, 
2003): power (centred on a single source of power); role (rational bureaucracy); task 
(network of expertise); and person (focus on people and collectives).  
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Cultural dimensions such as attitudes, beliefs, values, and behaviours figure 
prominently in many cultural studies (Henderson, 2004; Lewis, 1992). One review 
of organisational culture defines culture as 
“Basic assumptions that people in an organization hold and share about that 
organization. Those assumptions are implied in their shared feelings, beliefs and 
values, and embodied in symbols, processes, forms and some aspects of 
patterned group behaviour.” (Lewis, 1992, p. 48) 
Lewis’ definition is adapted, for the purposes of this study, to a multiple-culture 
environment that focuses on a narrower range of dimensions: 
Organisational culture: Basic assumptions that people in an organisation, or in 
a subset of that organisation, hold and share about the group of which they are a 
member. Those assumptions are implied in their attitudes, beliefs and values, 
and embodied in aspects of patterned group behaviour. 
This research focuses on the four dimensions of culture identified in this definition: 
Beliefs: the guiding philosophy of the group; 
Values: what is and isn’t important to the group; 
Attitudes: collective feelings about something; and 
Behaviours: group member actions shaped by their cultural membership. 
While the concept of subcultures had been subject to debate as well, it is now 
generally accepted that large organisations are comprised of overlapping subcultures 
(Lewis, 2001). 
2.7.2. IT Project Stakeholder Cultures 
Culture assumes particular importance in IT projects, because they require different 
stakeholder cultures to interact. The importance of culture to IT project success has 
been well-documented. (recent examples include Anumba, Dainty, Ison, & Sargeant, 
2006; Callen, Braithewaite, & Westbrook, 2007; Ifinedo, 2007). 
The IT project manager faces two challenges. They need to build a positive, 
productive culture within the project team, while recognising and working with the 
different external cultures brought to the project team (Elmes & Wilemon, 1988). 
When comparing a project culture with the organisation’s ‘base’ culture, marked 
differences have been recorded (Andersen, 2003); most projects were found to 
develop task cultures, where achievement of outcomes is paramount. Establishing a 
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project culture that is different from the existing organisational culture was hard to 
establish, especially if the existing culture was poorly understood. 
Cultural differences between stakeholder groups may lead to ‘culture clashes’ as the 
project progresses, with the attendant risk of conflict (Robey & Azevedo, 1994). 
There is a need to manage that risk through early identification and mitigation 
(Romm, Pliskin, Weber, & Lee, 1991), because the risk can lead to project failure 
(Pliskin, Romm, Lee, & Weber, 1993). Where culture clashes have led to conflict 
within an IT project, resistance to the IT-related changes is a likely manifestation 
(Cooper, 1994).  
A review of the literature examining the interactions of culture with, in turn, the IS 
development process, the characteristics of the IS being developed, and the way the 
IS is used post-implementation, found (Kappos & Rivard, 2008): 
• Culture influences the ISD process. 
• Culture moderates the relationship between the ISD process and the 
characteristics of the IS. 
• Culture moderates the relationship between the characteristics of the IS and 
acceptance or resistance. 
2.7.3. Culture and Conflict 
It has been observed that  
“Organisational culture influences IT decision-makers’ perceptions of the 
factors and priorities to be considered when making an acquisition decision, as 
well as outcomes of whether an IT is successfully implemented." (S. Ryan, 
Harrison, & Schkade, 2002, p. 94) 
By extension, conflict-related decisions within IT projects will be equally 
susceptible to the intensity and/or variety of cultural perceptions that could be 
involved. The introduction of IT-based change can mean different things to different 
groups, which can provoke conflict (Orlikowski & Gash, 1994). This is the basis for 
research into stakeholder cultural differences and their contributions to conflict 
within IT projects. 
“… cultural analysis has also proven adaptable to the study of conflict and 
contradiction within organisations” (Robey & Boudreau, 1999, p. 175). 
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Cultural analysis can also be applied to organisational subcultures. Within IT 
projects, stakeholder groups may engage in conflict due to the cultural differences. 
The next section examines elements of IT project control, including management 
and governance, and its relevance to conflict resolution. 
2.8. Governance 
In its broadest organisational sense, governance is concerned with control. Whereas 
management involves making and implementing decisions, governance is concerned 
with guiding and constraining these actions (Pound, 1995).  
First, the three major components of governance arrangements are introduced and 
described, leading to a definition of governance. The extensive research covering 
both corporate and IT governance is briefly examined, followed by a more detailed 
assessment of the literature focussed on IT project governance. 
2.8.1. A Framework for Governance Arrangements 
Henry Mintzberg describes three types of managerial control, through the use of: 
systems, structures and directives. Systems use established processes “to control 
people's behaviours” (Mintzberg, 1994, p. 16). Structures "establish responsibilities 
and define hierarchical authority" [p.17]. Directives "transmit information so people 
can act" [p.17]. These three types of governance arrangements are adapted for this 
study, by defining governance in terms of policy, authority structures and 
mechanisms. 
Policy is defined as “a principle or set of principles on which to base 
decisions.”(Chambers, 1998) It provides an explicit link between strategy and 
decision-making, whereby those that determine strategy, are also in a position to set 
policy reflecting that strategy (Allen & Wilson, 1996). Policy can be used to either 
guide or constrain management decision-making. Typically policies set standards, 
establish formal rules, and specify outputs, goals and targets (Peterson, 2004). 
Policy, as a concept in this research, is seen as the equivalent of Mintzberg’s 
‘directives’. 
Authority structures are defined to be either individual positions or bodies that 
establish responsibilities and define hierarchical authority. This describes 
Mintzberg’s ‘structures’. 
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Mechanisms are defined, in the context of this research, to be the processes, 
procedures, methodologies and other tactical methods that help decision-makers 
both make and implement decisions. Mechanisms can be formal or informal, 
permanent or temporary, planned or ad hoc, and prescriptive, guiding or 
constraining, in the way that they support management decision-making and 
implementation. Mechanisms are seen here as the equivalent of Mintzberg’s 
‘systems’, though mechanisms incorporate more than just processes. 
In this way, governance can be seen as a set of arrangements, organised by those 
who have oversight responsibility, that provide some control over delegated 
decision-making. These arrangements outline who will be responsible for making 
and carrying out those decisions, in terms of both position and appointment 
(authority). They explain why some decisions are more appropriate than others, so 
that they are better aligned with strategy (policy). And finally, they outline how, 
where and when these decisions should be made and carried out (mechanisms). This 
model of governance and its three components is summarised in Figure 2.1.  
Governance can be defined in terms of its ultimate purpose, providing the link 
between control and strategy. 
"…governance refers to the way the organization goes about ensuring that 
strategies are set, monitored, and achieved.” (Rau, 2004, p. 35) 
Expanding Rau’s definition to include the three components leads to the following 
definition: 
Governance: the way the organisation goes about ensuring that strategies are 
set, monitored, and achieved, by employing combinations of the following three 
arrangements. Policies are used to interpret strategy in such a way as to guide or 
constrain decision-making. Authority structures outline the responsibilities and 
allocation of decision-making rights. Mechanisms, including procedures, 
processes and methodologies, are tools the decision-maker can employ to help 
facilitate both decision-making and decision implementation. 
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Figure 2.1: How governance facilitates the transformation of strategy into strategic 
outcomes, by employing the three types of governance arrangements 
 
This model of governance arrangements is used to frame the project governance 
literature (see subsection 2.8.4), and forms the basis for analysis of governance 
arrangements in this study. 
2.8.2. Corporate Governance 
Articles over the last decade suggest corporate governance has assumed renewed, 
unprecedented importance.  This resurgent interest stems from several corporate 
trends over the past decade, including self-regulation – to curb recent corporate 
excesses (N. Jackson & Carter, 1995; Tapsell, 1999); opportunity – frequent 
restructuring enabled governance overhauls (Wright & Chiplin, 1999); and 
increasing size & complexity – reacting to the increasing global marketplace by 
growing larger (Wright & Chiplin, 1999).  
Traditionally, complete delegation of decision-making led to what was called the 
managed corporation (Pound, 1995).  Thus,  
“the role of the governance system was to put the right managers in place, 
monitor their progress, and replace them when they failed …”. [p.90] 
Pound goes on to suggest there may be times when a governing body must get 
involved in management decision-making, such as when a crisis looms, creating 
what he calls a governed corporation. The move from the managed corporation to 
the governed corporation must be done at the right time, before a crisis, when the 
organisation is doing well (Pound, 1995, p. 96). 
The idea that governance arrangements should be put in place before problems occur 
is important to this study. Applying Pound’s ideas to the domain of an IT project, 
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the suggestion becomes: The move from a managed IT project (complete delegation 
of decision-making) to a governed IT project (occasional involvement of governing 
body in decision-making) should have project governance arrangements in place 
before the project begins. 
2.8.3. IT Governance 
IT governance can be viewed as a subset of corporate governance.  That is, it is 
concerned with decision-making structures, mechanisms and policy – but with a 
focus on IT-related issues1.   
By the late 1990s, an increasing number of publications on IT governance appeared, 
though there was still uncertainty as to what IT governance meant. For example, 
Thomas Davenport, in his book Information Ecology, dedicated an entire chapter to 
this topic without explicitly defining it, though he was clearly focused on the 
decision-making structures with respect to ‘information control’. Other definitions 
have variously focussed on: the levels of decentralisation of IT responsibilities 
(Brown, 1997); the scope of authority decision-making across IT infrastructure, IT 
use, and project management (Sambamurthy & Zmud, 1999, p. 261); and the means 
by which authority make decisions, based on context, policy and mechanisms 
(Sambamurthy & Zmud, 1999, p. 261). 
Establishing the best authority structure for the IT function, and the corresponding 
debate over the degree of centralisation that was necessary, has been a major topic in 
the IT literature even before the phrase ‘IT governance’ was employed (Davenport, 
Eccles, & Prusak, 1992; Edwards, Earl, & Feeny, 1994; Russell & Muskett, 1993; 
Sambamurthy & Zmud, 1999).  
A review of the literature linking organisational context with IT authority structures 
found that within many organisations, different local business units had varying 
degrees of decentralised authority – the hybrid IT governance structure (Brown, 
1997). The implications for this study are that while the organisational context is 
                                                 
1
 Here the acronym ‘IT’ is used in its broadest sense, and includes issues related to data, information and 
information systems.  Some authors have referred to ‘IS governance’ and others to ‘information 
governance’.  While it can be argued that these are different, only rarely have authors explicitly 
differentiated them in their writing.  Therefore, IT governance will be used as a generic phrase in this 
study, encompassing all these variations. 
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important, local IT-related contexts are important too, including the way IT is 
perceived. 
2.8.4. IT Project Governance 
The concept of putting governance arrangements in place specifically for IT projects 
became commonplace only over the last decade. This rise in popularity coincides 
with that of project risk management. There is an increasing belief that IT project 
governance can provide an essential framework to manage risk (Kappelman, et al., 
2006; Schmidt, et al., 2001; Wallace & Keil, 2004; Young & Jordan, 2003).  
Risk management with respect to IT projects is defined to be: 
“The process of identifying, evaluating, and controlling what might go wrong in 
a project before it becomes a threat to the successful completion of the project or 
implementation of the information system.”  (Whitten & Bentley, 2008, p. 41) 
Risk management typically involves following six steps, categorised by the two risk 
management stages: risk assessment and risk control (Whitten & Bentley, 2008). 
• Risk Assessment:  
– Risk identification (including factors involved & possible outcomes) 
– Risk analysis (estimating likelihood & magnitude) 
– Risk prioritisation (based on likelihood & magnitude estimates) 
• Risk Control:  
– Risk management planning  
– Risk resolution (actions taken to reduce or eliminate risk) 
– Risk monitoring (re-assessing risk as the project progresses) 
That conflict is a risk that needs to be managed is not new. For example, stakeholder 
conflict, along with other more specific risks such as culture clashes, are included in 
some checklists of IT project risks (Schmidt, et al., 2001). However, being aware 
that stakeholder conflict is a potential risk is only a start. As noted in Chapter 1, 
much less has been said about what happens next. Exactly how the risk of conflict 
can be addressed is an important part of this study, and will be revisited in Chapter 
8. 
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In a seminal paper on control in ISD projects, Laurie Kirsch viewed control in a 
broad sense, with an equal focus on social as well as technical aspects (Kirsch, 
1997). At that stage the literature had focussed mostly on authority structures and 
project management, and she saw that as limiting. 
"While individuals need a certain amount of autonomy to produce parts of the 
solution, all pieces must eventually be integrated into a deliverable system." 
[p.216] 
While Kirsch supported the holistic perspective provided by a systems view, she 
also noted that practitioners tended to focus on project control from a more 
constrained cybernetic perspective. 
“This view assumes that outcomes are known, standards can be set, and 
corrective action is possible. However, desired outcomes, standards, and 
corrective actions are not always obvious in an ISD environment, …”. [p.216] 
It is not that cybernetics is not useful here, but it is limiting if employed in a strictly 
engineering sense, downplaying or ignoring human issues. 
Kirsch went on to distinguish between formal control and informal control, where 
formal control is “…viewed by organizational and agency theorists as a performance 
evaluation strategy…” and informal control is “…based on social or people 
strategies.” [p.217]  
Formal modes of control were based on policies, in conjunction with corresponding 
mechanisms used to carry them out, citing an ISD methodology as an example. 
Articulated objectives corresponded with a reward system based on meeting those 
objectives. By contrast, informal modes of control focused on behaviours. 
“Because formal controls tend to present a mechanistic view of the control 
process, they ignore interpersonal or self-regulating dynamics that also govern 
behaviour. [These] are typically undocumented and differ in terms of level of 
aggregation.” [p.217] 
Focussing on informal modes of control, her conclusions included: 
• The ISD process is dynamic, and needs to be recognised as such. Even 
outcome-based measures (milestones, deliverables, budgets, etc.) will be 
fluid over time, requiring renegotiation on occasion. 
• Those who control typically employ both formal and informal modes of 
control, including a variety of associated mechanisms. Some mechanisms, 
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such as the project plan, can be used to control both outcomes and 
behaviours. 
• Formal controls were regularly used to control task behaviours & outcomes, 
whereas informal controls were typically focused on stakeholder 
relationships. 
• Those with authority will conduct formal controls, and these will be 
documented and legitimised. It is less likely that informal controls, from both 
those in authority and, in particular, those who are not in authority, will be so 
readily identified. These will include both peer-to-peer and hierarchical 
relationships.  
These results combine to reinforce many of the issues raised earlier in this chapter: 
incorporating a holistic view to include both formal and informal controls, the need 
for treating complex project processes as dynamic with unpredictable outcomes, the 
fact that we know more about formal modes of control than informal modes of 
control, and that we know even less about how they all interact. 
Finally, Kirsch warned about the risks of looking at control from a narrow 
perspective. 
“… extant literature tends to view control as goal-oriented and purposive, 
emphasizing its role in coordinating and monitoring tasks. This view is 
consistent with the practitioner literature’s depiction of control as a cybernetic 
process. While coordinating task-related activities is important … individuals 
also exercise control to foster relationships in order to engender cooperation and 
elicit individual contributions. Thus, conceptualizations of control must take into 
account the varied reasons for implementing control.” [p.236] 
The importance of governing project stakeholder relationships, as well as tasks, is a 
critical theme in this research. 
Magnus Mähring published a monograph entitled IT Project Governance. Based on 
his doctoral thesis, a single case study is examined in considerable depth to 
investigate “how executives engage in information technology projects and how 
organizational control of IT projects forms and evolves over time.” (Mahring, 2002, 
p. back cover). Expanding upon Kirsch’s work, Mähring elevated context as the 
primary research interest, noting that IT projects incorporated contextual challenges 
to the way IT project governance worked. 
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“… central characteristics of work tasks in IT projects stack the deck against 
controllers, particularly non-IT controllers. Specifically, these task 
characteristics, including abstractness, technological complexity, duration, non-
repetitiveness, and low degrees of observability, measurability and 
programmability render both output control and behaviour control largely 
impracticable. 
Further, the common lack of domain knowledge among non-IT controllers and 
the high threshold in learning about IT and IT work practices, together with the 
often reported distance in views and perspectives between IT professionals and 
non-IT controllers, adds further complexity to the control setting. In addition, 
values and norms of the IT profession are enacted in the control relationship, in 
which mutual influence and evolving trust are central characteristics.” [pp. 289-
90] 
Nor was it always possible to recognise the influence wielded by the IT function, 
both directly and indirectly. 
“… controllers are apt to accept pre-existing control procedures and control 
forms, which are in turn likely to be extensively influenced by the IT 
department. They are also likely to accept that IS development methodologies, 
procedures and actresses, including reporting procedures, are within the 
professional jurisdiction of the IT professionals. Further, the project manager 
and people working in a project are likely to have extensive influence over goal-
setting. …[and] what is reported is quite subjective, open to judgement and 
influence by the controllee and highly difficult for controllers to verify.” [p.290] 
This disconnect in formal controls, complicated by the interactions between 
stakeholder-based environmental effects, illustrates how difficult it can be to put into 
practice such simple, yet ubiquitous, ideals as ‘strong top management support’. 
Add to this the fact that projects evolve dynamically, where the basis of decision-
making may change over time, and it is clear governance should be more than 
simply ensuring the right structures and mechanisms are in place. 
For these reasons, Mähring finished with a recommendation that risk management 
should include “risks and problems related to ‘strong top management support’” 
(Mahring, 2002, p. 291). There was a need to understand “the considerable 
differences in perspectives between executives (potentially ‘providing support’) and 
project managers and other actors (demanding attention and priority).” (Mahring, 
2002, p. 292) Much depends on the degree parties recognise their co-dependence, 
and that different parties may need to be involved in control at different times. 
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The range of policies, authority structures, and mechanisms used in IT project 
governance is broad. This is illustrated in Table 2.1, providing a summary of recent 
published research on the governance arrangements in use.  
Authority structures tend to dominate the IT project governance literature, as they 
have consistently done in the IT governance literature as well. Of particular 
importance are the oversight roles played at the project programme level, the IT 
project steering level, and the IT project management level.  
The Project Management Office (PMO) typically provides broad oversight of all 
significant organisational projects, with a focus on administrative processes. These 
include: setting IT project policies, including standards, providing training and 
support for project managers, and coordinating resources across different 
organisational projects, including IT projects (Hill, 2004; O'Donnell, 2003).While it 
has been suggested that the PMO could play a role in detecting potential stakeholder 
conflict (O'Donnell, 2003), this does not appear to have been followed up in the 
literature. 
The project sponsor is normally a senior manager or executive who provides both 
personal support, at the senior levels, for the project from its inception, and 
sufficient authority to help clear organisational obstacles (Feeny & McMullen, 
1999). Practitioners generally regard project sponsors as an essential element of IT 
project success (see, for example, Wyllie, 2004). 
As a decision-making authority for the project team, the project manager plays a role 
in IT project governance as well. They may well set policy and set up mechanisms 
for the project team – with, or without, the involvement of the PSC (Sumner, et al., 
2006). However, this role may be (possibly inadvertently) expanded beyond the 
project team to include the management of project stakeholders. The IT project 
manager is often left accountable for issues like user conflict when they do not have 
authority over the user community (Schmidt, et al., 2001; Wallace & Keil, 2004). 
Perhaps of most interest to those conducting research into IT project governance is 
the role of the PSC. Some see the governance of IT projects as being subsumed into 
a higher level body like the IT steering committee, comprising both business and IT 
executives (Bowen, Cheung, & Rohde, 2007; Maizlish & Handler, 2005). However, 
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both academics and practitioners have come to realise the importance of 
representative steering committees dedicated to individual IT projects (Englund & 
Bucero, 2006; Lechler & Cohen, 2009).  
The popularity of PSCs stems from the fact they offer many advantages in terms of 
IT project governance. For example, 
• Although responsible for project governance, the PSC also represents the 
highest level of decision-making for escalated problems (Jiang, et al., 2001; 
Nidumolu, 1995); 
• The PSC provides genuine stakeholder participation in both project 
governance and management decision-making (Vadapalli & Mone, 2000); 
and 
• PSC involvement provides a clear indication of top management support for 
the project in general, and the project manager in particular (Vadapalli & 
Mone, 2000). 
However, PSC characteristics such as the composition, responsibilities, meeting 
frequency, policy-making, and processes employed may vary not only across 
different organisations, but even across different projects within the same 
organisation. Furthermore, there are other IT project-related governance authorities 
involved, as noted above. Examining the critical role of user participation, Vadapalli 
& Mone suggest IT project governance works best with  
“…an integrated user participation structure composed of a combination of 
steering committees, cross-functional teams and project champions performing 
different functions and supporting each other during the course of project 
implementation.” (Vadapalli & Mone, 2000, abstract) 
 
It has long been recognised that the PSC should have the authority to resolve 
conflicts in IT projects (Drury, 1985), but few studies have since focussed 
specifically on this role (Nidumolu, 1995). This appears to be symptomatic of a 
broader area of neglect: 
“It was surprising to find a general lack of research on the role of committees in 
the implementation of projects.” (Lechler & Cohen, 2009, p. 51) 
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This chapter established a range of constructs from the academic literature that need 
to be included in the research framework for this study. The focus is on conflict and 
its resolution, but important contextual factors (such as power, culture, and history) 
and control factors (governance, management, and feedback) have also been 
identified. 
In the next chapter, these constructs are assembled into the research framework by 
employing systems thinking to improve construct integration. 
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Table 2.1: Recent IT Project Governance literature, with an emphasis on common IT project governance policies, authority structures, and mechanisms 
Process Policies Authority Structures Mechanisms 
IT project 
selection,  
prioritisation 
& approval 
(Morrison & Brown, 2004) – selection success based 
on: (i) visibility of product/service to be delivered; (ii) 
feasibility of project execution; (iii) feasibility of 
project management targets 
 (Morrison & Brown, 2004) – increasing focus on project 
portfolio management to achieve long term success 
IT project 
crisis 
management 
(Aiyer, Rajkumar, & Havelka, 2005) – policy on de-
escalation of commitment 
(Ivory & Alderman, 2005) – policy of dynamic, 
interventionist control; systems perspective 
(Keil, Moxon, Saarinen, & Tuunainen, 1995) – 
debate over sunk costs and escalating commitment 
affected by cultural diversity 
(Jiang, et al., 2001) – in spite of decision right allocation, 
governing body may need to intervene in crisis 
management 
(Aiyer, et al., 2005) – project recovery framework 
(Ivory & Alderman, 2005) – contract renegotiation; ad hoc 
problem-solving groups 
(Montealegre & Keil, 2000) –escalation of commitment due 
to challenges of IT project progress measurement & dynamic 
nature of project (e.g. freq. scope change & volatile 
requirements) 
IT project risk 
management 
(Aladwani, 2002) – holistic perspective (integrating 
technical and social) 
(Averett, 2001) – IT change: the more jobs change, 
the more serious risk gets 
(Fowler & Gilfillan, 2003) – ERP case: project policy 
vacuum, filled in by ad hoc operational decisions 
(Kappelman, et al., 2006) – warning signs of risk 
problems, each requiring a policy solution 
(B. Lee & Miller, 2004) – effects of policies on 
projects: e.g. hiring delays, staff turnover, resource 
availability, reward schemes 
(Fowler & Gilfillan, 2003) – university ERP case; failure 
to understand culture, power, approach to decision-making 
(Schmidt, et al., 2001) – software project risk mitigation 
often left to proj. managers, who lack the authority 
(Wallace & Keil, 2004) – present 2x2 framework (risk 
importance vs. project manager control); reinforces idea 
that control beyond project manager critical 
(Fowler & Gilfillan, 2003) – systems perspective, with 
governance as control function; stakeholder mapping; 
power/interest matrix 
(B. Lee & Miller, 2004) – employs project scenario planning 
(via simulation based systems dynamics model) to evaluate 
potential effects of: events, policies, theories & strategies 
(Schmidt, et al., 2001) – too much emphasis on estimation of 
IT project risk impact, not enough on likelihood 
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Process Policies Authority Structures Mechanisms 
General IT 
project 
governance 
(Hill, 2004) – project management maturity model, 
increasing importance of policy 
(Jiang, et al., 2001) – need for implementation 
policies (selecting ISD methodology; design approach, 
requirement changes, training provision, getting user 
support & management commitment, promoting 
changes, etc.) 
(Knodel, 2004) – employs holistic perspective to set 
policies based on strategic road map 
(Petkova & Petkov, 2003) – outsourced ISD and the 
lack of attention given to post-contract relationships 
(Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 2000) – radical IT change requires 
radical org. change (economic focus – human factor 
ignored) 
(Feeny & McMullen, 1999) – need proj. champion & 
broad proj. gov. to include stakeholders 
(Hill, 2004) – project management maturity model 
(1.project office, 2.basic PMO, 3.standard PMO, 
4.advanced PMO, 5. centre of excellence) 
(Hoffman, 2004) – tight PMO oversight can cause conflict 
with proj. management 
(Larsen, et al., 2006) – clarify responsibilities, 
deliverables, and relationships between: proj. manager, 
PMO and proj. steering committee. 
(O'Donnell, 2003) – PMO centralising standards, 
coordinating project plans, and detecting stakeholder 
conflict 
(Sauer, Gemino, & Reich, 2007) – levels of volatility 
(project target & governance) seen as measures of IT 
project success 
(Sauer & Willcocks, 2002) – IT project governance role to 
bring executives (have vision, but no IT) together in 
dialogue with IT (don’t understand vision) 
(Sumner, et al., 2006) – leadership capabilities of project 
managers just as critical to project success as PM skills 
(Wyllie, 2004) – practitioner piece promoting executive 
sponsorship & project steering committee 
(Fichman & Moses, 1999) – Results Driven Incremental 
(RDI) implementation methodology 
(Koch, 2004) – project governance through contingency 
planning 
(Knodel, 2004) – project lists; portfolio-based prioritisation, 
monitoring and idea generation; project scoring tool 
(Rosch, 2002) - compares situated action planning with 
predefined planning, and both often required with long, 
complex IT projects (e.g. conflict resolution) 
(Wyllie, 2004) – practitioner piece promoting strong 
communication & reporting channels as a necessity 
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3. Research Framework  
In the previous chapter, large IT projects were viewed as complex systems that were 
at risk of suffering significant setbacks. These setbacks were more likely to be 
caused by either organisational or human factors, than technical problems. These 
projects, particularly those based in larger organisations, promoted the integration of 
business processes, were facilitated by a corresponding integration of the 
information systems that supported them. The integration of both business processes 
and information systems often had a significant effect on a wide range of 
stakeholders. With greater stakeholder involvement in the IT project processes came 
increased risks of conflict between stakeholder groups. 
The literature revealed many human behaviours were relevant to an examination of 
conflict in this context, including organisational politics (power and influence), 
culture (and subcultures), history (past interactions between stakeholders) and 
governance (policies, authority structure, and mechanisms). Consequently, many 
authors had argued for a more holistic approach to studying IT project-related 
phenomena. Research had often been conducted on a subset of factors, leading to 
conclusions that may not have represented a complete picture of what is happening. 
A narrower research domain risks missing three important scenarios: 
• There may be important factors outside the research domain; 
• There may be important relationships between factors inside and outside the 
research domain; or 
• Some factors may be more dominant than others. 
Consequently, there is a strong argument that a holistic approach to examining the 
nature of IT project-related conflict is both appropriate and necessary. By 
broadening the research domain, the factors affecting conflict resolution raised in the 
previous chapter can be incorporated into this study.  
This chapter sets out to frame the research domain based on the process of conflict 
resolution in IT projects. It begins with a brief outline of systems thinking, including 
a description of a system’s primary components, and why it can be applied to a wide 
range of problem types. Conflict resolution is considered from a systems 
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perspective, where it is regarded as a subsystem of an IT project system. Based on 
general system components, a systems model of conflict resolution is developed, 
drawing on the different factors identified in the literature (Chapter 2), and 
representing them as constructs in the model. This systems model becomes the 
research framework for this study. Finally research questions are developed that 
focus on the constructs and their relationships delineated in the framework. 
3.1. Systems Thinking 
The systems movement emerged in the 1940s, advanced considerably by the works 
of biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy, founder of General Systems Theory, including 
the generic rules of system behaviour (von Bertalanffy, 1968), and Norbert Wiener, 
founder of cybernetics, which focuses on system control processes (Wiener, 1948). 
In a broader sense, a system can be defined as: 
“…a set of interdependent components (sub entities) that create a whole entity. 
The components are dynamically linked.” (Ahituv & Neumann, 1990, p. 74) 
There are two principles embedded within this definition. First, a system can be 
modelled by representing it as a set of components that are dynamically related to 
each other. Second, not only can we model the system’s interactive components, but 
we can model the environment (or context) that the system performs within. Based 
on the idea that ‘the whole may be more than the sum of the parts’, systems thinking 
encourages analysis through both decomposition (how does the system work?) and 
holism (how well does the system perform within its environment?).  
Systems thinking involves the application of seven fundamental systems concepts to 
a complex system: input, process, output, environment, boundary, feedback, control, 
and subsystem. By identifying specific components, along with the relationships 
between them, a diagrammatic framework can be created and employed as an aid to 
analyse an existing system or design a new one. 
The basic components can be described as follows, adapted from (Ahituv & 
Neumann, 1990, p. 75): 
• Inputs – system resources entering the system and ready to be processed 
(e.g. capital, information, personnel, materials); 
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• Process – a set of activities, or procedures, within a system component, that 
consumes system resources in order to transform system inputs into system 
outputs; 
• Outputs – the transformed inputs that leave the system for purposeful use 
elsewhere; 
• Environment – the factors that may interact with the system but remain 
outside the system boundary; 
• Boundary – separates the system from its environment; 
• Feedback – information output specifically focussed on process 
performance, which is normally relayed back to the control function for 
checking; 
• Control function – compares measures of achieved outcomes (feedback) 
with desired outcome measures and adjusts the system accordingly; and 
• Subsystem – A system component that represents a system in its own right 
(NB. Not all system components may be subsystems). 
These components can be linked through inter-component relationships to produce a 
diagrammatic representation of a system and its environment (Figure 3.1). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: A general systems framework 
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The relationships in Figure 3.1 can be explained as follows. The arrows with solid 
heads represent the flow of materials, and together with the three components, 
describe the purpose of the system. Inputs located in the system environment cross 
the system boundary (as unprocessed materials) and are accepted by the system for 
processing. When the process is complete, the resulting outputs cross the system 
boundary (as processed materials) back into the environment. This outlines the 
normal system processing as it was intended to function, its ‘business as usual’. 
The arrows with unfilled heads represent changes or effects that alter the way the 
process functions. This can happen in two ways. The control function may decide to 
alter the process. This is regarded as a controlled change – that is, the organisation 
has control over how the process functions. The other type of process changes may 
occur due to environmental, or contextual, effects. Because these effects are sourced 
outside the system boundary, they are regarded as uncontrolled changes – that is, the 
organisation has no control over these environmental factors because they are 
outside the system. 
Finally, the dotted line represents an information flow. This is additional output 
from the process that provides feedback about process performance. Process 
performance would normally be based on efficiency and effectiveness. Process 
efficiency is focused on input, seeking to minimise resource use. Process 
effectiveness is focused on output, seeking to maximise how well the system meets 
its objectives. To assess process performance, predetermined measures reflecting 
performance can be implemented as part of the process.  
The control function is a special adjunct system that prevents, detects, or corrects 
unlawful, or undesirable, events (Weber, 1999). The control function will assess 
feedback received and make changes to the system process if necessary. These 
changes may be temporary for a special case, or may be permanent for overall 
process improvement. Even the system objectives may be changed. The control 
function lies outside the system boundary, but nevertheless has a strong relationship 
with the system process. If changes have been made to the process, performance 
data continues to be collected and evaluated. Known as a control-feedback loop, it 
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provides the capacity for those controlling the system to monitor and adjust system 
performance on a continuous basis. 
Establishing a system boundary is frequently a challenging exercise. When a 
system is designed to achieve a set of objectives (its purpose), the boundary is set 
with two aims in mind. In an introductory textbook on information systems, these 
aims were expressed in terms of an IT project scoping exercise. 
"Do the boundaries constitute a self-contained entity? Is the entity controllable 
by the system within the boundaries?"  (Ahituv & Neumann, 1990, p. 82) 
First, those factors seen as outside the control of the system control function are cast 
outside the system boundary, and into the system environment. These 
environmental factors may have an impact on the system, but they are not subject to 
alteration by the control function. Secondly, the collection of system of components 
within the boundary must make up a complete system, so that it achieves the 
objectives it was designed to. 
Systems thinking can be applied to both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ areas. Hard disciplines 
include science and engineering, where scientific laws, mathematical models, 
variables that are well-defined, quantifiable and measurable, can be used to design 
and build effective systems to perform functions such as manufacturing, traffic 
management, electricity distribution, and bridge construction. Hard system design is 
based on what has been called mechanical thinking, which combines a positivist 
belief with a reductionist approach2 (Chapman, 2002). Mechanical thinking involves 
breaking a problem area up into smaller components. Each of these may be broken 
down further, until the components are small enough that they lend themselves to 
simple solutions. Then, the solutions are systematically joined together into 
increasingly larger solutions until the complete solution is achieved. System 
modelling reflects this approach by representing each of these components as a 
subsystem. System decomposition becomes the reductionist approach of mechanical 
thinking for hard systems. Therefore, to understand the system, one only has to 
understand the subsystems that comprise the system.  
                                                 
2
 A ‘reductionist approach’ involves attempts to reduce process complexity by breaking it down into 
component sub-processes. Many of these processes are, in turn, broken down further, until the level of 
detail is such that the problem can be isolated and fixed. This approach is also known as decomposition or 
deconstruction. 
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Soft disciplines include those found in the social sciences, including anthropology, 
education, health, management, and social services. However, these application 
areas typically involve significant human involvement, and are more likely to lead to 
what Chapman calls ‘messy’ situations, where the nature of, and solution to, 
problems are either uncertain or disputed (Chapman, 2002). Chapman suggests 
messy situations require holistic thinking. That is, rather than only attempting the 
traditional, reductionist approach, by successively reducing levels of model 
abstraction, it would be appropriate to raise the level of abstraction so that wider 
issues outside the system boundary can be taken into account.  
Chapman goes on to say that mechanical thinking and holistic thinking are 
complementary, not competitive. This supports the use of systems thinking in soft 
application areas, as it provides for both mechanical and holistic analysis. 
3.2. Systems Thinking in IT Project Research 
Given the name of the discipline, information systems, it should not be surprising 
that systems thinking has been employed in IS research. Some have applied general 
systems theory to frame the entire field of information systems (Alter, 1999; Bacon 
& Fitzgerald, 1999; Hallikainen & Chen, 2005; McLeod, 1995). Others have applied 
systems thinking to specific functions within the IS domain, such as business 
planning for network services (Dutta, 2001). 
Many of the applications of systems thinking to IS research focus on IT projects. 
Examples include: the implementation of a total quality management (TQM) system 
(Bennett & Kerr, 1996); describing how analyst-programmers see information 
systems development (Butterfield, 1998); and predicting both the intended and 
unintended consequences of implementing packaged software in small businesses 
(Binbasioglu & Winston, 2004).  
There are several more specialised, systems-based approaches that have been 
applied to IT project systems. Examples include: the ISD methodology Soft Systems 
Methodology (SSM) (Checkland, 1981; Holwell, 2000), critical system thinking (M. 
Jackson, 2006; Panagiotidis & Edwards, 2001), and cybernetics, including the 
Viable System Model (VSM) (Ahmad & Yusoff, 2006; Beer, 1985; Kawalek & 
Wastell, 1999). 
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Broad characteristics of IT projects have emerged with systems thinking 
applications. Complex relationships between project processes and their operational 
environment meant that the application of system decomposition could be difficult 
(Hornung & Adilova, 1997). Complexity also meant IT projects had to adapt to 
changing conditions and events (Goulielmos, 2004; Honkela, 2005).  
“Currently, most information systems are developed as ‘trivial machines’ to be 
predictable and controllable. However, the static nature of the information 
systems makes them also prone to be incompatible with the reality”. (Honkela, 
2005, p. 49) 
However, despite many introductory text books on IT project management 
promoting the idea that IT projects can usefully be seen as systems, surprisingly few 
studies in this area make full use of systems thinking (Ivanov, 2001). This includes 
IT-related conflict resolution, though at least two publications came close. 
Smyth represented conflict resolution as a system, noting that structure-oriented 
conflict (as opposed to issue-based conflict) may represent positive feedback (in a 
cybernetic sense) where entrenched power is strengthened (Smyth, 2002). However 
an IT-specific context was not considered. 
Barki & Hartwick presented a semi-systemic view with their general framework of 
interpersonal conflict in ISD development teams (Barki & Hartwick, 2001). The 
framework (simplified in Figure 3.2) considered conflict and conflict management 
as interactive processes, with the antecedents to conflict represented as input, and 
conflict outcomes represented as output. However, while a loop structure is 
represented by noting that conflict outcomes will have an impact on antecedents to 
future conflict, the control function is embedded within the processes, and there is 
no differentiation between genuine process input and environmental factors. 
The following sections outline how conflict resolution will be modelled, creating the 
basis for the research framework in this study. Based on the generic model presented 
in Figure 3.1, framework constructs are drawn from the literature review (Chapter 
2). 
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Figure 3.2: A rudimentary system model of conflict within an ISD team 
context; a simplified version of the model presented in (Barki & Hartwick, 
2001) 
       
3.3. The Conflict Resolution System and Holistic Analysis 
As conflict is seen as a major risk factor in many IT projects, the conflict resolution 
process can be represented as an important sub-system of the IT project system. 
However, as explained in Chapter 2, conflict resolution involves stakeholder 
interaction and human decision-making. The resolution process may vary for 
different conflicts, and will be susceptible to the effects of contextual factors such as 
stakeholder culture, power and interactive history. Complex, ‘messy’ situations (as 
Chapman called them) such as this require, as noted by the authors in the previous 
section, a focus on holistic investigation – particularly as decomposition may prove 
difficult. Seeing the conflict resolution process as dynamic and adaptive over time 
adds another dimension to the investigation. 
This study emphasises holistic analysis, as it examines the resolution process within 
its context. System decomposition, where possible, is employed to observe relative 
changes to the resolution process over time – a form of dynamic analysis. 
Holistic analysis will include the application of a mode of holistic enquiry3 to 
environmental factors relevant to the resolution process, based on three perspectives: 
completeness, interactivity, and comparative effects. These are outlined as follows. 
The completeness perspective refers to the enquiry over the addition of new 
environmental factors, not previously identified in the literature review, particularly 
                                                 
3
 The term ‘holistic enquiry’ is used for this study as a matter of convenience. 
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where they have independently had a significant impact on the resolution process. 
The interactive perspective refers to the enquiry over interactivity between 
environmental factors, and what impacts these interactions have on conflict 
resolution. The comparative perspective refers to the enquiry over the different 
impacts each of the environmental factors has on conflict resolution, and which are 
more dominant than others.  
3.4. The Research Framework 
The constructs in the research framework for this study are made up of those factors 
identified in the previous chapter as having an impact on conflict resolution (Table 
3.1). The following briefly outlines how the system components were derived, using 
Figure 3.1 as a diagrammatic template. 
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Table 3.1: Definitions of framework constructs from the Literature Review (Chapter 2) 
Constructs Definitions from Chapter 2 
Conflict A phenomenon that occurs between IT project stakeholders as they experience 
negative emotional reactions to perceived disagreements and interference with 
the attainment of their goals 
Conflict Resolution A process devised with the intention to reduce, eliminate or terminate conflict 
Conflict Resolution 
Outcome 
The degree to which conflict has been reduced, eliminated or terminated 
Culture A set of basic assumptions that people in an organization hold and share about 
that organization. Those assumptions are implied in their shared feelings, 
beliefs and values, and embodied in symbols, processes, forms and some 
aspects of patterned group behaviour 
Power A potential force that can overcome resistance in achieving a desired objective 
or result (a capacity to influence) 
Influence A process designed to alter the decision-maker’s perception of the issue and its 
context (the exercise of power) 
History Events in the past that have an impact on conflict resolution in the present 
(typically prior conflict that either makes some stakeholders wary or may still 
be unresolved) 
Management The decision-makers in the conflict resolution process (may be an individual or 
group) 
Governance The way the organisation goes about ensuring that strategies are set, monitored, 
and achieved, by employing combinations of the following three arrangements 
to guide/constrain decision-making: policies, authority structure, and 
mechanisms  
 
Basic System Structure 
The fundamental characteristic of any system is the input-process-output relationship 
that achieves the system’s main purpose. In this study, the main purpose of the 
conflict resolution system is to reduce, eliminate or terminate conflict. The system 
input is represented as the construct conflict, which reflects manifest conflict as 
outlined in the previous chapter (Section 2.8). The main system process responds to 
conflict and seeks to transform it into resolved conflict, and is represented by the 
construct conflict resolution. 
The primary output of the conflict resolution process is represented by the construct 
resolution outcome, reflecting the changed level of conflict post-resolution. There 
are five possible outcomes, where the original conflict is: reduced, eliminated, 
terminated, elevated or unchanged. Note that the resolution process does not 
necessarily have to be completed for an interim resolution outcome to be assessed. 
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Environmental Factors 
A strength of systems modelling is the emphasis placed on relationships between the 
system process and its context. This holistic perspective enables the basic 
framework to expand, taking into account the three contextual elements that had 
been identified in the previous chapter: culture, power, and history.  
In the literature review, organisational culture, and its subcultures, was found to be 
capable of considerable impact on human activities, including decision-making with 
respect to conflict resolution (Section 2.10). However culture does not readily lend 
itself to manipulation, at least not in the short term. That culture can have an impact 
on the resolution process, but resists overt control, places the culture construct in the 
system environment. 
Power was differentiated from authority in the literature review (Section 2.9), 
representing capabilities to informally influence decisions, and formally make 
decisions, respectively. Power was found to be a significant factor affecting 
decision-making in conflict situations. There are many sources of power, but its 
distribution, and the decision to exercise it, is normally outside formal organisational 
control. The construct power is placed in the system environment. The influence 
construct represents the exercise of power designed to affect decision-making on 
specific occasions. Influence was found to be a dynamic process (varies over time), 
and is placed within the system boundary as an adjunct to the decision-making 
process embedded within the resolution process, which means it may be (at least 
partially) subject to organisational control. 
While not considered explicitly in the literature review4, many studies cited listed 
historical events (typically past incidents of conflict) as an important factor in some 
cases of present conflict. This factor is represented by the construct history. 
Finally, while the impacts of these three factors on the conflict resolution process 
have been highlighted in the literature, it would seem unlikely that these would be 
the only environmental factors to have an impact on conflict resolution. These 
factors are collectively represented by the construct other factors. 
                                                 
4
 This omission was primarily due to a lack of published studies that have focussed on the impact 
historical events can have on current conflict. Instead, it is frequently listed among a range of other 
important factors, as noted on several occasions in Chapter 2. 
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Control 
Another advantage of systems modelling is the explicit identification of a control 
function, with the intention of ensuring the objectives are met. A key part of control 
with a conflict resolution system is the management role of decision-making. At 
one or more points in the resolution process, there will be an individual or body with 
the authority to make decisions. The decision-making function is represented by the 
construct management. While this function resides outside the system, the decision 
itself becomes part of the system process, reflecting the strong relationship between 
management and the process they have authority over. 
Management intervention with the conflict process will depend on the feedback 
they receive. Generated by the resolution process, updates and issues with respect to 
conflict resolution are passed on to management for evaluation. Management would 
then decide if action is required, what that action might be, and how it should be 
implemented. The resolution process feedback is an information flow describing 
system performance, and is represented as the construct feedback in the framework.  
Where management is concerned with direct control, governance is concerned with 
indirect control. The role of setting up IT project governance arrangements (policies, 
authority structures, and mechanisms) to control management decision-making, and 
ensure they are variously promulgated, monitored, and where necessary enforced, 
falls to the governance function. This construct is represented in the framework as 
governance. 
51 
 
 
Figure 3.3: The complete research framework represented as a system model of the conflict 
resolution process within an IT project context 
 
The relationships between the constructs are of three types. First, the Conflict 
Resolution Process is set up to receive a conflict incident (input) and produce a 
conflict resolution outcome (output). These flows are represented in Figure 3.3 as 
solid, black-headed arrows.  
Second, the Conflict Resolution Process is subject to change, and both environmental 
effects and control effects may cause these changes. Control involves both direct 
responsibility for how the resolution process is carried out, and indirect responsibility 
in terms of how governance controls management. Environmental effects are 
generally regarded as outside formal control, but will still have an impact on the 
resolution process. Power is the one environmental factor that affects the resolution 
process indirectly when exercised through a dynamic influence process. Influence is 
a process conducted in direct response to events over the conduct of the resolution 
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process, and as included within the system boundary. Environmental and control 
effects on the Conflict Resolution Process are represented in Figure 3.3 as solid, 
white-headed arrows. 
Finally, the Conflict Resolution Process is designed to produce resolution 
performance information as a feedback mechanism that is relayed back to 
Management, so that they can make adjustments to the resolution process if required. 
This information flow is represented in Figure 3.3 as a dotted, black-headed arrow. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
3.5. Research Questions 
The research framework in Figure 3.3 partitions the conflict resolution phenomena 
into components that represent the fundamental elements of a system. These 
components are represented by constructs drawn from the literature (Chapter 2). 
This study is focussed on three specific areas: 
1. The nature of the uncontrollable environmental factors, and their effects on 
conflict resolution; 
2. The nature of the controllable factors (governance and management 
decision-making) and their effects on conflict resolution; and 
3. In what way governance can moderate negative effects from environmental 
factors on conflict resolution. 
The following explores each of these areas of enquiry, and develops a corresponding 
research question. 
Environmental Factors 
As noted in the literature review (see Sections 2.8 - 2.10), there have been a small 
number of studies carried out linking an environmental factor, such as culture, 
power or history, to the conflict resolution process. These studies provided insights 
into the nature of the relationship between the environmental factor and the 
resolution process. Earlier in this chapter, it was argued that a holistic examination 
of the resolution system would yield more than just the sum of knowledge from each 
study. A more complete picture would emerge if holistic enquiry could be applied as 
well, recognising that:  
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• some factors outside culture, power and history may also be significant 
(testing for completeness);  
• two (or more) factors may interact in such a way as to produce different 
effects from those that would have occurred from either in isolation (testing 
for interactivity); and 
• the effects on conflict resolution from each factor can be gauged on a 
comparative basis to establish relative significance (testing for comparative 
dominance). 
This leads to the first research question: 
RQ1:  In what way, and to what extent, do environmental factors affect the 
conflict resolution process and its outcomes? 
To address this question, each of the factors are first considered in isolation, and 
then become subject to holistic enquiry. The first part of the question focuses on 
how the environmental factors (both in isolation and in combination) affect the way 
the resolution process operates. The second part of the question focuses on the most 
significant effects, and their effects on resolution outcomes. Different stakeholders, 
it should be noted, may see these effects, and the corresponding outcomes, in a 
positive or negative light, depending on their perspective over the conflict. 
Governance and management decision-making 
As recorded in the literature review (see Section 2.11), while management have 
ultimate responsibility for making and implementing the decisions over conflict 
resolution, they are guided and constrained by governance. Governance 
arrangements consist of three components: policies, authority structures, and 
mechanisms. Those involved in different levels of IT project governance will be 
responsible for designing, implementing, promulgating and monitoring different 
governance arrangements for their areas of responsibilities. The focus of this study 
is on the effects governance has on management decision-making as part of the 
resolution process. This leads to the second research question: 
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RQ2:  In what way, and to what extent, can governance design, monitor, and 
control the management of conflict resolution? 
To address this question, each of the three governance components are examined for 
their effects on resolution decision-making. The first part of the question focuses on 
how policies, authority structures, and mechanisms affect the way the resolution 
process operates. The second part of the question focuses on the most significant 
effects, and their effects on resolution outcomes. Note that there are typically many 
different levels of authority structures involved with a large project, (at a corporate 
level, IT level, programme level, project level, team level, etc.). This means that a 
specific authority structure may simultaneously have a management role at one 
level, and a governance role at another.  
Governance and environmental effects 
Both governance arrangements and environmental factors are capable of producing 
any of: positive, nil, or negative effects on conflict resolution, depending on how 
levels of conflict changed post-resolution. Many examples from the literature of the 
negative effects of culture, power and history on conflict resolution were provided. 
But, in this study, it is generally assumed that environmental factors are 
uncontrollable – that is, their nature within a particular organisation is unlikely to 
change over the duration of the project (though exceptions undoubtedly occur), 
despite organisational efforts to the contrary.  
However, while the environmental factors themselves may lie outside the system 
boundary, their effects on conflict resolution do not. This raises the question over 
the role of governance with respect to environmental effects, which becomes the 
third area of investigation. This leads the the third research question: 
RQ3:  In what way, and to what extent, can governance moderate negative 
effects of the environmental elements on conflict resolution? 
To address this question, each of the three governance components are examined for 
their effects on the way environmental factors affect conflict resolution. The first 
part of the question focuses on how policies, authority structures, and mechanisms 
affect the way environmental factors, in turn, affect resolution operation. The second 
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part of the question focuses on the most significant examples of governance control 
over environmental effects, particularly negative effects.  
The next chapter determines and describes the research methodology to be used for 
data collection and analysis so that these questions can be addressed. 
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4. Research Methodology 
 
In the previous chapter, elements identified in the literature review were placed into 
a research framework based on systems thinking concepts. From this, a series of 
research questions were outlined, emphasising both environmental effect and 
organisational control within the IT project conflict domain. The main objective of 
this study is to collect, analyse and report on data relevant to the research 
framework, and subsequently address the research questions. This chapter describes 
how this objective was met. 
First, the selection of a research methodology is discussed. It is argued that adopting 
a positivist approach, employing a qualitative method through the use of case studies 
would be appropriate for this research. Next the research design is outlined. Criteria 
were developed for the selection of each of: organisations to study (the cases), IT 
project selection within the organisation, stakeholder group identification within the 
project, and stakeholder group representative identification for interviewing 
purposes. The unit of analysis (the conflict incident) was established. The Critical 
Incident Method is found to be well-suited to data collection through interviews. 
Construct validity issues are addressed. 
The data analysis techniques are discussed in relation to the research questions. 
Coding methods are outlined and their application to both within-case and cross-
case analytical techniques are discussed. Issues with conceptualising some of the 
constructs are considered. The analytical tools used to discuss each of the conflict 
incidents are outlined, including presentation of results. The methods used to 
improve the trustworthiness of the qualitative data and the way it is used for research 
is described. 
4.1. Methodological Approach  
The following describes, first, the suitability of case study research to address the 
research questions. To this end, the history and development of the positivist case 
study method in the IS discipline is considered. Finally, qualitative enquiry (as 
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opposed to quantitative data collection) is argued to be the most appropriate approach 
to data collection. 
4.1.1. A Case Study Research Method 
A case study can be defined as: 
“… an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within 
its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident.” (Yin, 2003, p. 13, emphasis added) 
Yin goes on to say  
“… you would use the case study method because you deliberately wanted to 
cover contextual conditions – believing that they might be highly pertinent to 
your phenomenon of study.” [p.13]  
Case study enquiry represents a method well suited to the research problem. Each IT 
initiative within an organisation is investigated through stakeholder interviews 
(empirical enquiry), with a focus on stakeholder conflict (contemporary 
phenomenon), within an organisational environment that includes cultural, political, 
historical, and controlling influences (real-life context). While the literature suggests 
that all of these may affect conflict, there is no clear indication as to how these 
factors act in concert, across different situations, to affect the conflict resolution 
process (boundaries not clearly evident). 
Like all research methods, case research has its strengths and weaknesses. Case 
studies capture ‘reality’ in greater detail, and provide the capability for analysing 
more variables than most other methods (R Galliers, 1992). The potential for 
complexity offered in the research framework suggests this strength is important to 
this study. 
However, Galliers also warned that this strength can be a weakness. By taking into 
account a wide range of perspectives, it can be difficult to deduce precisely what is 
going on. Furthermore, practical constraints, especially time, can restrict the number 
of cases considered, making generalisability problematic. Sometimes only one case 
study is possible to achieve the required depth of enquiry in complex situations. 
While this research cannot escape these issues completely, including several case 
organisations attenuates these concerns to some degree.  
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4.1.2. A Positivist Foundation 
This research employs a positivist assumption to guide the research design through 
the use of case studies for data collection and data analysis. This statement is 
discussed in detail in this and following sections.  
There is a long tradition of employing positivist case study research within the 
information systems discipline. Originally, IS case studies were mostly descriptive 
in nature – providing useful insights and lessons learned, but rarely testing or 
building theory. However, towards the end of the 1980s, key papers appeared 
challenging researchers employing case studies to do more than just supply insights 
and recommendations. A review of case studies in top IS journals from the early 
1980s identified severe weaknesses in many, in terms of both purpose and method 
(Benbasat, Goldstein, & Mead, 1987). For example, they found that researchers did 
not provide: “clearer descriptions of where the topics fit into the knowledge building 
process; detail the case selection criteria; and provide more information about the 
data collection process.” (Dube & Pare, 2003, pp. 598-599) Building on Benbasat et 
al’s work, a ‘scientific’ approach to employing single case studies to build theory in 
IS was published two years later (A. Lee, 1989).  
Around the same time, Kathleen Eisenhardt’s seminal work on the use of case 
studies in research (Eisenhardt, 1989) had a significant effect on IS case study 
research over the following years. She provided guidelines on how to develop theory 
using case studies, including a positivist perspective employing a priori specification 
of constructs. 
“A priori specification of constructs can also help shape the initial design of 
theory-building research. …it is valuable because it permits researchers to 
measure constructs more accurately. If these constructs prove important as the 
study progresses, then researchers have a firmer empirical grounding for the 
emergent theory.”(Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 536) 
Since then several papers in top IS journals have appeared, further refining issues of 
rigour and theory-building as applied to positivist case study research (Darke, 
Shanks, & Broadbent, 1998; Dube & Pare, 2003; Pare, 2004). In an in-depth 
examination of positivist case study research within the information systems 
discipline, Guy Paré noted that case study research is useful: 
1. “When a phenomenon is broad and complex, 
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2. Where the existing body of knowledge is insufficient to permit the 
posing of causal questions, 
3. When a holistic, in-depth investigation is needed, and 
4. When a phenomenon cannot be studied outside the context in which it 
occurs.” (Pare, 2004, pp. 233-234) 
In this study, it was established through the literature that large IT projects can be 
broad (in terms of the range of stakeholders) and complex (particularly where 
stakeholder behaviours are concerned), satisfying criterion (1). It has also been 
established through the literature that, while a range of studies have identified 
important factors affecting IT project-related conflict and its resolution, few have 
considered them from a holistic perspective. Different factors can be dominant at 
different times, across different contexts. Further, some factors may reinforce, or 
diminish, the effects of others. Causality can be difficult to establish if there are 
multiple factors at work, satisfying criterion (2). It is proposed that a holistic 
perspective would be the best way to assess the relative, and interactive, effects of 
the combined set of factors, satisfying criterion (3). Finally, many of the most 
important factors identified in the literature are contextual with respect to the 
conflict resolution process, including pre-existing cultures, power structure, 
individual behaviours, and historical factors, satisfying criterion (4). 
Sarker and Lee emphasised the essential difference between interpretivist and 
positivist epistemologies when employing case study research: 
“…consistent with the empiricist ideal of eliminating “speculative assumptions 
not founded on observation” (Schweizer, 1998), we adopt a ‘realist’ ontology 
rather than a social constructivist or an impressionist perspective (Van Maanen, 
1988), focusing on what organizational participants said or did, rather than on 
what (we thought) they meant through our interpretations of symbols.” (Sarker 
& Lee, 2003, p. 817) 
Positivist case study research continues to be popular in the IS discipline (recent 
examples include: Beachboard, 2005; Ke & Wei, 2006; Masrek, Karim, & Hussein, 
2008; Poba-Nzaou, Raymond, & Fabi, 2008). 
4.1.3. A Qualitative Study 
Positivist case study research can involve both qualitative and quantitative data 
collection and analysis. However, the primary source of data in IS-based case study 
research typically involves interviews and organisational documents. Therefore, 
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while quantitative methods are employed on occasion, it is generally qualitative data 
that is collected and subsequently analysed.  Qualitative research can be defined as: 
“… an inquiry process of understanding, based on distinct methodological 
traditions of inquiry that explore a social or human problem. The researcher 
builds a complex, holistic picture, analyses words, reports detailed views of 
informants, and conducts the study in a natural setting.” (Cresswell, 1994, p. 15) 
In this definition, Cresswell emphasises a complex, holistic picture,  
“…as a reference to a complex narrative that takes the reader into the multiple 
dimensions of a problem or issue, and displays it in all of its complexity.” [p.15] 
This study uses qualitative data collection and analysis, but does not undertake any 
quantitative data collection. 
4.1.4. Addressing the Research Questions 
The following research questions were developed in Chapter 3. 
RQ1:  In what way, and to what extent, do environmental factors affect the 
conflict resolution process and its outcomes? 
RQ2:  In what way, and to what extent, can governance design, monitor, and 
control the management of conflict resolution? 
RQ3:  In what way, and to what extent, can governance moderate negative 
effects of the environmental elements on conflict resolution? 
RQ1 focuses on the causal relationships between environmental factors and conflict 
resolution. RQ2 shifts the focus to the causal relationships between the controllable 
governance factors and conflict resolution. Finally, RQ3 examines the causal 
relationships between the controllable governance factors and the effects of the 
environmental factors on conflict resolution. Implicit in these questions is the 
assumption that the interactive and causal effects under scrutiny will not only be 
complex, but may vary considerably across different organisations, and even across 
different IT projects within a specific organisation. 
Therefore, to address these questions, it has been argued that case studies can be 
employed as a form of positivist, qualitative enquiry, based on assumptions built 
around a pre-determined framework representing extant theory.  
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4.2. Research Design and Conduct 
A research design is “…the logic that links the data to be collected (and the 
conclusions to be drawn) to the initial questions of the study.” (Yin, 2003, p. 19) 
The following outlines the research design for this study. The outline provides 
descriptions of: an initial exploratory study; case selection, IT project selection, 
stakeholder identification, representative selection as interviewee candidates, and the 
unit of analysis. Each design aspect description includes a justification for the design 
approach, and the consequent events when the design was operationalised. 
4.2.1. An Exploratory Study 
Prior to the case study research, an exploratory study was conducted to provide 
initial empirical support for the following assumptions: 
• That significant stakeholder conflict at some stage, or stages, of large, 
complex IT projects is not unusual; 
• That organisations, seeing the effects of unresolved or escalating conflict, 
take conflict resolution seriously; and 
• That organisational factors such as power and culture can affect the way 
conflict resolution is conducted. 
The study objectives focus on the way both environmental and control factors are 
important in the way they affect conflict resolution. Therefore, before the case study 
research was initiated, it was important to establish that: significant conflict was 
likely to be present in the project’s history (the first assumption); control factors are 
important as organisations seek to resolve conflict (the second assumption); and 
environmental factors, such as power and culture, are also important as they are 
capable of affecting conflict resolution. 
This exploratory study involved informal interviews with five senior project 
management consultants (all from different consultancy firms). Observations were 
drawn from the recorded interviews, but they were not transcribed. As all three 
assumptions were empirically supported, the decision to embark on the case research 
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based study was made. Appendix A provides a summary of the findings from this 
exploratory study5.  
4.2.2. Case Selection 
An organisation that participated in this study represents a case. Organisational 
selection was based on the following three criteria: 
• The organisation was based in the Wellington region6; 
• The organisation was of sufficient size that they had their own IT 
department; and 
• The organisation undertook IT projects periodically, and had completed, or 
were close to completing, at least one significant IT project within the last 
two years. 
Location was important given each case required multiple interviews. Confining the 
data collection exercise to a limited area meant differing interview days and times 
could be logistically managed. Furthermore, as New Zealand’s capitol, Wellington 
is home to many head offices for both public and private organisations.  
Size was important insofar as the organisation needed to be big enough to have its 
own IT support and service functions, including IS development. Furthermore, it 
was likely that larger organisations would have larger, more complex IT projects, 
and a broader range of stakeholders involved. 
It was important that the organisation had either recently completed, or was close to 
completing, a significant IT project. Recent events can be recalled more clearly, and 
with some contextual depth. A completed, or nearly completed, project would have 
accumulated sufficient history to allow conflict incidents to have emerged. 
Initially, work-related contacts (colleagues and ex-students) employed by medium-
to-large organisations were approached by email, briefly describing the research 
objectives and how their respective organisation might be interested in participating. 
                                                 
5
 The findings of the exploratory study do not form part of the analysis for this research beyond providing 
empirical support for the three assumptions. For this reason, the findings are summarised in the 
appendices. 
6
 Wellington City is New Zealand’s capitol and second largest city. The Wellington region comprises 
Wellington City, the Hutt Valley, and other surrounding areas, with a combined population of 
approximately 400,000.  
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Contacts willing to help passed on the request for participation to the highest IT-
related authority in their organisation. The possibility of participation in the study 
was discussed by telephone with the senior IT person. If the senior IT authority 
agreed to participate, and the case selection criteria were met, then the organisation 
was confirmed as a research case for this study. This process continued until three 
cases were confirmed. 
4.2.3. IT Project Selection 
Within each organisation, the senior IT authority (the CIO, IT Manager, etc.) was 
the first to be interviewed. The first part of the interview served three purposes. The 
first was to identify an appropriate IT project (there were often several options) for 
the study. The second saw the senior IT authority assist with identifying key 
stakeholder groups involved with the project. Finally, the IT authority also identified 
key representatives of project stakeholders that would make suitable candidates for 
interviewing. 
The criteria for IT project selection were that: 
• The project should have either been completed within the last two years, or 
be near completion; 
• The project should be organisationally significant, including at least three 
distinct stakeholder groups and a relatively major budget and timeframe; and 
• The project should be complex, where outcomes were difficult to ensure or 
foresee. 
Stakeholder group identification was necessary so that interviewee selection 
would be as representative as possible. In all three cases, stakeholder groups 
included: two or more user groups, the IT function, and management.  
Interviewee selection was based on recommendations from the senior IT authority. 
To improve generalisability and provide a foundation for comparative analysis, 
multiple-case research requires a degree of literal replication, where an opportunity 
is created to see if similar situations lead to similar results (Yin, 2003). It could be 
argued that constraints placed on both organisational and project selection are 
sufficient to create a foundation for literal replication. However, the focus of the 
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research is on stakeholder conflict, and standardisation in stakeholder group 
selection would have more impact in terms of literal replication.  
In Chapter 2 (Literature Review), it was noted that situations involving stakeholder 
conflict within IT projects most often involved the IT Department and one or more 
user groups. Therefore, interviewee selection was fundamentally based on these two 
stakeholder groups; two interviewees would be selected from the IT function 
involved in the project, and two would be selected based on their representation of 
each of two distinct user groups. At least one other stakeholder group should be 
represented – more, if the senior IT authority identifies others.  
Initially, there was no way of knowing whether or not a minimum of five 
stakeholder representatives would be sufficient to provide the necessary multiple 
perspectives on conflict and its resolution. For this reason, no upper limit was set on 
the number of interviewees for each case. Consequently, in each of the three cases, 
the senior IT authority was able to identify appropriate interviewees for each 
significant stakeholder group based on the criteria outlined above. The number of 
interviewees selected for each of the three cases were 5, 6 and 7. 
Further, the data collection exercise was always open to other recommendations for 
further interviewing if there appeared to be important perspectives not previously 
identified. Where others were recommended during interviewing, they proved to be 
either those already on the interview list, or some who were identified as knowing 
more about one specific aspect (e.g. budgetary control processes). However, the 
need for further interviewing was deemed unnecessary in the end, for the reasons 
discussed below. 
The concept of ‘theoretical saturation’ refers to “…the point at which incremental 
learning is minimal, because the researchers are observing phenomena seen before 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967)” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 545). However, one major objective 
of the data collection method, critical incident technique, is to emphasise the most 
significant (in this case) conflict incidents. Thus, saturation in this research context 
refers to the point where each significant conflict incident identified was as fully 
described (in terms of the framework constructs and dimensions) as seemed 
possible. 
65 
In practice, significant conflict incidents (typically those identified and discussed by 
more than one interviewee) appeared well-described, with few gaps, and a general 
consensus from the interviewees on what happened. These incidents were deemed to 
be saturated, and included in the analysis. Those conflict incidents identified by only 
one interviewee were typically less significant in terms of impact on the project and 
stakeholders – and were correspondingly incomplete in terms of identifying and 
evaluating the different factors involved. These incidents were invariably omitted 
from the analysis. 
In each case it was possible to identify individuals who met at least one of the 
following criteria:  
• The senior IT authority in the organisation; 
• The project manager; 
• Senior representatives from at least two distinct user groups; 
• At least one other stakeholder group representative (another IT 
representative, a consultant or vendor, the project sponsor, etc.) 
These groups were selected for the following reasons. The senior IT authority had to 
be interviewed for assistance with project and stakeholder selection. Further, they 
offered a senior management perspective on the project. 
Project managers were key individuals who managed project operations. They were 
on many of the project-related governing and management bodies, and were charged 
with keeping the project moving forward. They interacted with other stakeholders – 
particularly users, the IT Dept. and management. 
User groups were almost inevitably involved in project-related conflicts, as they 
were the ones who would end up using the new system (and possibly paying for it).  
They are the stakeholders who would be most affected by problems that may affect 
the project’s resourcing, quality, timeframe, or functionality. Large projects often 
have more than one user group. Consequently, at least two user perspectives was 
appropriate. 
The selection of the fifth interviewee was more flexible. For example, external 
stakeholders were seen to provide a useful, non-organisational perspective, and all 
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three cases had external involvement, to varying degrees. As five interviewees were 
considered the minimum number for this study, further flexibility was possible 
through additional interviews. One case involved five interviews, one six, and the 
other seven. 
It should be noted that interviewees were not identified only for their stakeholder 
group representation. As the focus of this research is on the decision-making and 
governance involved in conflict resolution, it was necessary that they be involved in 
the IT project at a broader level, preferably in key project decision-making or 
governing roles. Those lower down in the decision-making hierarchy, who were not 
members of any governing or management body with respect to the IT project, were 
less likely to be aware of all the issues involved in stakeholder conflict. This does 
not mean they could not add valuable information, only that they were less likely to 
add as much as someone who was more directly involved. This was born out in one 
case when a team leader from the project team, representing the vendor responsible 
for software implementation, admitted in an interview that while he was aware many 
things were going on at a higher level, he was not always able to provide new 
information.  
The senior IT authority would identify interview candidates and discuss their 
suitability for interviewing. Where possible, the criteria for interviewee suitability 
included some combination of the following individual characteristics: 
• Likely to be available for interviewing; 
• An active member of the stakeholder group they were representing;  
• Knowledgeable about, and at least moderately involved in the project; 
• Member of project governance or management groups; and 
• Likely to discuss project issues with candour. 
Across all three cases, only two key interviewees were not initially available. Both 
had since left the organisation (there were two suitable projects selected for data 
collection and analysis in that case), and both were project managers. One of them 
was subsequently tracked down and interviewed. The other was travelling overseas, 
but a suitable alternative was identified and interviewed instead.  
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While these decisions were made during the interviewing period, it became 
increasingly clear that the ‘missing’ project manager played a key role in at least one 
significant conflict incident, and the lack of data representing her perspective did 
leave a potentially serious gap. However, many other interviewees associated with 
that project commented on her involvement, with consistent observations, 
suggesting the impact of this ‘missing’ perspective was not as serious as originally 
thought; nevertheless, there is no way of knowing for sure whether the missing 
perspective at a material impact on the analysis or not. Fortunately, this was the only 
occasion when a key participant could not be interviewed.  
Finally, the senior IT authority was asked if the selected interviewees could be 
contacted directly. In one case, he went further and contacted the interviewees 
himself, suggesting they cooperate with the research exercise. In the other two cases, 
interviewee contact details were provided and permission to use the senior IT 
authority’s name in negotiations was granted. Consequently, in all three cases, every 
selected interviewee contacted had agreed to be interviewed. 
4.2.4. Unit of Analysis 
Identification of the unit of analysis is a critical step in the research process. 
“In an exploratory case study, a clear definition of the unit of analysis helps 
define the boundaries of the theory, which in turn, set the limitations in applying 
the theory.” (Dube & Pare, 2003, p. 610) 
The phenomenon under investigation is IT project-related stakeholder conflict, and 
specifically, organisational responses to that conflict. The unit of analysis is the 
conflict incident, which is defined to be a single incident of conflict with the 
following characteristics: 
• Prior to an organisational response, conflict exists between two or more 
stakeholders (groups or individuals) – it may have arisen over an IT project-
related issue, or it may have been ongoing relationship conflict; 
• The conflict is manifest and recognised as conflict by the stakeholders; and 
• There is an intentional response to resolve the conflict. 
Consequently, this study is concerned with the way an organisation responds to the 
emergence of project-related conflict incidents. 
68 
4.3. Data Collection  
Interview data was the primary source of analytical material for this research. The 
data were collected by employing semi-structured questioning, based on the Critical 
Incident Method, where the first conflict incident that came to the interviewee’s 
mind became the focus of enquiry. Interviewees were encouraged to talk about the 
conflict, including contextual elements, with minimal prompting.  
4.3.1. Organisational Documents 
Where possible, documents were collected from interviewees to provide additional 
research material. These included:  
• hierarchical authority charts for the organisation (or at least the parts that are 
relevant to the stakeholders involved) – these provided the chain of authority 
(a governance arrangement) for those stakeholders involved in the project;  
o Example: In Case 2, the organisational chart highlighted the 
governance issues – all three members of the primary governance 
(and management, as it transpired) group were in charge of groups 
that had autonomous existences under a loosely governed ‘umbrella’ 
deputy directorship. 
• quality assurance reports; 
o Example: In Case 1, the entire set of monthly (sometimes fortnightly) 
QA reports were made available (with permission from the 
organisation) by the independently contracted project QA assessor. 
The QA assessor was interviewed as well, and the reports provided 
(at times vivid) chronological evidence of both a worsening situation 
for the project and the inability of the project steering committee to 
address it (in spite of the QA’s advice, also recorded, which they did 
not always heed); 
• both written and diagrammatic outlines of organisational processes and 
procedures (governance mechanisms); 
o Example:  In Case 3, the CIO described the complex governance and 
management hierarchy by drawing a diagram, adding components as 
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he discussed them7. He illustrated these structures in operation by 
outlining the processes covering project funding and project 
oversight.                                    
• and sample project status reports to the project steering committee.                      
o Example: In Case 3, the CIO presented an example of a current 
project status report to demonstrate how project progress is monitored 
and risk assessments are regularly re-evaluated each month.  This 
established the project-related information both provided by the 
various reporting structures and acted upon by the decision-making 
bodies.              
4.3.2. Critical Incident Method (CIM) 
The Critical Incident Method (CIM), also known as the Critical Incident Technique, 
was originally developed as an aid to understanding human behaviours in 
psychology research (Flanagan, 1954). CIM involves the identification of critical 
incidents as a way of exploring and classifying human behaviours. A critical 
incident is  
“…one that makes a significant contribution, either positively, or negatively, to 
an activity or phenomenon.” (Grove & Fisk, 1997, p. 67) 
CIM is a flexible approach to collecting data, as it can be used in qualitative or 
quantitative research, to build or test theory. It is used in a broad range of 
disciplines, particularly with psychology, marketing and health research. It has been 
used in the IS discipline, but perhaps not as often as it could have (G. Kelly & 
Bostrom, 1998). In combination with content analysis of the collected data, CIM is 
well-suited to exploratory research of holistic phenomena (Bitner, Booms, & 
Tetreault, 1990). 
The essential idea of CIM is to use a critical incident as a focal point for the 
interviewee to recall important elements relating to the phenomena being studied, 
including behaviours, chains of events, antecedent and contextual factors. Provided 
the incident has a clear, fixed duration, there are a number of advantages to 
employing this approach. 
                                                 
7
 It quickly became necessary to verbally identify the components as he spoke, so that they could be 
identified on the completed diagram at a later stage, when reviewing the interview recording. 
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• The incident will be important – prior research shows interviewees, when 
asked to recall an incident, tend to raise those that have had a significant 
impact (Chell, 1998); 
• The incident will be more easily recalled – although retrospective, the 
incident is both recent and important (Chell, 1998); and 
• The method suits a holistic research objective – the interviewee should not 
feel constrained about raising anything that might be important in relation to 
the incident (G. Kelly & Bostrom, 1998). 
In this research, the phenomenon in question is the IT project, and the conflict 
incident (the unit of analysis) becomes the critical incident.  
4.3.3. Construct Validity 
There are risks in working with constructs where the researcher must make 
subjective interpretations as to how the construct is identified and measured (Yin, 
2003). Yin identified two tactics which can improve construct validity: using 
multiple sources of evidence; and maintaining a chain of evidence. 
The collection of evidence from a range of sources strengthens construct validity 
by showing consistency of meaning across different perspectives (Yin, 2003). While 
interview data was the prime source of evidence, documents (such as hierarchy 
charts, process diagrams, quality assurance reports, and meeting minutes) were also 
collected and used as supplements to the interview data.  
Furthermore, it was not unusual for different interviewees within the same case to 
raise the same conflict incident. However, there were no examples of direct 
contradictions in terms of factual events. Interviewee opinion over conflict and its 
resolution had differed on many occasions, but these differences inevitably 
represented the nature of conflict itself, which is the subject of scrutiny in this 
research 
The material in each case should be presented in such a way that the reader can 
follow the chain of events and determine for themselves if the construct measures 
appear appropriate (Yin, 2003). Conflict incidents that were raised, but not discussed 
in any detail by any interviewee were discarded from the sample due to insufficient 
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information for analysis. Otherwise, each of the 34 incidents across three cases were 
described as conflict events, including the triggering conflict, the environmental and 
control effects on resolution over time, and the resolution outcome. Where possible, 
the conflict incidents were also arranged chronologically to provide a brief history of 
the project through a conflict perspective. This was important as in some situations 
the resolution of one conflict incident either created or exacerbated follow-up 
conflict incidents 
4.3.4. Data Collection Process 
All research that requires interaction with people must undergo a stringent 
evaluation by the university Human Ethics Committee (HEC) before it can proceed. 
The evaluation focuses on anonymity, confidentiality, reporting, and publication. 
One requirement is that every interviewee receives (and discusses) both an 
information sheet about the research, and a consent form for them to sign. The HEC 
approved the data collection methods of this research. The HEC document, 
including copies of the information sheet and consent form, is provided in Appendix 
C. 
There were a total of 18 interviews across three cases. Interview times ranged from 
45 minutes to 65 minutes. Interviews were conducted at the head office of each 
organisation, except where interviewees were external to the case organisation. 
Three external interviewees were interviewed: one in his own office; one in the 
researcher’s office; and one in the backroom of a public hotel bar.   
For each case, interviews were conducted over a time period of 2-3 months. In all 
cases the conflict incidents described were within two years of the interviews taking 
place. 
Every interview was recorded, with the interviewee’s permission. Every recording 
was transcribed, and the transcription sent to the interviewee for checking. 
Approximately a quarter of the interviewees offered minor amendments and 
clarifications (which were incorporated into the transcripts); another quarter 
indicated they were fine with the transcript; and the remaining half did not respond. 
All interviewees were offered the opportunity to withdraw from the study at any 
time up to one month after receiving the transcripts. None chose to do so. 
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Each interview employed the same protocol, with the exception of those with the 
senior IT authority, where the first half of the interview was focused on identifying a 
project, stakeholders and interviewee candidates (see Section 4.2), but the second 
half reverted to the standard protocol. This protocol is provided in Appendix B. 
Apart from pleasantries and administrative tasks (answering initial queries about the 
research, explaining the process, signing the consent form), the interviews focused 
briefly on background, followed by a semi-structured interview about conflict 
incidents. While interview time was confined to a maximum of an hour, there were 
no limits on the number of conflict incidents raised. Across all three cases, 34 
conflict incidents were raised. 
4.3.5. Data Collection Protocols and Forms 
The purpose of a protocol in this research was to outline a conversation schedule 
between the researcher and someone important to the research process. Separate 
protocols (see Appendix B for details) were developed for the following purposes: 
• Outline the research project to an organisational contact (telephone); 
• Outline the research project, and organise an interview time, to the senior IT 
authority (telephone); 
• Outline the research project to a candidate interviewee, and organise an 
interview time (telephone); 
• Organise case confirmation, project selection, stakeholder identification and 
candidate interviewee identification with senior IT authority (face-to-face 
interview, first half); and 
• Enquire about conflict incidents with every interviewee (face-to-face 
interview). 
A two-page information sheet, introducing the researcher, describing the project, 
inviting the reader to participate, and stating contact details, was provided for every 
potentially interested party, including all contacts and interviewees. A consent form 
was presented, discussed and signed by every interviewee at the beginning of each 
interview. The consent form explained what kind of information was being 
collected, how it would be used, what will happen to it on completion of the 
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research, when the data can be withdrawn from the research exercise, and how 
anonymity and confidentiality will be preserved. Both these documents are provided 
in Appendix B. 
4.4. Data Analysis  
The analysis of the collected data was based on applying and interpreting codes 
representing constructs identified in the research framework. Codes are “tags or 
labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential information 
compiled during a study.” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 56). The following 
describes the data analysis process used in this study. First the process of 
transforming constructs into codes is discussed, followed by a brief description of 
the coding process. The ascription of codes to text was not always straightforward, 
requiring refinements to the conceptualisation of the conflict incident and some of 
the codes – these issues are discussed in some detail. Finally, the strategies 
employed to improve the trustworthiness of the data are addressed. 
4.4.1. Developing codes from constructs 
A large quantity of information about the framework constructs, and their 
relationships, was drawn from the literature. In these circumstances, it is 
recommended that a ‘start list’ of predetermined codes be drawn up and used in the 
initial analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  
The list was drawn from the constructs identified in Chapter 3, using definitions 
identified in the literature review (Chapter 2). Operational definitions (for coding 
purposes) were adapted from academic definitions, and these are listed in Appendix 
D. The challenges in characterising the constructs within the text are discussed in 
Section 4.4.3. 
The codes were of two kinds: primary codes representing constructs explicitly 
identified in the research framework, and secondary codes representing either 
dimensions of constructs (such as the three dimensions of conflict) or useful 
explanatory data (such as the conflict trigger). 
The codes were structured in the following way. The top level codes were of two 
kinds: General Organisational Information and Conflict Incidents. Each time a new 
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conflict incident was identified during analysis of the text, a new top level code was 
created. The full structure of the codes used for analysis is described in Appendix H.  
Only one significant code was added during the coding process: individual 
behaviours. The way this new code emerged is described in detail in Section 4.6. As 
a consequence, the original research framework was modified to include this new 
environmental construct.  
There were no significant code deletions, though there were plenty of minor ones. 
These occurred when a conflict incident did not require every code available for that 
incident (see the code structure of the conflict incident in Appendix H). For example, 
some conflict incident descriptions did not provide any data about the use of power 
and influence. Most likely this would mean that power and influence did not play a 
significant role in that incident. In these cases, the codes for power and influence 
would disappear from the code structure – but only for those conflict incidents. 
4.4.2. Coding 
The software package NVivo was used to record the applied codes on each of the 
electronically stored transcripts. Codes were mostly applied to segments of text 
ranging from several sentences to several paragraphs. In many cases, two or more 
codes applied to the same segment of text.  
To validate both the applicability of the codes, and their actual application, an 
academic colleague was asked to apply the set of operational codes to several pages 
of text from a transcript. The applicability of the operational definitions was 
discussed. Both the applications of the definitions were compared, and differences 
discussed. Some refinement of the definitions was required, but the differences were 
not significant.  
4.4.3. Characterising Conflict Incidents 
For coding to be successful, the operational code definitions have to clearly apply to 
the text segments. This application was generally straightforward, but there were 
instances where this was not the case. The following outlines how conflict incidents 
were characterised, along with a selection of codes that required further elaboration. 
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Conflict incident (UNIT OF ANALYSIS) 
Conflict incidents were identified based on meeting the following criteria: 
• The incident related, in some way, to the IT project; and 
• There were at least two parties (the conflict stakeholders) who demonstrated 
any of the three characteristics used to define conflict: disagreement, 
negative emotions, or interference. 
Across all three cases, only two conflict incidents were discounted because they 
were unrelated to any IT project conducted by the case organisation. The other 
criterion presented some challenges. 
Some conflict incidents were discounted due to insufficient information for analysis. 
There were a variety of reasons why this occurred. Sometimes the incident was 
raised only in passing, to illustrate a specific point – often in the middle of 
discussing a different incident (this was the most common reason). On a few 
occasions, the incident was raised near the end of the interview, leaving little time 
for expansion.  
There were also ‘borderline’ incidents, where sufficient information was available 
for only limited analysis. However, one of the basic tenets of the critical incident 
approach is that the interviewee will tend to raise the most important, or striking 
features first (albeit from their perspective). Working under this assumption, even 
where only some attributes about an incident are raised, they are likely to be 
important ones worthy of attention. Consequently, borderline incidents were 
retained for the study. 
Some conflict incidents were initially identified as separate incidents, described by 
different interviewees, but upon scrutiny, were later found to be the same incident. 
The data, in these situations, were merged. 
Occasionally, the concept of conflict prevention came up. This typically involved 
taking action to generally discourage (or at least minimise the harmful effects of) 
conflict. This might include setting up good communication channels between 
stakeholders; creating a cooperative work environment; ensuring decision-making 
bodies are representative; and establishing generic conflict management policy 
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(possibly incorporating mechanisms for conflict resolution). These fall under the 
ambit of governance. 
However, it is important to differentiate between the concept of conflict prevention, 
and what is termed here anticipated conflict. Whether an outcome of formal risk 
management, including some form of project stakeholder analysis, or a prediction 
based on experience and personal suspicion, anticipated conflict represents a conflict 
incident involving identifiable conflict stakeholders that has yet to occur. As it 
qualifies as a risk factor, it may merit attention. Like all risk factors, the anticipated 
conflict incident may either be very likely to occur, or have the potential to seriously 
impact the project, or both.  
No one can say what would have happened if some action had, or had not, taken 
place. Nevertheless, where conflict had been identified as a genuine risk, and risk 
mitigation processes were initiated as a direct result, it was still possible to compare 
the anticipated level of conflict with the actual level of conflict once the issue had 
surfaced.  
For the purposes of this study, anticipated conflict incidents can be examined in 
much the same way as those that have already occurred. With the latter, 
interviewees describe the levels of conflict they observed, but with the former, they 
describe the levels of conflict they think would occur if no prior action is taken. 
Once the anticipated conflict incident is identified, measures may be taken to 
‘resolve’ (mitigate) the anticipated conflict (risk). They might ‘reduce’ the level of 
conflict (by taking actions such that when (and if) the conflict finally does occur, the 
impact is likely to be manageable); ‘eliminate’ it (by dealing with issues in a 
constructive way, avoiding disagreements, negative emotions, and interference); or 
‘terminate’ it (by making early decisions about issues, before conflict can develop, 
and then moving on – essentially attempting to quash any expression of 
disagreement, negative emotions or interference). Furthermore, the pro-active 
concept of managing anticipated conflict has the attraction that doing so successfully 
would very likely reduce detrimental effects on the project. In every case, 
anticipated conflict was found to be a critical element in the project. 
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Conflict (INPUT) 
For a specific conflict incident, the level of conflict is assessed using the three 
dimensions: disagreement, negative emotions, and interference. For comparative 
purposes, each dimension was assigned a value of ‘YES’, ‘Some’ or ‘NO’. A value 
of ‘YES’ meant this dimension was clearly apparent from the evidence. A value of 
‘NO’ meant this dimension was not apparent due to any evidence. A value of 
‘Some’ meant there was at least some evidence that this dimension was apparent. 
For example, an interviewee observed there were different views on what should 
happen (‘YES’ for disagreement), anger and frustration by one of the stakeholders 
(‘YES’ to negative emotions), and their resulting inability to meet their own 
objectives (‘YES’ to interference) over a particular issue. 
Conflict Resolution (PROCESS) 
The formal processes used by the organisation to resolve the conflict were identified 
here. There was variation over time, as conflict resolution was a dynamic process. 
Some conflict incidents were relatively short in duration, where a specific issue 
developed, manifest conflict was observed, and then the conflict was resolved. 
Others tended to be ongoing, often triggered or exacerbated by a series of related 
issues over time, with conflict dimensions waxing and waning as attempts at 
resolution continued with variable success.  
As indicated earlier, the dimensions of conflict (disagreement, negative emotions, 
and interference) were re-assessed once the resolution process had finished. Note 
that where resolution was ongoing, it was still possible to gauge changes in conflict 
dimensions after a period of time had elapsed. Attention was focused on the change 
in levels of conflict, including both the direction of that change (had the level of 
conflict gone up or down?) and its magnitude (had the level of conflict changed 
significantly?)  
Individual Behaviours (ENVIRONMENT) 
Individual behaviours refer to the actions of individuals that are not explained by 
culture, power or history, but are instead based on the personal attributes of that 
individual. This was not an original construct developed from the literature review, 
but rather it emerged during the coding exercise. This emergent code represented an 
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environmental factor that had a significant impact on resolution in all three cases. As 
a consequence, the new code was confirmed and some recoding was required. 
Where the role of an individual is typically a governance issue, how well that 
individual carries out their role will partly come down to personal characteristics, 
such as experience, skill levels, decisiveness, ability to communicate, etc. 
Statements on individual behaviours were only noted where it was clear they had an 
impact on resolution. 
Establishing clear demarcation between the effects of personal attributes and culture 
on an individual’s behaviour was also problematic on occasion. Culture is defined in 
terms of collective values, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours. Many personal 
attributes of an individual can also be described in terms of these characteristics. It 
can be convenient to think of one’s personal attributes as a ‘culture of one’. It was 
not always possible to discern an individual’s values, attitudes and beliefs based on 
interviewee evidence. However, seeking psychological explanations for an 
individual’s behaviours went beyond the scope of this research, and therefore the 
new construct would only focus on behaviours, which were observable and easier 
for interviewees to describe. 
Governance & Management (CONTROL) 
While it was generally clear who was involved in resolution decision-making 
(management) and who was overseeing the process (governance), these role 
allocations would change over time on occasion. The most common example 
occurred during the use of problem escalation to a higher authority. Typically this 
would be the same authority that was responsible for governance, but who became 
directly involved in the decision-making. Thus those who had a governance role 
sometimes took on a management role. 
Policy (CONTROL) 
Policy is a governance arrangement designed to guide, constrain or direct 
behaviours, including decision-making. Formal policies are set at the governance 
level, promulgated to all affected, and where appropriate, enforced by those that 
govern. There were two points that arose during coding. 
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First, like other governance arrangements, policies were set at different levels of the 
project hierarchy. Second, there emerged descriptions of policy that had not been 
formally set and promulgated, yet effectively performed in a similar manner. This 
informal policy, while infrequent, did come from a governing body, and involved 
conveying their expectations in other ways (e.g. through verbal communication, or 
through example by leadership). Both formal policy (explicitly expressed by the 
governing body) and informal policy (implicitly expressed by the governing body) 
had significant effects on conflict resolution on occasion. 
In practice, it was sometimes difficult to identify relevant policy. Frequently, even 
senior managers in an organisation found it hard to identify explicit policy that may 
have affected conflict resolution. In many cases, relevant policy may simply not 
have existed at the time. In other cases, decision-makers may have been: unaware of 
its existence (poorly promulgated), unable to apply it in any practical sense (poorly 
designed or explained), or simply ignored it (poorly enforced). It could have been 
that policy did exist, and was applied, but no one referred to it as ‘policy’, or 
confused it with the related, but more prescribed concepts of process and procedure. 
Any of these explanations could have applied. In the end, only those segments of 
text that clearly indicated a policy (both formal and informal) were coded as such. 
Mechanisms (CONTROL) 
All three cases employed a variety of mechanisms relevant to conflict resolution. 
Seen as tools that helped either decision-making or implementation, some were pre-
determined, while others were set up on an ad hoc basis. Most were formally 
recognised and used, such as a procedure for determining the relative priorities of 
different project proposals. Occasionally, some were informal, such as setting up a 
discussion forum to broaden consultation. Finally, reflecting the variability of 
governance levels in the project hierarchy, mechanisms were devised and/or 
implemented at levels appropriate to their governance and management levels 
respectively. 
4.5. Presentation of Results 
The following outlines the approaches used to present the results from the data 
analysis. The approaches are organised into a series of five steps: 
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• Transform code allocations into code reports; 
• Organise the code reports into large tables; 
• Reduce the large tables to summary tables; 
• Reorganise the summary tables to highlight preliminary findings; and 
• Reorganise and condense the summary tables to address research questions. 
Code reports present the text segments allocated to a specific code from all the 
interviewees for a specific case organisation. This enables an analytical focus on 
each code, and what it has meant for the case as a whole. NVivo software was used 
to compile the code reports. 
Large tables were set up using an Excel spreadsheet, one for each case 
organisation. The columns represented every code used in the coding exercise. The 
rows represented each of the conflict incidents. Each cell was filled with key points 
and appropriate quotes linking the conflict incident to the code. Owing to size 
constraints, each table had to be split into separate tables: Background (describing 
the organisation, the IT function, the IT project, and the stakeholders); Input 
(describing the issue, the conflict stakeholders, the decision and decision-maker; 
Process (describing conflict resolution and influence on decision-making); 
Environment (culture, power, history, individual behaviours); Output (resolution 
outcomes); and Control (management and governance arrangements). 
Summary tables were condensed from the unwieldy large tables, by removing the 
quotes and summarising the key points. This provided two advantages: first, the 
reports were now small enough to include in the Appendices; and second, they made 
the analysis required for preliminary findings more straightforward.  
The preliminary findings were presented as part of each case analysis in the 
following way. 
• First, a conflict incident overview is provided, where each incident is numbered 
and presented in chronological order (where this is known). This enables a 
narrative overview, where the brief descriptions of each incident are linked 
through the unfolding story. This provides the reader with a reference point as 
the individual incidents are examined in detail at a later stage. 
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• Immediately following the overview is the conflict incident map, displaying each 
of the conflict incidents diagrammatically. Where the outcome of conflict 
resolution for one incident either directly causes a new conflict incident, or 
exacerbates an existing incident, this is represented as a relationship linking the 
two incidents. Each relationship is represented as a labelled arrow, where the 
label indicates the specific outcome from the resolution that negatively affected 
another incident. This provides an alternative measure of resolution success, as 
fewer relationship arrows would suggest broader acceptance of the resolution 
outcomes. 
• Each conflict incident is examined in greater detail, drawing on the summary 
tables and extracting supporting quotes from the original large tables. As a rule, 
significant incidents were investigated more extensively than minor incidents. 
Where several minor incidents had common features, they were often discussed 
collectively. 
Finally, the research questions were addressed for each case analysis by 
examining the nature of each construct as observed across all conflict incidents. This 
included condensing the summary tables further, so that they could be included 
within the text of this study. One condensed table linked the effects of 
environmental factors with conflict resolution, to support the analysis for the first 
research question. The second table linked the effects of governance to conflict 
resolution and its management, to support the analysis of the second research 
question. The effects of governance on the environmental factors, the subject of the 
third research question, did not warrant a condensed table as there were insufficient 
table entries. 
4.6. Qualitative Data Trustworthiness 
Originally, quantitative concepts of data validity and reliability were carried over to 
qualitative research as measures of data quality, but the evolution of the interpretivist 
paradigm challenged these measures (Seale, 1999), arguing data quality should 
reflect “the assumption of multiple constructed realities” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 
295). Instead, the concept of qualitative data trustworthiness was used, incorporating 
the idea that ‘proof of truth’ in any account presented is not possible, yet there are 
ways to encourage trust in the account.  Trustworthiness continues to be an 
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important measure of data quality (Seale, 1999). Four criteria for trustworthiness in 
qualitative research were put forward (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) based on the concepts 
of: credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. 
4.6.1. Credibility 
The credibility criterion focuses on the believability of the outcomes from qualitative 
data analysis. Credibility comes with close involvement with research participants, 
triangulation of data gathering techniques, and member checking (Pickard, 2007). 
Member checking refers to the submission of qualitative research outputs back to the 
original participants for confirmation of the results.  
In this research, each participant providing data was interviewed face-to-face, and in 
their place of work (excepting several external consultants), achieving close 
involvement. Data gathering mainly involved one-hour interviews, but included 
printed documentation such as organisational charts, quality assurance reports, and 
meeting minutes. However, triangulation of the data was an important factor as well. 
As a positivist study, the research focused on predefined constructs. Focussing on 
critical incidents limited the domain of recall to very specific events in the project 
history. As a result, it was common for interviewees within the same case 
organisation to refer to the same constructs, and often the same conflict incidents – 
particularly the more significant ones (in terms of project risk). This meant there was 
virtually no contradictory evidence about conflict resolution events or any of the 
factors that may have affected them. Where opinion from one interviewee was not 
verifiable from other evidence, that opinion remained qualified as a single opinion 
only during analysis (and consequently carried less weight as evidence). Member 
checking was not done in this study beyond returning the printed transcripts to the 
interviewees for checking. Because the preliminary results were based on data 
mostly verified by multiple interviewees, checking did not appear necessary. The 
next stage of analysis, where the preliminary research outcomes are discussed in 
aggregate form, as it would have unnecessarily jeopardised confidentiality. Finally, 
the analysis of each case took place two years after the data was collected, and their 
recall of events would have faded further. 
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4.6.2. Transferability 
The transferability criterion focuses on the qualitative research outcomes and their 
capability for application in other, perhaps similar contexts (Pickard, 2007). The 
same research method is applied to three different organisations. While they were 
similar in a few ways (all public entities), their contexts were otherwise quite 
different. Not only was the research design successfully applied in all three cases, 
but the final analyses found several important findings applied in all three contexts. 
4.6.3. Dependability 
The dependability criterion focuses on the qualitative research process, ensuring the 
procedures described in the research design continue to be carried out in a consistent 
manner (Pickard, 2007). This can be achieved through external peer review of the 
process. As this research was conducted as part of doctoral studies, there have been 
two senior research supervisors closely involved throughout the research process. 
4.6.4. Confirmability 
The confirmability criterion focuses on the capability to trace back from final 
research outcomes to the original raw data gathered (Pickard, 2007). This provides 
an evidential chain that lead to the findings. Figure 4.1 describes the evidence chain 
for this study. Note that the researcher has every link in the chain in possession. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: The evidence chain tracing from research findings back to the original raw data 
 
Summary  
The chapter began with the determination of the research methodology. It was 
established that a positivist research approach is appropriate, where deductive 
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reasoning can be applied to collected data. The holistic nature of the research 
framework corresponds with the complex conflict domain, allowing certain research 
perspectives (interactive, comparative, and completeness) to be applied. These 
perspectives are not normally possible in a post-decomposition environment, when 
the research focus is on one or more selected factors. 
Environmental complexity and a focus on human behaviour suggests a qualitative 
approach is more appropriate. Case research was found to be an effective way to 
collect and analyse data from organisations where human-based phenomena occur 
within, and interact with, complex organisational systems.  
Next the research design was outlined. Criteria were developed for the selection of 
organisations to study (each representing a ‘case’). Within each organisation, an IT 
project is to be selected, based on criteria designed to maximise the quality of the 
data. More criteria were designed to select appropriate stakeholder representatives 
for interviewing.  
The unit of analysis is the conflict incident, from the time conflict is recognised, to 
the time it is deemed to have ended. 
The next chapter outlines the analysis of the first case study. 
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5. CASE 1: The New Zealand Fire Service  
 
This chapter provides an account of the first case study for this research. It begins 
with a brief description of the New Zealand Fire Service, the case organisation. The 
organisational setting for the project is described, including the organisational 
decision-making structure and broad descriptions of the major project stakeholders. 
Both the Financial Management and Asset Management information systems 
projects, including the relevant project authority structures, are described. The 
interviewees are introduced, followed by a chronological overview of the conflict 
incidents they identified. The findings of the preliminary analysis are presented for 
each conflict incident. Each of the three research questions is addressed, and the 
results are discussed in terms of their implications for IT projects. 
When this case study was conducted, the New Zealand Fire Service (NZFS) was a 
government organisation responsible for both fire fighting (‘Fire Operations’) and 
fire prevention (‘Fire Safety’), across the country. The NZFS was overseen by the 
NZ Fire Commission, a government-appointed body responsible for the governance 
of the NZFS, including alignment with government policy and strategy. 
The focus of this case lies with Fire Operations (generally referred to as 
‘Operations’). There were several levels of administration within Operations, but 
ultimately it was front-line fire fighting that was of primary concern, including fire 
stations (‘property’), fire trucks, also known as fire appliances (‘fleet’), fire 
equipment (hose, breathing apparatus, etc.), and of course the fire fighters 
themselves. There were 430 fire stations across the country, including both 
professional and volunteer services. The NZFS was responsible for them all. 
5.1. Organisational Setting 
The country was divided into eight regions, and each region was further subdivided 
into different districts. Each district incorporated a number of fire stations, both 
professional and volunteer. The organisational structure is described in Figure 5.1. 
The National Head Office (HO) of the NZFS was appropriately based in New 
Zealand’s capitol city, Wellington, as it was both geographically central, and the 
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home to the NZ government, including the NZ Fire Commission. HO included the 
National Commander (also known as the CEO), and other administrative executives 
who together made up the Senior Management Team8 (SMT).  
 
 
Figure 5.1: The NZ Fire Service organisation chart 
 
 
Each region had a Fire Region Manager and two Assistant Fire Region 
Managers – one responsible for fire operations, and the other fire safety. The Fire 
Region Manager was responsible for regional administration, reflecting the fact that 
different regions in New Zealand (e.g. rural vs. urban) will have different 
requirements for fire services. Similarly, regional subdivision into districts allowed 
for coordination of local fire stations within a district to meet variable community 
needs within the region. For example, fire stations were able to coordinate their 
                                                 
8
 Note that some interviewees referred to this body as the Executive Team. 
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actions for more significant fire emergencies by concentrating their collective 
resources where they are needed in the district. 
Each fire station was managed by the Chief Fire Officer and was mostly made up of 
Operations personnel. They worked closely with other stations in their district, 
including sharing equipment and joint firefighting. 
 
5.2. Implementing an ERP System 
In 2001, the NZ Fire Commission approved the NZFS proposal to upgrade many of 
their internal processes. For example, while the manual systems used to manage 
resources appeared to work well at the station and district levels, they were 
effectively obstacles to HO’s aggregation of the data at a national level. This, in turn, 
made it harder both to set strategy, and to follow it. 
Therefore, the NZFS chose to adopt a nationwide Enterprise Resource Planning 
(ERP) system, with the intention of integrating and automating resource processing 
both across functions and across geographical and hierarchical dispersion, including 
stations, districts, regions, and national HO. Once the government tender process 
was complete, software vendor JD Edwards (later to become PeopleSoft) was 
awarded the contract to supply, and help implement, their ERP software package 
modules across the NZFS. It was agreed by HO that the modules would be 
implemented one at a time.  
The Chief Financial Officer (CFO) was a strong advocate for a new ERP system, 
and agreed to be project sponsor for each of the first two projects undertaken. These 
two projects represent the domain of this case study, and are briefly described below. 
The Financial Management Information System (FMIS) was the first ERP 
module to be installed, and was seen to be one of the core systems for the overall 
ERP project. System users were identified as those responsible for processing 
financial transactions and records at all levels within the organisation (stations, 
districts, regions and HO), as well as those who manage the financial function at 
higher levels (particularly HO). The FMIS was intended to automate and integrate 
these processes.  
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A steering committee (SC) was appointed, and the project budget and deadlines were 
set. The SC hired external consultants for two key roles: the project manager and a 
quality assurance adviser. Technical development and implementation consultants 
were supplied by JD Edwards to work with the NZFS IT project team to adapt the 
module to the NZFS’ specific context, structure and requirements.  
The Asset Management Information System (AMIS) was the second ERP module 
to be installed. Assets needed to be managed in two ways: financially and physically. 
NZFS was an asset rich organisation, representing considerable financial investment 
in fleet and equipment. The manual systems employed at the fire stations had 
struggled to keep up with a number of financial requirements, including the 
provision of asset data to be used at a national level. The firefighting assets also 
required regular maintenance checks and repairs, to ensure they will operate 
effectively during a fire emergency. AMIS was intended to maintain both financial 
and physical information about NZFS assets electronically. 
The AMIS project was intended to achieve four key outcomes.  
• Create asset management processes for high-value assets – specifically 
property (buildings and land, with a special focus on fire stations), and fleet 
(fire trucks and other vehicles); 
• Create asset management processes for specialist (and often expensive) 
equipment that are typically housed on the fire truck, including hose, pumps, 
breathing apparatus, etc.; 
• Automatically provide data to FMIS so that financial aspects of assets can be 
aggregated at district, regional and national levels; and 
• Enable Operations staff at fire stations to monitor and update maintenance 
records for specialist (including life-saving) equipment. 
The AMIS project began soon after the FMIS had been fully installed. The FMIS 
project manager was invited to manage the AMIS project, but she declined, and a 
new external project manager was contracted. PeopleSoft (previously the vendor ‘JD 
Edwards’) again provided technical consultants to work with NZFS IT staff as part 
of the project team. At the time the research interviews were conducted, the project 
was nearly complete. 
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The Asset Verification Project (AVP) was an unexpected project that emerged 
from the original AMIS project specification. It had always been recognised by the 
AMIS steering committee that effective asset management was critically dependent 
on possessing accurate asset data. At that stage, each station had its own system for 
managing assets. Furthermore, at the district level, stations regularly shared 
equipment, and even trucks, when the need arose, making asset location a challenge 
as well. 
Data collection was initially seen by the SC as an important task within the AMIS 
project. Teams of two were sent out to each fire station to identify what assets they 
possessed, along with any other relevant information. As this task grew in 
complexity, there was a gradual elevation of its status to, eventually, a separate 
project (although still technically seen as a subproject of AMIS). Thus, what was 
originally referred to as the ‘asset data collection exercise’ eventually became the 
Asset Verification Project (AVP), with its own separate project manager. 
5.3. Project Authority Structures 
Two major authority structures were involved in the ERP implementation: the 
Senior Management Team, and the Project Steering Committee (for each of FMIS, 
AMIS, and AVP). Two other relevant authority structures were also identified: the 
Project Review Committee, which did not exist until after the FMIS and AMIS 
projects began, and the Operational Function Group, which had a limited role (Table 
5.1). 
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Table 5.1: Bodies involved in governing IT-related projects 
Body Level of 
Focus 
Membership Main IT Project-
Related Roles 
Senior 
Management 
Team (SMT) 
Organisation CEO and senior executives, including IT 
Strategy Manager & CFO 
Project prioritisation & 
budget distribution (prior to 
PRC assuming role) 
Project 
Steering 
Committee 
(for FMIS & 
AMIS) 
Project Three finance managers (including CFO);   
Senior IT managers (including IT 
Strategy); 
External contract project managers; 
A senior operations manager; 
External contract QA; 
Other senior members in different 
combinations; 
Project oversight of AMIS 
& FMIS, including strategic 
and important tactical 
decision-making 
Project 
Steering 
Committee 
(for AVP) 
Project Three finance managers (including CFO);  
AVP Project manager; 
Project oversight of the 
AVP 
Project 
Review 
Committee 
(PRC) 
Organisation 
/ Project 
Two members of SMT; 
Other senior members of the organisation 
(fluid); 
Business case appraisal; 
Project prioritisation & 
budget distribution; 
Project approval; 
Operational 
Function 
Group 
(OFG) 
Organisation Assistant fire regional managers 
(operations); 
Two members of SMT; 
Discuss implications of new 
systems on regional 
operations 
 
The Senior Management Team (SMT) determined which projects would be 
undertaken each year, based on a variety of criteria – some formal, others political or 
personal. The selection of the ERP projects, and other IT and non-IT projects at the 
same time, occurred under this somewhat unstructured approach to project 
prioritisation. This did not change until the Project Review Committee was created 
(see below). 
Once a business case had been considered and the corresponding project approved, a 
project sponsor was appointed. The Project Sponsor was expected to provide 
executive level support for the project. 
Unless the project was quite small, a Project Steering Committee (SC) was set up 
by the SMT. This applied to both IT and non-IT projects. In theory, the membership 
of this steering committee would vary according to the stakeholders involved and 
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the type of project. In practice, however, it was common for individual executives 
and senior managers to sit on many steering committees.  
The SC comprised the key project authority structure. All major project-related 
issues and problems that could not be resolved at the project team level were 
escalated to the SC. Many SC members also belonged to the SMT. Both FMIS and 
AMIS had virtually identical membership in their steering committees9.  
The Project Review Committee (PRC)10 was a newly formed body of senior 
individuals (two of whom were on the SMT) tasked with reviewing every single 
business case (for both IT and non-IT projects). They prioritised projects based on 
strategic considerations, and set their budgets. Finally, they established membership 
of the steering committees to oversee the projects. 
“Within the organisation we’ve now got a project methodology for the Fire 
Service, and a whole lot of standard templates that people have to fill out. So, in 
theory, you need to bid to do major projects, be they capital expenditure projects 
such as IT, or even operating expenditure projects such as the asset verification 
project was." [National Financial Controller] 
Both the IT project sponsor (normally the Manager of IT Strategy) and the CFO are 
excluded from the PRC as a matter of policy, as they were seen to be subject to 
conflicts of interest when assessing IT projects. Instead, they would attend specific 
PRC meetings to present their proposals for assessment.  
“[The person] who, effectively, looks after the fleet and property assets … would 
have done a presentation to the PRC on the fleet strategy, the building strategy, 
looking at those sorts of things. There would have been other presentations done 
to that Committee, from people who had other interests in certain areas of the 
business, and strategies. Hence people like [the IT Strategy Manager] aren’t 
involved in the voting side of the Committee. So you’ve got that independence 
there.” [National Financial Controller] 
The Operational Function Group (OFG) comprised all eight assistant fire region 
managers (Operations), and two members of the SMT. The objectives of the OFG 
were to raise and debate issues affecting regional fire fighting, and coordinate 
actions across the country. The assistant fire region managers (Fire Safety) also had 
their own group, but they were not stakeholders in this study. 
                                                 
9
 For this reason, the more convenient abbreviation ‘SC’ will simply stand in for either. Where it is 
important to differentiate the two committees, the term is qualified at that point. 
10
 Even though this committee did not exist until after the AMIS project had begun, it is included here to 
enable some comparison with how it was done for prior projects, including FMIS & AMIS. 
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Although not directly involved in project governance, the OFG were an important 
body in the project process. The OFG provided the opportunity for regional factions 
to debate, and reach some kind of consensus on how to respond to the implications 
of new systems such as FMIS and AMIS. Physical meetings of the OFG took place 
on an ad hoc basis as situations arose, where the regional representatives from across 
the country flew to Wellington and met at HO. 
5.4. Interviewees for this case study 
Six individual project stakeholders were interviewed for this case study (Table 5.2).  
The first interviewee was the Manager, IT Strategy, who was in charge of the IT 
function at NZFS. He identified the two related projects (FMIS, AMIS) that met the 
selection criteria. He also identified suitable candidates for interviewing. He did not 
offer to contact them, however, instead providing me with email and telephone 
contacts and permission to use his name when approaching them. Each candidate 
contacted agreed to be interviewed. 
 
Table 5.2: New Zealand Fire Service interviewees for this study  
Interviewee Position Textual 
Referral11 
Body Member Interest Group 
Manager, IT Strategy  IT Strategy 
Manager 
Steering Committee 
(FMIS, AMIS) 
IT management (HO) 
National Financial Controller National Financial 
Controller 
Steering Committee 
(FMIS, AVP, AMIS) 
Financial management 
(HO) 
Contract project manager 
(FMIS) 
Project manager 
(FMIS) 
Steering Committee 
(FMIS) 
FMIS Project team  
JD Edwards / PeopleSoft: 
technical consultant 
PeopleSoft 
consultant 
 AMIS Project team 
Synergy International: quality 
assurance consultant 
QA consultant Steering Committee 
(FMIS, AVP, AMIS) 
Project management & 
governance 
Assistant Fire Region Manager 
(Operations) - Wellington 
Assistant Fire 
Region Manager 
Steering Committee 
(FMIS, AVP, AMIS) 
Operations 
 
                                                 
11
 ‘Textual Referral’ implies these ‘shortenings’ will be used in the text of this study for (albeit limited) 
relief to both the reader and the writer. 
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5.5. Conflict Incident Overview 
The following provides a précis of events as the project progressed over time. The 
unit of analysis for this research is a conflict incident. Therefore, as an aid to link 
contextual, historical events (from the project’s inception) to the analysis that 
follows, specific conflict incident numbers, corresponding to those used in the 
analysis, have been included within the text in parentheses. These are summarised in 
the conflict incident map in Figure 5.3, focussing on conflict incident identification 
and their interrelationships in terms of the impacts of conflict resolution over one 
incident on the development and resolution of one or more other incidents. These 
impacts form a part of the analysis of each conflict incident in the sections that 
follow. 
In terms of risk, the pre-existing relationship conflict between HO and Operations 
(#1) was arguably one of the most important issues threatening the implementation 
of nationwide ERP modules within the Fire Service. The underlying issues behind 
the relationship conflict are discussed later, but its effects permeated many of the 
conflict incidents to come. 
The implementation of the FMIS went relatively smoothly, generally keeping to 
schedule and budget. The new system spanned all levels of the organisational 
hierarchy, from HO to the fire stations, but the primary users were limited to 
financial managers at these levels. For this reason, gaining buy-in, even at station 
level, was less problematic, because most of these users wanted to see FMIS 
implemented.  
It wasn’t until the implementation of AMIS that serious problems began. The SC 
was well aware that Operations might take issue with aspects of AMIS, and sought 
measures to reduce the risk of resistance (#2), through limited increases in both 
consultation and participation with Operations representatives during the project. 
These measures were tested when the time came to collect asset data from each 
station, so that the new AMIS asset database could be populated with data. 
The asset data collection exercise, it transpired, proved a considerably more complex 
and contentious operation than originally thought by the SC. Complex, because the 
data collection teams quickly realised there was a significant range of assets in the 
form of equipment, and that these assets were difficult to classify. Contentious, 
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because the station firefighters were being asked to give up time to help the data 
collection teams, which included the time-consuming removal of equipment from 
each of the fire trucks for inspection. The benefits of AMIS appeared to accrue 
primarily to HO. 
Although Operations was obliged to cooperate with the asset data collection teams, 
there was considerable passive resistance in terms of priority – many fire station 
managers were reluctant to give asset data collection the attention it required (#3). 
Consequently, the collection exercise went very slowly.  
There were also issues over the accuracy of the data collected. HO knew the 
nationally aggregated asset figures, but not how they were distributed. However, the 
totals of the collected data did not match the national figures. As it was not always 
possible to know which stations had provided accurate data, the SC made the 
decision to conduct the data collection exercise a second time. This time it would be 
carried out as a separate project (the Asset Verification Project, or AVP) with its 
own project manager. Furthermore, since the AVP was seen as a subproject of 
AMIS, more and more resources from the AMIS project budget were diverted to the 
AVP. This included involving the AMIS project manager to help recover control 
over AVP, so that the data collection could be wrapped up quickly, and AMIS could 
then move ahead. 
However the extra workload meant the project manager had less time for AMIS. It 
had also become clear to the SC that she was finding it difficult to relate with 
Operations personnel, and did not seem capable of improving the AVP performance 
in terms of time and accuracy (#4). As a result, the SC made the decision to dismiss 
her, and hire a new project manager specifically for the AVP project. 
The second data collection exercise provided collective totals that were much closer 
to the national figures, but some members of the SC still felt it was not accurate 
enough. The proposal to launch a third round of data collection became a 
contentious issue within the SC (#5). In the end, a third round of data collection was 
undertaken. 
Shortly before the interviews took place, another Operations vs. HO issue had arisen. 
The problem centred on who would be responsible for updating asset data in AMIS, 
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once it had been implemented. Finance, within HO, wanted to enter the data to be 
sure that all financial consequences of that asset were updated, before then allowing 
Operations to enter asset-specific information such as maintenance records and 
location. Operations, with their emphasis on asset safety, wished to do it the other 
way around (#6). This issue was still unresolved at the time of the interviews, and 
had caused further slippage in the AMIS project schedule. 
At the time of interviewing, the implementation of AMIS was still not complete. In 
spite of concerns expressed by the external QA consultant, the SC insisted on 
placing the AVP on the critical path within the AMIS project plan. This meant that, 
not only was the AVP absorbing AMIS resources, including its project manager, but 
the consequent slippage against the AMIS deadlines was causing increasing concern 
(#7). Even after the third round of data collection, there were still some concerns 
within the SC, but it was felt that would have to be good enough, and so the AVP 
was finally closed. 
The conflict incident map in Figure 5.2 places each of the conflict incidents referred 
to above in a chronological context, as indicated by both the directional arrows and 
the increasing value in the conflict incident numbers. This map also highlights 
relationships between the resolution outcomes of conflict incidents and their 
corresponding impacts on following conflict incidents. The arrow labels identify the 
specific resolution outcomes of interest. 
 
Figure 5.2:  A conflict incident map outlining incident numbers and brief descriptions, as 
well as their interrelationships in terms of initiating/fuelling other conflict 
incidents 
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There was one clear example of causality between conflict incidents. The PSG made 
a decision to appoint the AMIS project manager to be the AVP project manager as 
well, in the hope of reducing the conflict between Operations and HO (from #3 to 
#4). However, the other relationships represented in Figure 5.2 were less causal and 
more contributory. For example, many resolution decisions contributed to 
Operational resistance (#3): poorly resolved relationship conflict (from #1); 
insufficient consultation and participation in the planning of both the AMIS and 
AVP projects (from #2); the inability of the AMIS project manager to work with 
Operations (from #4); and the imposition of a third data collection round on 
Operations (from #5). Similarly, the overall slippage in the AMIS deadlines (#7) 
could be attributed to the combination of: continued resistance by Operations (from 
#3); slippage in the AVP deadlines (from #5); and conflict over asset data entry 
(from #7). 
The key pathway runs centrally through the conflict incident map, from #1 to #3 to 
#7. There was considerable relationship conflict between Operations and HO when 
the AMIS project began. This was not fully resolved, and the relationship conflict 
remained an underlying factor in many of the conflict incidents, including 
Operations’ eventual resistance to the data collection exercise. Consequently, 
attempts to resolve other conflicts sometimes exacerbated the relationship conflict 
and encouraged further resistance.  Ultimately, all of the conflict incidents 
contributed directly, or indirectly, to the considerable slippage in the AMIS project 
deadlines. 
The following sections examine each conflict incident in turn. 
5.6. Relationship conflict between Operations & HO (#1) 
While there was evident relationship conflict over the duration of the AMIS project, 
and particularly the AVP, it is important to note that a major source of this conflict 
was the pre-existing (prior to these projects) tension between Operations and HO. 
The reasons for this are historical, and it is worthwhile exploring these past events to 
understand why this conflict developed the way it did. Three interviewees flagged 
the decade-old events as important regarding what happened with the AMIS project. 
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In the mid-1990s, businessman Roger Estall was appointed CEO of the Fire Service 
as part of a set of economic reforms that began in the mid-1980s. Estall’s 
appointment broke the tradition of career firefighters becoming National 
Commander (as the position was known until Estall’s appointment). Estall’s task 
was to seek efficiencies through cost reduction – primarily through reduction of staff 
and equipment. Operations vigorously objected on two grounds: (1) Estall didn’t 
understand how firefighters worked; and (2) Estall’s proposed cuts were seen as a 
serious threat to firefighter safety. 
Significant contention between Operations and HO spilled over into the public 
arena, culminating in the first ever firefighter strike in New Zealand. Estall, and his 
reforms, were eventually removed, but the damage had been done and Operations no 
longer trusted HO.   
“…the final effect from that is still apparent, and it certainly affected the [AMIS] 
project.” [QA consultant] 
One of Estall’s initiatives in the ‘90s also involved asset data collection teams 
moving across the country. However, in that instance, Estall went further and 
ordered the removal of what had been deemed by HO as ‘excess’ equipment for 
each station.  
“So, you’ve got all this history, where people come into someone’s fire station 
and want to count your assets - there are all these misconceptions about what the 
purpose of it is. You tell them there is no sinister, hidden purpose … we’re not 
trying to take your assets. We’re just trying to get a fair reflection of what they 
actually are. Then everyone delves back into the past, and their memories are 
[long]… because people in this organisation [have been] around for a very long 
time. So there is that general mistrust." [National Financial Controller] 
The other major contributor to tension between Operations and HO was the 
significant cultural differences between the two groups.  
“We’ve got a cultural divide in our organisation, between people who wear a 
uniform, and those who don’t. That’s been around since we’ve had an 
organisation.  That’s just life, the way it is.” [Assistant Fire Region Manager] 
People in Operations saw themselves as front-line staff – the ones who literally 
risked their lives to provide a community service. They saw HO as far removed 
from what they did – functionally, hierarchically, and geographically. And despite 
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the CEO being a uniformed man12, the vast majority of HO staff were still seen by 
Operations as ‘suits’. This included the SC, whose members were mostly drawn 
from the suits in HO. 
This perceived lack of understanding and interest by HO was not completely 
unfounded. 
“I think there’s not a lot of empathy from the National Office about what people 
are actually providing out there, and the role of each level of the organisation 
needs to be better spelt out, in terms of how we’re going to move this forward.  
Our core business is going to fires and emergencies, and [that’s] what drives the 
organisation. … everything else that surrounds that are support functions, 
including this office.  So, I like to think that the young lady that inputs our 
accounts in National Office has a view that she’s helping support people in the 
fire stations.  That’s really difficult to get [HO] people to get their head around." 
[Assistant Fire Region Manager] 
The suspicion held by Operations towards HO could be quite intense. 
“…we can’t use that word ‘centrally’, because there’s a huge hang-up about that 
out in the regions. Calling it central purchasing sort of implies that the control is 
central.  So we call it ‘coordinated purchasing’.” [Assistant Fire Region 
Manager] 
As if to highlight the gulf between ‘suits’ and ‘uniforms’, one interviewee – the 
National Finance Controller – continually referred to the fire stations as "business 
units" and the corresponding Chief Fire Officers as "business unit managers". 
HO, and particularly Finance, were very enthusiastic over their increasing use of IT 
to improve the way they processed and aggregated data, and looked forward to the 
implementation of these ERP modules. However, Operations felt much removed 
from these ambitions. They had relied on local manual systems for decades, and 
generally felt comfortable with their use. Consequently they were reluctant to 
change, and were often described by interviewees as “IT illiterate”. Given poor 
communication channels between these groups, Operations often felt they had new 
systems thrust upon them, sometimes with little apparent benefit for them. 
It was in this environment that the AMIS project was launched. The SC was aware 
of these tensions, at least to some degree, and was also aware that they would need 
to address them. The asset data collection exercise would require Operations’ 
                                                 
12
 Firefighters often contrasted themselves from HO people by their working clothes. Uniformed people 
were those who were, or once had been, firefighters. Suits were those who mostly worked at HO. After 
businessman Estall was removed, NZFS returned to the tradition of appointing a uniformed CEO. 
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cooperation as the possessors of the assets. But apart from limited (one) 
representation on the SC, there were no other mechanisms designed to facilitate HO 
and Operations working together on a more cooperative basis for this project. This 
issue was simply not addressed at a governance level – leaving those responsible for 
integrative IT projects to fend for themselves. 
This long-standing issue clearly had a significant impact on the AVP and AMIS 
projects (see the analysis of conflict incident #3 below). Nevertheless, it was 
anticipated to some degree (see #2 below). 
5.7. Anticipated conflict between Operations & HO (#2) 
As a direct consequence of the relationship conflict between Operations and HO (see 
#1 above), the SC was concerned resistance might be an issue, and sought measures 
to reduce the effects of relationship conflict through increased consultation and 
participation. 
Perhaps the single most important thing the SC did was to retain the services of the 
Wellington-based Assistant Fire Region Manager after the FMIS project. Originally 
seconded to the FMIS project to resolve a specific issue that had arisen, he was 
consequently placed directly on the SC for the AMIS project. The SC hoped this 
improved representation of Operations’ perspectives would help them appease 
Operations’ concerns over the upcoming AMIS project. Unexpectedly, it also 
provided the opportunity for Operations to learn something about National Office 
from him, including the fact that some of them do wear uniforms. 
"Because, the people out there think these people in National Office, in the main, 
they’re just a bunch of selfish idiots… particularly because they wear a suit – 
they don’t wear a uniform. So I introduced the concept to the people that work at 
the National Office – that work for me – they wear a uniform to work.  Let’s see 
if we can break through the cultural divides there.” [Assistant Fire Region 
Manager] 
A key measure was the development of a communication plan. 
"When we got serious about the asset management system, I got agreement from 
everyone in the Steering Committee that I would manage the communication 
plan, so that we could keep people informed. We would give them enough to 
motivate them to want to do more.” [Assistant Fire Region Manager] 
Other measures were also put in place: 
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• Each data collection team would be made up of an external consultant and a 
uniformed firefighter; and 
• The Chief Fire Officer of each station would sign off on the data collected 
(the National Financial Controller thought this would give the stations “input 
into the process”). 
"All the processes were there to make sure we got the best data that we could. 
…So, in theory, we should have got full cooperation and really good data out of 
it." [National Financial Controller] 
The SC even considered which assets would be most helpful to start with. 
"People’s lives are at stake with breathing apparatus. So the people whose job it 
is to maintain them, and service the equipment, and so forth, are very 
conscientious. That is why it was chosen as the first piece of plant and 
equipment to be put into the system. …We knew they would want to maintain 
good records. So, we chose that equipment accordingly … for that reason." [IT 
Strategy Manager] 
As noted earlier, a communication plan had been drawn up by the Assistant Fire 
Region Manager, supposedly with full support from the rest of the SC. 
Unfortunately, firefighters in Operations remained both un-consulted and 
uninformed about the project. 
“And, frankly, [the communication plan] died a financial death, because nobody 
[at HO] was really serious about it.  I found it really difficult to get people 
together even to have their photo taken, to put in our in-house magazine.  Pretty 
scary stuff. I went to our Director of Communications, and he really wasn’t 
interested...” [Assistant Fire Region Manager (Operations)] 
Their other measures proved to be only partially successful at best. For example, 
while “buy-in at senior management level” was certainly important, it was not a 
substitute for station-level buy-in. Apparently the presence of a ‘uniform’ in the data 
collection teams was helpful, but it didn’t make up for the time and effort the station 
personnel would have to put in. The Chief Fire Officer of each station took an 
independent approach to cooperation with data collection, some willing to sign off 
on inaccurate records, others refusing to sign off at all. It is difficult to see how the 
National Financial Controller’s assertion that this gave them “input” into the process 
could carry much weight, as the process had already been determined. It allowed 
them to participate in the process only. The selection of breathing apparatus as the 
first asset to focus on was effective in some respects (Operations took safety very 
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seriously), but this required the fire trucks to be stripped down of virtually all the 
equipment. Consequently even these asset assessments were not popular. 
There was a sense that the SC was reluctant to relinquish power over the process, 
and appeared to fully recognise neither the depth of feeling held by Operations 
towards HO, nor the lack of genuine participation in the development of the data 
collection process, or in the AMIS project in general. The seriousness of the risk of 
resistance should have, perhaps, been more apparent considering what had happened 
on an earlier project. 
“At one stage, not on [the AMIS] project, but another, it actually affected their 
ability to roll out their HR system. The firemen were using refusal to carry out 
tasks as an industrial weapon.” [QA consultant] 
 
5.8. Operations resistance over data collection (#3) 
The SC was initially confident that they had put measures in place that would 
involve Operations more in the project processes set up for AMIS. But it wasn’t until 
the data collection exercise that Operations unrest became manifest. Although all 
fire stations felt obliged to participate in the exercise, many did not give timeliness 
or accuracy as high a priority as the SC would have liked them to. By the end of 
what they thought would be the only round of data collection across the country, 
they discovered much of the data was of poor quality, and the asset database was not 
yet ready to be populated. 
The underlying issue was that while HO did have accurate figures at a national level, 
how those assets were distributed across 430 individual fire stations was unknown to 
them. Physically fixed assets (property) were straightforward, but many assets were 
moveable and might (for many reasons) have been transferred to different stations 
(e.g. breathing apparatus, fire hose, etc.). An AMIS objective was to enable the 
tracking of these, so that maintenance records could be stored and accessed. So, data 
collected from stations, when aggregated, did not add up to the national figures. The 
differences were, in fact, so significant that further data collection was required.  
That Operations had the power to resist without openly refusing to cooperate was 
amply demonstrated. 
102 
“…it would just be done late … and skimpily. We would get figures down that 
were not trustworthy. It became, to them, a low priority task. And, very quickly, 
probably after a deadline had been passed, phone calls were being made, and it 
had to be got out of the system … got out of the way, so people were put in 
[situations where they made] low quality decisions." [Manager, IT Strategy]  
In some cases, this led to a few Chief Fire Officers resisting by not signing the asset 
count off as correct, even when there was pressure to do so. 
The first problem was that each data collection team was made up of an external 
contractor, who was in charge of the process, and a firefighter, who was there in 
support. It was not clear to what degree the external contracting firm prepared its 
staff, but it quickly became clear that they did not really understand Operations 
culture, and consequently struggled.  
The contractors had not appreciated the complexity and range of assets to be 
identified until the process was well underway. In fact, it was so complex that the 
Assistant Fire Region Manager had to work with senior contractors to quickly come 
up with an asset classification scheme.  
In terms of individual behaviours, the SC was fortunate to have the services of the 
Assistant Fire Region Manager available at such short notice. An extremely 
experienced firefighter (over 30 years in the uniform), he understood the nature and 
variety of assets. He also sat on the SC, and was fully supportive of the project. 
The situation was further exacerbated by poor communication from the SC to station 
officers.  
"There was not a great communication line to tell [fire station] people what they 
were doing, to encourage them to help, and so the data [the collection team] 
brought back was, frankly, compromised." [Assistant Fire Region Manager] 
"We’ve got over 430 fire stations … different people have different attitudes to 
these things. Those who pay more attention to detail are very conscientious – 
fantastic results, even and correct, 100% accurate. Those who are more laissez 
faire in their approach are perhaps a bit more secretive…they’re into their little 
fiefdom – that’s the Chief Fire Officer – especially in some volunteer brigades. 
[They] would probably not wish to be so cooperative, also, or reveal all their 
assets, for whatever reason they’ve got. But, as I say, a lot of that is apparently 
back to history." [National Financial Controller] 
The SC was sufficiently unhappy with the accuracy of the data that they made the 
decision to initiate a second round of data collection. A letter was sent to regional 
and district management requesting cooperation with the exercise. But regional 
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managers operated within a semi-independent, overtly political environment of their 
own, and weren’t necessarily supportive. 
“...the Fire Service was a very politicised organisation – those regions were like 
separate governments. It seemed to me that they were run on their own, and here 
we were going to have an integrated system and we were going to put everything 
in one place. I think that was probably the cause of most issues, at the start, until 
someone said this is the way we’ll do it. …It felt like we had all these regions 
out there, that had just been told ‘You will be coming on to the new system’ – a 
sort of command. But then … ‘No, you aren’t coming onto my patch’ … ‘We do 
it this way ...’ or ‘We do it differently from Auckland …’ … a lot of that sort of 
talk [ensued].” [PeopleSoft Consultant] 
However, at station level, the insistence on a second round of data gathering was not 
well received. 
“...we were pushing for accuracy, and this is work for all the regional people, 
who have to all go off and check their assets again … They don’t see any 
immediate gain – it’s just an extra burden for them. ...you impose a new system 
on everybody, and impose the obligation to use it, in order to capture this 
information – information that is of importance and value to the Head Office 
people who make these policy decisions. … but not to the people on the outside 
who are actually going to do all the work." [IT Strategy Manager] 
By now, the SC had realised that the data collection exercise was more complex 
than they had at first thought. To provide more coordination and move things 
forward, the collection exercise was elevated to a project status and given the name 
Asset Verification Project (AVP). The AMIS project manager was allocated to 
manage the AVP as well. Not all SC members were in favour of this move (see #4 
below). 
The results of the second collection round were better, but were still not regarded as 
good enough by most members of the SC. Reluctantly, they made a consensus 
decision to perform a third round of data collection. 
They had also come to realise that the AMIS/AVP project manager was not 
performing as expected, including a failure to relate to some of the station managers. 
In the end, the SC agreed to end her contract (for both AVP and the AMIS project), 
and hired new project managers, one for each of AMIS and AVP. 
By the end of third collection round, again the quality of the data had improved, but 
some SC members were still unhappy. A vigorous debate within the SC ensued 
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about whether or not one final round was necessary (see #5 below). In the end, they 
decided the asset data was sufficiently accurate that they could move on with AMIS. 
5.9. Involving the AMIS project manager in the AVP (#4) 
As noted earlier (#3), while agreeing on a second round of data collection, the SC 
also considered a proposal to ask the project manager of the AMIS project to 
manage the AVP as well. There was disagreement within the SC over this proposal. 
Its proponents suggested she was hired to manage the AMIS project, and AVP was 
considered part of that. Furthermore, one of the reasons the first round of data 
collection did not go well was poor coordination of the exercise – the sort of 
discipline a project manager would be expected to bring. 
Those against the idea pointed out AMIS was already delayed because of AVP 
delays, and asking the AMIS project manager to effectively manage a new project as 
well would only further stall AMIS.  
"There was conflict there about how much time she should be spending on this. 
Was this part of her responsibility or not? …The more time she spent doing that, 
it was time she was not spending on other things. And there were conflicts 
within the team because of that." [IT Strategy Manager] 
Those for and against were not explicitly identified in the interviews, though one 
interviewer indicated Finance members supported the proposal to avoid the cost of 
another contractor. Ultimately the proposal was agreed upon by the SC, and the 
AMIS project manager had the AVP added to her portfolio of projects. 
Unfortunately, the second data collection exercise did not go as well as expected. 
The project manager struggled to make it work, though the SC was not aware of this 
for some time – likely due to the formal feedback mechanism that required only the 
project manager to report back to the SC. It was not until the decision for a third data 
collection round was being considered, that the SC also agreed to terminate the 
contract of the project manager from both AVP and AMIS. 
"The issue was essentially allowed to drag on, and it wasn’t until it became a 
crisis, that they decided to sack the project manager – partly because of conflicts 
…". [QA Consultant] 
As well as conflicts within her project team, there were suggestions of conflict with 
Operations managers as well, particularly at those fire stations that needed special 
attention. Two comments from the FMIS project manager, who turned down the 
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offer to manage AMIS as well, provide some insight into another cultural divide that 
may have affected the AMIS project manager’s ability to communicate effectively 
with Operations staff. 
"I didn’t wish to do the next stage of the project. …I suggested that they get 
another project manager who could relate, specifically, to the firemen. Not 
meaning to sound sexist, but I thought it would be better done by a bloke. … and 
they ended up with another woman!" [FMIS project manager] 
"I did get a feeling that some of the Fire Service managers out in the field had 
trouble relating to me, and I had assumed it was because I am a woman. 
…they’re very focused on the knowledge of the fire appliances and techniques 
used. I felt that maybe a man would be able to relate to them better." [FMIS 
project manager] 
The personal qualities of the AMIS project manager had an impact as well, though 
not necessarily a positive one. 
"I suspect one of the [problems] was that they put the wrong person in charge of 
Asset Verification from the beginning, which didn’t help. When it was clear she 
wasn’t the right person, nothing was done about it." [QA Consultant] 
“The project manager was an ex-employee of PeopleSoft … she used to work 
with me. …She could be quite a difficult person, actually. You can have conflict 
with the project manager easily, too." [PeopleSoft Consultant] 
So it was only when the SC recognised the extent of the problem, did they exercise 
their authority both to replace the project manager and hire more staff. After that, 
"...things went smoothly". [QA Consultant]. 
5.10. Slippage in AVP deadlines (#5) 
Each round of data collection further delayed the AVP project. In addition, station 
personnel were becoming increasingly annoyed at having to spend more time doing 
the same exercise. Three times the problem went to the SC for a decision, after each 
data collection round. Both the QA consultant and the PeopleSoft consultant used 
the word “naïve” when describing the NZFS approach to IT projects. For example, 
one of the issues was data accuracy. Beyond making sure the collected figures 
tallied with the national ones, they had not really considered establishing accuracy at 
an individual station level, a district level, or even at a regional level. 
“…supposedly all the asset lists were to be signed off by all the regional 
managers as being accurate. And we never got that done successfully. ...I 
suppose we could argue that there were arguments, discussions … about how did 
we know when we had finished? How do we know when we’ve got that degree 
106 
of accuracy? …it will never be absolutely accurate. ...We did not have any 
objective basis for saying 'it’s now accurate enough'. …I would say the biggest 
issue for AMIS was asset register correctness.” [IT Strategy Manager] 
The SC debates over repeated data collection exercises split the SC membership 
along two main arguments. Finance members, led by the CFO, argued against 
further collection exercises based on minimising further delays and costs with the 
AVP. Others, including IT management, argued that if the data were not accurate, no 
one would trust the system and they wouldn’t use it. Finance, worried that AVP 
delays were setting AMIS back as well, took a conservative view on the trade-off of 
time and cost vs. quality. The problem was, unlike large assets such as land, 
buildings and fire trucks (where the figures are accurate), lengths of hose, level two 
suits, portable pumps, and a whole lot of other rescue equipment were more difficult 
to track.  
“We’ve got over 100,000 assets on our asset register. So, it’s extensive … we’re 
an asset rich organisation. From a materiality point of view, we’re always going 
to be accurate with the dollars, but it’s just some of the finer detail – that’s where 
you get the hassles." [National Financial Controller] 
Finance argued that further refinement of the data was unnecessary. The Manager of 
IT Strategy was on the other side of the argument, believing strongly that data 
quality was critical. However, he didn’t think it was just the financial argument that 
finally led to the decision to end the AVP. 
"...in my opinion, there is a psychological element about this as well. There was 
an element of weariness about it. After it had been done so many times, you’re 
saying to yourself, ‘do I have to do it again?’ You say ‘I’ve spent so much time, 
so much money doing this – we’ll go with it as it is.’ Now that was not spoken, 
in my opinion, but there was an element of that in the decision taken." [IT 
Strategy Manager] 
In terms of governance, HO (including the SC) had authority over stations, districts 
and regions, but chose not to exercise it beyond making it clear to district and 
regional managers that cooperation with AVP was compulsory. The fact that 
resistance at the station level remained a considerable problem suggests edicts to 
Operational management were not sufficient to encourage cooperation from the 
frontline firefighters. As noted earlier, Operations saw themselves as functionally, 
culturally and geographically distant from HO. Described by one interviewee as 
“fiefdoms”, many of the Operations groups at station, district and regional levels 
were strongly, and sometimes aggressively, independent.  
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For example, regional offices not only complained about the AVP and the AMIS 
project, but also conducted their own meetings to discuss why AMIS was even 
necessary (some of them had their own systems), and whether or not any benefits 
would accrue to them. The fact that turf protection was rife among them was noted 
by two interviewees, who also said the politics at the regional level could get very 
nasty sometimes. Exercising SC authority, by itself, was not sufficient for HO to 
gain full cooperation from Operations. 
The Operations representative on the SC saw it differently, suggesting HO didn’t 
have the courage to do more than just send out commands.  
“…there was a view that if people at the senior level in the organisation wrote to 
people at regions and districts, and said if we don’t do it this way, we won’t fund 
you.  I think that’s really good, but…instead, they sent out one of those ‘do as I 
say’ instructions to all the regional managers, not that we listen to the 
instructions, frankly.” [Assistant Fire Region Manager] 
As the governance body for each project, the SC was praised by external (to the 
NZFS) interviewees. They noted the SC was prepared to face up to problems and 
look for a solution, and that they generally reached consensus on most important 
decisions.  
“The Steering Committee was very, very consensus orientated – a very convivial 
approach. There were no authoritarian or dictatorial approaches. It didn’t seem 
to be a blame culture, either, which is quite different from other places." [QA 
Consultant] 
 
5.11. Asset data entry responsibility (#6) 
The issue of responsibility over asset data entry into AMIS emerged in the latter 
stages of the AMIS project. There was (and remained at the time of the interviews) 
conflict between Operations and the SC, particularly Finance, over the asset system 
update process.  
"…when we purchase the asset – that’s when the conflict starts. [Say] we 
purchase a new fire engine. Now when you buy a fire engine, you put it in the 
asset management system.  But I put my hand up and say hang on, I want to do 
it, because I want to associate that new truck, the fire engine, with all its standard 
tests, and its pump tests, and all the compliance issues that surround [it]. …The 
financial people say: ah, any purchase has got a financial implication, and we 
want to do it.  And when we’ve done it, you can do your stuff.  Well I don’t want 
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to do it like that.  I want to put it in and then I want them to do their stuff." 
[Assistant Fire Region Manager (Operations)] 
Once again, HO vs. Operations tensions emerged as a major factor in the conflict 
and its resolution. Operations felt considerable resentment over this issue, as they 
perceived a loss of control over their own assets to fit into a system that was 
designed to support financial administration at HO. "It smacks of big boy control!" 
[Assistant Fire Region Manager] 
While Finance understood that front-line firefighters had important needs in terms of 
safety and effectiveness, they nevertheless still saw the data as being fundamentally 
financial in nature. Finance pointed out that the PeopleSoft asset system module was 
structured around a financial processing perspective, and that the long-term view 
was that other data implications, through the implementation of other ERP modules, 
would flow on from that. 
Similarly, while many in Operations understood that financial and accounting 
systems were important, they saw AMIS as yet another HO function that places what 
was an administrative support system higher in priority than fire fighting. They saw 
the data as representing the fire fighting equipment, and they wanted to see each of 
these assets characterised correctly before any financial implications were 
considered. 
As noted earlier, the cultural gaps between HO and Operations had a major impact 
on the ways these conflicts unfolded. Even where opposing parties sought dialogue 
to resolve the issue, cultural differences challenged their ability to see things in the 
same way. 
"In my experience, working with people like financial accountants is rather a 
different experience for people like me who start life as a firefighter, and in fact, 
end up working in an area like this. We don’t have a lot of exposure to people 
with great academic accounting experience and the way they manage the things 
at a high level. It’s quite a challenge for us to be able to work with people like 
that." [Assistant Fire Region Manager] 
There were many attempts, through debate and argument, to resolve this. At the time 
the interviews for this study were conducted, the conflict was still at an impasse. The 
Assistant Fire Region Manager made it clear that he had the option to "bully" 
resistors if necessary. But it had not come to that, and he was still optimistic.  
109 
The Assistant Fire Region Manager found himself on both sides of the argument, 
having to balance the interests of Operations, as he was their representative on the 
SC, with those of the SC in terms of wanting to see the delays ended and the project 
moving forward. For example, the SC frequently turned to the Assistant Fire Region 
Manager whenever HO vs. Operations conflict arose. They formalised his 
troubleshooting role by appointing him to manage the implementation of the AMIS 
project. The conflict over asset data entry was one of the first he had tackled since 
the appointment. Even so, he did feel the governance arrangements were skewed to 
entrench HO values over those of Operations. Authority structures and policy setting 
were weighted in favour of administrative management over ‘uniformed’ 
management. 
"One of the underlying problems is that we have a whole range of people 
developing policy for the organisation in isolation. People in the Finance 
Division will develop finance policy that has an impact across assets that we 
manage, without consulting us.  …when you see the make-up of the senior 
management team, it’s weighted towards the people who manage the business at 
National Office, [including] the Chief Financial Officer, … We’ve got quite a 
diverse group that develop a whole range of policy, and they look after data 
management, project management, a whole range of stuff, and those people 
drive the policy as well." [Assistant Fire Region Manager] 
Furthermore, he observed a shift from empowerment to command and control. There 
was a growing sense that Operations at the lower levels was increasingly 
disenfranchised from the decision-making that would affect them. Poor 
communication and consultation channels played a major role in this neglect. 
"Now, the policy, the business rules, the way we do things around here, are 
…moving from a cultural value, into a more centralised control of the 
organisation, and there’s a need for some of those. Some would debate that 
we’ve even gone too far.  We’ve gone back to a nationally led management 
organisation, rather than regions working within the boundaries of business rules 
and policy, but are quite autonomous in their day-to-day operation. …And it 
went from being already good at walking the talk about being completely 
empowered to the lowest level in a bottom-up organisation, [to the point where] 
we’re screening the people who are working in there." [Assistant Fire Region 
Manager] 
There was little by way of policy to govern projects – the SC acted autonomously to 
manage as they saw fit. Within HO, there was a presumption that HO, and 
particularly Finance, were solely responsible for creating policy for developing these 
new systems. There were no formal mechanisms available for consulting Operations 
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to ensure they had some input into the policy documents that would be governing 
their actions in future. 
 “…there was no set of policies that [would help us] manage all this stuff when 
we started all this. We did all this back-to-front.  We found out what the system 
could do for us, and then we wrote a bunch of policy that managed it." [Assistant 
Fire Region Manager] 
 
5.12. Slippage in the AMIS project schedule (#7) 
There was considerable slippage in the AMIS schedule. As suggested in Figure 7.1, 
this was the culmination of a series of prior conflict incidents that had contributed 
either directly or indirectly to this. There were also broad issues that spanned 
virtually the entire AMIS & AVP projects, and they are discussed here as well. 
The most important contributor, highlighted by every interviewee, was the deadline 
slippage in the AVP. This, in turn, was primarily due to resistance from Operations. 
Historical relationship conflict between HO and Operations, exacerbated by a 
perceived lack of consultation and participation in the project processes, contributed 
to the resistance that occurred. 
“What we underestimated with that, and the flow-on effect into the AMIS 
project, was how long it would actually take to upload all the verification data. 
...The Steering Committee was aware of this pretty much all the way through. 
Unfortunately it was just one of those things we were committed to doing, and 
we just had to let the verification data run its course … and let the impact of that, 
on the AMIS project, take its course as well." [National Financial Controller] 
"...in the end, the timeline and the budget for [AMIS] blew out by 100%. … and 
that was due to this one problem of verifying the assets. ...I’m not convinced 
they actually got value for money out of the Asset system [anyway]." [QA 
Consultant] 
Initially, the data collection exercise was seen as a task in the AMIS project. 
However, the QA consultant repeatedly warned the SC of the risks to AMIS by 
putting the data collection into its critical path. This created a dependency on 
finishing the data collection and verification phase first, before other tasks in AMIS 
can be undertaken. It wasn’t until the formal creation of the AVP as a separate 
project that this advice was finally heeded.  
“…they never really appreciated the amount of work, and the complexity [of the 
AVP]. It caused the [AMIS] project to blow out in terms of time and budget. 
…When it was brought to their attention that they had an issue, they tried to do 
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everything that needed to be done to bring it back on track. But that was based 
on a misunderstanding about just how difficult it was. The issue was essentially 
allowed to drag on." [QA Consultant] 
"...you are in [crisis mode] to deal with it...It’s a natural tendency [to avoid sunk 
costs], to try and recover from it. Instead, you should be taking a big step back. 
But if you don’t understand how big a problem is, you don’t do that. ...I think 
they probably should have [understood this issue.]" [QA Consultant] 
Politics, particularly between the regions, played a role throughout both the AMIS 
and AVP projects. The majority of the politics observed were based on ‘turf wars’ 
(jockeying for resources, power, etc.), and most of them seen by the QA consultant 
appeared to be protective, rather than opportunistic (though there were a few 
instances of that as well, he noted). There were occasions where a few members of 
either Operations or the project team were involved in political in-fighting that led to 
project delays. 
"There was some fairly low-level [below SC level] staff politics – a bit of 
stabbing people in the back. …The politics were, oh, fairly corrosive, yes. The 
relationships broke down." [QA Consultant] 
Cultural differences between ‘suits’ and ‘uniforms’ had played an important role in 
most of the conflict incidents discussed so far. Two others were raised as well: the 
firefighters’ resistance to change in general, and their degree of computer illiteracy. 
"...the FMIS was successful, in terms of new operational systems, [as it was] 
totally in line with what the stakeholders needed. Whereas AMIS was something 
new – a new way to manage things. … and the Fire Service doesn’t seem to be 
very good at changing their culture, and encourage people to do things 
differently." [QA Consultant] 
"There’s very much the Fireman’s culture, which is computer-illiterate – well, 
their job is fighting fires. The management culture is very slow at making 
decisions, and there is a separation of policy from operations. Even though 
things move at a very slow pace, the capacity for the firefighters to take on 
change is very low. Therefore, it’s very hard to make change." [QA Consultant] 
"I guess some layers of management probably don’t have the imagination to 
understand what they could do with the new information that the computer 
systems have given them. This has happened in other areas as well, where 
people weren’t sure if they were actually taking full advantage of the tools that 
were rolled out – because they didn’t have that as a mindset." [QA Consultant] 
This “separation of policy and operations” illustrates the divide between HO and 
Operations. Operations’ reluctance to embrace both change and IT, and this was not 
formally recognised by the SC.  
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“That comes back to the project governance, where the low capacity to absorb 
change really wasn’t fully taken into account.” [QA Consultant] 
Another ‘big picture’ issue was the challenge of doing so many projects at once. 
Other projects were underway around the same time as AMIS. For example, while 
the SC was grappling with the increasingly problematic AVP, the SC of another 
active IT project (The ‘Portal Infrastructure’ project) was also having problems. 
However, the two project steering committees had virtually the same membership. It 
was not unusual for some senior HO staff to spend considerable time on several 
steering committees, including non-IT projects, all on top of their normal duties. 
Consequently, both implementation resources and implementation management 
were stretched. 
When the Manager of IT Strategy was asked about a programme office function, he 
indicated the NZFS was much too small to warrant that expense. Yet the lack of 
programme-level management, according to the QA consultant, led to problems. 
"So, [they were] trying to roll out this kind of project, at the same time they are 
rolling out other projects – too many projects in an organisation that has low 
capacity to absorb change … and there didn’t seem to be an overall view from a 
governance perspective. When I was there, there wasn’t anything visible about: 
‘here’s our programme of projects … here are the implementation dates … here 
are the resources they need to implement them’. ...a lot of implementations 
don’t, of course. I think they are viewed as ‘just’ IT projects." [QA Consultant] 
The QA consultant went on to point out that NZFS had not been involved in both the 
complexity and frequency of change such as this before.  
“They weren’t used to these sorts of projects. ...You have got this major block of 
organisational change happening, [but the] ability of the organisation to resolve 
the change wasn’t as coordinated as it should have been. [This is] not necessarily 
uncommon. Some organisations, if they say we are implementing an ERP 
system, they know that this is an organisational change project, so they have that 
focus. Whereas here, it was an HR system, a finance system, an asset system, a 
station management system – all different, aren’t they?” [QA Consultant] 
There were no visible mechanisms for managing change at an organisational level – 
particularly at the user level, where the degree of engagement was minimal. Nor 
were there any for managing programmes of projects, so that “it becomes difficult to 
focus the type of resources to actually make the project a success.” [QA Consultant] 
Until the creation of the Project Review Committee, project prioritisation was done 
on an ad hoc basis. 
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"…the CEO comes in and he wants to do [a new station management system], 
and we just do it … as opposed to actually looking at the workload, and doing 
the forward scheduling. When I raised it with them, they said “Oh yes, yes, yes, 
we probably need to do that.” I was thinking about what their response would be, 
whether they would do something about it. They were doing some fairly major 
IT initiatives there.” [QA Consultant] 
The following section examines the above conflict incident analysis through the lens 
of the research framework, and addresses each of the research questions in turn. 
5.13. Conflict Resolution 
The following examines the assessment of the dimensions of conflict, the 
corresponding resolution outcomes, and the primary targets across all conflict 
incidents. Recall that the level of conflict involved in a given conflict incident can be 
accessed through an examination of each of the three key dimensions of conflict: 
disagreement, negative emotions, and perceived interference with objectives.  
Conflict resolution outcomes are determined by comparing the level of pre-
resolution conflict with the level of post-resolution conflict. First, each dimension of 
conflict is assessed for each conflict incident, both before and after resolution. Each 
assessment leads to one of the following allocations: YES (there is clear conflict 
with respect to this dimension); Some (there is evidence of conflict with respect to 
this dimension, but the level is not clear); NO (there is no evidence of conflict with 
respect to this dimension); and Uncert (there is insufficient information to make an 
assessment). 
There are five possible outcomes for each dimension of conflict comparison: E 
(conflict has been eliminated); R (the level of conflict has been reduced); U (the 
level of conflict remains unchanged); T (conflict has been terminated – that is, no 
further resolution attempted); S (the level of conflict has escalated); and ? 
(uncertain). 
For this case study, the assessments of levels of conflict, both before and after 
resolution, along with the corresponding resolution outcomes, are briefly described 
in the summary table found in Appendix E (Table E-1). These results are condensed 
in Table 5.3.  
      
Table 5.3: A summary of the changes in levels of conflict after resolution for each conflict incident 
# Incident Target Conflict (Pre-Resolution) Conflict (Post-Resolution) Resolution Outcome 
Disagreement Negative 
Emotions 
Interference Disagreement Negative 
Emotions 
Interference Disagreement Negative 
Emotions 
Interference 
1 Relationship conflict between Operations & HO 
Relationship YES YES YES YES Some YES U R U 
2 Operations’ resistance to AMIS [anticipated]  
Task (process) 
[Relationship] 
YES YES YES YES YES YES U U U 
3 Operations’ resistance to AVP  Task (content / process) 
[Relationship] 
YES YES YES YES YES YES U U U 
4 AMIS project manager becomes AVP project manager as well  
Task ( process) 
[Relationship] 
YES YES YES NO Some NO E R E 
5 SC faced with slippage in AVP deadlines  
Task ( process) YES Some YES NO Some Some E U R 
6 Who controls asset data entry Task (content) 
[Relationship] 
YES YES YES YES YES YES U U U 
7 SC faced with slippage in AMIS deadlines  
Task ( process) YES NO YES NO NO NO E U E 
Resolution Outcome: T = Terminated; E = Eliminated; R = Reduced; U = Unchanged; S = Escalated; ? = Uncertain (in terms of direction & degree of 
change) 
 
      
For each conflict incident, a positive outcome can be defined as one where each 
dimensional level of conflict is either reduced (R) or eliminated (E). Conversely, a 
negative outcome can be defined as one where each dimensional level of conflict is 
one of: unchanged (U), escalated (S) or terminated (T). A partially positive 
outcome can be defined as one where two dimensional outcomes are positive and 
one is negative. A partially negative outcome can be defined as one where two 
dimensional outcomes are negative and one is positive. 
The primary target of a conflict incident can be any combination of three types: 
task content (conflict over the nature of the task itself), task process (conflict over 
how the task should be carried out), and relationship (conflict due to an awareness of 
interpersonal incompatibilities).  
The frequencies of resolution outcome types are related to primary target types in 
Table 5.4. Overall, 3/7 of the conflict incidents achieved positive, or partially 
positive, outcomes. Two of these were conflicts between SC members, who 
employed a consensus decision-making approach. Conversely, 4/7 incidents 
achieved negative (3) or partially negative (1) outcomes, all of them involving 
relationship conflict between HO and Operations as a factor (see Table 5.3). 
However, it is difficult to draw any conclusions about a 43% success rate, given it 
was based on seven incidents. Furthermore, according equal status to each conflict 
incident in this statistic is not reasonable, given the incidents varied widely in terms 
of significance and context. However, the success rate was indicative of the 
problems the SC have had with conflict resolution when Operations were involved 
as major stakeholders.   
Task processes dominated the primary targets of conflict resolution with 4/7 
incidents, the others evenly spread across other types.  This reflects the use of ad hoc 
methods to resolve conflict as conflict incidents arose, with varying degrees of 
success. 
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Table 5.4: The frequency of resolution outcomes expressed as negative or positive results, 
categorised by the corresponding primary targets 
Primary 
Target 
Resolution 
Outcome Type 
1. 
Relationship 
2. 
Task 
(content) 
3. 
Task 
(process) 
4. 
Task (content 
& process) 
 
TOTAL 
Positive 
  1  1 
Partially positive 
  2  2 
Partially negative 1    1 
Negative 
 1 1 1 3 
TOTAL 1 1 4 1  
 
Drawing from the preliminary findings, the following three sections examine the 
contributions of each of the constructs identified in the research framework. Each 
section focuses on a different research question. 
5.14. Analysis Addressing Research Question 1 
The first research question focused on contextual, or environmental, effects. 
RQ1: In what way, and to what extent, do environmental elements affect the 
conflict resolution process and its outcomes? 
Each of the environmental elements identified in the research framework (culture, 
power, history, individual behaviours) are now examined across the conflict 
incidents identified in this case. A summary appears at the end of this analysis. 
These effects are then considered holistically, testing the framework for 
completeness, and identifying interactive and dominant effects. 
Cultural differences between HO and Operations stood out as an enduring factor in 
terms of conflict throughout the projects covered in this organisational case study. 
Applying the four dimensions of culture to both major stakeholders yielded the 
following results, summarised in Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.5: Cultural dimensions and relevant context of both Head Office and Operations 
 HEAD OFFICE OPERATIONS 
CONTEXT 
Geography A building in Wellington Stations dispersed across country 
Gender Mixed (but senior positions all male) Male dominated 
Capability Authority to make decisions Power to resist decisions 
CULTURE 
Beliefs See themselves as managers & 
coordinators of firefighters at a national 
level; 
See themselves as firefighters providing 
local community service as the core 
‘business’ of NZFS; 
Values  Effective organisational coordination and 
oversight; 
Centralised control; 
Efficiency 
Saving lives & property; 
 
A degree of autonomy ; 
Effectiveness 
Attitudes Drivers of change; 
See Operations as conservative & unable 
to move ahead; 
Reluctant to change; 
Think poorly of HO management 
Behaviours Embraces new technologies & systems; 
Insist on Operations cooperation; 
Dress in suits 
Many computer illiterate & suspicious of IT; 
Sometimes refuse to cooperate  
Dress in uniforms 
 
Table 7.3 demonstrates an internal consistency across all four dimensions of culture 
for each of HO and Operations. The range of differences between HO and 
Operations that had an impact, including the context that helped shape these 
differences, were equally pronounced across all four dimensions. 
Power and influence played an important role in the conduct of these projects, 
according to three of the interviewees. Perhaps the most important example was the 
fact that Operations had the power to resist a command from HO that they gave 
asset data collection a high priority, and a number of them exercised that power. 
Many of those firefighters who participated in the strike in 1995 were still fighting 
fires in 2004. Given the high standing firefighters had in NZ society, it was likely 
that this group would always have significant power to resist something they 
genuinely felt would threaten their ability to do their job. Therefore, until HO were 
to find mechanisms for engaging Operations more in the way things were done, it 
was equally likely that Operations would continue to exercise that power through 
resistance. 
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Another example, independent of the HO vs. Operations tensions, was the turf 
protection brought on by the changes in the way the internal processes would 
function. Information related to resourcing at a regional level was to be used through 
the new system, which could alter the way resources were allocated. At the regional 
level, Operations management consisted mainly of long-serving firefighters who had 
moved up through the ranks. To what extent HO was aware of these dynamics is not 
clear, but when describing the interactions of the regional managers, the QA 
consultant used phrases such as "stabbing people in the back”, “corrosive”, and 
“relationships broke down." It is difficult to see how ‘corrosive’ political infighting 
could be anything but damaging to a project such as AMIS.  
Historical events were at the root of the constant tension between HO and the 
geographically dispersed Operations. But apart from the FMIS project manager 
(who had no real involvement in AMIS), every other interviewee made a direct 
reference to the extensive efficiency initiatives in the mid-1990s, and how it 
severely soured the relationship between HO and Operations. 
Although those events took place a decade before the interviews, they made it clear 
that the relationship conflict had remained more or less unresolved since then. 
Furthermore, this conflict had led to project implementation problems before AMIS 
(such as the new HR system), typically in the form of resistance. 
It is puzzling, then, why historical lessons do not appear to have been learned. There 
are many possible explanations, including: 
• HO were not really aware of the extent of the relationship conflict; 
• HO were convinced, each time resistance occurred, that it was a one-off 
problem that could be avoided next time; 
• HO would like to improve the relationship, but are unsure how to go about it; 
• HO were resigned to the fact that resistance may occur, and preferred dealing 
with resistance on an ad hoc basis through the SC, if and when it occurred; or 
• HO assumed that the measures put in place to involve Operations more in the 
decision-making would be sufficient to avoid resistance. 
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Any of these explanations are possible on the evidence available, though plausibility 
may vary.   
Individual behaviours rarely had a significant impact on project-related conflict in 
this case. The key stakeholder groups in this study, HO (particularly as embodied 
within the SC) and Operations were typically represented by individuals who 
reflected their stakeholder groups’ perspectives on issues. Consequently, few 
individuals were singled out by interviewees, although there were exceptions. 
Both the CEO and the CFO were very enthusiastic about bringing ERP, and other 
process changes, into the NZFS. One interviewee described how the CEO had 
insisted (on more than one occasion) that they initiate a new project, even when 
resources were already spread thin with other projects on the go. The Project Review 
Committee, created after that point, would have severely constrained such 
behaviour, even from the CEO. 
The CFO, a senior member of the Senior Management Team, tended to focus more 
on financial functionality and HO data aggregation, than on operational functionality 
– particularly at station-level. Because he was joined by two other senior Finance 
managers on the SC, Finance had a strong voice on virtually every project.  
Several interviewees noted that the original project manager for the AMIS and AVP 
projects could be difficult to work with. Her inability to work with resisting 
Operations staff, particularly at the station level, ultimately led to her dismissal. By 
the time the SC realised she was not coping, considerable delays and costs had been 
incurred. 
The Assistant Regional Manager, who sat on the SC, was in a unique position. On 
the one hand, he was very enthusiastic about the projects, and used his position as a 
senior Operations representative on the SC to first, persuade, and then oblige those 
in Operations who resist to cooperate more. He indicated he would even, if 
necessary, use authority-based threats. “I would bully them,” he said. On the other 
hand, he also encouraged others in the SC, particularly those from HO, to think 
more about the needs of the firefighters. He provided a rare voice for Operations at 
HO level, and was quite direct about the problems with relationship conflict and 
cultural differences.  
120 
The Assistant Fire Region Manager’s personal interest in AMIS was highlighted 
when he worked urgently with senior consultants to design asset classes, applying 
the knowledge he had gained over thirty years of service as a firefighter. Arguably, 
his involvement was critical to what limited success AMIS eventually produced. 
The preliminary analyses addressing the first research question are briefly described 
in the summary table found in Appendix E (Table E-2). These results are condensed 
in Table 5.6. 
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Table 5.6: A summary of the impacts of environmental factors on conflict resolution for each conflict incident. 
# Incident Culture Power History Individual 
Behaviours 
1 Relationship conflict 
between Operations & HO 
Many cultural differences 
between Operations & HO 
Operations have power to 
resist; semi-autonomous 
management 
Effects of mid-90s events 
still impacting on these 
projects 
Operations rep on SC worked 
hard to bridge gaps, but one 
person was not enough. 
2 Anticipated resistance by 
Operations to AMIS/AVP 
Many cultural differences 
between Operations & HO 
Operations have power to 
resist; semi-autonomous 
management 
  
3 Resistance by Operations to 
AVP 
Many cultural differences 
between Operations & HO 
Operations had collective 
power to resist, from 
regional to station level; 
Prev. empowerment culture 
-> semi-autonomy from HO 
Direct recall of ill-fated 
asset data collection in mid-
1990s; firefighters have 
“long memories” 
Effective qualities of 
Operations rep on SC helped 
considerably – delivered 
more than SC expected. 
4 AMIS project manager over 
involved in AVP 
Gender issue between 
Operations & PM; 
  Personality issue between 
Operations & PM; 
5 Slippage in AVP deadlines  Finance valued cost 
minimisation; Project team 
valued accurate DB 
   
6 Control over AMIS asset 
data entry 
Many cultural differences 
between Operations & HO, 
and Finance is a subset of 
HO 
Operations have power to 
resist; semi-autonomous 
management 
  
7 Slippage in AMIS deadlines Indirect effect - many 
cultural differences between 
Operations & HO 
Office politics hinder 
progress, including turf 
protection among regional 
managers 
Lack of history with major, 
integrative projects such as 
these 
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The following extends the above analysis by examining the environmental elements 
holistically, as part of a broader, interactive system. This is done by considering, in 
turn, each of completeness, interactive effects, and dominant effects. 
Completeness, in terms of environmental effects on conflict resolution, refers to the 
identification of any significant effects that could not be explained by those already 
identified in the research framework.  
The FMIS project manager raised the issue of gender, in the sense that Operations 
was vastly male-dominated, in spite of a gradual increase in numbers of female 
firefighters (though not in Operations management). This might partly explain why 
the AMIS project manager, once appointed the AVP project manager as well, found 
it difficult to relate well to the Chief Fire Officers at the fire stations, regardless of 
personality issues. 
While gender bias was important here, it did not represent a separate factor, but 
rather was another facet of cultural differences. Firefighters, who might have found 
themselves in positions of physical danger, placed tremendous value in camaraderie 
and an ability to rely on others for support. The FMIS project manager suggested 
many in Operations might have found this difficult to achieve with female 
firefighters. The attitudes and behaviours of a significant number of male firefighters 
were not always welcoming towards their female colleagues. 
A variety of interactive effects were identified in the case. Historical events from 
the 1990s had exacerbated tensions based on the strong cultural differences between 
HO and Operations. At the time of the interviews, the culture clashes were still 
present, and the historical effects of the early reforms were still reinforcing 
Operations’ suspicion of HO’s motives.  
However, those historical events also combined with the existing power Operations 
already had to resist HO through their geographical, hierarchical and cultural 
isolation. The result was an increased sense of power after firefighters went to the 
unprecedented lengths of industrial action. The extent of Operations’ power, based 
partly on their popularity with the public, a well-organised union, and a distrust of 
HO, was tested when the firefighters went on strike. Their subsequent awareness of 
their power to resist provided Operations with an effective mechanism for getting 
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what they wanted. Thus the tensions described before are reinforced further by the 
knowledge that Operations can act, if necessary, on their concerns. 
Another example of environmental interaction involved the original AMIS project 
manager. The above three factors (culture, history, and power) would already have 
made it very difficult for the troubleshooting role she was meant to fulfil. However, 
there was general agreement among several interviewees that she was not well suited 
for this role anyway. Her individual behaviours were described as “difficult”, and 
she failed to gain buy-in from fire station chiefs – a task she was charged with 
achieving. Her position became untenable. 
A dominant factor is one that considerably outweighs others in terms of its effects 
on conflict resolution. In this case, it was difficult to distinguish between several 
different factors – they were all significant at different times, and no individual 
factor consistently stood out. There was also a degree of interdependence between 
their effects. For example, cultural differences had been shown to be a major 
underlying factor behind most of the conflict incidents considered. On the other 
hand, historical events a decade earlier dramatically increased the cultural tensions, 
and were a significant underlying factor behind the project-related conflict. 
Furthermore, the power to resist had become, or should have become, of overriding 
concern with such projects, as it is a direct consequence of the cultural differences 
and historical events described above.  
5.15. Analysis Addressing Research Question 2 
The second research question focused on control effects, specifically regarding the 
manner in which governance both guides and directs management decision-making. 
RQ2: In what way, and to what extent, can governance design, monitor, and 
control the management of conflict resolution? 
Each of the governance control elements identified in the research framework 
(policy, authority, and mechanisms) is examined in turn across the range of the 
eleven conflict incidents identified in this case. A summary appears at the end of this 
section in Table 5.7. 
Policy played a minor role in terms of project governance. Where policy did apply, 
it was not always project focused, and was inevitably created by HO staff with little 
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input from Operations. Where policy was communicated to Operations, it typically 
appeared as a command, which would then be filtered down through the Operations 
management structure. HO-based policy making and dissemination of this kind was 
seen by Operations as further evidence that HO was attempting to reverse the 
empowerment initiatives of several years earlier by reasserting a command and 
control approach.  
The lack of policy governing projects was most pronounced where long-term and/or 
broad-based issues arose. For example, no long-term strategies were devised (and 
hence no policies set up to reflect them) to deal with frequent occurrences of 
resistance.  
Coping with multiple projects was another major organisational problem, but no 
policies existed to direct project prioritisation, resource allocation, etc. at the time. 
This was later remedied, to some degree, with the creation of the Project Review 
Committee. 
There was an informal policy among the HO staff within the SC to: (a) be prepared 
to face a problem and find a solution; and (b) use a consensus approach to determine 
that solution. This informal policy appeared to be very successful. Debate could be 
vigorous, but no one dominated proceedings while agreement was eventually 
reached. Unfortunately, informal policies can change even as membership of the 
committee changes.  
In terms of project governance authority, the steering committee allocated to a 
project was given sole responsibility. The SC provided summary reports to the CEO, 
including the regular QA report, which the CEO requested to see before anyone else 
did. Even so, no interviewee indicated any further interest or interference with the 
projects from the CEO. This committee, apart from the External QA consultant, the 
Project Manager, and the Assistant Region Fire Manager, were all representatively 
drawn from Head Office, and many of them from the Senior Management Team. 
The committee was virtually unchanged in membership across both FMIS and 
AMIS, with a subset looking after the AVP. Finance was well-represented on all 
three committees. 
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The SC, although charged with project governance and high-level decision-making 
(such as appointing a project manager), it was crisis decision-making that 
increasingly took precedence as the HO vs. Operations conflicts continued. 
Furthermore, where Operations were concerned, the SC appeared to be much better 
at making decisions than implementing them. The SC were genuinely surprised each 
time their decision to do an asset data collection round did not yield the results they 
wanted. They seemed unaware of the limited capability their authority had in this 
environment. 
The Operations SC representative pointed out that HO did have the authority to 
withhold funding, or elevate it to an HR performance issue. But as he said, the threat 
to do so was pointless unless they were prepared to carry it out – and he didn’t think 
they were. 
The other problem that the SC faced was their apparent inability to take a broader 
and longer-term perspective on what was going on. They were inexperienced with 
such large, complex projects of this type, and had too many projects going on at the 
same time anyway. Having an experienced External QA was very helpful in this 
regard, but his warnings were not always given due attention. For example, the key 
decision to place the asset data collection exercise on the AMIS critical path list as a 
dependency was made against QA advice. 
Years prior to these projects, a policy of accepting a degree of local empowerment 
through the Operations hierarchy encouraged semi-autonomous behaviour 
throughout regional, district and station levels. While negative politics among 
regional managers was an unfortunate consequence of this, by and large Operations 
clearly preferred the chance to manage their own staff, resources, and assets in ways 
that suited them.  
But ERP is based on the concept of standardisation and integration of processes. 
Exercising authority to achieve this was clearly going to be problematic. In other 
words, authority was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to integrate processes 
across Operations.  
Project governance mechanisms were not as widely used as they could have been. 
Perhaps the most glaring omission was the lack of effective communication 
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channels between Operations and HO. For example, the latter agreed on a 
communications plan to keep Operations at all levels well informed. But in the end 
it failed due to lack of funding and lack of interest from the SC. 
Communication in the other direction was no better. For example, there were few 
formal mechanisms for consultation, which meant Operations were effectively 
excluded from much of the decision-making. This could also be seen as the lack of 
an effective feedback mechanism for the SC in terms of progress with Operations, as 
most of their information would come through third parties (such as the project 
manager).  
As a consequence, Operations were rendered both poorly informed and poorly 
consulted.  
However, HO was not totally oblivious to the tensions, and had anticipated some 
conflict. Bringing a senior uniform into the SC was a significant step at bridging the 
HO/Operations gap. Having more uniforms in the SC might have helped even more, 
providing more voices for Operations, and spreading the representational workload. 
Other measures were taken as well, but in the end these proved mostly ineffectual. 
There were no mechanisms for managing multiple projects – no one was responsible 
for any kind of programme management function. There were no mechanisms for 
change management, in spite of the enterprise-wide effects of the ERP projects. 
According to one interviewee, the SC more or less assumed that all aspects of 
change were handled by the project manager.  
However, this apparent neglect was almost certainly attributable to inexperience 
with such large and complex projects, including implementation challenges, and 
possibly a sense of resignation over the HO/Operations relationship conflict. 
Furthermore, the creation of an important project governance mechanism such as the 
Project Review Committee was a strong step in the right direction. Afterwards, 
project prioritisation and resource allocation were subject to rigorous processes 
under policies directly linking strategy to decisions. 
The preliminary analyses addressing the second research question are briefly 
described in the summary table found in Appendix E (Table E-3). These results are 
condensed in Table 5.7. 
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Table 5.7: A summary of the impacts of governance arrangements on conflict resolution for each conflict incident. 
# Incident Policy Authority Mechanism  
1 Relationship conflict 
between Operations 
& HO 
Policy making split from Operations Ultimately HO remained in charge 
through governance & management 
body SC 
No serious mechanisms employed (esp. 
communication channels) to encourage 
cooperation 
2 Anticipated 
Operations resistance 
by Operations to 
AMIS/AVP 
 Appointed an Asst Regional Manager 
(Operations) to SC as Operations rep 
Some mechanisms used: data collection 
teams incl. an Operations person; buy-in 
from senior regional Operations 
management; selection of BA for asset 
collection first;  
communication plan approved, but failed 
due to no support 
3 Resistance by 
Operations to AVP 
 SC has some authority, but not enough 
to quell resistance 
Poor communication mechanisms 
between Operations & HO 
4 AMIS project 
manager over 
involved in AVP 
 SC had poor understanding of situation 
– took too long to realise first PM a 
mistake 
Seeing AVP as a project did help, but 
only when new PM appointed 
5 Slippage in AVP 
deadlines  
 SC made tough decisions, but doing so 
on ad hoc basis 
Eventually applied project mechanisms 
(eg appointing a PM) 
6 Control over AMIS 
asset data entry 
If this is a finance priority vs. 
firefighting priority, then policy 
required 
SC ultimately have authority to break 
impasse, but are reluctant to use it 
Discussion meetings 
7 Slippage in AMIS 
deadlines 
IT Strategy Manager has informal 
policy of preferring quality over 
meeting deadlines 
SC effective in making consensus 
decisions, but do so on ad hoc basis. 
Not always able to deal with 
Operations 
lack of Operations involvement in 
decision-making 
Poor communication, lack of programme 
management  
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5.16. Analysis Addressing Research Question 3 
In chapter 3, the third research question also focused on control effects, but in this 
case, the controls were directed towards environmental effects on the resolution 
process. The question is represented here. 
RQ3:  In what way, and to what extent, can governance moderate 
negative effects of the environmental elements on conflict resolution? 
Each of the three governance arrangements available to a governing body identified 
in the research framework (policies, authority and mechanisms) are now examined 
across the range of the environmental elements identified in the research framework 
(culture, history, power and personal qualities). 
As found earlier, cultural differences between HO and Operations has played a 
major role in the conflicts discussed. The need for the Fire Service to bridge some of 
the cultural gaps had been noted on several occasions. However, little has been said 
of any attempts to address these gaps beyond short-term tactical manoeuvres to 
achieve specific ends. Many broad suggestions from interviewees had been put 
forward, and are summarised (within a governance context) as follows: 
• POLICY: Bringing Operations into the policy-making process; 
• AUTHORITY: Placing more Operations people in decision-making and 
governing bodies such as steering committees; and 
• MECHANISMS: Installing effective communication channels between HO 
and Operations. 
Note that these recommendations are complementary and could be considered as a 
project governance package, given each recommendation would support the others. 
However, at the time of interviewing, the cultural differences appeared undiluted 
and as much of an issue as ever.  
The effects of historical events of the mid-1990s were still reverberating through 
projects ten years later. These effects appear to have strengthened the tensions 
already provided through the cultural differences. It is likely that the 
recommendations provided to address cultural gaps would also help render historical 
effects less influential. They need to put the past behind them. 
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Operations, at all levels, had the power to resist, and did so on occasion. Seen as a 
manifestation of cultural differences and historical events, there was clearly a need 
to find some long-term way of bringing Operations and HO together more and 
encourage cooperation. It is unclear why they had not done so before – perhaps HO 
treated each occasion as a one-off; or HO were unaware of the extent to which this 
was an issue; or it may be HO were aware, but were resigned to this sort of problem 
happening on occasion. 
Policies governing the way projects are undertaken and managed would provide an 
opportunity to recognise Operations concerns. This process had begun with the 
development of the Projects Review Committee, reflecting the new policies 
governing how projects were assessed, prioritised, and allocated resources. 
However, this initiative had more benefit for HO than Operations. 
The allocation of members to a project steering committee provides HO with an 
ideal opportunity to bring more people from Operations into the decision-making 
process at the SC level. At the time, HO and Operations had authority structures that 
made cooperative management across both groups quite difficult. 
At a mechanism level, the need for effective communication channels, going in both 
directions, has been highlighted many times already. There are many other project 
processes which could more directly involve Operations as well. 
Personal qualities had little impact on governance arrangements in this case, partly 
because there was so little project governance beyond the SC. Only a few 
individuals stood out in the project process. The CEO was found guilty of pushing 
through pet projects without worrying about stretched resources and higher priority 
projects. But once policy (on prioritising & resource allocation), authority (the 
Projects Review Committee), and mechanisms (the project review process) had been 
formalised, even the CEO was no longer able to subvert the process. 
5.17. Discussion 
Seven conflict incidents were identified for the AMIS and AVP projects, and none 
were identified for the FMIS project. A number of themes emerged post-analysis, 
and these are: 
• the importance of addressing anticipated conflict; 
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• the dynamic relationship between the outcomes of one conflict resolution 
and their impacts on later conflict incidents; 
• the need to learn from history and any pre-existing relationship conflict; 
• how governance can moderate dangerous culture clashes; 
• the conflict resolution process should take into account the power of user 
resistance; 
• the risks of relying on project authority structures for governance, with few 
project-specific policies and mechanisms; 
• the risks of placing key governance and management responsibilities on the 
same individuals; and 
The following considers each of these themes in turn. 
The importance of ‘resolving’ anticipated conflict, by adopting either preventive 
or moderating measures, cannot be underestimated. The AMIS project steering 
committee did anticipate conflict between HO and Operations, but did not do enough 
to moderate the risk. Every incident identified in this case involved Operations either 
directly or indirectly. Given relationship conflict between HO and Operations was 
present since the firefighters went on strike many years earlier, and that other 
historical events at times exacerbated this relationship conflict, it should have come 
as no surprise to the SC that serious conflict, in the form of resistance, was a genuine 
risk. Strong cultural differences between the ‘uniforms’ and the ‘suits’ made it 
difficult to reduce the level of relationship conflict between them. Furthermore, as a 
professional, front-line group, Operations had, just as in the past, considerable power 
to resist. Greater action from the HO-dominated SC to mitigate the risk of resistance 
was not taken – the magnitude of the risk was underestimated. Some of the actions 
that could have been taken by the SC are discussed below. 
The dynamic relationship between conflict incidents was highlighted by the 
conflict incident map (Figure 5.2). A relationship between conflict incidents is 
established when the resolution outcomes of one incident either cause or exacerbate 
the follow-up incident. That all 7 incidents identified should be part of this web of 
conflict is testimony to the need for contextual understanding and effective 
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governance arrangements. Ad hoc decision-making was frequently employed to deal 
with immediate problems, ignoring or underestimating underlying issues, and with 
less consideration towards longer term consequences. 
The need to learn from history and any pre-existing relationship conflict is 
important to project risk management. To mitigate this risk, those responsible for 
project governance must understand as much as possible about the major 
stakeholders, including how well they interrelate, incorporating knowledge of 
relevant events from the past. Furthermore, project governance arrangements 
reflecting this knowledge can be in place before the project begins. However, the SC 
did little more than include a firefighter in each data collection team, and co-opt one 
Operations manager onto the SC.  
Culture clashes helped explain why the underlying relationship conflict between 
Operations and HO had always been present since the 1990s. The differences, in 
terms of beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviours, were so marked that some 
interviewees admitted each group knew very little about the other. As well as the 
usual differences between an organisation’s head office and satellite offices spread 
across the country, the two groups had very different backgrounds. HO had some 
people with a firefighting background, but many others did not, such as those in 
Finance and IT). For as long as they remained relatively ignorant of each others’ 
cultural characteristics, it will be difficult for them to put in place the right 
governance measures to prevent, reduce, or eliminate conflict. 
While resistance is not an unusual form of conflict in IT projects, the power to 
resist can still be assessed early on (and reassessed over the duration of the project) 
as part of a risk management process. Once identified as anticipated conflict, 
appropriate governance arrangements can be put in place to either eliminate or at 
least reduce the impacts of resistance. In this case, the risk of Operations resistance 
was correctly identified, but was poorly evaluated, leading to only minor 
adjustments in project governance and consequent serious conflict. 
Placing the role of governance into the hands of a single authority structure, 
without sufficient project-oriented policies and mechanisms to back it up, was a 
serious risk. Governance is a three-pronged approach, requiring authority structures 
to be guided, directed or constrained by policy, and supported by established 
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mechanisms. These three components should be balanced and complimentary to suit 
the context. Policies ensuring Operations were better represented in decision-making 
and governance, with mechanisms available to ensure strong communication and 
coordination channels were in place, would likely have meant less conflict and more 
effective resolution. 
Allowing the boundary between governance and management to blur made the 
SC’s job harder. Project governance provides direction and constraints to help guide 
management decision-making. Those responsible for governance may get involved 
in decisions that will have high impact on the project (e.g. with conflict escalation), 
but are generally not involved in day-to-day decision-making. By placing both 
project governance responsibilities and decision-making roles onto the same body 
(the SC), the relationship between governance and management had collapsed, 
enabling greater decision-making freedom and less objective monitoring and 
control. 
For example, because the SC had not fully prepared for the anticipated conflict with 
Operations, they had become reactive, frequently making ad hoc decisions to 
address conflict as it arose. There was little incentive for the SC to think in the 
longer term, or in a broader context, than whatever the immediate issue presented. 
This would help explain the dynamic web of causal conflict throughout the project 
(Figure 5.2). Furthermore, governance requires a certain degree of objectivity, and a 
focus on the bigger picture. However the SC were almost exclusively drawn from 
HO, and was unable to see the conflict with Operations objectively. 
       
5.18. Conclusions 
All seven conflict incidents were essentially based on the relationship conflict 
between HO and Operations, either directly or indirectly. Historical events, in 
combination with strong cultural differences between HO and Operations, have 
meant an ongoing set of issues arose when the two groups worked together on the 
AMIS and AVP projects. Those same historical events also demonstrated to 
Operations that they had the power to resist HO in some areas – particularly where 
they thought changes would increase the risk to firefighters. 
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Project governance was placed in the hands of the Steering Committee. This 
authority structure, although functional and consensus driven, was not effective in 
dealing with conflict between HO and Operations. This may not be surprising given 
the SC members were mostly drawn from HO, with only one representative from 
Operations. Thus, the SC was seen as representing HO by Operations, and so would 
have found it difficult to mediate between the conflicting parties. 
Few project governance mechanisms were available to the SC and the project 
manager, and the most significant omission was the failure of the SC (and HO in 
general) to establish effective communication mechanisms between them and 
Operations. That would have ensured Operations were both well informed about the 
project and its progress, and had a voice expressing concerns to decision-makers. 
Similarly, the SC would have a better chance of gaining buy-in. Ultimately 
improved communication could have reduced the level of relationship conflict 
between the two, possibly closing the sizable cultural gap with a better 
understanding of each other’s values, beliefs, attitudes and behaviours.  
There were no mechanisms for conflict resolution for either organisational or 
project-oriented conflict. Indeed, a mechanism designed specifically to deal with HO 
vs. Operations conflict would have seemed sensible given the frequency of such 
outcomes. Instead, the SC used ad hoc, informal methods based on the assessed 
situation at the time. The short term focus was on resolving the immediate conflict, 
with little attention paid to longer term issues that led to the conflict in the first 
place. 
Policies affecting the conduct of IT projects were also minimal. For example, the IT 
Strategy Manager was barred from being a member of the Projects Review 
Committee (because he was normally the project sponsor) as a matter of policy. But 
no such policy existed for ensuring operational representation at the SC level, where 
most of the important project-related decisions were made. 
This is not to say that the SC had not genuinely tried to deal with the relationship 
conflict, but they failed to recognise the depth of feeling, and never really tried to 
understand the issues from Operations’ perspective. On the other hand, Operations 
had been suspicious and resistant regarding HO initiatives, presenting serious 
obstacles to project progress. In the end, however, the SC was responsible, and had it 
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within their power to institute project governance arrangements to help reduce or 
eliminate the relationship conflict.  
Finally, taking a holistic perspective has revealed how difficult it was for the SC to 
successfully implement some ERP modules when the combined effects of history, 
cultural differences and the power to resist made conflict both likely to occur and 
difficult to resolve. Making full use of the range of project governance arrangements 
available, instead of just a project authority structure, would have gone some way to 
mitigating many of the inter-related issues. 
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6. CASE 2: The New Zealand Ministry of Health 
 
This chapter provides an account of the second case study for this research. It begins 
with a brief description of the New Zealand Ministry of Health, the case 
organisation. The organisational setting for the project is described, including the 
organisational decision-making structure and broad descriptions of the major project 
stakeholders. The Web Consolidation Project, including the relevant project 
authority structures, is described. The interviewees are introduced, followed by a 
chronological overview of the conflict incidents they identified. The findings of the 
preliminary analysis are presented for each conflict incident. Each of the three 
research questions is addressed, and the results are discussed in terms of their 
implications for IT projects. 
The New Zealand Ministry of Health (referred to hereafter as the ‘Ministry’) was a 
major government ministry whose role and purpose was based on achieving key 
outcomes at “…three connected levels, reflecting directions established in the NZ 
Health Strategy and NZ Disability Strategy.” [Review of the Ministry of Health, 
2006, p.12]. Those three connected levels were: 
• Societal level – promoting healthy New Zealanders; 
• System level – promoting a fair and functional health system; and 
• Ministry level – ensuring the system works for all New Zealanders. 
The Ministry was headed by the Minister of Health – a senior cabinet minister in 
Government appointed by the Prime Minister. The Director General of Health is a 
position equivalent to a chief executive, with overall responsibility for the functions 
of the Ministry as an organisation, reporting to the Minister. 
This case focuses on a project intended to consolidate the various web presences 
maintained by semi-independent bodies (referred to as ‘directorates’) within the 
Ministry. Although under the authority of the Director General, these directorates 
operated on a semi-independent basis, and had developed their own websites in 
assorted ways, including the use of outside consultants and employing different 
technologies for content management. Even so, many of them elected to use an in-
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house service group who managed and uploaded their content, while the IT function 
maintained the web technology infrastructure, including software development. 
The following sections describe the nature of the project and its organisational 
context. 
6.1. Organisational Setting 
At the time of the study (2006), the Ministry was broken down into eight semi-
autonomous directorates, each headed by a Deputy Director General (DDG) (Figure 
6.1). Each directorate was seen as relatively distinct in function and purpose. 
Consequently, although each DDG reported to the Director-General, they had 
considerable freedom as to how they engaged their budget. What follows are the 
descriptions of selected organisational structures that are relevant to this case study. 
The Corporate and Information Directorate (CID) incorporated the major 
stakeholder groups involved in the selected IT project, while other directorates were 
website system users. The CID included a variety of disparate functions (such as 
legal services, human resources and IT services) that provided specialist internal 
support services across the whole Ministry (Figure 6.1). The following describes 
each of the three major project stakeholder groups: the Publications & 
Communications Group (generally referred to as ‘Comms’), the New Zealand Health 
Information Service (NZHIS), and Information Technology Shared Services (ITS13). 
Comms managed the content and publishing of material to be made available to the 
public. This service was available across the Ministry, and included both hard copy 
material (pamphlets, reports, etc.) and websites. These services were also available 
to Ministry advisory committees, incorporating for example, annual reports, 
consultation documents, brochures, and health charts. In total, Comms was 
responsible for approximately 200 publications every year. In recent years, Comms’ 
responsibilities had grown to include content management for Ministry websites.   
The number and diversity of Ministry websites had grown considerably in recent 
years. Those in Comms felt that their resources should have been bolstered to deal 
with the increased workload that had evolved. They believed there had been 
                                                 
13
 Although the acronym is not totally accurate, Ministry staff used ‘ITS’ anyway – possibly due to verbal 
convenience in conversation. 
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insufficient development in terms of their web publishing tools for eight years. This 
made it increasingly difficult to offer the more sophisticated services that their web-
hosted clients within the Ministry had come to expect. 
ITS was responsible for the IT infrastructure, which included the development and 
maintenance of IS software, and the implementation of software packages. ITS was 
overseen by the Chief Technology Officer (CTO), who reported to the DDG of the 
CID. 
For many years Lotus Notes had been the integrated technology platform for many 
of their systems. ITS continued to maintain a team of Lotus Notes developers, who 
were responsible for creating and maintaining systems using this platform. Users had 
become increasingly unhappy with many of these systems, as Lotus Notes had 
waned in popularity over the previous decade, and newer technologies seemed 
capable of much more. 
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Figure 6.1: The NZ Ministry of Health organisation chart, with a specific focus on the Corporate & Information Directorate. 
The shaded components represent areas of interest to this case.  
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All system faults and requests for enhancements to systems were communicated to 
the ITS Service Desk. It was not clear what internal processes ITS used to allocate 
priority and resources, but there would typically be little or no communication 
between ITS and users over a service request. 
NZHIS was a Ministry business unit residing within the CID directorate. Its mission 
statement was to “support improved health and disability outcomes through ensuring 
effective governance and delivering value through robust management of national 
health and disability information & systems.” (NZHIS, 2006, p. 5). NZHIS focused 
on four key areas: clinical coding (design, coding, and data collection); data 
management (monitoring & maintaining data quality); business intelligence 
(analysis & dissemination of information); and strategy & policy (governance & 
communication). 
It was not unusual for NZHIS to be involved in IT projects likely to affect NZHIS 
functions at a national level. They had sponsored many in the past, though none 
quite like this one, according to the NZHIS Chief Advisor. The following section 
describes what became known as the Web Consolidation Project, and the drivers 
behind its initiation. 
6.2. The Web Consolidation Project 
The Ministry’s range of websites varied considerably in terms of: technology 
platforms, ‘look-and-feel’ and navigational design, and content management. This 
situation evolved over time as many groups, based in various directorates throughout 
the Ministry, were each granted their own budget to develop a website. A few, such 
as the NZHIS, had their own developers. Several allowed Comms to manage content 
and publish on the web for them, which made Comms the biggest single system user 
group. Others used commercial software, and a few outsourced the function. 
By 2001, there were over 20 separate sites, of which about a third were managed 
centrally. This prompted the inclusion of the Ministry’s web presence to be part of a 
broad IT strategy document as an item requiring increasingly urgent attention. The 
development and implementation of a web strategy was allocated a capital budget 
which, unlike operational budgets, could be rolled over every year until spent. In this 
case, $800,000 was allocated over a 3-year period. The roll-over option meant there 
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was flexibility over the timing of the spending, even beyond the 3-year period. The 
project was given the name Web Consolidation to reflect the intention to standardise 
aspects of the websites and centralise, to some degree, control. There were several 
important drivers: 
• There was a strong sense that consolidation would go some way towards 
improving “…our ability to provide better information to our external 
stakeholders – very significantly better information – and to 
multipurpose, and present in different ways the information that has been 
generated by the Ministry for the purposes of web publication. … 
recognising that actually a lot of that information is quite common, but in 
the past, hasn’t been well presented, hasn’t been easily discoverable, for 
our external stakeholders, and therefore its value has been reduced.” 
[NZHIS Chief Advisor] 
• Centralised standards, in terms of look-and-feel, navigation, and search 
engines, for example, were also important: “you can really help people if 
all of your sites have consistent, good practice, navigational and 
presentation aids. I see it as meeting our responsibility to our external 
stakeholders or clients, and being sensible about the way we do it.” 
[NZHIS Chief Advisor] 
• There was also an issue of website management. “There wasn’t good 
consistency of site management, and we didn’t have real visibility of the 
costs, because they were being paid in various ways, from various parts of 
the Ministry. There was some variation in the costs that were being paid 
by different sites. I believe by consolidating, we could do it for less cost 
overall. Therefore, we would save money, and that seems a mighty fine 
thing to do. So, there is a good financial business case for doing this.” 
[NZHIS Chief Advisor] 
• Finally, there was the government’s requirement that all government 
departments ensure their websites were compliant with a new set of e-
government requirements. Initially this was seen as being outside the 
project’s scope. However, when an absolute deadline was set by the 
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government, compliance became an important issue, and in the end, a key 
driver. 
6.3. The Project Authority Structures 
Three major authority structures were involved in the Web Consolidation Project: 
the Programme Management Office, the Information Systems Senior Management 
Team, and the Project Steering Group (Table 6.1).  
The Programme Management Office (PMO), based in the CID directorate, 
oversaw any Ministry project allocated a budget greater than $250,000. It employed 
a checklist approach involving a complex set of processes, including many project 
templates, across a comprehensive set of project tasks.   
The Information Systems Senior Management Team (ISMT14) was given 
responsibility for ensuring that IT strategy was linked to Ministry strategy, and that 
new IT projects met these criteria. Chaired by the DDG of the CID, this group 
governed the overall use of IT within the Ministry. This included the evaluation, 
prioritisation and approval of IT projects (and their budgets). The ISMT did not 
generally get involved in IT projects operationally.  
Table 6.1: Project authority structures governing the Web Consolidation Project 
Proj. Authority 
Structure 
Level of 
Focus 
Membership Main IT Project-
Related Roles 
Programme 
Management Office 
(PMO) 
Programme 
/ Project 
PMO staff Standardised approach to 
managing large projects, 
based on established 
processes and templates 
Role reduced when this 
project repackaged as a 
series of smaller projects 
Information Systems 
Senior Management 
Team (ISMT) 
IT/Project DDG (chair); 
representatives from ITS 
and IS users (usually at 
executive or senior 
management level) 
project prioritisation & 
budget distribution; 
Project approval; 
Project Steering 
Group (PSG) 
Project ITS Manager; 
Comms Manager 
NZHIS Advisor / Project 
Sponsor (chair) 
Unique to this project 
Project business case; 
Oversight of project 
progress (schedule, 
budget) – reports received 
from project manager; 
                                                 
14
 Again, the acronym is not specifically accurate, but it is what the interviewees used. 
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The Project Steering Group (PSG) represented the highest level of project 
authority where membership varied from project to project. While PSG membership 
was normally determined by the ISMT, it was the DDG who selected PSG members 
for the Web Consolidation Project.  
In this case, the PSG was the key decision-maker in many of the conflict incidents 
that emerged. Although the project manager handled most of the operational issues 
that arose, many of the more significant issues were escalated to the PSG. Although 
the option was always available, the PSG had not escalated any issues to the DDG. 
In addition, there were three key individual roles involved in the decision-making: 
the project sponsor, the project owner, and the project manager. These are all briefly 
described as follows. 
Every Ministry project was required to have a project sponsor. This was normally 
someone senior within the Ministry responsible for driving the project forward and 
clearing organisational obstacles where possible. For an IT project, the sponsor was 
usually appointed by the ISMT. But in the case of the Web Consolidation Project, 
the DDG appointed herself and NZHIS as joint sponsors – the former at a very high 
level; the latter more closely involved with the project. 
Every Ministry project was also required to have a project owner – someone who 
controlled the project budget and was ultimately responsible for the system once it 
had been successfully implemented. Normal practice would have had a senior 
manager representing the primary user as the project owner. Again, the Web 
Consolidation Project was an exception. The ‘primary’ user group was not 
immediately obvious, and control of the budget went to NZHIS. 
Finally, every Ministry project was required to have a project manager, who filled 
the traditional project management role of coordinating and controlling the 
operational progress of the project, including the day-to-day management of the 
project team and the resources available. The project manager for Web 
Consolidation was initially an ITS employee, but was later replaced by an external 
contractor. In the latter case, the project manager reported directly to the PSG on a 
monthly basis. 
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As the project sponsor, owner, and manager were all seen as key roles for the Web 
Consolidation Project, it was important to include them among the people selected 
for the research interviews. 
6.4. Interviewees for this Study 
Seven individual project stakeholders were interviewed for this case study (Table 
6.2).  
The first interviewee (the Programme Management Office Team Leader) established 
a project that met the selection criteria, obtained access permission from senior 
managers, and put the researcher in touch with the CTO. The CTO decided to 
support the research project, identified suitable candidates for interviewing, and 
asked them all to cooperate with the researcher – which they did. The PMO Team 
Leader did not offer any observations on the project itself, as the project had not 
been selected until post-interview discussions with other PMO staff.  
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Table 6.2: Ministry of Health interviewees for this study  
Interviewee Position Textual 
Referral15 
Body 
Member 
Interest 
Group 
Team Leader, Programme Management 
Office 
PMO Team 
Leader 
 Programme 
management 
Chief Technology Officer, ITS CTO ITS 
representative 
on PSG 
IT management 
Team Leader, Publications & 
Communications 
Comms Team 
Leader  
 Web publishing 
Group Manager, Publications & 
Communications 
Comms 
Manager 
Comms 
representative 
on PSG;  
Project owner 
Comms 
management 
Chief Advisor, Health Information Strategy 
& Policy Section, NZHIS 
NZHIS Chief 
Advisor 
Chair of PSG; 
Sponsor & 
budget holder 
IT strategy 
implementation 
management 
Knowledge Manager, ITS 
Seconded as User Liaison Officer between 
users & ITS 
User Liaison 
Officer 
 IT project support 
Web Consolidation project manager 
(contract) 
Project 
Manager 
 Independent 
  
6.5. Conflict Incident Overview 
The following provides a précis of events as the project progressed over time. The 
unit of analysis for this research is a conflict incident. So to link contextual, 
historical events (from the project’s inception) to the analysis that follows, specific 
conflict incident numbers, corresponding to those used in the analysis, have been 
included within the text in parentheses. These are summarised in the conflict 
incident map at the end of this section (Figure 6.2). 
In 2001, the ISMT recognised the need for the Ministry’s web presence to be 
considered from a Ministry-wide strategic perspective. They approved a budget for a 
project that would both recommend a strategy, and if approved by the ISMT, 
implement it. 
NZHIS were made co-sponsors (along with the DDG for the Corporate and 
Information Directorate) and given the responsibility to both manage the budget and 
                                                 
15
 ‘Textual Referral’ implies these ‘shortenings’ will be used in the text of this study for (albeit limited) 
relief to both the reader and the writer.  
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oversee the project. This surprised Comms, as they had a much deeper involvement 
with the management of web publishing than did NZHIS, and normal practice 
within the Ministry would have allocated budgetary control to them, given that the 
Comms Manager had agreed to become the project owner. 
There had been historical tensions between ITS and Comms for some time. Comms 
had been heavily dependent on ITS for software support for years, but ITS did not 
reveal how they prioritised work requests – including those from Comms. Comms 
felt service was often poor, and frustrated their efforts to provide more functionality 
for Comms’ Ministry clients. 
The DDG was concerned that this relationship conflict between ITS and Comms 
could lead to manifest conflict within the project (#1). NZHIS had the necessary 
expertise to oversee a project of this size, and were seen as independent of both ITS’ 
and Comms’ interests. It was hoped NZHIS could manage any emergent conflict 
and keep the project moving forward. 
The Chief Advisor for the NZHIS was appointed to effectively govern the project on 
NZHIS’ behalf. He allocated an NZHIS analyst to the newly created role of Web 
Team Leader, tasked with developing a web strategy document. Issues of 
governance and centralisation were to be addressed, though it is unclear from the 
interviews how much guidance he was given in terms of expected outcomes. He 
spent almost a year developing the document, consulting widely – including 
Comms, which argued strongly for centralised governance (content control, 
Ministry-wide search engines, standardised navigation and look-and-feel, etc.).  
However, there was little contact between the Web Team Leader and NZHIS over 
this period, and the recommendations the Web Team Leader offered when the report 
was submitted were a major surprise to the NZHIS Chief Advisor, as they required a 
budget considerably higher than that available (#2). The Web Team Leader was 
removed from the role, and NZHIS had to start again. 
In the interim, the NZ government required all government websites to become 
compliant with new e-government practices. The Ministry was not well-placed to 
meet these obligations. Its disparate collection of websites were developed, designed 
and managed in a variety of ways, using their own budgets and local preferences.  
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The NZHIS Chief Advisor decided a business case was to be developed to 
determine what could realistically be achieved with the funds available. An external 
contractor was hired as the project manager to create the business case. This would 
identify what changes to the Ministry’s web presence would be necessary to at least 
partially centralise web management processes and practices, what would be 
involved in implementing them, and how they would ensure e-government 
compliance. 
Project governance was formalised with the creation of the Project Steering Group 
(PSG), incorporating three members: the NZHIS Chief Advisor (chair; Chief 
Advisor for NZHIS), the Comms Manager (Group Manager, Comms) and the CTO 
(managing ITS). This meant the three major project stakeholders were represented at 
the project control level, though the NZHIS Chief Advisor retained control over the 
budget. 
Early meetings of the PSG saw “vigorous” debate (as one interviewee described it) 
about what could realistically be achieved with the limited funds remaining. The 
focus was on a web content management system (CMS). The CTO argued that the 
cheaper software packages available on the market would either fail to meet some 
functionality requirements, or would be too expensive. As an alternative, the CTO 
argued that an effective CMS could be built in-house, based on the Ministry’s Lotus 
Notes platform. Both NZHIS Chief Advisor and the Comms Manager were initially 
very doubtful an in-house system could be developed with the time and money 
available (#3). Ultimately, the PSG agreed to this approach, but with the proviso that 
ITS must fund its development internally – they would get paid through the project 
budget only once an acceptable working system was provided. This was a 
significant risk taken by the CTO. 
Meanwhile, the business case had been developed to the point where a draft ready 
for submission to the PSG for signatures. The team that developed the business case 
was selected by the project manager, and included representatives from ITS, Comms 
and the NZHIS. It was at this point that the CTO refused to sign it, as the business 
case was based on the presumption that a CMS package would be purchased (#4). 
The IT Infrastructure Manager, who was representing ITS on the business case team, 
was unaware of the CTO’s recent commitment to build a CMS. Instead, the CTO 
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replaced him on the business case team, and effectively led the development of a 
second draft of the business case from that point on, shifting the emphasis from a 
client priority to a technology focus.  
The second draft was signed off by the PSG members, and the externally contracted 
project manager for the business case development was re-appointed as the project 
manager for the system to be developed and implemented. The Web Consolidation 
project manager operationally moved from NZHIS to ITS, but continued to report 
progress to the PSG.  
Even though the Comms Manager signed off the new business case, the Comms 
group remained unhappy for several reasons, including: 
• Comms saw the management of Ministry content on the web as an integral 
part of web publishing, yet the proposed changes implied different website 
owners could allocate the role of content approvers to anyone they wished, 
including themselves (#5). 
• More generally, Comms had originally proposed greater centralised control 
of the Ministry’s web presence, for better governance and more consistent 
features (navigation, look and feel, etc.). This proposal disappeared with the 
second draft of the business case (#6). 
• Comms had consistently complained over several years that they were under-
resourced for the responsibilities they had to carry out.  Now they feared that 
with more websites migrating into a centralised process, their workloads 
would increase further, but again without further resources (#7). 
• Where the project sponsor had an oversight role for a project itself, the 
business owner normally funded the project and took ownership of the 
system once implemented. The Comms Manager was anxious not to accept 
this role, fearing further burdensome responsibility. However, the Comms 
Manager was on the PSG at the time it was agreed Comms would be the 
business owner (#8). 
There was a history of tension between ITS and Comms. The latter used a Lotus 
Notes-based system to publish material on the web. Faults, issues and suggested 
improvements had to be reported through the ITS Service Desk, but it was not clear 
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to the users how these work requests were prioritised. There were considerable 
delays, even for relatively straightforward requests, with little or no communication 
from ITS until they announced the job was done. Often testing had been inadequate, 
with Comms being left to find the faults. Even senior ITS staff had admitted ITS had 
given poor service prior to the Web Consolidation Project. This ongoing relationship 
conflict was considered to be a risk (#1), which was why a third party (the NZHIS 
Chief Advisor) was put in charge of both budget and the PSG. 
The Lotus Notes platform was unpopular. Comms and other Ministry users found it 
an awkward, frustrating system which had gone “past its use-by date”, according to 
the Comms Manager. When ITS announced they would build a new CMS based on 
Lotus Notes, most users were sceptical (#9). 
Generally, Ministry projects required the use of templates provided by the 
Ministry’s Programme Management Office (PMO). These PMO templates formed 
the basis of a checklist approach to project governance – ensuring various project-
related processes were carried out according to PMO standards. However, the CTO 
was anxious to complete the project on time, with the desired functionality and 
quality. He was trained in various commercial IT governance toolsets (including 
ITIL16 and COBIT17), and chose to employ the principles of project governance 
embedded in the commercial product PRINCE218, essentially ignoring the PMO 
templates (#10). 
Early in the project, resistance from non-Comms users within the Ministry was 
anticipated (#11). Many had developed their own sites using their own budgets. As 
each directorate had a significant degree of autonomy, external users were seen as 
likely to resist attempts to standardise the technology and centralise control. 
Therefore the PSG adopted a strategy that involved the following steps: 
1. Create a new position – Project Client Liaison – to facilitate cooperation and 
coordination between ITS and the system users (especially Comms). 
                                                 
16
 The Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) is a best-practice framework setting out 
concepts and policies for managing IT infrastructure, development and operations.  
17
 The Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) is another best-practice 
framework, initially focussing on IT governance through auditing, but has since expanded to offer a 
complementary look at IT governance and management in conjunction with ITIL. 
18
 The Projects in Controlled Environments (PRINCE2) represents a best-practice framework for 
specifically managing and controlling projects.  
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2. Have ITS work closely with Comms, in terms of user requirements, system 
design, and implementation. In this way, Comms would become the project 
“champion”19, who could then promote the new system to other users. 
3. Finally, with the support of the champion, other external users would be 
“picked off one by one”, as the NZHIS Chief Advisor put it. That is, both the 
User Liaison Officer and the project manager would work closely with each 
external user, in a sequential order. As more agreed to migration, there 
would be more pressure on the remaining ones to migrate as well. 
Step 1 proved successful when the ITS Knowledge Manager agreed to take on the 
Project Client Liaison role. She proved popular with the users she dealt with, 
including Comms. In the end, both the User Liaison Officer and the project manager 
were directly instrumental in convincing the majority of the users to migrate to the 
new system. 
However, while Comms cooperated well with the new CMS design and 
implementation (step 2), Comms required considerable time to specify how the new 
CMS would work. This was challenging as they were already overworked, and 
generally knew little about content management systems and how they worked 
(#12). Added to this was their unhappiness over the abandonment of their proposals 
and the continued dependence on Lotus Notes. It was becoming clear to the PSG 
that Comms might not make suitable project champions after all (#13). 
The Maori Health Directorate was identified as another good candidate to be project 
champions. They were proud of their distinctive website, and required assurances 
that if they migrated, not only would ITS preserve most of the design aspects of their 
website, but it would also be e-government compliant. However, ITS failed to 
follow up these assurances with communication about progress, and nearly lost 
Maori Health as a project champion. In the end, they were successfully migrated 
and, as project champions, became part of the “road show”, as one interviewee 
referred to it, to convince other external users. 
                                                 
19
 The term ‘champion’ was used informally by the PSG to refer to the promotional role they could fill to 
support the project. The champion was to be drawn from the user pool. It should not be confused with the 
formal role of project sponsor, who was responsible for promoting and supporting the project at the senior 
level. 
150 
The CTO was a strong driver of the project, and fully supported both the User 
Liaison Officer and the project manager in their efforts. By contrast, the ITS project 
developers continued with their indifferent and non-communicative ways. The 
project manager illustrated this when, a few months earlier, he had placed a work 
request with ITS to set up new IP addresses for the migrated websites. He had been 
promised it would be done within two weeks. Months later it remained undone with 
no contact from ITS (#14). 
At the time of interviewing, most of the external websites, including the NZHIS and 
those run by Comms, had been converted to the new system. The NZHIS Chief 
Advisor was confident the remainder would be converted eventually – though in one 
case an external user had purchased its own CMS. 
The conflict incident map (Figure 6.2) places each of the conflict incidents referred 
to above in a chronological context, as indicated by both the directional arrows and 
the increasing value in the conflict incident numbers. This map also highlights 
relationships between the resolution outcomes of conflict incidents and their 
corresponding impacts on following conflict incidents. The arrow labels identify the 
specific resolution outcomes of interest. 
 
Figure 6.2: A conflict incident map outlining incident numbers and brief descriptions, as 
well as their interrelationships in terms of initiating/fuelling other conflict incidents. 
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For example, anticipated relationship conflict between ITS and Comms (#1) led to 
the decision to appoint a ‘third party’ (NZHIS) to be joint sponsor of the project, 
with responsibility for overseeing both the project and its budget. However the 
NZHIS Chief Advisor then appointed the Web Team Leader and failed to monitor 
him, leading to an unacceptable web strategy document (#2). In looking for an 
appropriate way to scale down the scope of the project, the CTO saw an opportunity 
to propose an in-house system built by ITS. This led to further conflict, both within 
the PSG (#3), and across all Ministry web users (#9). 
Some conflict incidents can be directly attributed to the resolution of past incidents, 
such as those between #2 and #3, between #3 and #9, and between #3 and #4. 
However, in other cases, the relationship may be less causal and more contributory. 
For example, abandoning the first business case (#4) exacerbated pre-existing 
conflict involving Comms (#5, #6, and #7). Any predictions of ‘what would have 
happened’ if different resolution outcomes had ensued could only ever be 
speculative. 
The relationships in the conflict incident map combine to form chains of conflict 
incidents. The chain at the top of the diagram (from #1, #2, #3, #9, #11 to #13) 
moves from the project’s inception (#1) to its implementation (#13). Each incident 
in the chain required an ad hoc resolution that had consequential effects in terms of 
new conflict. The risks of seeking short-term solutions over long-term ones were 
borne out. 
The other incident chain lies at the bottom of the diagram (from #3, #4, #5-7 to #13). 
As the PGS were making the decision to have ITS develop a CMS based on Lotus 
Notes, no one expected there to be an issue with the concurrent development of the 
business case. Once the CTO took over, and a new business case was developed, 
five conflict incidents arose based on Comms’ discontent. Two were new issues 
appearing as a direct consequence of the new business case (#8, #12).  However, 
three were pre-existing concerns that flared up again when the first business case 
was abandoned (#5, #6, and #7). Comms remained unhappy, and this seriously 
affected the PSG's hope that Comms would make a good website conversion 
champion (#13).  
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The following sections examine the conflict incidents in detail. They are presented 
in chronological order, with the exception of those incidents with strong 
commonality over Comms involvement – these are described in one section at the 
end of the preliminary analysis. 
 
6.6. Original web strategy too expensive (#2) 
The newly appointed Web Team Leader was tasked with developing a web strategy 
document, and after almost a year of work, produced recommendations that would 
lead to unacceptable costs to management, “…almost three times the available 
funding!” [NZHIS Chief Advisor] 
The newly formed PSG responded quickly, removing the Web Team Leader from 
the project and deciding on a major change in direction. The Government policy that 
all government websites would be compliant with e-government standards had 
become more pressing, as a date for compliance had been set. Therefore, the need 
for a strategy document was abandoned in favour of a more concrete business case 
to reorganise content management and ensure Ministry websites would be e-
government compliant. This new approach was seen as preferable to  
“… the original, grand strategy, which I threw overboard a year after [the first 
draft] was delivered, which cost us a year. ...The organisation wasn’t ready to 
achieve [much of what was in the draft]. …At the end of the day, my doubts 
about it – which were largely instinctive, apart from the lack of money – were 
reasonably well-founded." [NZHIS Chief Advisor] 
However, some interviewees pointed out that, as both sponsor and budget holder, 
NZHIS could have done more to stay involved. Had there been an effective 
reporting channel from the Web Team Leader to the NZHIS Chief Advisor, and 
better direction given to the Web Team Leader, the conflict would likely have been 
less of a risk and resolved at an earlier stage.  
The length of time taken before a deliverable was produced was also an issue. One 
interviewee observed that bringing together the collective views of various 
stakeholders required a degree of skill in interpersonal relations, something the Web 
Team Leader did not possess, she said. She also believed that NZHIS should have 
monitored his efforts more closely. 
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“...[the Web Team Leader] was supposed to pull together the Communications 
side and the IT people, who are running [the intranet system]… He developed a 
web strategy, which was great. He also wasn’t the right person for the job. He 
didn’t get on with people very well - he tended to rub them up the wrong way, 
quite easily… He got everybody offside … and left.” [Comms Team Leader] 
According to another, the mistake was giving control to an independent business 
unit, expecting them to provide sufficient time and resources towards non-revenue 
generating activities. 
“And pretty much as we predicted, because NZHIS is a stand-alone business 
unit, they have done nothing with it for four or five years – to the stage where 
they had to move pretty quickly to actually meet the e-government standards…” 
[Comms Manager] 
 
6.7. Risk of Lotus Notes-based CMS (pre-decision) (#3) 
Having hired the project manager to lead a stakeholder representative team to create 
a business case based on the implementation of a content management system 
(CMS), the PSG was presented with an unexpected option. The CTO had proposed 
to build a CMS using Lotus Notes as the software platform, arguing a good CMS 
package would be unaffordable.  
"So, we, at IT, sat down and brainstormed some ideas around this, and we came 
up with the concept that we could do this in-house, using some reusable 
components and Lotus Notes. ...we have a development team that can do this." 
[CTO] 
Knowing how unpopular Lotus Notes had become with many in the Ministry in 
recent years, the Comms Manager and the NZHIS Chief Advisor were initially 
unimpressed with the offer, and conflict ensued within PSG meetings.  
"Between the three of us, there was probably a point in time when two of us 
were very, very sceptical about [the CTO’s] stated position – he believed that the 
Lotus toolset could do the job. It really was a ‘put up, or sit back and we will 
make some decisions for you, on your behalf’ type situation. … We certainly 
weren’t three Lotus Notes sycophants, sitting in a room, saying it will be Lotus, 
by God, or it will be nothing!" [NZHIS Chief Advisor] 
The Comms Manager was particularly doubtful, arguing that Lotus Notes was an 
“orphaned” system – with few other government departments still using it. 
Consequently, few saw value in learning apparently redundant skills. 
"Most staff in the Ministry do not like Lotus Notes. They never have, right from 
the day that it was introduced. … It was a star on the rise ten years ago, but it 
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seems to have fallen by the wayside, now. And from what I hear, IBM doesn’t 
support it anymore." [Comms Manager] 
Resolution was only achieved when an unusual deal had been struck. The CTO 
agreed to pay for the system development out of his operational ITS budget. Only 
when the developed system was provided within the tight deadline, and was proven 
to meet the functional and quality requirements, would ITS be reimbursed for its 
costs out of the project budget. It is unclear why the CTO was willing to take this 
risk, but it was strongly argued that it would be cheaper than purchasing a suitable 
CMS package.  
"Basically, [the CTO] took a development risk decision, and turned his Lotus 
Notes developers loose to develop the toolset, almost on a pure commercial 
basis. In other words, if it was not good enough, and wasn’t accepted, he 
wouldn’t get paid. So, effectively, he took an internal commercial risk." [NZHIS 
Chief Advisor] 
The only interviewee to mention this deal was the NZHIS Chief Advisor – 
suggesting the arrangement was not necessarily apparent to anyone outside the PSG. 
Given the nature of the risk, this would support any reluctance on the part of the 
CTO to admit to what he agreed (for example, one could imagine how his own staff 
might feel about the risk to their operating budget). The project manager had 
assumed the project fund was paying costs. 
“From a project sponsorship point of view, for a long time [the NZHIS] took a 
step back, and said to ITS, right – deliver! We have been backed into a position 
where we have to fund this project … so, give it to us! You are telling us what it 
is going to be on. You are telling us how it is going to happen. You have told us 
it can happen within the right timeframe." [Project manager] 
Although resolution was complete, the potential cost to ITS was high. The CTO had 
the power base of IT expertise when promoting a technological solution, but 
persuasion was not sufficient. The historical tension between Comms and ITS, 
coupled with Comms’ strong dislike of Lotus Notes, meant the Comms Manager 
was likely to be unconvinced. Furthermore, the Comms Manager observed that ITS 
was seen as having a “Lotus Notes culture”, where their experience, knowledge and 
confidence were built around Lotus Notes.  
6.8. First business case abandoned (#4) 
While the PSG members were debating the CTO’s radical proposal to build the CMS 
using Lotus Notes, the business case team had completed its first draft. The team 
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included representatives from NZHIS, Comms and ITS (with none from the PSG) 
and was headed by the project manager. Once consensus on the business case was 
reached, the project manager circulated the document to the PSG members for 
formal approval. To their surprise the CTO, having seen the document, refused to 
sign it. 
"We went through one iteration where we believed that we had the key players 
fully involved: NZHIS, Communications and ITS. We got to the stage where we 
believed that we had a viable business case, but were then surprised to find that 
there were objections within ITS over the direction of that business case." 
[Project Manager] 
Even more surprising, the CTO dismissed the ITS representative from the business 
case team and personally took his place. The CTO openly drove the business case 
process from that point, producing a second draft that effectively moved it from a 
client focus to a technology focus. The second draft was more in line with the 
CTO’s proposal to develop a new CMS using Lotus Notes. The Comms Manager 
was now under pressure to sign the new business case, even though the changes 
significantly reduced Comms’ input. 
"We had to, relatively significantly, rework the business case. ... [With the 
change in emphasis towards the technology,] there was a recognition that this 
might provide Comms with some benefit, but it might not give them everything 
they wanted. But if they didn’t sign up to this, then they were back to square 
one. … So, some of the goals that NZHIS and Comms had seen as being major 
deliverables from the project were very much pushed to a secondary level. … 
communication very much took a back seat." [Project Manager] 
While this swift and decisive response directly supported the new direction of the 
project, and in that sense was effective, conflict was not completely resolved. First, 
the mechanism set up by the PSG to create a business case was corrupted by the 
CTO, and it was not made completely clear to the business case team why this had 
happened. A team that had worked well together now found their joint outcome was 
time wasted, and they had to start again. Second, the CTO was now in control, and 
consensus was no longer an available option, adding more tension to the team. 
Third, everyone assumed that the senior ITS representative on the business case 
team (the IT Infrastructure Manager, in fact) had the mandate from the CTO to reach 
an agreement, making consequent events even more puzzling. The autocratic way 
the CTO handled the resolution process partly reflected his own individual 
behaviours, according to the project manager. 
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"I think the CTO has very strong opinions as to how the project should be run. 
So, I think that he was concerned that perhaps there wasn’t enough involvement, 
despite our efforts, of his people. ...I think he felt that the Ministry had invested 
heavily in Lotus Notes as a platform product for the Ministry, and he felt that 
any solution should be built around that product and platform." [Project 
Manager] 
The PSG did not receive feedback over the developing business case. Particularly 
surprising was the CTO’s failure to communicate with his own representative, prior 
to the representative’s removal from the team. 
"At the time, I felt that [the ITS representative] had been let down, because he, at 
that stage, believed that he was providing advice on behalf of ITS, and had 
support from further up. As I say, there was some kind of communication 
breakdown at some level. When the business case suddenly changed in direction, 
I thought ‘he’s been left out to dry’." [Project Manager] 
"I think [the CTO] was aware that something was happening, but it never really 
pushed any buttons or alarm panels for him. ... [It was] under his radar." [Project 
Manager] 
The PSG had the formal authority, but the Comms Manager accepted an 
increasingly passive role (discussed later) and the NZHIS Chief Advisor backed off , 
effectively leaving it to the CTO. On reflection, the project manager felt it was more 
about power and personality than authority. 
"If there are lessons to be learned, with hindsight, then you would take more 
notice of personalities within the Ministry, and know which ones can influence 
things, and which ones can’t." [Project Manager] 
 
6.9. Risk of Lotus Notes-based CMS – post-decision (#9) 
After the decision to build an in-house CMS using Lotus Notes was announced, the 
scepticism that first appeared in the PSG debates was reflected among the broader 
web user groups, including Comms staff. Lotus Notes was unpopular among website 
owners, and this decision would see them have even greater dependence on ITS for 
support.  
"A large number of people did not want the Lotus Notes platform – that was one 
where we started a long way behind the starting line, in trying to push that one 
through. There was a lot of politics around that." [NZHIS Chief Advisor] 
There were three issues of concern across the broad user community. First, many 
had felt that the opportunity to get a new CMS was lost by committing even more to 
Lotus Notes. Secondly, as a consequence of that commitment, users were also 
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committing more to ITS support. Historical experiences with both Lotus Notes and 
ITS support had led to a legacy of mistrust and frustration. Third, some user groups 
had already invested in other systems, and were clearly reluctant to abandon those 
investments given these uncertainties.  
"...there was that perception out there that ITS, as opposed to me, wasn’t 
necessarily having a customer focus. ...I’ve put myself right out there, and at 
times, I thought these [ITS] guys were going to let me down. But I always had 
the CTO’s full support. ... If that hadn’t happened, I doubt that we would have 
been able to deliver. There had been enough broken promises, I think, in the 
past." [User Liaison Officer] 
Bringing in the User Liaison Officer, and the project manager, both of whom 
worked closely with the users, went some way towards encouraging collaboration 
within the project. Ultimately, it was not until a successful version of the CMS was 
provided that both external and Comms users were able to see that functionality, 
usefulness and usability had all improved considerably.  
"So, we have had to show them that we have thought about this pretty well, and 
that we have been quite tough on our IT people to deliver good practice 
software, based on the Lotus Notes platform, and that that has been achieved."  
[NZHIS Chief Advisor] 
There were several reasons for the new system’s eventual broad acceptance by the 
user community: 
• There was the requirement that each Ministry website be e-government 
compliant, and migrating to the Lotus Notes based CMS provided an 
opportunity to meet it relatively painlessly. 
• The NZHIS Chief Advisor and the Comms Manager drew back from much 
of the decision-making, seeing the CTO as the main driver of what was now 
a more technical project. The CTO was in control and had very strong 
reasons to ensure the project succeeded. 
• The decision to appoint the Knowledge Manager for ITS to the role of user 
liaison proved to be very successful. Known for her strong interpersonal 
skills, she was able to provide the communication channel between ITS and 
the users – something noticeably absent from ITS’ normal support structure. 
• The contract project manager provided the communication channel between 
the users and other project stakeholders, including a regular reporting 
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mechanism to the PSG. He also worked very well with the User Liaison 
Officer. 
6.10. Anticipated external user resistance (#11) 
Historically, many external users built and ran sites outside Comms’ centralised 
control, employing a range of both technologies and arrangements to manage them. 
This had grown in number and size over the years preceding the project, and it was 
the realisation that some control over this growth was required that led to the project 
in the first place.  
Shortly after it was announced that ITS would build a CMS, the PGS determined it 
was likely there would be user resistance – especially from the external (non-Comms 
supported) users. Many of the directorate groups in the Ministry, such as Maori 
Health and the NZHIS, not only had specialist functions, but included staff with 
specialist skills and backgrounds. Consequently, several interviewees spoke of 
strong, yet diverse cultures within the Ministry, and that in some cases their websites 
reflected this culture – often referred to as their ‘brand’. Again, Maori Health was 
cited as a good example, where website design and content reflected Maori culture 
as well as health issues of particular concern to Maori.  
Thus there were several reasons why resistance was likely: 
• External users feared any degree of centralisation would threaten their 
cultural identity on their websites through attempts to standardise site 
characteristics. 
"...they avoided the central site, because they didn’t want to look like the 
Ministry. They wanted individual branding." [NZHIS Chief Advisor] 
• The PSG had neither power nor authority over the external users, as they 
were in semi-autonomous directorates outside the CID. 
• Some external users had used their own budgets to build and maintain their 
own systems, and saw a return to Lotus Notes as a risk to what they had 
already achieved. 
• Many of the external user groups had a poor understanding of what was 
involved in maintaining a website. 
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"... well, for most of the [user] websites, the lack of understanding of what a 
web presence really means [is an issue]. Very, very basic understandings, or 
misunderstandings, about what it means to place a website, when you are a 
large organisation, and what that means, what legal responsibilities you have, 
vis-à-vis things like the Archives Act. What are the perceptions that the 
external stakeholders have of a site that they know is run by part of a 
government department?" [NZHIS Chief Advisor] 
Consequently, the PSG acted to reduce or resolve some of the issues before conflict 
became manifest. As they had neither the power to obligate, nor the authority to 
direct, the PSG hoped to persuade the external users. They had a strong policy lever 
in that all government sites had to be e-government compliant.  
"There was a site that was non-compliant…and they were, bluntly, in the crap, 
because they hadn’t allowed for these site changes. They needed to do it, and 
they needed to do it quickly. …We were able to come along, like a knight in 
shining armour, and solve their problem for them." [CTO] 
So, the new CMS was framed as an opportunity to have it done for them, but 
without threatening the unique features of their website.  
"As it turns out, in nearly all cases, when shown the advantages of migrating to a 
centrally supported infrastructure and toolset, most of the site owners have been 
pretty relieved, to be quite honest. They thought that was a hell of a good idea. 
...We were able to show them that the same toolset actually gives them [their 
unique characteristics], and yet takes away some of their worries about 
information integrity, publishing processes, backup, disaster recovery, and 
fulfilling their archival and legislative responsibilities." [NZHIS Chief Advisor] 
The PSG brought in the User Liaison Officer and the project manager, who had the 
right personal qualities to be persuasive, to work closely with the users and build a 
strong communication channel between them and ITS – at least over the duration of 
the project. “Once we actually started talking to people we needed to, it was fine.” 
[User Liaison Officer] Accorded some flexibility in their roles, both the liaison 
officer and the project manager decided to take on the responsibilities of both testing 
and training. Consequently, ITS delivered a better product to Comms, and Comms 
were able to get more involved. 
“[The project manager] and I, by that stage, had such good knowledge of what 
had been delivered, that Comms could come back to us with a whole lot of 
questions. So, we ended up doing the training as well…” [User Liaison Officer] 
The NZHIS Chief Advisor admitted that the involvement of these two key people 
were possibly the critical factor leading to the success of the project in the end. Even 
as ITS representatives, they listened to the users’ concerns, while also keeping them 
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informed about the project. The users, including Comms, had not experienced this 
before.  
The PSG established an implementation strategy where each user would be dealt 
with individually, in a planned sequence. This proved to be another component of 
the project’s success. There were three reasons for this: 
• It accommodated the fact that the users were strongly heterogeneous – staff 
in different user groups had different backgrounds and different functions in 
the Ministry, effectively leading to differences in directorate-level cultures. 
This was relevant both to the design of their websites and to the way they 
needed to be approached by the project team. 
• There were also technological issues. Each user group employed their own 
directorate budget to pursue a web presence within the Ministry. There were 
varying hardware and software solutions employed. Some of these were 
maintained by the users’ own technical staff, while others were dependent on 
third parties outside the Ministry. ITS argued that the migration to the new 
system would simplify things. 
“[So, we said], if you [migrate], then all you have to do is change the logo, 
and whammo, you have got a new website, and you didn’t have to do any 
hard work on it. And that used to cost you $50,000. So, we were playing on 
the value proposition to them, in terms of getting some leverage in places 
they might not have wanted to go in the first place." [CTO] 
• The one-by-one strategy also enabled them to be selective about who they 
work with first – seeking to increase the likelihood of early successes. This 
included the fact the PSG wanted a champion user group to help promote the 
migration exercise. 
This strategy generally worked well by reducing the potential for resistance in most 
cases. This also meant less drastic measures were required to achieve cooperation. 
"...it probably cost us a lot of time, but we chose to absorb that time. We 
remained within program budget, because we had a couple of lucky wins, really, 
and that has enabled us to actually stretch the time to take this fairly low-key 
approach. I think that has probably enabled us to not have to bring out some of 
the other mechanisms. It means there are no bodies on the path behind us, 
really." [NZHIS Chief Advisor] 
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However, one of the more serious obstacles was the ITS culture of indifference and 
inward focus. The User Liaison Officer noted how she was worried at one point that 
the ITS development team would not come through as promised, and how important 
it was to have the CTO backing her up (using his authority) to ensure ITS was not 
seen as an impediment. The project manager also recounted an illustration of ITS’ 
inability to work effectively with users and other project team staff, and how he too 
had to escalate to the CTO. It is not clear to what degree the CTO was aware of ITS’ 
widespread reputation for poor client support. Even so, it had clearly been in 
evidence during the project, often requiring escalation to avert user disgruntlement 
and project delays. There was nothing to suggest that ITS culture was likely to 
change much post-project, and so would remain a threat to future IT projects. 
Several interviewees identified NZHIS as one of the more challenging external user 
groups they had to deal with. The NZHIS website was targeted early during 
implementation, and the project team had assumed the co-sponsors of the project 
would be no trouble over migration. But the NZHIS technical staff interpreted the 
project objectives as likely to interfere with their ability to process and present 
statistical information – a major function they were responsible for. Consequently, 
they initially refused to cooperate, and the NZHIS Chief Advisor had to get 
involved. 
"I have been able to stand back, in this semi-independent role, and I eye-balled 
my own unit in the same way that I have eye-balled others, and said ‘You have 
to come along. I am sorry, yes, you have got a lovely website, and it does 
comply with the government’s accessibility guidelines, and I applaud you for 
that, but you are going to consolidate onto the Ministry one, because there are 
other business drivers to do so." [NZHIS Chef Advisor] 
In hindsight, it appeared the NZHIS technicians had misinterpreted the intentions of 
the project, highlighting perhaps another internal communication problem. 
Persuasive reassurances from the User Liaison Officer and the project manager were 
not sufficient this time, nor were obligations to be e-government compliant – they 
had already achieved that on their own. In the end, the conflict was escalated by the 
project manager to the NZHIS Chief Advisor, the latter having to take the NZHIS 
staff to task and making it clear they had to cooperate – an exercise of authority 
within the NZHIS. 
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6.11. Conflict driven by Comms ( #1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13) 
Comms was at the centre of half the recorded conflict incidents. That is, in each of 
these incidents, it was Comms which was most concerned about the current or future 
implications of project-related events. As early as the allocation of the project 
budget, the historical relationship conflict between Comms and ITS (#1) was 
explicitly identified as a threat to the project.  
"Where ITS have been working with Comms – it hadn’t always been an easy 
relationship, because they weren’t necessarily good at enunciating what their 
requirements were. ...and ITS is not necessarily that wonderful about 
communicating back." [User Liaison Officer] 
The DDG dealt with it at a governance level, by putting the NZHIS Chief Advisor of 
NZHIS in charge.  
“My role, really, has been a facilitative role…  I have exercised budgetary 
delegation – in other words, I have paid the bills. This set me up nicely, in some 
respects, to chair the Steering Committee, and to be the project sponsor. And 
that, coupled with holding the money, has allowed us to pursue an approach that 
might have been harder for [the key stakeholders – Comms, ITS and NZHIS] 
who were closer to the project itself. That sort of independence has been of real 
value.” [NZHIS Chief Advisor] 
Even so, not everyone was pleased with the decision, including Comms, which felt 
he did miss an important opportunity when they abandoned the web strategy 
document. Many of the issues raised by Comms were interrelated and came down to 
concerns over workload and being valued. The latter referred to the pride taken in 
web publishing in general, and content approval in particular. This value system was 
part of their culture, with behaviours such as working long hours consistent with 
ensuring high quality work. Comms perceived the project taking this role away and 
placing it in the hands of the less-qualified external users (#5). They felt this was 
happening because higher levels of management, including the NZHIS Chief 
Advisor and the CTO, did not appreciate the knowledge and expertise required to do 
the job well.  
"At present, [Comms] are doing the three main processes, which are: entering 
content, approving, and publishing. The aim [of the project] is to separate those 
three roles.  ...Comms was quite keen on having content owners entering their 
own content, but then got nervous about what the implications were for that." 
[User Liaison Officer] 
Specifically, Comms was concerned about content approval. There were fewer 
issues over entering content (that could fall to the users) and publishing (that would 
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remain with Comms). Although content approval could still be allocated to Comms 
under the new system, it was expected that many external users might retain this 
role.  
"Of course, they could see the benefits, they wanted the content creation side. 
But they really weren’t too keen on the fact that they would lose control on this. 
...This came down to Comms saying they wanted to be the publisher and the 
approver. And other people saying, well maybe you shouldn’t be." [CTO] 
In another example, Comms’ detailed proposals about web centralisation and 
standardisation were abandoned in the project process without consultation or 
explanation (#6). Again, they did not feel listened to. They felt their views were not 
valued. The emphasis of the business case shifted from a consolidation of 
stakeholders (through web governance) to a consolidation of websites (through 
technology). 
“The Web Consolidation Project is really the only opportunity for people to meet 
– that is, for the right people to be in the same room together.” [Comms Team 
Leader] 
The Comms Team Leader felt that if Comms had effective responsibility to manage 
the web presence, then she, as publishing team leader, would end up defacto 
manager.  
"I don’t think that I am the right person, and I don’t think I necessarily have the 
right role. Well, I certainly do not have the resource. …I think somebody who is 
more experienced in the web should be leading the Ministry forward on where 
we are going on the web. ...I think that I can add huge value, and I am very 
happy being in charge of the content, and being responsible for the content, and 
making sure that everything has been signed off..." [Comms Team Leader] 
Another common theme was Comms’ view that they were seriously under-resourced 
to do their job properly. While this was an issue historically (pre-project), it came to 
a head when Comms determined the project objectives – bringing more external 
users onto a common software platform – were likely to lead to considerably more 
work. Again, their calls for more resources went unheeded by the PSG (#7).  
Comms had direct representation on the PSG, but by this time the Comms Manager 
no longer wished to be very involved in the project (see the following discussion of 
incident #8), and did not lobby as hard for Comms’ interests as he could have.  
"I don’t think the Steering Group ever said that we weren’t able to [get 
additional resources], it’s just that it hadn’t been explicitly stated, and nobody 
had been employed.” [Comms Team Leader] 
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The CTO, who was now driving the project, was convinced the workload for 
Comms would be less post-project than it was at the time of the conflict. The NZHIS 
Chief Advisor, who managed the budget, felt the issue was outside the scope of the 
project, and needed to be discussed with the DDG independently of the project.  
On one occasion, Comms successfully negotiated more resources, albeit on a 
temporary basis. They found the time and effort required to specify the new CMS in 
some detail was draining, and made more difficult by, first, their lack of knowledge 
of such systems, and second, the already had a heavy publishing involvement in a 
major national promotion for meningitis vaccinations at the time (#12).  
"I guess the conflict that we have had, is that while we have hugely appreciated 
the fact that there is this project, and while it is fantastic having it run through IT 
– because (a) they had paid for it; and (b) that we have got this upgraded system, 
upgraded tools, etc., but there hasn’t been any resource allocated to 
Communications. 
So, it was great that there was this Notes developer working on our tools, and it 
was great that we developed the specifications, but it was all done out of 
‘business-as-usual’ funds....We were already stretched; it is already an 
impossible task. I have to write the service specifications, review them, and 
review each test – each time there would be something to do. …We were always 
under pressure, because the project kept going on and on, because it took us so 
long to give them the feedback, because we didn’t have any time!" [Comms 
Team Leader] 
In this incident, the PSG accepted this was an issue, and brought in more help during 
the specification stage. 
Because Comms had these major reservations about the new system, the PSG could 
see they might not make the best project champions as originally hoped (#13). 
Despite the positive working relationships with ITS through the User Liaison 
Officer and the project manager, and the genuine benefits provided by the new 
system (which even Comms were pleased with), it was clear they would not 
unreservedly support the new system.  
“We wanted to have champions. So, because we had done the main Ministry 
web site, and the Ministry web site was run by Comms, we thought Comms 
would be good champions. But, in fact, they were still dithering around this 
whole issue about what does it mean for us? Who is going to approve the web 
site? … They were good at saying that this is a really good process for the user. 
But they weren’t very good champions for the whole process, because they were 
happy about one bit, but weren’t very happy about the other bit." [CTO] 
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Fortunately for the PSG, they had successfully convinced one of the major external 
users, Maori Health, to be their champion. 
"I didn’t actually consider [Maori Health] difficult, but we absolutely did have to 
win them over, because they had this really bad track record with ITS, trying to 
engage for help. …One of the good things was, because we had done the MIH 
site with Comms, we actually had something to show Maori Health. … A lot of 
it was regaining people’s trust, and that ITS could actually deliver." [User 
Liaison Officer] 
Comms’ concerns also accounted for the confusion over system ownership. The 
Comms Manager had agreed, early on in the project, that Comms would become the 
system owners. However, as time went on, he changed his mind, seeing it as a 
“trap”, as he described it. The Comms Manager’s suspicions were based on the 
assumptions that the workload and resource issues would be set aside during the 
project, and would only emerge once it was all Comms’ responsibility (#8).  
“…they are busy trying to ‘duck shove it’20 to someone else – basically my 
team. And my team are responsible for the content. Then we have the IT people, 
who are responsible for making it go, and redeveloping it. So, it is quite 
fragmented.” [Comms Manager] 
This accounted for the Comms Manager’s gradual withdrawal of interest in many of 
the project issues – he did not want to be seen as part of the project process. He did 
not communicate this to his own publishing team. Both the NZHIS Chief Advisor 
and the CTO, however, remained firmly convinced that the system owner was 
Comms, and that the Comms Manager would be assuming primary responsibility for 
looking after it.  
Overall, Comms-centred conflict was successfully resolved on two occasions. When 
Comms was deemed unsuitable to be their project champion, the PSG was flexible 
enough to seek another champion (#13). The other incident was resolved when the 
PSG accepted Comms needed further, albeit temporary, resources to help them 
specify the new CMS (#12).  
On three occasions Comms-centred conflict was dealt with only insofar as to keep 
the project on track, but remained unresolved from Comms’ point of view. It was 
unclear to what degree Comms’ control over web content would remain post-project 
(#6). System ownership was resolved formally as the Comms Manager reluctantly 
                                                 
20
 A colloquial phrase meaning to accept responsibility, only to pass it on to someone else. 
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agreed to accept ownership – yet subsequent behaviour suggested it remained 
unresolved, and could yet manifest itself some time post-implementation (#8). 
Certainly the systemic, culture-based problems users (especially Comms) had with 
ITS were not dealt with, except temporarily over the project’s duration. From a 
tactical point of view, decisions made – particularly by the PSG – had propelled the 
project forward to an apparently successful conclusion. Nevertheless, from a 
strategic perspective, the long-standing grievances borne by Comms became 
prominent as a consequence of the project, yet were generally brushed aside. 
Although strapped for money and time, the PSG could have raised the issues 
formally with the DDG, who was not only the project co-sponsor, but was also the 
manager of the CID, including ITS and Comms. Instead, Comms had come away 
with a grudging acceptance of the new toolset, but retained deep concerns about web 
management and governance, coupled with workload issues and ongoing 
relationship conflict with ITS. Future web-based projects could well be impacted by 
these same issues. For example, there was no guarantee that ITS could employ 
successful communicators such as the User Liaison Officer and the project manager 
in the future. The fact that there were clear indicators of all three conflict 
components: disagreement, negative emotions and interference (respectively 7/7, 6/7 
and 6/7 incidents) indicated the seriousness of the strategically unresolved conflict. 
6.12. Conflict Resolution 
The following examines the assessment of the dimensions of conflict, the 
corresponding resolution outcomes, and the primary targets across all conflict 
incidents. Recall that the level of conflict involved in a given conflict incident can be 
accessed through an examination of each of the three key dimensions of conflict: 
disagreement, negative emotions, and perceived interference with objectives.  
Conflict resolution outcomes are determined by comparing the level of pre-
resolution conflict with the level of post-resolution conflict. First, each dimension of 
conflict is assessed for each conflict incident, both before and after resolution. Each 
assessment leads to one of the following allocations: YES (there is clear conflict 
with respect to this dimension); Some (there is evidence of conflict with respect to 
this dimension, but the level is not clear); NO (there is no evidence of conflict with 
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respect to this dimension); and Uncert (there is insufficient information to make an 
assessment). 
There are five possible outcomes for each dimension of conflict comparison: E 
(conflict has been eliminated); R (the level of conflict has been reduced); U (the 
level of conflict remains unchanged); T (conflict has been terminated – that is, no 
further resolution attempted); S (the level of conflict has escalated); and ? 
(uncertain). 
For each conflict incident, a positive outcome can be defined as one where each 
dimensional level of conflict is either reduced (R) or eliminated (E). Conversely, a 
negative outcome can be defined as one where each dimensional level of conflict is 
one of: unchanged (U), escalated (S) or terminated (T). A partially positive 
outcome can be defined as one where two dimensional outcomes are positive and 
one is negative. A partially negative outcome can be defined as one where two 
dimensional outcomes are negative and one is positive. 
The primary target of a conflict incident can be any combination of three types: 
task content (conflict over the nature of the task itself), task process (conflict over 
how the task should be carried out), and relationship (conflict due to an awareness of 
interpersonal incompatibilities).  
For this case study, the assessments of levels of conflict, both before and after 
resolution, along with the corresponding resolution outcomes, are briefly described 
in the summary table found in Appendix F (Table F-1). These results are condensed 
in Table 6.3.   
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Table 6.3: A summary of the changes in levels of conflict after resolution for each conflict incident 
# Incident Target Conflict (Pre-Resolution) Conflict (Post-Resolution) Resolution Outcome 
Disagreement Negative 
Emotions 
Interference Disagreement Negative 
Emotions 
Interference Disagreement Negative 
Emotions 
Interference 
1 Relationship conflict between 
ITS and Comms (anticipated) 
Relationship YES YES YES YES Some YES U R U 
2 Original web strategy too 
expensive  
Task (content) YES Some YES NO Uncert NO T ? T 
3 Risk of Lotus Notes based 
CMS (Pre-decision)  
Task (content / process) 
[Relationship] 
YES YES YES NO NO Some E E R 
4 First business case 
abandoned  
Task (content / process) 
[Relationship] 
YES Uncert YES Some YES YES R S U 
5 Comms losing control over 
web content  
Task (content) YES Some YES Some Some NO R U E 
6 Control over Ministry web 
presence. 
Task (content) YES YES YES YES YES YES U U U 
7 Web resources for Comms  Task (process) YES YES YES Some Some Some R R R 
8 Business owner of the 
implemented system 
Task (content) 
[Relationship] 
YES YES YES YES YES YES U U U 
9 Risk of Lotus Notes based 
CMS (Post-decision) 
Task (content / process) 
[Relationship] 
YES YES YES Some Some Some R R R 
10 A common approach to project 
management and governance  
Task (process) YES Some YES Some Uncert Mostly NO R ? R 
11 User resistance (anticipated) Task (content) 
[Relationship] 
YES Some YES Mostly NO Mostly 
NO 
Mostly NO R R R 
12 specifying a new CMS  Task (process) YES YES Some NO NO NO E E R 
13 Looking for a website 
conversion champion 
Task (process) 
[Relationship] 
YES YES YES NO NO NO E E E 
14 ITS fail to keep promise: IP 
addresses  
Task (process) YES YES YES Uncert Uncert Uncert ? ? ? 
Resolution Outcome: T = Terminated; E = Eliminated; R = Reduced; U = Unchanged; S = Escalated; ? = Uncertain (in terms of direction & degree of 
change) 
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The frequencies of resolution outcome types are related to primary target types in 
Table 6.4. Overall, 8/13 of the conflict incidents achieved positive, or partially 
positive, outcomes. In fact, all but one of them was positive. Conversely, 5/13 
incidents achieved negative (3) or partially negative (2) outcomes. However, it is 
difficult to determine whether or not a 63% success rate suggests much more than 
‘room for improvement’. According equal status to each conflict incident in this 
statistic is not reasonable, given the incidents varied widely in terms of significance 
and context.   
 
Table 6.4: The frequency of resolution outcomes across all 13 conflict incidents, 
categorised by primary target 
Primary 
Target 
Resolution 
Outcome 
1. 
Relationship 
2. 
Task 
(content) 
3. 
Task 
(process) 
4. 
Task (content 
& process) 
 
TOTAL 
Positive 
 1 4 2 7 
Partially positive 
 1   1 
Partially negative 1   1 2 
Negative 
 3   3 
TOTAL 1 5 4 3  
 
The inter-stakeholder relationship was the primary target of one incident (#1), 
where the conflict was anticipated. This assessment of risk proved accurate as the 
long-term tensions between ITS and their user base (particularly Comms) spilled 
over into this project, contributing to conflict incidents on at least 6/13 occasions (or 
7/13 if the anticipated relationship conflict is included). It is not possible to know to 
what degree relationship conflict would have been a problem if it had not been 
anticipated, and acted upon, in the early stages. Even so, it is clear it was not fully 
eliminated as the project progressed, as the level of relationship conflict barely 
improved. 
Task content was a major target in 8/13 incidents (columns 2 and 4 in Table 6.4). 
Many of these involved Comms, as they felt their requirements and proposals were 
abandoned and replaced with something likely to be just as, or even more, onerous 
(#3, 4, 5, 6, 8). Task content-based conflict was generally poorly resolved (column 
2). Of the three conflict dimensions, disagreement and interference were more 
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successfully reduced than negative emotions, suggesting this dimension may either 
be harder to manage or given less attention. 
Task process was a major target in 8/14 incidents (columns 3 and 4 in Table 6.4), 
which suggests some of the project governance arrangements were not working well. 
Again, Comms was a major contributor to the conflict, as they often felt either 
locked out of the decision-making process or poorly represented within the decision-
making process (#2, 4, 7, 13). However, process-based conflict was positively 
resolved in every case (column 3). The question arises as to why process-based 
conflict should be resolved more effectively than content-based conflict. The 
analysis that follows suggests there is no one reason for this. 
The majority of the conflict incidents identified in this case involved a combination 
of the three major stakeholder groups of the project: Comms, ITS, and NZHIS. 
Comms were the most significant user group, as they handled many websites, but 
external users (those within the Ministry, but outside Comms involvement) were a 
disparate collection of independent websites that could only be meaningfully treated 
as a group to a very limited degree. 
Although only one incident of relationship conflict between Comms and ITS was 
raised during interviews, it was noted by all interviewees but one – the CTO, who 
manages ITS. The direction of conflict appeared to be one-way, that is, ITS’ 
indifference and lack of communication considerably frustrated Comms, but there 
were no indications that ITS staff had any negative emotions with respect to Comms. 
Their lack of client focus suggests they were either unaware of the negative 
emotions they were generating, or simply didn’t care. 
Drawing from the preliminary findings, the following three sections examine the 
contributions of each of the constructs identified in the research framework. Each 
section focuses on a different research question. 
6.13. Analysis Addressing Research Question 1 
The first research question focused on contextual, or environmental, effects. 
RQ1: In what way, and to what extent, do environmental elements affect the 
conflict resolution process and its outcomes? 
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Each of the environmental elements identified in the research framework (culture, 
power, history, individual behaviours) are now examined across the conflict 
incidents identified in this case. A summary appears at the end of this analysis. 
These effects are then considered holistically, testing the framework for 
completeness, and identifying interactive and dominant effects. 
Culture was an important factor in five separate incidents. In two of them, Comms 
felt they weren’t accorded credit and attention due; they weren’t listened to. They 
valued their responsibility for content management, but maintained their belief that 
they were under-resourced and underappreciated. Early behaviours based on seeking 
consensus to resolve the situation gradually evolved into passive acceptance and a 
degree of resentment.  
ITS culture appeared as a significant factor in three separate incidents. ITS had what 
one interviewee called a “Lotus Notes culture”, where the senior technical staff have 
been working with a Lotus Notes platform for so long, it was what they knew best, 
and what they felt most comfortable applying.  
However, it was ITS client support that users were particularly frustrated about. 
Even the project manager and the User Liaison Officer, both working for ITS, 
expressed concerns about ITS development staff, in terms of communication with 
users, prioritisation of jobs, and the constant need to escalate issues to the CTO.  
Culturally, the external user groups were quite diverse, independent minded, and 
semiautonomous. While a third of all Ministry web users fell under the wing of 
Comms, the rest operated web sites with varying degrees of dependence on external 
products and support. Many of these external users had marked cultural artefacts, 
often represented through their websites (content, style, logos, etc.). The PSG 
anticipated the threat to the users’ cultural brands could lead to resistance. 
Furthermore, these cultures were diverse, and it was strongly felt by the PSG that a 
collective treatment would not work. 
Table 6.5 describes the cultures of these three important stakeholder groups, by 
applying the four dimensional model based on assessing their respective: beliefs, 
values, attitudes and behaviours. 
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In terms of power, collective resistance remains one of the more potent ways to 
influence the direction of an IT project. One of the more important incidents – 
anticipated resistance from external users – was sourced from the power they held to 
resist migration if they were not convinced of the value of the project for them. They 
obligated the PSG to listen to them, treat them well, and persuade them. 
Influence was also apparent at the individual level. The NZHIS Chief Advisor used 
his power as both overseer of the budget and the chair of the PSG in such a way that 
the CTO felt obliged to accept the demanding requirements if he wanted to develop 
the CMS in Lotus Notes.  
Once committed to building the new CMS, the CTO was seen by the other PSG 
members as informally taking charge of the project. This gave him the power to 
make decisions with the knowledge the PSG would back him up. This included both 
the abandonment of the first business case draft and the removal of the ITS 
representative from the business case team. To align the business case with his new 
project, the CTO had no qualms about quietly removing Comms’ web governance 
proposal. He also used his knowledge and experience to avoid the formal 
involvement of the PMO (and their template-based project processes) by 
restructuring the project into a collection of smaller projects. 
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Table 6.5: Cultural dimensions and relevant context of each of ITS, Comms and the 
external website owners 
 ITS COMMS EXTERNAL SITE 
OWNERS 
CONTEXT    
PSG 
Representation 
CTO – a strong personality 
who represents ITS 
interests well 
Comms Manager – a 
weaker personality who 
does not represent Comms 
interests well 
NZHIS Chief Advisor (PSG 
Chair) – a strong 
personality who does what 
is seen as necessary to get 
job done 
Project 
Representation 
Client Liaison Officer; 
Project Manager (post-
business case) 
Comms Team Leader Individual Directorate 
website managers 
Capability Authority to make 
decisions on IT-related 
issues, including work 
priority; 
Power to override policy 
Little authority to make 
decisions (eg workload, 
resources, scope of 
responsibility); 
Little power to resist 
decisions 
Authority to make decisions 
about own websites (report 
to DDGs); 
Power to resist members of 
PSG, due to high level of 
independence 
CULTURE    
Beliefs See themselves as final 
arbiters of what is 
important in terms of IT 
support 
See themselves as 
providing specialist, high 
quality publication services 
Mostly see themselves as 
independently responsible 
for their own systems 
(including websites);  
Each seen as different from 
others 
Values  Degree of independence 
from users; 
Persevering with Lotus 
Notes, a comfort zone for 
technical staff  
Being appreciated by 
senior management; 
Having sufficient resources 
to do their job well; 
Having control over the 
publication processes, 
including content, to ensure 
standards and high quality 
Mostly independent from 
Ministry, including ITS in 
some cases; 
Ability to promote own 
‘brand’; 
Each controls own budget 
Attitudes Indifference towards users, 
including Comms 
Pride over contributions; 
Feelings of victimisation 
and under-appreciation – 
sometimes despaired that 
nothing will ever change; 
Think poorly of ITS 
Strongly protective of own 
‘brand’; 
In some cases, protective 
of own system  when 
developed independently of 
ITS 
Think poorly of ITS 
Behaviours Uncommunicative over 
system support requests; 
Determine own work 
priorities, rather than those 
of users 
Pursued better funding & 
recognition; 
Sometimes refused to 
cooperate 
Initially resisted until won 
round (a few remained 
resistant) 
 
174 
On the other hand, the ITS Knowledge Manager was seconded to the newly-created 
role of Client Liaison to help prevent external user resistance. Both she and the 
project manager were able to successfully influence the migration outcome through 
persuasion, rather than obligation or coercion. 
Historically, Comms, along with many other website users within the Ministry, had 
long been troubled by the support provided by ITS. There was no sense of how user 
job requests were prioritised, nor was there much communication between users and 
ITS. Sometimes the software had not been tested properly. Furthermore, the Lotus 
Notes-based systems were becoming antiquated and difficult to use. Lotus Notes had 
already been abandoned by most other government departments – yet ITS remained 
strong advocates of the platform. These behaviours were the manifest outcomes of 
cultural traits (client indifference and devotees of Lotus Notes) referred to earlier. 
As a consequence, according to one interviewee, approximately two thirds of the 
website users opted for ITS-independent, Lotus Notes-free solutions. These external 
user groups were able to do so for two reasons. First, they were based in directorates 
outside the CID, providing considerable independence for the deputy director 
generals in each directorate. This made it very difficult for ITS to implement any 
kind of Ministry-wide strategic web-based initiative. Secondly, directorate 
independence extended to each DDG receiving his or her own budget with 
considerable freedom to use it as they see fit. Over the years, not only were some 
user groups able to refuse to cooperate with ITS, but they were in a financial 
position to pursue alternative solutions, including the use of commercial packages, 
consultants, software development contractors, and even hiring their own 
development staff. 
However, unlike those users who went their own way, Comms continued to operate 
directly through ITS. Comms was their largest single user group, as ITS ran the 
main Ministry website, along with many others. Over time, Comms’ dependency on 
ITS, coupled with the unsatisfactory support they were receiving, meant that 
relationship conflict developed between them. Even the DDG of the CID was aware 
of this, and anticipating project-related conflict, installed a third party (NZHIS) to 
oversee the project, as both Comms and ITS were major stakeholders. The NZHIS 
Chief Advisor was allocated the roles of project overseer and budget holder. This 
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was also reflected in the membership of the project governing body, where both ITS 
and Comms were represented at managerial level, but the NZHIS Chief Advisor was 
the chair. Where conflict arose, the NZHIS Chief Advisor was expected to either 
seek consensus or cast the deciding vote. 
Comms’ concerns about overwork and under resourcing had been circulating for 
several years – they had frequently put forward proposals to improve the situation, 
but to little avail. However, these concerns were exacerbated when their views were 
collected for both the strategy document and the business case, only to see them 
evaporate, first by the rejection of the strategy document, and then by the rewriting 
of the business case. These actions were perceived as further examples of their work 
and views being disregarded. That these historical concerns were not well 
anticipated was clear when the PSG was forced to abandon its hope of using Comms 
as their project champion.  
All five protagonists (the three PSG members, the project manager and the User 
Liaison Officer) demonstrated that individual behaviours can have significant 
effects on conflict resolution. For example, all three members of the PSG showed a 
lack of communication with their own staff on occasion. The NZHIS Chief 
Advisor’s own unit did not understand the implications of the project, and proved to 
be one of the biggest resistors until he became personally involved. The Comms 
Manager explained little of what went on in PSG meetings, leaving his Comms staff 
occasionally perplexed as to why certain decisions were made. Although the CTO 
consulted his development team over the viability of building their own CMS, he 
didn’t appear to drive the issues of urgency and good client communication home to 
them. The project manager’s frustration with ITS’ broken promises, and the constant 
need to escalate to the CTO would suggest even the CTO wasn’t able to counteract 
the ITS culture, and there was a lot at stake for him. There were no indications that 
anyone outside the PSG was even aware of what the CTO was risking with this 
project. 
Initially, the lack of a functioning feedback mechanism could be traced to neglect. 
The NZHIS Chief Advisor was heavily involved in other projects, also at a 
governance level, and did not seek progress reports from the Web Team Leader 
during the early stages of the project. This resulted in wasted time and resources, 
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unnecessary conflict, and the abandonment of the strategy document. They had to 
start again. 
Other examples illustrating the effects of individual behaviours include: 
• The CTO had strong opinions on running IT projects. Once internal CMS 
development was agreed upon by the PGS, the CTO brushed aside the 
business case development process (originally set up by the PGS) and took 
control. 
• The Comms Manager was not seen as an effective representative of Comms 
staff concerns while being a member of the PSG. In his position, Comms 
staff thought he would be able to discuss some of the governance issues 
while working with the other key players. He did not, nor did he remain 
closely involved with the project once ITS had taken over.  
• Originally the Knowledge Manager for ITS, the User Liaison Officer was 
seconded to the project with a client liaison role precisely because she was 
well regarded as someone who communicated well, made a point of 
understanding user concerns, yet always moved things forward. This was 
seen by all interviewees (but one) as very successful. 
• The project manager was contracted to manage first, the business case for the 
project, then the project itself. He also turned out to be a strong 
communicator and worked well with both clients in general and the User 
Liaison Officer in particular. The NZHIS Chief Advisor was adamant that 
the project would not have been successful if they had not ended up with two 
people such as the User Liaison Officer and the project manager, who earned 
both trust and respect, and eventually persuaded most of the external users to 
migrate. They even provided Comms with its first positive experience (for 
some time) working with ITS. 
The preliminary analyses addressing the first research question are briefly described 
in the summary table found in Appendix F (Table F-2). These results are condensed 
in Table 6.6. 
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Table 6.6: A summary of the impacts of environmental factors on conflict resolution for each conflict incident. 
# Incident Culture Power History Individual 
Behaviours 
1 Relationship conflict between ITS and Comms (anticipated) 
  ITS/Comms – historical 
relationship conflict 
 
2 Original web strategy too expensive  
   the NZHIS Chief 
Advisor – opted to spend 
time elsewhere 
3 Risk of Lotus Notes based CMS (Pre-decision)  
the CTO/ITS – “Lotus 
Notes culture” 
the NZHIS Chief Advisor – as 
chair & sponsor 
the Comms Manager – Comms 
/ ITS tension  
the Comms Manager – 
poor Comms rep; 
4 First business case abandoned   the CTO – as PSG member, took over business case team 
 the CTO – “strong 
opinions” on running 
project 
5 Comms losing control over web content  
Comms – pride & 
dedication in their roles 
the CTO – imposed new 
process with toolset 
Comms – built up culture 
through history of dedication 
 
6 Control over Ministry web presence. 
Comms – not being listened 
to 
the CTO – dumped governance 
provisions for CMS focus 
  
7 Web resources for Comms    Comms – history of under-resourcing 
the project manager – 
helped Comms draft 
request 
8 Business owner of the implemented system 
 
   the Comms Manager – 
feeble resistance; poor 
communication 
9 Risk of Lotus Notes based CMS (Post-decision) 
  Users – dislike Lotus Notes & 
ITS support 
the User Liaison Officer 
/Project Manager – 
strong communication & 
understanding 
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10 A common approach to project management and governance  
 the CTO – power to redefine 
project structure 
 the CTO – experienced 
with project budgets; 
follower of PRINCE2; 
11 User resistance (anticipated) Ext users – branded individualism 
ITS – indifference to clients 
& inward focus; dedicated 
to Lotus Notes 
Ext users – anticipated 
resistance  
PSG – no power (by 
obligation) over ext users 
the User Liaison Officer /the 
project manager – successfully 
persuasive 
Ext users – gradual  & sig. 
investment in own website 
the User Liaison Officer 
/the project manager – 
personal qualities to 
persuade users to migrate 
12 specifying a new CMS    Comms – no experience with CMS 
 
13 Looking for a website conversion champion 
  Comms – unresolved issues 
spill over 
 
14 ITS fail to keep promise: IP addresses  
ITS – client indifference & 
inward focus 
 ITS – long history of “broken 
promises” 
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The following extends the above analysis by examining the environmental elements 
holistically, as part of a broader, interactive system. This is done by considering, in 
turn, each of completeness, interactive effects, and dominant effects. 
Completeness, in terms of environmental effects on conflict resolution, refers to the 
identification of any significant effects that could not be explained by those already 
identified in the framework. In this case, virtually every important factor identified 
within the collected data appeared to meet the criteria to be represented by one or 
more of the constructs identified in the research model, including the emergent 
individual behaviours. The one exception involved an external authority (the New 
Zealand government in this case) imposing standardised website requirements on all 
government websites, including those in the Health Ministry. While it can be argued 
that all organisations must comply with various regulations, this situation was 
somewhat unique given that the edict only became an issue over the course of the 
project, and further proved to be a key component when convincing external users to 
migrate to the ITS system. Consequently, it seems more appropriate to incorporate 
this environmental factor under the category ‘Other’. 
Interactive effects refer to those environmental effects on conflict resolution that 
occur due to the combined effect of two or more environmental factors. That so 
many conflict incidents, in this case, involved major contextual factors (often 
several) affecting conflict resolution was not entirely surprising. There were 
numerous stakeholder groups, including Comms, ITS, NZHIS, PMO, Maori Health 
and each of the other external users as individual groups, all involved at different 
points in different combinations. Further complexity was introduced when key 
individuals’ behaviours were also found to affect the resolution process.  
There were several examples of relevant interactions between environmental 
elements. For example, the PSG anticipated potentially strong resistance from many 
of the external users (#11). First, the external users had the power to resist, as the 
PSG had no authority over them. Second, many of the external users had strong 
cultures of their own, as represented through their own web site brands. Fear of 
brand loss provided a reason to resist. Third, many of the external users had invested 
considerable time, effort and money to create what they currently have, providing 
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another reason to resist. Finally, many were aware of ITS’ culture of Lotus Notes 
and client indifference, offering yet another reason. 
So, where resistance was anticipated, the power imbalance provided the external 
users with the means to influence the result. Historical effects (external users 
organised their own systems; ITS neglected its clients), along with culture clashes 
(between the external users and ITS), provided the external users with the reasons to 
influence the result. Where resistance did finally occur, the combination of the 
interpersonal skills offered by the User Liaison Officer and the project manager, 
with their ability to persuade external users to migrate, resulted in many successes. 
A dominant factor is one that considerably outweighs others in terms of its effects 
on conflict resolution. In this case, there were several occasions when there was 
more than one dominant environmental factor for a given conflict incident. For 
example, incident #3 involved direct confrontation between the CTO and the NZHIS 
Chief Advisor within the PSG over the CTO’s proposal to build the CMS in-house, 
using Lotus Notes. The CTO, and his ITS development team, were driven by their 
Lotus Notes culture to the point where the CTO was prepared to take on all the 
financial risk. The NZHIS Chief Advisor, as PSG chair and project sponsor, had 
considerable power to influence the outcome, which he certainly exercised by 
requiring ITS to take on the project risk. For this incident, both culture (for the CTO 
and ITS) and power (for the NZHIS Chief Advisor) were dominant environmental 
factors. 
Another example concerns incident #11. As discussed earlier, history and culture 
were identified as important in terms of creating a situation likely to lead to conflict. 
However, it was power that provided the capacity for the resistance, while the User 
Liaison Officer and the project manager employed their personal qualities 
(establishing effective communication channels) and their persuasive power (on the 
merits of migrating to the new system) very successfully. In this case, these were all 
significant, but dominance of any one factor was hard to establish.  
6.14. Analysis Addressing Research Question 2 
The second research question focused on control effects, specifically regarding the 
manner in which governance both guides and directs management decision-making. 
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RQ2:  In what way, and to what extent, can governance control the management 
of conflict resolution? 
Each of the governance control elements identified in the research framework 
(policy, authority, and mechanisms) is examined in turn across the range of the 
eleven conflict incidents identified in this case. A summary appears at the end of this 
section (Table 6.7).   
Policy was an important factor in eight separate conflict incidents. In four of them, 
the need to meet e-government compliance requirements proved to be a significant 
factor, as Ministry policy reflecting these requirements had an impact on conflict 
resolution. First, the deadline was getting closer even as they were rejecting the web 
strategy document (#2), which served as a major driver for the decision to pursue a 
more specific business case. Second, the debate within the PSG about building a 
CMS in-house (#3) was partly focused on the genuine risk that time and resources 
could be wasted, and this led to the agreement between the NZHIS Chief Advisor 
and the CTO. As the debate over the use of Lotus Notes widened (#9), the 
compliance requirement was used to explain why this decision was made. Fourth, 
and perhaps most importantly, it was used as a major bargaining tool to win over the 
external users (#11). Anticipating conflict, two ad hoc policies were set at the project 
level by the PSG. Essentially tactical manoeuvres, first the PSG determined that the 
external users would be approached on a one-by-one basis, and second, they sought 
an early champion user to help promote user migration. 
One Ministry policy, that any projects valued over $250,000 must be governed by 
the PMO, using their own template-based system, was circumvented by the CTO so 
that he could employ the principles of PRINCE2 without PMO constraint. 
Sometimes it was the lack of policy that affected conflict resolution. For example, 
ITS either had no policy outlining how their Support Desk should prioritise and 
conduct user requests, or they had not promulgated, explained, or enforced the 
policy. Another example was the lack of formal policy governing the allocation of 
resources to Comms. The process used was not transparent to Comms. 
Decision-making authority had a significant effect on conflict resolution in 12 of 
the conflict incidents, with the PSG involved in nine of them. Although their primary 
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purpose was project governance, the PSG also represented the highest authority on 
project-related issues (with the exception of the DDG of CID, but she did not get 
directly involved in the project). Therefore the project manager and the User Liaison 
Officer both reported directly, and regularly, to the PSG. 
The PSG also held indirect authority over ITS and two of the major web system 
users (Comms and NZHIS) through its membership: the CTO, the Comms Group 
Manager, and the Chief Advisor of NZHIS. When NZHIS resisted migration, the 
NZHIS Chief Advisor took them to task. When ITS developers were slow and non-
communicative, the CTO got directly involved through escalation. However, 
sometimes the Comms Manager neither kept his team informed, nor represented 
their interests, and was ineffective at establishing Comms as a useful project 
champion. 
The PSG did not have authority over the external users, and this is what led to their 
decision to broach the project in a different way – based on persuasion, as opposed 
to direct control. 
Governance mechanisms played an important role in nine different incidents. 
Communication, particularly between managers and their staff, was not always 
apparent, even where important issues were concerned. Examples of this occurred 
with all three managers making up the PSG. Each of them, on at least one significant 
occasion, failed to communicate effectively (or at all) with their own staff regarding 
information describing the status of project-related conflict. This may help explain 
why both the User Liaison Officer and the project manager were so popular with 
users – they had set up effective communication channels: between ITS and the 
external users (the User Liaison Officer); and between the project team and other 
project stakeholders (the project manager). 
Feedback mechanisms, especially reporting functions to both management and those 
governing the project, were effectively used in some cases (e.g. the project manager 
reporting on project progress to the PSG on a monthly basis), and did not exist in 
others (e.g. with the original development of the web strategy). 
Other governance mechanisms had been set up prior to the project’s inception. 
However, even these established mechanisms were either manipulated (such as the 
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CTO’s creation of multiple proposals to avoid the PMO involvement) or overridden 
(where the first business case was abruptly abandoned). 
The preliminary analyses addressing the second research question are briefly 
described in the summary table found in Appendix F (Table F-3). These results are 
condensed in Table 6.7. 
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Table 6.7: A summary of the impacts of governance arrangements on conflict resolution for each conflict incident 
# Incident Policy Authority Mechanism  
1 Relationship conflict between ITS and Comms (anticipated)  NZHIS/the NZHIS Chief Advisor – given project budget authority as independent 
 
2 Original web strategy too expensive  E-govt compliance PSG decisive NZHIS – poor feedback; 
3 Risk of Lotus Notes based CMS (Pre-decision)  E-govt compliance  Comms – poor consultation 
4 First business case abandoned   the CTO – internal ITS the CTO – corrupted business case process 
PSG – poor feedback 
5 Comms losing control over web content   PSG – rubber stamp the CTO decision  
6 Control over Ministry web presence.  PSG – rubber stamp the CTO decision the Comms Manager – poor communication to staff; 
7 Web resources for Comms  No resourcing policy PSG – unwilling to act  the NZHIS Chief Advisor: “outside scope” 
No resourcing mechanism 
8 Business owner of the implemented system  PSG – the Comms Manager already agreed to ownership 
 
9 Risk of Lotus Notes based CMS (Post-decision) E-govt compliance  Demonstrations & road show for users 
10 A common approach to project management and governance  Policy – PMO governs if  project large the CTO/PSG – authority to repackage project 
Budgeting mechanism; 
PRINCE2 
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11 User resistance (anticipated) Tackle ext users one by one (project-level policy) 
E-govt compliance 
PSG – no authority over ext users 
the CTO – frequent escalation from the 
project manager/the User Liaison Officer  
re: poor ITS response/communications 
Good communications: 
- the User Liaison Officer : between ITS & ext users 
- the project manager: between project team & 
stakeholders 
12 specifying a new CMS   PSG – agreed to temp resources  
13 Looking for a website conversion champion Strategy – need a champion PSG – no authority, even over Comms via the Comms Manager 
 
 
14 ITS fail to keep promise: IP addresses  No client prioritisation / support policy the CTO – escalation point for ITS-induced conflict 
ITS – poor feedback / communication 
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6.15. Analysis Addressing Research Question 3 
The third research question also focused on control effects, but in this case, the 
controls are directed towards environmental effects on the resolution process.  
RQ3:  In what way, and to what extent, can governance moderate negative 
effects from environmental elements? 
Each of the environmental elements identified in the research framework (culture, 
power, history, individual behaviours) is now examined with respect to the 
moderating effects of governance arrangements.  
Culture has already been found to have had significant impacts on conflict 
resolution (Section 6.13). For example, Comms played a major role in many of the 
conflicts, involving a mixture of reluctant acceptance and passive resistance. But the 
degree to which Comms’ attitudes and likely behaviours were taken into account 
was variable. The DDG set up a project governance structure that sought to 
minimise the ongoing relationship conflict between Comms and ITS. Importantly, 
senior management also made sure Comms were well-represented at the PSG level. 
The PSG, in turn, devised the client liaison role so that the User Liaison Officer 
could deal more sensitively with Comms. While these authority measures 
demonstrably helped with both anticipated and actual conflict in many cases, many 
of the measures were ad hoc and did not address the longer term issues that drive 
Comms’ sense of their place in the organisation. Furthermore, communication 
channels were either poorly designed or poorly used, frequently leaving Comms 
staff puzzled over the way events unfolded. 
ITS had a more pronounced group culture that isolated them from the rest of the 
organisation. Their values (technical achievement over customer satisfaction), 
attitudes (centred on the generally unpopular Lotus Notes), and behaviours (client 
indifference) were generally well known among those who had to deal with them. 
Governance measures described above applied equally well to ITS (representation 
on the PSG, a neutral PSG chair), with the User Liaison Officer brought in as a 
‘friendlier’ face than ITS had shown in the past through their user support practices. 
Again, while this worked well at a higher level, it was not always successful at the 
operational level of the project. Consequently, even ITS front line staff such as the 
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User Liaison Officer and the project manager were concerned about ITS 
development staff and their approach to their work.  
The PSG was the key authority structure, both responsible for project governance 
(appointing the project manager, receiving monthly reports, setting up 
subcommittees, setting policy, etc.) and becoming directly involved in conflict 
resolution decision-making. Despite its representational membership, ongoing issues 
both within and between Comms and ITS remained a problem, many of them due in 
part to culture clashes. This failure can be put down more to the personalities of the 
individuals on the PSG (see below) than the existence of a representational steering 
group. Even so, in spite of occasional dysfunctionality and ad hoc approaches to 
decision-making, the PSG continued to push the project forward successfully. 
The PSG recovered from many early setbacks largely thanks to two key 
appointments. The creation of a client liaison position enabled the secondment of the 
Knowledge Manager to the project as the Client Liaison Officer – someone who 
would act as a successful communication channel between ITS and the users. The 
appointment of the project manager was also successful, as he too had the ability to 
communicate well with the users, working in tandem with the Client Liaison Officer. 
However, this dependence on having the right personalities involved suggests the 
governance arrangements put in place did not prove sufficient in themselves. By 
circumventing the PMO, the PSG was the authority structure that essentially had the 
freedom to oversee the project the way its members saw fit. There was little by way 
of either policy or communication mechanisms that may have helped translate what 
was intended at the project level into the attitudes and behaviours of those housed 
within strong cultural groups. 
The PSG were able to exercise the power fortuitously accorded them when given 
responsibility over the impending deadline on e-government compliance 
requirements. As they had no authority over the external users, this capability for the 
PSG to oblige many of the external users to migrate to the new system proved to be 
decisive. Typically, either the User Liaison Officer, or the project manager, would 
first explain to the external user that they were responsible for ensuring that their 
website became e-government compliant by the deadline. But then ITS would point 
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out that if the external user migrates to the ITS platform, they would no longer need 
to worry, as ITS would ensure the user’s website was e-government compliant. 
In terms of history, two issues that led to conflict in the past had both appeared once 
again as conflict during this project. First, Comms had made their concerns (under 
resourcing, under appreciation, overwork, etc.) plain over several years, but 
remained feeling neglected by senior management. Comms was represented within 
the PSG, yet its hope to receive more recognition and resources was built up by early 
consultation, only to be disappointed when their views were ignored when the 
project was redefined. Comms had some support from ITS, particularly when the 
User Liaison Officer was involved, but in the end the arrangement of including the 
Comms Group Manager within the most senior project governance and decision-
making authority proved insufficient to prevent these same issues recurring. Further, 
poor communication channels meant Comms, and other project staff, were largely 
unaware of any justification for their views to continue unheeded. 
The other historical issue involved ITS, and its disdain for customer service when 
processing work requests. Those in the Ministry who had experienced ITS’ lack of 
process transparency and communication tended to balk at committing to ITS again. 
This is one reason why so many Ministry users sought website independence from 
ITS. Yet the CTO appeared either unaware or unconcerned over this reputation. 
When ITS effectively took over the project, the project manager frequently had to 
escalate the same issues with ITS development staff to the CTO. This is surprising, 
given how urgent and important this project became for the CTO. There was no 
evidence of any attempt to pre-empt these conflicts by the PSG in general, or the 
CTO in particular. 
Comms, being ITS’ most significant website client, were a case in point, as for the 
most part they were either neglected or treated indifferently. However, for this 
project, senior management was both aware and willing to act in order to pre-empt 
any conflict. But putting an independent party in charge of oversight and budget, 
and ensuring Comms and ITS representation at the project governance level, were 
not sufficient to counteract historical relationship conflict. 
Individual behaviours interacted with governance arrangements in a variety of 
ways. Examples included: 
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• One individual who subverted established governance practices – the CTO 
overrode, and effectively took over, the business case development process; 
he also went on to redefine the project as a series of smaller projects, thus 
avoiding the policy to use the PMO’s templates for formal project control. 
• Two individuals who neglected established governance practice – the 
NZHIS Chief Advisor was responsible for the first part of the project 
(development of the web strategy document) but did not monitor its progress 
adequately; the Comms Manager partially disassociated himself from the 
project, as he feared the responsibilities of system ownership would include 
continued under-funding.   
• One individual for whom governance arrangements were established – the 
Knowledge Manager was brought in for client liaison specifically due to her 
positive individual behaviours. In other words, the person was not selected 
for the position, the position was created for the person. 
6.16. Discussion 
While the 14 conflict incidents identified for this project involved a variety of 
resolution approaches and outcomes, a number of themes stand out. These are: 
• the importance of addressing anticipated conflict; 
• the dynamic relationship between the outcomes of one conflict resolution 
and their impacts on later conflict incidents; 
• the need to learn from history and any pre-existing relationship conflict; 
• how governance can moderate dangerous culture clashes; 
• the conflict resolution process should take into account the power of user 
resistance; 
• the risks of relying on project authority structures for governance, with few 
project-specific policies and mechanisms; 
• the risks of placing key governance and management responsibilities on the 
same individuals; and 
• the risks of individual behaviours distorting governance arrangements. 
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The following considers each of these themes in turn. 
The importance of ‘resolving’ anticipated conflict (by adopting either preventive 
or moderating measures) cannot be underestimated, as illustrated by the two 
incidents in this case. The first, at the project's inception, saw the DDG anticipating 
conflict between ITS and Comms – the two major stakeholders in this project (#1). 
Consequently, she broke with tradition by appointing a third-party (NZHIS) as 
project sponsor, with the NZHIS Chief Advisor as project overseer and budget 
holder. The anticipation was based on both historical events (past conflicts between 
ITS and Comms) and knowledge of the continuing relationship conflict between 
them. However, despite the action taken, the relationship conflict continued to be a 
problem throughout the project. Furthermore, the DDG’s decision led to consequent 
conflict incidents. The ‘resolution’ of this anticipated conflict was not successful 
because the underlying problem of relationship conflict was not addressed. 
The second incident of anticipated conflict occurred at the point of implementation, 
when the external users needed convincing that migration to the new system was 
worthwhile (#11). The PSG were fully aware that they did not have authority over 
the external users, and so persuasion would be required. They were also aware of the 
commitment many of the external users had made to their own website systems, and 
that there was considerable distrust of both ITS and Lotus Notes. This understanding 
of the context, the external users’ independent culture, their power to resist, and their 
negative historical experiences with ITS, enabled the PSG to take successful action. 
They used the upcoming e-government compliance deadline, they brought in two 
key people with strong interpersonal skills to interface with the users, they dealt with 
each external user individually rather than en masse, and they found a suitable 
project champion to promote the project. In this way, the underlying issues were 
addressed, and the anticipated conflict was mostly resolved. 
The dynamic relationship between conflict incidents was highlighted by the 
conflict incident map (Figure 6.2). A relationship between conflict incidents is 
established when the resolution outcomes of one incident either cause or complicate 
the follow-up incident. That all but two of the 14 incidents identified should be part 
of this web of conflict is testimony to the need for contextual understanding and 
effective governance arrangements. Ad hoc decision-making was frequently 
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employed to deal with immediate problems, ignoring or underestimating underlying 
issues, and with less consideration towards longer term consequences. 
The need to learn from history and any pre-existing relationship conflict is 
important for project risk management. To mitigate this risk, those responsible for 
project governance must understand as much as possible about the major 
stakeholders, including how well they interrelate, incorporating knowledge of 
relevant events from the past. Furthermore, project governance arrangements 
reflecting this knowledge should be in place as early as possible. This means more 
than just establishing authority structures such as the project steering group, the 
project manager and the project owner. For example, the appointment of a third-
party project overseer was done specifically to contain anticipated conflict, but was 
not always successful. On the other hand, the project-specific appointment of the 
Client Liaison Officer to help bridge the communication gap between ITS and its 
users proved very effective. Even so, ITS continued to be relatively 
uncommunicative, and Comms continued to feel neglected, suggesting not enough 
was learned from the past. 
Culture clashes helped explain why the underlying relationship conflict between 
website users (especially Comms) and ITS had persisted for so long. The 
Communications and Information Directorate was unlike any other directorate in the 
Ministry. Whereas other directorates were responsible for areas directly related to 
health, the CID was an eclectic collection of service-oriented Ministry support 
groups and semi-independent business units, including the three major stakeholders 
for this project: ITS, NZHIS and Comms. Each serves a different purpose, involves 
quite different skills, and employs people with different backgrounds. Each is 
relatively isolated in its own way: ITS supports many website users, including 
Comms, yet is unwilling to communicate effectively; Comms has felt orphaned from 
the rest of the Ministry for some time; and NZHIS is a separate business unit, 
including its own website and publications support. It is therefore no surprise that, 
not only has each developed its own culture, but there appears to be little 
understanding of each other's cultures. This project brought the three units together, 
and a consequent clash of cultures contributed to both relationship conflict and 
difficulties in resolving task-oriented conflict. As long as the communication 
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between these and other groups remained poor, both before and during the project, 
culture clashes continued unabated. 
While resistance is not an unusual form of conflict in IT projects, the power to 
resist can still be assessed early on (and reassessed over the duration of the project) 
as part of a risk management process. Once identified as anticipated conflict, 
appropriate governance arrangements can be put in place to either eliminate or at 
least reduce the impacts of resistance. This was well illustrated when resistance was 
anticipated from the external website users (#11). As discussed above, a thorough 
understanding of the context laid the platform for the successful actions taken, 
including the creation of the position of Client Liaison Officer (and the 
corresponding appointment) as an effective communication mechanism, the 
identification of a project champion as a promotional mechanism, and the policy of 
dealing with each external user one by one. As a direct result, the majority of the 
external users had agreed to migrate to the new system. 
Placing the role of governance into the hands of a single authority structure, 
without sufficient project-oriented policies and mechanisms to back it up, is a 
serious risk. Governance is a three-pronged approach, requiring authority structures 
to be guided, directed or constrained by policy, and supported by established 
mechanisms. These three components should be balanced and complimentary. The 
anticipated resistance from external users described above (#11) provided an 
example of this balance leading to a successful outcome for the PSG. However, this 
was partly forced upon them because they had no authority over the external users. 
Other attempts at conflict resolution tended to rely solely on authority decision-
making on an ad hoc, reactive basis. In some cases, conflict occurred because an 
established process was subverted by decision-makers. Ad hoc decision-making, 
coupled with poor levels of communication and transparency, created an air of 
uncertainty for stakeholders, including those who had representation at the PSG 
level. Many simply did not understand what was happening, or why. 
Allowing the boundary between governance and management to blur made the 
PSG’s job even harder. As the DDG chose not to be involved, the PSG was given 
full responsibility for project governance. There are times when a governance body 
needs to take on a management role, such as the escalation of conflict for resolution. 
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However, in this case, the PSG were heavily involved in the conduct of the project 
throughout. As they were frequently reactive and ad hoc in their approach to issues 
as they arose, there was little incentive for the PSG to think in the longer term, or in 
a broader context, than whatever the immediate issue presented. This would help 
explain the extensive web of causal conflict throughout the project (Figure 6.2). 
Furthermore, governance requires a certain degree of objectivity, and a focus on the 
bigger picture. Two of the PSG members (the CTO and the Comms Manager) each 
had a strong interest in the outcomes of the project, making it difficult for the PSG 
chair to exercise either objectivity or a focus on the bigger picture. 
Finally, there is the risk that, for reasons of their own, individuals may neglect, 
interfere with, or even subvert, governance arrangements. Although the NZHIS 
Chief Advisor was given overall responsibility for the project, he brought in the 
senior managers from two of the major stakeholders (ITS and Comms) to form the 
PSG. On the face of it, having a project steering group made up of senior 
representatives from the two biggest stakeholders, plus a neutral third party as chair, 
appears reasonable. Furthermore, according to the NZHIS Chief Advisor, the group 
seemed to work well together much of the time. But this was not always the case, as 
personal agendas arose over the course of the project. Each of the three PSG 
members is discussed in turn. 
The NZHIS Chief Advisor was provided with a lengthy timeframe and a budget that 
could be rolled over from year to year. Over the first year he appointed the Web 
Team Leader to create a web strategy document. But the NZHIS Chief Advisor 
prioritised other, non-project activities over this period, and failed to monitor the 
Web Team Leader’s work until the first draft of the strategy document was 
presented. Later, once it was agreed that ITS would develop the new system, he was 
again happy to leave most of the decision-making to someone else, this time the 
CTO.  
The Comms Manager, fearing what he perceived to be the onerous responsibilities 
involved in being the new website system owner, withdrew significantly from 
involvement in the decision-making within the PSG. While he may have hoped that 
disassociating himself from the decision-making might, in some way, have reduced 
his responsibilities, there were undesirable flow-on effects. First, he was no longer 
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representing Comms’ interests, nor was he communicating what was happening to 
his own staff. Second, through voluntary withdrawal of interest, he no longer 
provided a separate voice in the governance process.  
As both the Comms Manager and the NZHIS Chief Advisor withdrew from much of 
the decision-making process on the PSG, this effectively left the CTO to oversee the 
project. At this point, the boundary between governance and management 
dissipated. The CTO had so much at stake that he personally wanted to ensure the 
project was a success. For example, when he discovered the first draft of the new 
business case did not fit with his own objectives, he stepped in and removed the 
senior ITS representative and personally took his place. The CTO announced the 
first draft would be abandoned, and he was then able to ensure the new draft would 
support ITS’ development of the new system. The project manager, who chaired the 
business case development team, was stunned over these events and did not 
understand why they happened. 
It was this lack of communication and feedback that recurred as a problem 
throughout the project. One telling example was the arrangement made between the 
CTO and the other two members of the PSG, wherein ITS was told that they would 
be allowed to develop the system only if they paid for the development costs 
themselves, out of their operational budget. They would only be reimbursed from 
the project budget if they could complete the system satisfactorily by the tight 
project deadline. While this safeguarded the project funding, it put at risk a 
significant portion of ITS’ operational budget. Had ITS failed to meet these criteria, 
it is likely this would have affected ITS’ ability to do the kind of development and 
support work it would have normally done. Having ITS develop the system in-house 
was a critical decision for the future of the project, but there was no consultation 
beyond the three members of the PSG and no transparency in the decision-making 
process. Nor was the DDG formally told, and the Comms Manager doubted she was 
aware of it at all, in spite of the fact that all three PSG members report to her either 
directly, or through one extra layer of management. 
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6.17. Conclusions 
There were 14 conflict incidents identified for the Web Consolidation Project in this 
case study. Focusing on the nature of conflict and its resolution in these incidents 
yielded two striking results. The first is the important role of conflict anticipation 
and its incorporation into project risk management. There were two anticipated 
conflict incidents. One involved an action taken to reduce the risk of relationship 
conflict flaring up during the project, which was only partially successful. The other 
involved a series of actions taken to reduce the risk of user resistance, which proved 
very successful, because those actions were based on a more considered analysis of 
the situation and its context. In both incidents, the decisions made had significant 
effects on the project. Secondly, the degree to which 12 of the 14 incidents were 
linked dynamically over time was surprising, where at least one of the conflict 
resolution outcomes for an incident had a negative impact on one or more follow-up 
incidents. While some might have been expected anyway, many were results of ad 
hoc decision-making and ineffective project governance, with insufficient 
consideration given to the relative situations and their contexts. These issues were 
investigated by addressing three research questions. 
The first research question (RQ1) focuses on contextual elements and their effects 
on conflict resolution. Each of the environmental constructs identified in the 
research framework (culture, power, history, and individual behaviours) had 
significant negative impacts on conflict resolution at one stage or another – some on 
several occasions. In particular, three issues stood out: the need to learn from history 
to anticipate conflict, including pre-existing relationship conflict; the potentially 
damaging effects of culture clashes; and the anticipation of resistance. In any 
contextual analysis, historical events can be particularly important as they can be 
used as manifest evidence that history could repeat itself again unless action is 
taken. In this case, senior management were aware of historical relationship conflict, 
but did little to address it on a proactive basis. Consequently, the relationship 
conflict continued to negatively affect conflict resolution over several incidents. 
Secondly, culture clashes – particularly those between the IT function and the 
website users – were major contributors to problems with conflict resolution. The 
users, a collection of independent groups within different directorates, were diverse 
 196
and very protective of their individual cultural ‘brands’, making it difficult to work 
with them in any homogeneous way. ITS was internally cohesive, but quite isolated 
in terms of its external support relationships, with quite different cultural values, 
attitudes, and behaviours. Finally, the power of these external users to resist the 
system implementation in favour of their own solutions was of paramount concern, 
as even the senior representatives involved in project governance did not have any 
authority over them.  
The second research question (RQ2) focuses on governance and its effects on 
conflict resolution. Of the three project governance arrangements available (policy, 
authority, and mechanisms), little was done beyond setting up a single individual as 
the overseer of the project, who in turn set up a three-person authority structure (the 
PSG) to govern, and frequently manage, the project. But there was little policy to 
guide them, nor were there many mechanisms available to help them make and 
implement decisions. Communication mechanisms, both vertically through the 
hierarchy, and horizontally across functional areas of the Ministry were either 
ineffective or non-existent. This was particularly true of formal feedback 
mechanisms. This led to a reactive, ad hoc approach to conflict resolution in terms 
of decision-making and implementation, with variable success. Furthermore, the key 
authority structure (the PSG) frequently struggled to operate as a unified entity. 
Each of the three members had their own personal agendas, and as a result, 
sometimes one, and frequently two PSG members were simply not active in terms of 
oversight. When this happened, project governance was less apparent, and ad hoc 
management through the CTO was the only control available.  
The third research question (RQ3) focuses on governance and its capacity for 
moderating contextual effects. Clashes of culture, as discussed earlier, were 
established as major contributors to conflict within this project. The PSG 
demonstrated either a poor understanding of these cultures, or a poor sense of their 
importance. It was not until two people who were capable of understanding cultural 
differences were appointed to critical roles in the project (project manager and client 
liaison officer) that the clashes became less frequent and less serious. Considerable 
understanding and thought was applied to the issue of the external users’ power to 
resist, with consequent success. However, the capability of governance 
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arrangements to help safeguard against abuse of decision-making authority by 
individuals was poor. There were several instances where each of the three members 
of the PSG was involved in either neglecting or subverting existing governance 
measures. That they were able to do this highlights the lack of governance, including 
receiving and monitoring feedback from the PSG, in terms of overseeing the project 
as a whole, including the performance of the PSG. 
This case study, as a consequence of focusing on conflict and its resolution, 
illustrated the importance of project governance, not only to help control the project, 
but to help moderate the effects of any negative contributions from contextual 
elements. However, attempts at moderation will only succeed if there is a clear 
understanding of what the contextual elements are and how they might affect the 
project. Furthermore, expecting one authority structure to oversee the project 
without support from policy or mechanisms represents a project risk. In this case, 
the critical authority structure engaged more in ad hoc management than oversight, 
and there was no effective oversight at a higher level, in spite of project sponsorship 
residing there. 
The following chapter describes the outcomes of case research conducted on the 
third case organisation. 
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7. CASE 3: The Hutt Valley District Health Board 
 
This chapter provides an account of the third case study for this research. It begins 
with a brief description of the Hutt Valley District Health Board, the case 
organisation. The organisational setting for the project is described, including the 
organisational decision-making structure and broad descriptions of the major project 
stakeholders. The Electronic Medical Record (EMR) Project, including the relevant 
project authority structures, is described. The interviewees are introduced, followed 
by a chronological overview of the conflict incidents they identified. The findings of 
the preliminary analysis are presented for each conflict incident. Each of the three 
research questions is addressed, and the results are discussed in terms of their 
implications for IT projects. 
When this case study was conducted, the Hutt Valley District Health Board (referred 
to hereafter as the ‘DHB’) was responsible for planning, prioritising, funding and 
providing government-funded health care and disability support services for the 
135,000 people that lived in the Hutt Valley. The Hutt Valley consists of a series of 
mostly small townships stretching along the Hutt River, partially isolated from the 
neighbouring Wellington City (New Zealand's capitol). The DHB employed a little 
over 2,000 people, most of whom were clinicians and administrators that worked for 
either Hutt Hospital or various community and regional health services. Thus, ‘the 
DHB’ was a phrase used to describe the collective organisation, including all of its 
employees. However, technically, a district health board was a group of people 
(eleven in the Hutt Valley) that had strategic oversight, or governance, over the 
DHB. For clarification purposes, this group will be referred to hereafter as the 
‘Board’. 
Hutt Hospital opened on 15 May 1944, providing secondary services to the Hutt 
Valley district and a range of services to the Wellington region and lower half of the 
North Island. At the time the interviews were conducted, Hutt Hospital had a 
capacity of 250 beds. In addition to general medical, surgical and emergency 
services, Hutt Hospital provided specialist tertiary services for rheumatology, burns 
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and plastic surgery for the wider south and central North Island and upper part of the 
South Island.  
The DHB had been in existence since 1 January 2001, when the government 
reallocated responsibility for health services by decentralising the network of 
regional health boards down one level to district health boards, with the intention of 
achieving a better response to local community needs. The goals of each district 
health board were specified in the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act, 
which included: to improve, promote and protect the health of their communities; 
and to better coordinate health services in the district (e.g. general practitioner and 
hospital-based services, and reduction of disparities in health outcomes). 
This involved contracting services from a wide range of health and disability service 
providers, including general practitioners (GPs), mental health providers, rest 
homes, pharmacies, private laboratories, and both public and private hospitals.  
7.1. Organisational Setting 
A simplified representation of the organisational hierarchy at the DHB is provided in 
Figure 7.1. What follows are the descriptions of selected organisational groups 
representing stakeholders of the IT project that is the focus of this case study. An 
external stakeholder is also described. 
 
Figure 7.1:The organisational hierarchy for Hutt Valley DHB. 
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As outlined in Figure 7.1, the senior management positions within the DHB all 
reported to the CEO. Like most district health boards across New Zealand, the 
Board and senior management had very limited funds to allocate to IT projects, and 
were anxious to avoid cost overruns. There was also an understanding among senior 
management that quality is paramount with information systems affecting clinical 
practice.  
The IT Department was responsible for IT development, implementation and 
support at the DHB. When Hutt Hospital was separated administratively from 
Wellington Hospital in the early 1990s, the information systems used at Wellington 
were provided for Hutt Hospital as well. However, the infrastructure for IT 
development and support, including the staff, remained at Wellington. The Hutt 
Hospital Board decided to outsource information processing to a local company. In 
addition, the head of that company, who was a friend of a Hospital Board member, 
gave Hutt Hospital advice about IT, so there was a potential for conflict of interest. 
The IT manager at Hutt Hospital was an external consultant as well, who offered 
them little by way of IT leadership – focussing primarily on system maintenance and 
the upcoming Y2K issues. 
The Hospital Board would not approve funds for IT projects without a business case, 
but there was no process in place for someone to develop and present one. However, 
by the late 1990s, the Board drafted an information systems strategic plan, 
approving a budget of $2.7 million (over an initial two-year period) to realise the 
plan. In 1999, the position of Chief Information Officer (CIO) was created, reporting 
directly to the Hospital Board. The CIO originally appointed remained in that 
position up to the time of the study. His job was to oversee the implementation of 
the strategic plan, and he was given considerable freedom to set up the necessary 
governance and management structures. In 2001, management of Hutt Hospital was 
subsumed into the new DHB structure, the Hospital Board was replaced by the DHB 
Board, and the CIO then reported directly to the CEO. 
The IT project team referred to the IT Department’s staff assigned to work on a 
particular project. This normally included a project manager and IT specialists, who 
would be responsible for working with both the users (e.g. eliciting requirements, 
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prototyping, acceptance testing, support, and training) and the vendors (e.g. 
conducting gap analysis, software adaptation, system testing, and technical support). 
The IT Department was also responsible for operating and maintaining a new 
information system, post-implementation. 
The clinicians were the front-line personnel responsible for patients within the DHB 
system, still predominantly focused on the activities of Hutt Hospital. ‘Clinician’ 
was a general term for a person who held a professional qualification relevant to the 
assessment, treatment, and care of patients, for example, doctors, nurses, 
psychologists, midwives and occupational therapists. There was a shortage of 
clinicians, especially senior clinicians, in New Zealand, and they were difficult to 
attract and retain. This group, especially doctors, had ultimate responsibility for 
patient safety and treatment. For these reasons, clinicians held considerable respect 
throughout the organisation, and their perspectives on clinical practice were 
normally paramount. 
Administration was the collection of DHB staff responsible for the administration 
of Hutt Hospital and its relationship with the broader clinical community. 
Specifically, they were responsible for maintaining the paper-based patient record 
management system. Increasing pressure for performance, accountability and 
accurate financial planning meant that the DHB senior management required 
extensive statistical reporting on patient management; for example, bed numbers and 
length of stay. This was not necessarily a high priority for the clinicians that needed 
to provide the information.  
The external vendor Orion Health was a major provider of technology for the 
healthcare sector.  Orion specialised in workflow, messaging and integration 
software to support primary, secondary and tertiary healthcare providers to manage 
patient care and the exchange of healthcare data. Orion had been involved in the IT 
project of this case study from the inception. An Orion account manager was 
allocated to the project, and remained the point of contact with the DHB for higher-
level issues. 
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7.2. The Electronic Medical Record (EMR) Project 
World-wide, there has been a trend towards digitisation of medical records and 
workflows (Jensen & Aanestad, 2007). For example, several years ago the U.S. 
government “unveiled a plan to implement EHRs [electronic health records] for 
every American within ten years” (Swartz, 2006, p. 19). Key drivers for this include 
automating routine services (prescription writing, scheduling appointments, 
invoicing), data exchange with other health care providers, increased data accuracy, 
and possibly even cost reduction (Dansky, Gamm, Vasey, & Barsukiewicz, 1999; 
Poston, Reynolds, & Gillenson, 2007). 
An international 2001 survey found that New Zealand was second only to the United 
Kingdom in terms of both the percentage of physicians who sometimes used EHRs 
and the percentage of physicians who often used electronic prescribing (Swartz, 
2006). District health boards across the country had gradually, independently been 
adopting EHRs in one form or another. Implementing an EHR was a major thrust of 
the new IT strategy at the DHB.  
However, integrating complex, interrelated processes across an organisation had 
historically proven to be difficult, as implementation challenges with both business 
process reengineering (BPR) and enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems have 
demonstrated in the past. EHR systems were no exception, with problems regularly 
encountered, including high-cost, process disruption (with corresponding risk to 
patients), confidentiality issues, and in particular, organisational and social issues, 
including conflict and resistance (Baron, 2007; Carr & Dimitrakakis, 2003; Kleinke, 
1998). 
At the DHB, the EHR initiative was given the overall title of the Electronic Medical 
Records (EMR) Project21. While the concept of the electronic medical record was 
not new, the majority of the clinicians did not initially fully understand the effects it 
would have on their clinical practice. This meant that the project evolved over time, 
with more and more features added to encompass the range of information that 
makes up a medical record. The EMR project was developed as an incremental 
programme of work, with a number of phases, each of which added new software 
                                                 
21
 Note that, while all the interviewees regularly referred to the EMR initiative as a ‘project,’ in fact it was 
a programme of projects, all based on the fundamental concept of an electronic medical record.  
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and functionality. These phases were typically seen as separate projects, and staffed 
accordingly. 
After a selection process, a third party vendor, Orion Health, provided the basic 
patient management system package, and undertook (by contract) to work with Hutt 
Valley’s IT project teams to adapt and implement the software. 
At the time of investigation, the DHB had implemented a number of EMR-related 
projects, but were still some distance from the ideal of the paperless medical record 
that can be used not only internally, but would also be accessible by primary health 
providers such as general practitioners. It was envisaged by the CIO that the rate of 
change may slow down over time, but was unlikely to completely stop, as there 
would be a steady stream of new ideas and new features emerging.  
Clinicians were identified by senior management as the primary user group for the 
EMR project. Administrators were also important users, but were nevertheless seen 
as a support function to the clinicians who were ultimately responsible for patient 
safety. It was considered extremely important for clinical acceptance that the system 
behaved consistently, with a usable interface given the context. A defining feature of 
clinical staff was that they moved around, and may have used ten or twenty different 
terminals, to either enter or retrieve information, within a single day. Clinicians were 
always busy, working under pressure, and in many cases were not very computer 
literate. Once the basic functionality had been agreed, there was extensive 
discussion and refinement of the interface.  
The original budget for Phase 1 of the EMR project was $1.1 million over 2 years. 
Phase 2 was $800,000. The budget was contestable against other major capital 
expenditure (such as medical equipment), which meant it needed to deliver value for 
money.  
7.3. Project Authority Structures 
During the 1990s, IT governance was largely ignored in the DHB. Operationally, the 
DHB was satisfied with the IT Manager’s management of the outsourced 
information processing, but there were no processes available to promote major new 
IT initiatives. This situation changed with the development of the IS strategic plan, 
and the appointment of a CIO to implement that plan. Initially, there were few 
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policies, authority structures, or mechanisms available to help govern both the IT 
function and IT projects. With a specific focus on the EMR project, the CIO worked 
with senior management to develop the following project governance structures, 
including membership, and project-related processes they would be responsible for 
(summarised in Table 7.1 and described below). Policies emerged over time, and at 
differing levels in the hierarchy; these are described further into the chapter. 
 
Table 7.1: Authority structures involved in governance and decision-making for IT-related 
projects 
Body Level of 
Focus 
Membership Main IT Project-Related 
Roles 
The Board   Corporate Both locally elected and   
NZ government appointed 
representatives 
Approving IT strategic plan, 
including budget for EMR 
implementation 
The Executive Corporate CEO (chair); 
Other executives 
(including CIO) 
Broad oversight of EMR progress 
(report from CIO) 
Information 
Systems Steering 
Committee 
[ISSC] 
IT/Project CFO (chair); 
Selected executives; 
Senior clinical staff; 
Senior administration 
staff; 
CIO 
Annual project prioritisation & 
budget distribution; 
Project approval; 
Monthly monitoring via project 
status reports 
Project Steering 
Group 
[PSG] 
Project CIO; 
EMR sponsor; 
External QA; 
Senior project manager; 
Chair of CUG 
Scope & business case (proposal 
from Sponsor); 
Oversight of project progress 
(schedule, budget, quality, etc.) – 
reports received from project 
managers 
 
Clinical User 
Group 
[CUG] 
Project IS clinical advisors; 
Clinician reps (dominant 
group); 
Administration reps; 
Other reps 
Project prioritisation from 
operational perspective; 
Analysis of operational impacts 
Project 
Implementation 
Team 
[PIT] 
Project Project manager; 
Clinical practice Reps.; 
IT development / 
implementation staff 
Develop and implement a specific 
EMR project; 
Work with Orion to integrate the 
project with their patient 
management system 
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At the time of interviewing, neither the Board, nor the Executive, had been directly 
involved in project decision-making once the project had begun. The Board had 
agreed to adopt an EMR-based system as part of their IT strategic plan, and agreed 
on a budget. The Executive members, and particularly the CIO, worked together to 
put the project authority structures in place. Beyond that, the Executive remained 
chiefly involved in broad oversight of the EMR project, primarily through monthly 
reports from the CIO.  
Four authority structures were involved in the governance and decision-making over 
the duration of the EMR project: the Information Systems Steering Committee, the 
EMR Project Steering Group, the Clinical User Group, and the Project 
Implementation Teams. 
The Information Systems Steering Committee (ISSC) was the highest level 
authority in the DHB specifically focused on IT-related systems. The ISSC was 
made up of executives and senior managers, including both the Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO) as chair, and the CIO as the executive representing the IT-function. 
Other executives and senior managers represented clinical and administration staff. 
The purpose of the ISSC was “…to approve, guide and direct [the DHB] on all 
information technology projects. … [including those] encompassed by the IS 
strategic plan” [ISSC Terms of Reference]. The committee oversaw the 
implementation of all IT-related strategy and investment, including the EMR 
project, which had been the major budget item since 2001. The ISSC was 
responsible for conducting a number of project-related processes, including: annual 
project prioritisation and budget distribution, project approval, and monitoring 
current projects. The committee received monthly summarised status reports on all 
projects currently under way. Each summary report included achievements for that 
reporting period, plans for the next period, and major issues (referred to as “red 
flags”).  
The EMR Project Steering Group (PSG) specifically oversaw the EMR 
programme of projects. The membership, balancing the interests of both clinicians 
and the IT function, was based on key individual positions spanning the EMR 
project structure (see Figure 7.2), including: 
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• the CIO; 
• the EMR Project Sponsor (normally a senior clinician at executive level); 
• the Senior Project Manager, who oversaw the project management of 
individual projects; 
• the Chair of the Clinical Users Group, normally a senior clinician 
representing the interests of all clinicians at the DHB; and 
• an external Quality Assurance (QA) contractor, who conducted an 
independent external audit every quarter. 
The PSG received regular, detailed monthly reporting from project managers on 
project progress, checking against: objectives, budget, risk management, risk 
mitigation and user satisfaction.  
The Clinical User Group (CUG) was established to provide a communication 
conduit between the IT Department and the clinicians within the DHB. The support 
of the large, diverse, and powerful community of clinicians was considered essential 
for the success of the project from the outset. The CIO established an early version 
of this group to select the vendor for the EMR project. It was his intention that this 
would encourage clinicians to take ownership of the project. However, the 
recognised value that this group provided meant it survived and evolved over time 
as a forum for consultation with the clinician community.   
The CUG had encouraged inclusive representation of different viewpoints, wide-
ranging and open debate, and consensus building. Potential issues could be ‘headed 
off’ through debate within the CUG. Once consensus was achieved, their 
recommendations could then be implemented through formal project mechanisms.  
“Everybody’s view is able to be expressed. It sounds pretty basic, but it was 
actually relatively innovative…The IT team were able to pull the threads out of 
that, to ensure that the developments, as best we could, had everybody’s needs 
represented. The CUG had some pretty spirited debates”. [Chair of the CUG] 
Ensuring the membership of the CUG was fully representative had been challenging.  
“We are constantly working on the make up of the group…we are always cutting 
a balance between having too many people representing a particular group and 
not having enough”, and “membership wavers between 15 and 20…we also have 
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IS people in the group, because it is very much informal feedback”.  [Chair of 
the CUG] 
The CUG was not a formal decision-making authority structure in the sense that any 
decision about the project emerging from a CUG meeting still had to be considered 
and formally ratified by the PSG. However, the strength of the CUG was that as well 
as serving as a forum for consultation and discussion, it was also brokered 
agreements, which were then largely rubber stamped by the PSG. This semi-formal 
status provided considerable flexibility. On the one hand, CUG membership was not 
controlled by management, but by the clinicians themselves. The Chair of the CUG 
was always a clinician, and CUG members were typically clinicians who had an 
interest in IT and its medical applications. The IT representation on the CUG was 
normally small (2-3 members) but important, as they advised clinicians about the 
implications of the EMR project, along with any queries or suggestions put forward 
during an ensuing debate. On the other hand, the PSG treated CUG decisions as 
formal proposals, being well aware that the prior consensus reached between major 
project stakeholders made PSG approval considerably easier.  
The Project Implementation Team (PIT) was an operational authority structure at 
the project level. The PIT was responsible for the development and implementation 
of the project. Every PIT had a project manager, along with IT staff and user 
representation. Each subproject of the EMR project was allocated a PIT to oversee 
it. 
The hierarchy of IT project governance is outlined in Figure 7.2. 
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DHB 
Executive
IS Steering Committee
[ISSC]
EMR Programme
Steering Group [PSG]
EMR Project
Implementation Team [PIT]
Clinical User Group 
[CUG]
Hutt Valley DHB 
Board
Other PITs
A box with a dashed line indicates a semi-formal 
authority structure
A dashed line arrow indicates decision-making 
influence, rather than direct authority
 
Figure 7.2: Organisational hierarchy governing IT-related projects. 
 
7.4. Interviewees for this Study 
Five individual project stakeholders were interviewed for this case study (Table 7.2). 
The CIO was approached first, who agreed to support the research project and 
identified suitable candidates for interviewing. Note that at the time of interviewing, 
the ex-Chief Operating Officer (Ex-COO) had only recently stepped down from his 
tenure as Chief Operating Officer, and had consequently relinquished his position as 
EMR Sponsor and PSG member to the new Chief Operating Officer. Prior to that, he 
had been heavily involved in the EMR project from its inception. 
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Table 7.2: EMR Project Interviewees for this study  
Interviewee     
Position 
Textual 
Referral22 
Body 
Member 
Focus 
Chief Information Officer CIO ISSC; 
PSG 
IT management 
IS Clinical Advisor Chair of CUG PSG; 
CUG (Current Chair) 
Clinical user 
Ex-Chief Operating Officer Ex-COO, ex-
sponsor 
Ex-EMR Sponsor; 
Ex-PSG 
Clinical 
management 
Senior Project Manager Senior Project 
Manager 
PSG; 
some PITs 
IT practice 
Orion Health Account 
Manager 
Orion Account 
Manager 
None at DHB Vendor 
 
7.5. Conflict Incident Overview 
The following provides a précis of events as the project progressed over time. Note 
that the unit of analysis for this research is a conflict incident. Therefore, as an aid to 
link contextual, historical events (from the project’s inception) to the analysis that 
follows, specific conflict incident numbers, corresponding to those used in the 
analysis, have been included within the text in parentheses. These are summarised in 
the conflict incident map below (Figure 7.3), focussing on conflict incident 
identification and their interrelationships in terms of the impacts of conflict 
resolution over one incident on the development and resolution of one or more other 
incidents. These impacts form a part of the analysis of each conflict incident in the 
sections that follow. 
The CIO was appointed in 1999, charged with the responsibility of overseeing the 
implementation of the new electronic medical record. Over the next two years, he 
prepared the IT infrastructure for the new system, while collecting informal data 
about how well an EMR might be received. As a result, by 2001 the CIO was aware 
of just how resistant both clinicians and administrators were likely to be once the 
transition to an EMR-based system began. Furthermore, he knew that EMR systems 
were notoriously difficult to implement unless the majority of clinicians were fully 
                                                 
22
 ‘Textual Referral’ implies these ‘shortenings’ will be used in the text of this study for (albeit limited) 
relief to both the reader and the writer. 
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supportive. Therefore, he had to find ways to help encourage buy-in from the 
clinicians and administrators. 
Prior to 1999, Hutt Hospital had very little exposure to IT. Basic IT-based, non-
clinical administration systems were maintained by an externally contracted IT 
manager. Clinicians and clinical administrators continued to employ traditional, 
paper-based processes. Therefore, the CIO was fortunate in that he had not inherited 
any lingering relationship conflict between IT and the clinicians. However, he was 
also aware of the risk to their working relationship, should clinician resistance 
become a major problem. 
This anticipated conflict (#1), based on the mutual threats of significant resistance, 
accompanied by an increase in relationship conflict, led to the creation of a variety 
of governance arrangements to mitigate these threats. Their general purpose was to 
encourage a sense of clinical ownership and involvement with the EMR from the 
outset. Clinicians were responsible for patient safety, and so their concerns about 
significant change to clinical processes were generally seen as valid throughout the 
DHB. 
IT project governance authorities such as the ISSC (EMR oversight, budgets and 
timeframes) and PSG (project prioritisation and operational oversight) were created 
to ensure effective representation from both clinicians and the IT Department. The 
CIO also oversaw the emergence of the CUG, a semi-formal authority dominated by 
clinicians, and to a lesser degree, clinical administrators and IT advisors that made 
key decisions over the design, use and management of EMR data and processes. 
Policies were also employed as a way of dealing with potential resistance. Two were 
particularly significant. A positive, informal policy came from both the CIO and the 
Senior Project Manager requiring the PITs and IT advisors in the CUG to be as 
collaborative, patient and accommodating with the clinicians as possible, until a 
consensus decision was reached. Another policy came from the ISSC – that no one 
will be exempt from the transition to the EMR system. In this way, any recalcitrant 
clinical departments would ultimately have to accept it. 
Finally, a variety of project governance mechanisms were created. Formal feedback 
mechanisms were used extensively: the PITs report to the CUG and the PSG; the 
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CUG reports to the PSG and the staff in clinical and administrative departments; and 
the PSG reports to the ISSC. Informal communication mechanisms such as both 
formal and informal meetings between different stakeholder groups, along with IT 
road shows and presentations, were used on a regular basis. 
The most important mechanism was the CUG, which served not only as a decision-
making authority, but was also used as a forum for consultation, debate, design, and 
communication (both vertically and horizontally) to all relevant EMR stakeholders 
through feedback reporting and dissemination by CUG representatives.  
The conflict incidents that followed were characterised by their relative isolation 
from each other. All of them occurred at different (possibly overlapping) times, with 
respect to various EMR projects, but exactly when they occurred is immaterial to 
this study. Therefore, local groupings of conflict incident types such as those 
involving resistance, or the vendor Orion, have been listed (and numbered) together. 
Otherwise, the following nine conflict incidents are listed in no particular order. 
Having put governance arrangements in place to help prevent or mitigate resistance, 
they were tested on three occasions identified by the interviewees. One of these 
occasions centred on the receipt and timeliness of lab test results, which used to be 
sent as paper documents to the doctors for checking and further action (#2). An 
EMR project required these results to be recorded in the EMR and forwarded to the 
doctor electronically. The clinician concern was how would doctors be alerted to the 
availability of the lab test results, and how could they be confident it will go to the 
right doctor? The clinicians resisted implementation until they were confident these 
issues could be addressed. 
A similar concern emerged over the sign-off of diagnostic results and other patient 
information (#3). Senior clinicians were particularly reluctant to abandon the paper-
based system which they understood and trusted. But an EMR project had created a 
modified clinical process based on electronic sign-offs, and there was prolonged, 
generally passive resistance over design and implementation issues. 
There were a number of small, semi-autonomous clinical units within the DHB. One 
particular unit were determined to avoid the EMR completely (#4). The unit’s senior 
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clinicians argued: the risks of new processes were too high; training would require 
too much time & effort; and there were no perceived benefits for them. 
Two incidents involved EMR project prioritisation issues, though there was little 
similarity between them beyond that. One incident focussed on the changes to the 
clinician alerts system, where originally paper alerts, or special notes attached to the 
patient file that highlight critical issues about the patient, such as a drug allergy (#5). 
An EMR-based alerts system would need to provide these clinical warnings 
electronically – technically achievable, but the challenge centred on the processes 
used to collect and maintain the currency of the alert information. Getting agreement 
among different clinicians was proving difficult, and opinion was divided as to 
whether other EMR projects should be given higher priority, or the EMR alerts 
system should be given more resources (i.e. an even higher priority). Some saw it as 
essential, while others saw it as too hard at present – wanting to move on with other 
projects. 
The other project prioritisation issue involved a single senior clinician who was head 
of department for his clinical unit (#6). He was particularly determined to see an 
EMR project that would have benefited his unit to be given a higher priority than the 
PSG had allocated. He lobbied hard, even somewhat aggressively, to have more 
resources fast-tracked to his project. 
Two other conflict incidents were raised by interviewees as well. The first 
demonstrated how powerful clinicians, and surgeons in particular, were. Surgeons 
had always collected data about their own operations, so that their performance 
could be reviewed by their peers (#7). The data was never available to anyone 
outside the group of surgeons involved in the peer review, encouraging honest 
reporting and appraisal. An EMR project involved the development of an electronic 
surgical audit system – performing essentially the same function, but improving data 
collection and dissemination for peer review. However, once data is electronically 
stored, it can be readily employed in other areas. DHB administration responsible 
for areas such as surgical quality and risk assessment could see great value in 
accessing the data to improve their own effectiveness. The surgeons had made it 
very clear the data must be secure; otherwise the value of the peer review would be 
lost. 
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The other incident was based on differing perspectives on IT use due to the cultural 
divide between senior and junior clinicians. A discharge summary is the document 
given to the patient on discharge from the hospital. Originally, it was dictated to 
someone from the typing pool, and then signed off by a senior clinician (#8). An 
EMR project had changed that, where the information required for the discharge 
summary, stored electronically, could be used to generate one automatically. This 
had the unexpected outcome of enabling junior clinicians to sign off discharge 
summaries without involving a senior clinician. Given increasing GP use of 
discharge summaries to treat patients, the senior clinicians argued that the process 
needed to be changed for patient safety purposes. 
Two conflict incidents were markedly different from the others, as these involved 
the external software vendor, Orion, who were contracted to work closely with the 
DHB’s IT Dept. to develop and implement the EMR projects. The DHB 
stakeholders were happy with the quality of the software product, but grew 
increasingly dissatisfied with Orion’s support, gradually increasing the level of 
relationship conflict between them (#9). Orion support staff were not responding as 
quickly, or diligently, as was expected by the IT Department. The CIO became 
increasingly involved in an attempt to resolve the conflict and recover the previously 
strong working relationship.  
One particular incident involved a very serious problem that required urgent 
attention from Orion’s support team, whose response was found inadequate (#10). 
Although one of many incidents that contributed to the relationship conflict, this 
incident was significant, requiring escalation further up Orion’s hierarchy, beyond 
the authority of their Account Manager (who normally dealt with the DHB).  
Finally, several interviewees raised the problem of delays in the EMR projects’ 
timeframes (#11). This was a generic problem, in that many of the conflict incidents 
discussed above contributed to delays and missed timeframes. However, the PIT 
project managers were frustrated that they could not meet the deadlines, due mostly 
to the extensive consultation and debate surrounding many of the projects. Many of 
these led to requests up to ISSC level to provide further resources. The ISSC had to 
explain to the Board why the timeframes were being missed. This conflict was 
ongoing, and yet largely accepted as the price to pay for consensus. 
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The conflict incident map below (Figure 7.3) places each of the conflict incidents 
referred to above in a chronological context, as indicated by both the directional 
arrows and the increasing value in the conflict incident numbers. This map also 
highlights relationships between the resolution outcomes of conflict incidents and 
their corresponding impacts on following conflict incidents. The arrow labels 
identify the specific resolution outcomes of interest. 
 
Figure 7.3:  A conflict incident map outlining incident numbers and brief descriptions, as 
well as their interrelationships in terms of initiating/fuelling other conflict 
incidents. 
 
In this case, the conflict incident map above demonstrates little interaction between 
the conflict incidents. Furthermore, the relationships that are identified were both 
expected and regarded as an acceptable cost by the PSG and ISSC, given the way 
decisions were made. When they devised the policy that there would be no 
exceptions to conversion to the EMR, they knew it would need to be enforced on 
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occasion. This explains the fact that the policy led to a conflict incident through 
resistance (from #1 to #4). 
The remainder of the conflict incident relationships depicted in Figure 7.3 all 
emerged from a number of isolated cases of conflict. In each case, the resolution 
approach took considerable time – contributing to the delays that often required 
extended timeframes and occasionally more resources (#11). Even so, the occasional 
delays had become an accepted part of the process if consensus was to be achieved. 
7.6. Anticipated Clinical Resistance to the EMR Project (#1) 
In 1999, the CIO was appointed by the DHB executive to oversee the design and 
implementation of an EMR system, a key part of the Board's strategic plan. 
However, the CIO anticipated possible resistance from both clinicians and 
administrators. There were several reasons for this: 
• As noted earlier, clinician resistance to an EMR system has been a common 
feature in many hospitals, including the United States and the United 
Kingdom. 
• Informal discussions with several clinicians indicated: many clinicians were 
apprehensive about using IT; and others were concerned about the stability 
of patient management. There were even questions over the cost: 
“There have been people who have asked: why are we spending all this 
money on this, when we could be spending it on replacing our medical 
equipment?” [CIO] 
• Informal discussions with several administrators indicated: a reluctance to 
abandon a paper-based system that is known to work; and some felt that time 
would be better spent incrementally refining the paper-based system. 
The CIO knew that it was important to gain buy-in from the clinicians and 
administrators, and he also knew the consequences if he didn't. “Well, if I don’t get 
people to jump on board, then I am out of a job!" [CIO] 
The following outlines the background to the risk of resistance, and the actions taken 
to mitigate that risk. First, the contextual roles of history, culture, and power are 
explained. This is followed by a description of the project governance measures put 
in place specifically to help mitigate the risk of resistance. 
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7.6.1. History 
Until 1999, when the CIO was appointed, Hutt Hospital had very little exposure to 
IT. Mostly focused on data gathering and reporting, the automated information 
processing had no impact on the all-important patient management processes, which 
remained paper-based. The externally contracted IT manager maintained the existing 
systems, but did nothing to promote any further use of IT over many years. 
Consequently, clinicians were not exposed to IT-based systems in their work over 
this period, and remained largely indifferent to the IT function.  
“There was [prior to EMR] probably a culture of IT being an overhead, about IT 
not really being relevant – that is probably the best way to describe it. What does 
IT do? … [Many thought] ‘it provides computers, that’s all. It doesn’t really 
have any strategic significance to me’.” [CIO] 
With historical indifference towards IT, and the perception that IT was of low value 
to their work, clinicians were identified by the CIO as a significant risk in terms of 
resistance. 
7.6.2. Culture 
Generally, clinicians were very concerned about any potential disruption to their 
work practices – particularly those with an uncertain outcome, such as the 
introduction of the EMR. Clinicians felt comfortable with the current patient 
management system, and would be likely to resist any threat to its stability.  
“[If the clinicians were unhappy with the project’s direction, they] would vote 
with their feet, and not use the system. So, for us, that would probably be the 
bottom line. If someone says, if that goes ahead, we will not use it, then we go 
back and look at the circumstances around that. We haven’t, yet, had that.”  
[Senior Project Manager] 
However, all the interviewees indicated that the clinicians were not seen as pariahs 
ready to exercise their dominant power to deliberately obstruct the EMR project. 
Instead, clinician suspicions were seen as mostly valid, and had to be taken into 
account. There were three reasons for this. First, there was a strong culture of 
conservatism over changes to patient management, given many had ultimate patient 
responsibility. 
“The key responsible clinicians are the doctors. They are the people, at the end 
of the day, who, if something happens to their patient during a course of 
treatment, they are usually the ones who are called to account.”  [Senior Project 
Manager] 
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Second, clinicians would need to be convinced that the IT Department staff properly 
understood how complex patient management systems were. For example, while 
management and administration would have regular access to the system from their 
office, 
“…a lot of medical staff don’t quite know where they’re going to be, and over 
the course of the day, may actually use 10 to 20 different terminals. It took a 
while for the IT Department to get their head around that simple fact, let alone 
starting to actually look at some of the software. Even just the issues around 
logging in to a terminal are critically important to the acceptability, or the 
usability, of an EMR.” [Chair of the CUG] 
Third, the needs of senior clinicians and junior clinicians were quite different, and 
this would also need to be taken into account. Generally, older clinicians had found 
it harder to adapt to an electronic information system. 
“You basically have one layer – the senior layer – which are people that will be 
here for decades. Then you have two or three further layers of what we call 
junior doctors, who may work here for their training, over a period of months – 
at least three months, and up to several years. You may eventually work here as 
senior staff, but the bulk of the junior doctors you will only see for one stretch of 
five to six months. So, you have a group of medical staff who are extremely 
‘long-service’, and you have another group, at the other end, who are extremely 
‘short-service’. And so you have a very divergent group of people just within 
one career group. …It is particularly important to get it right for the senior staff, 
because they are going to be here for their life, if you like. So, it is quite 
important that we work well with them. Whereas our junior staff…are probably 
tapping on their computers all day long.” [Chair of the CUG] 
“But, what we have had, is very, very slow pickup of the system by some senior 
medical staff – very, very slow. People have a private practice, as well as their 
public practice, and they come into the public system for two or three sessions a 
week – in which time they will be operating, or they will be in outpatient clinics, 
and validly or invalidly, they are reluctant to log in and use our electronic 
system. They keep relying on the paper.” [Senior Project Manager] 
The CIO also identified the administrators as a group that may also offer resistance 
to the EMR. Administration staff had developed ideas for improving the current 
paper system for patient management, and saw the EMR as a needless threat to their 
safer, incremental improvement objectives: 
“The people who wanted more clerical staff to embed organisational use of 
paper medical records probably weren’t at that meeting [promoting the new 
EMR initiative]. …They wanted colour-coding in the medical record, they 
wanted every bit of information to be sorted in the paper record, … they felt that 
by focusing on more filing effort, they could improve clinical practice – which is 
probably true, to some extent. But, the organisation had to weigh up: was it 
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better to invest in a hundred more filing clerks, or are we going to go down the 
way of using electronic systems to organise data, and do away with paper?”  
[CIO] 
Although potential culture clashes were a concern, there were also positive cultural 
norms at an organisational level. 
“In this organisation, there has sort of been a tradition… of communication, 
working together…I think that has got to be the reason why it all works, really. 
Having people enjoying what they are doing, and getting on with the job, 
communicating well with each other, trusting each other, and generally working 
well together. It’s pretty simple...”  [Chair of the CUG] 
 “Also, the retention of staff is very important. …Certainly with our IS staff, and 
our IS project staff, we have people who have been here for many years. But that 
is really a cultural thing, throughout the organisation.” [Chair of the CUG] 
There was a collaborative environment within the DHB. Originally, the Hutt 
Hospital was a rehabilitation hospital after World War II, and some of the traditions 
of working together had endured since those days. The rehabilitation ethos was still 
present, including current specialisations in burns and plastic surgery. 
7.6.3. Power and Influence 
There was a significant power imbalance between the clinicians and the IT 
Department. Clinicians were well educated professionals with a strong collective 
voice within the DHB over clinical matters. This power to resist initiatives that 
affected their clinical practices was well recognised within the DHB and generally 
supported by management. Consequently, the Clinical User Group, representing the 
interests of the DHB clinicians with respect to the new EMR system, would 
typically have the final say over non-technical issues. 
“The Clinical User Group is in charge. They would not accept anything that they 
weren’t happy to live with. …They need to be able to discuss the ramifications 
of any situation that there is, and what they say needs to go [ahead].”  [Senior 
Project Manager] 
The CUG provided a forum for constructive discussion on project issues. The CUG 
was an organisational mechanism to air stakeholder views and reach a decision 
transparently, by consensus.  
“I think [politics have] largely been circumvented by the CUG…Knowing there 
was a way to put their issues out, there was no need to play politics…They could 
engage with the issue as opposed to playing games.”  [ex-COO, Project 
Sponsor] 
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The CIO’s first step was to rebuild and modernise the IT infrastructure, so that there 
would be technical capacity to run the new EMR system.  
“So, the opportunity was there to really move into... clinical information 
systems. In order to do that, we had to fix up some of our infrastructure, which 
was to upgrade the back end networks, replace dumb terminals, upgrade 
Windows, etc. We spent about 18 months doing that. …For me, it was to build a 
solid infrastructure that would last for five years. And we are too small an 
organisation to do both major infrastructural change, and major application 
change. Get the infrastructural stuff out of the way, and that gives you a stable 
platform… It took us until the end of 2000, beginning of 2001.”  [CIO] 
This also gave the CIO time to informally discuss what some of the issues might be 
with users, visit other hospitals that had implemented an EMR system, and learn 
more about the complex patient management processes at Hutt Hospital. He was 
well prepared for the first promotional meeting. 
“The first thing I did, is I gave a talk to a large audience of a variety of clinicians 
and clerical people from all around the place about where we were going, … 
where we could possibly go with some of the technologies for clinical 
information systems.”  [CIO] 
Because clinicians, and to a lesser degree administrators, had considerable power 
over a proposal that could radically alter their work practices, the CIO and Senior 
Project Manager needed to convince them that the benefits of the EMR would 
outweigh the risks and costs. However, the CIO and Senior Project Manager did 
possess the capacity to influence clinician thinking – partly through their IT 
knowledge and expertise, and partly through the use of good communication and 
interpersonal skills.  
The CIO began this long-term process by juxtaposing the implications of two 
options: further enhancements to the paper system, or full commitment into the 
EMR.  
“If we go down this [EMR] path, we face a number of risks, but we have the 
potential to do the things that we could never do on paper. To me, that was just 
to get the buy-in to the concept of moving forward. In other words, a zero 
assumption on what you want to do. Because then, people jump on board, they 
start to own it, and say 'yes, we want to go down this path', rather than me, as IS 
manager – because I obviously have a bias in that area ...”  [CIO] 
The Senior Project Manager was selected by the CIO to lead the overall EMR 
project for a number of reasons. 
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"... to shout softly is what we do. There is a certain amount of purposive 
personality, purposive approach, a certain amount of soft skills that I, actually, 
personally use to influence staff to move along, to get going."  [Senior Project 
Manager] 
A sign of success with this approach was that the Chief Operating Officer (COO) at 
the time, although computer illiterate (by his own admission during his interview), 
became enthusiastic from the promotion meetings, and agreed to sponsor the project 
at an executive level. However, it took time for the clinicians to appreciate how their 
work practices would be affected as the new EMR system steadily grew with 
increasing functionality. 
“The concept of the electronic medical record was pretty well accepted – 
accepted by the majority. But the implications of what the fully electronic 
medical record was about – I don’t think they were completely understood by 
anybody except for the very IT-literate.”  [ex-COO, Project Sponsor] 
7.6.4. Project Governance 
The CIO pointed out the important role of project governance and its close 
relationship with system ownership. 
“The issue for me was how to move forward with clinical information systems, 
when you needed strong clinical ownership of that, strong business ownership. 
So, this is where the beginning of the governance stuff comes in. ... certainly for 
clinical information systems, it was going to be the major issue, as far as I could 
see.” [CIO] 
The CIO was involved in the creation of all the important authority structures for the 
EMR project. This included the Information Systems Steering Committee, the 
project steering group, the project implementation teams, and ultimately, the 
Clinical User Group.  
Although mainly focused on IT governance, the Information Systems Steering 
Committee (ISSC) made the original commitment to implement an EMR-based 
system, and continued to receive monthly reports from the CIO ever since. 
“Around governance, unless you’ve got people who are willing to govern, and 
willing to champion the system, you don’t have governance, you only have 
figurehead. The best way to achieve governance is to get the governance body to 
actually select the system in the first place – because then it becomes their 
system.” [CIO] 
Formally, the ISSC was the highest level of problem escalation (including conflict) 
should the PSG be unable to resolve it. However, in practice, the ISSC rarely needed 
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to be involved for the duration of the project. To the CIO, early successes meant the 
ISSC remained fully supportive of the project, and so managing problems 
effectively at the lower levels was important. 
“If you tackle stuff down at the lower levels, the people up here in the ISSC have 
a degree of confidence that the process is rigorous further down, because you are 
also getting buy-in – all the time you are getting buy-in, at the user group level, 
and the steering committee level as well. So, once you have started delivering a 
few results, the people in the ISSC tend to have a lot of faith in the process, and 
so they keep supporting you, because they haven’t had the failures come up to 
them. So that by the time I come to speak to them at an ISSC meeting, they are 
fairly sure that I have been through a reasonably rigorous process. …For me, 
there is a clear accountability here, at the steering committee level, for me to 
deliver. But their accountability is to say, yes, do this project, and not that one. 
That is not my choice. The sponsor has to be strong and behind it, and there has 
to be the whole framework in there.” [CIO] 
The Project Steering Group (PSG) was the highest level decision-making 
authority that specifically focused on the EMR project. The PSG closely monitored 
each of the EMR projects. 
“I have had, in my role as Chief Operating Officer, an oversight role with the 
EMR since its inception. And I have had, up until recently, the role of Project 
Sponsor. There, I had a role that interfaced with the key IT people delivering the 
project, and sought to have project control through the clinical people at the 
direct system use level, and just to receive regular feedback, and then enter my 
input into the project. We did that on a monthly basis. We exercised, through 
that, the usual project control mechanisms of measuring progress against time 
for key objectives, measuring progress against budget, identifying the risks, and 
identifying mitigations for those risks, and getting feedback on the satisfaction 
by the users, and conversely by the developers on the project itself.”  [Ex-COO, 
Project Sponsor] 
The PSG was balanced across the two major stakeholders: the IT function (CIO, 
Senior Project Manager), and clinicians (the Project Sponsor, the CUG Chair). It 
was also balanced across hierarchy: the executive level (CIO, the Project Sponsor), 
and the operational level (Senior Project Manager, the CUG Chair). Finally, an 
independent, part-time fifth member, an external auditor acting in a quality 
assurance role, was there to report on project performance. 
“...at the moment, 3-monthly, we have an external auditor sitting on the [PSG] as 
well. So, that is where the formal processes – the reporting, the risk evaluation, 
the issues evaluation, and change control - happen for the electronic medical 
record. ... So every three months [the external auditor] comes out here and 
spends either half a day, or a whole day, depending on what our needs are at the 
time, including spending some time with myself. I usually book times (for him) 
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with leaders of other projects that are happening at the moment, within IT. 
Generally, we have two or three projects happening at once, within the EMR, … 
or, aligned to the EMR. So, he will spend time with those project leaders, … and 
he may spend time with the Manager of Operations, or the Manager of 
Application Support as well – usually about half an hour. That gives him a 
chance to get a feel for the progress of the project, and the pressure points, where 
there are contentions for resources, those sorts of things. Then, he will prepare a 
report for us, [which goes to the CIO] and myself.”  [Senior Project Manager] 
As noted in the literature review (Section 2.11), the existence of a project steering 
group at the DHB, and the responsibilities it held in this case, are relatively 
commonplace across many organisations in recent years. What was more unusual 
was the relationship the PSG had with a semi-formal user representative group (the 
CUG), and how this user involvement with the PSG decision-making process, 
according to all of the interviewees, had become essential to the PSG’s success in 
terms of resistance management.  
The Clinical User Group (CUG), ultimately a key factor in the reduction and/or 
elimination of resistance-based conflict, did not even exist when the project began. 
In 2001, the time came when the new EMR system was to be announced, and a 
vendor with a suitable product had to be found. The CIO saw this as an ideal 
opportunity to involve clinicians in the decision-making, and thus promote a sense 
of ownership. 
“So, I had a cunning plan. We got an enthusiastic group of about 10 or 12 
clinicians, we met, and we said this is the way we are going to do it – we agreed 
on that. We drew up a set of requirements around what we wanted, including 
prioritising the top 10 requirements. Then we had another list of about 20, but 
really focusing on some key, simple requirements. [For example], a single log-
on to provide secure access to patient information in a very easy, user-friendly 
way. We then put those requirements out to a selected market – New Zealand 
vendors who already had installations in hospitals around the country. We went 
through an evaluation process – my evaluation team had 10 people: three 
doctors, three nurses, three IT people, and one manager. The key thing was that 
the clinical people could outvote the so-called administration side of things. But 
I really worked it as a team. ...It was a risk for me, because I could not control 
the outcome.” [CIO] 
After the vendor was selected, all the major stakeholders (clinicians, administrators, 
the IT Department and management) were generally pleased with the outcome. 
“By following that robust process, we came out with a good answer, and then we 
moved forward with that vendor. And that vendor has turned out to be extremely 
successful. That decision came from the right process.”  [CIO] 
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This collaborative approach to decision-making proved so successful, it had 
continued to be used ever since, evolving into what became known as the Clinical 
User Group. While the CUG grew in size, adding a range of clinical representatives 
with an interest in IT, the IT Department representatives remained members as 
advisors only. The clinicians dominated the CUG decision-making, but they were 
always mindful and respectful of the IT advice they received.  
“[The CUG] does act as a very important point of communication between the 
clinical staff and IT staff, because they are often quite poles apart, in their views 
of the hospital.” [Chair of the CUG] 
The clinical CUG representatives went back to their own departments and promoted 
both the decisions, and the reasons why. Any serious objections at that point could 
be returned to the next CUG meeting for further assessment, given that they met 
regularly (weekly, initially, but they had since settled on fortnightly) .  
“The clinicians are an interesting group of users. Where we have seen very 
successful implementation, and well-received implementations, a lot of that has 
been led by clinical groups, by clinical leaders who might have an interest in IT, 
but they are not IT people. It is an important success factor, overall.”  [Orion 
Account Manager] 
“The Clinical User Group…would not accept anything that they weren’t happy 
to live with. They need to know the full picture. They need to know what we 
know, if you like. They need to be able to discuss the ramifications of any 
situation that there is....”  [Senior Project Manager] 
Even so, the IT Department had to retain that positive relationship by ensuring that 
each new addition to the EMR system worked well. 
“The IT people, here, are seen as being part of the team. Their relationship with 
clinicians, on the floor, is very strong, and they have given a good service, from 
the help desk end to the solving problems end. There is a high level of trust and 
confidence in what they do. That has added to the confidence people have had in 
pushing a barrel quite a long way. …I think having the strong Clinical User 
Group, which a number of the IT people are part of, has also added to the 
teamwork concept. It has also added to that dimension that reduced seeing IT 
people as somewhat removed from the real world – what really goes on in a 
hospital. I think it is the visibility of a number of the IT people has also added to 
that. …If there is no relationship between the frontline clinicians, and the key 
provider, such as the IT unit, then what we have achieved would not have been 
possible.”  [ex-COO, Project Sponsor] 
When things did go wrong, the users were generally better informed about IT 
projects – demonstrating how effective the CUG was as a communication 
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mechanism. Not only did the IT Department learn a great deal about the issues 
facing clinicians, but the converse applied as well. 
“[The users] are very realistic about IT. They are very aware that you can design 
functionality and think that you have covered everything … and you go over it a 
number of times, and you get sign off by a number of different people, who say, 
yes that is what we want. Then, further down the track, they are aware that 
things break. Things don’t always work the way you believed they would work.” 
[Senior Project Manager] 
Consequently, disagreement over how best to improve the patient management 
system had all but vanished, and the focus had shifted to how best to implement the 
EMR. Clinicians had become generally satisfied that if done properly, the 
implementation of an EMR would not necessarily lower the quality of patient 
management, and in fact could improve it. Similarly, administrators were convinced 
that paper-based improvements were not necessarily the best approach in the long 
run. 
Several policies were devised to support EMR implementation. First, the strong 
organisational culture valuing and promoting cooperation and transparency was 
effectively translated into an informal policy that EMR-related decision-making 
would be representational, open, and consensus-seeking. This included the way 
management and the other EMR stakeholders approached conflict resolution. 
“I think that most disagreements about how to approach things next were tackled 
in a fairly open way – particularly with [the DHB]. I can think of other examples 
of conflicts, but I think with [the DHB], for the large part, with most issues, it is 
the way we behave. Most issues are tackled in a way that we want to get a 
general agreement on the way forward, that doesn’t result in compromise, or one 
party feeling like they lost.”  [Orion Account Manager] 
Second, the PSG approved a formal policy requiring all clinical departments, and 
relevant administration, to migrate to the new system. It reflected the fact that 
although clinicians were capable of acting in concert on important issues, they were 
nevertheless distributed across different clinical departments – and each of these 
departments was managed largely independently of each other. They varied in size, 
number of staff, function, approach to management, and various cultural attributes. 
Therefore, even where agreement was reached within the CUG, pockets of 
resistance from individual clinical departments, or even just senior individuals 
within a department, were still always possible. The policy emerged from the EMR 
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proposal, signed off by the ISSC, that clearly encompassed the whole organisation, 
including all clinical departments. 
 “...we wanted one system to operate within the organisation. We didn’t want to 
have islands that retained a different system. We didn’t see any department as 
being so special, that they had an opt-out option. … It would become 
inconceivable, to me, to run two medical records systems.” [ex-COO, Project 
Sponsor] 
The PSG did accept that there would be unique requirements within individual 
departments. For example, clinical audit systems differed across most clinical 
departments. These would require future enhancements to the EMR system, but the 
essential concept of the EMR remained unchanged across all departments.  
Third, an informal policy of accommodation, communication and patience when 
working with users (particularly the clinicians) applied to IT staff across all project 
implementation teams. From the outset, the CIO, and the newly appointed Senior 
Project Manager, both consistently made efforts to listen to, and ameliorate where 
possible, user concerns. This policy was simply an extension of their approach, 
demonstrating the effort required to engage busy, and possibly indifferent clinicians. 
“I am prepared to put a presentation together, and take a laptop and a datashow 
around, and just fit in [to their timetable]. Now, I could have said ‘I’ve got this 
presentation, over in a meeting room here, between such and such, and such and 
such, please send your staff.’ It doesn’t work. ... You know where the power is. 
So you go there. ... [Even the CIO] is prepared to go and sit in the doctors’ 
offices and listen to them. 
We have a lot of lunchtime meetings, where we provide a light lunch to get them 
to look at these implementation teams, to make decisions along the way. We run 
them from half past twelve to half past one, and provide lunch, so that the 
doctors come between their theatre session, and the outpatient session. You have 
got to get them somehow.” [Senior Project Manager] 
A variety of project governance mechanisms were employed to support both 
making and implementing decisions, including the reduction of the risk of 
resistance. However, two mechanisms stood out: the Clinical User Group, and the 
extensive range of feedback mechanisms. 
The CUG did more than make decisions that were inevitably ratified by the PSG. 
Although clinician dominated, the CUG’s representative membership ensured broad 
consultation with different stakeholder groups. Further, it was used by the IT 
Department to present issues that could be both debated and decided upon. Finally, 
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its cross membership with both a variety of stakeholder representatives and different 
authority structures such as the PSG, meant effective communication about 
important issues both vertically (to management) and horizontally (across 
stakeholder groups) throughout the DHB. 
“The Clinical User Group is not just medical. It actually represents all of the 
clinical professions across the board, including administration. …So, while it is 
called a Clinical User Group, its focus is about the clinical activity, but it isn’t 
restricted to clinicians. It ensures there is quite wide-ranging debate. 
Everybody’s view is able to be expressed.”  [ex-COO, Project Sponsor] 
With a slight shift in focus from the solely clinical implications, to the broader 
effects on the entire clinical system, it took time for new voices in the decision-
making process to gain confidence. 
“It sounds pretty basic, but it was relatively innovative. It has taken some people 
quite a while to be comfortable in putting their view across. Like a clerical 
person, or a secretary, debating with some of the medical or nursing people, 
about their requirements for a system to be effective, as opposed to the medical 
requirements. The process ensured that everybody’s view was kept tabled, and 
could be debated, and the IT team were able to pull the threads of that, to ensure 
that the developments, as best we could, had everybody’s needs represented. The 
CUG had some pretty spirited debate. Some of their discussions progressed over 
a number of meetings, but they were able to reach decisions, which added a lot 
of value to the process.”  [ex-COO, Project Sponsor] 
This last point from the above quote is particularly important. Even when conflict 
was apparent, the CUG was driven by the need to reach a consensus, so that the 
project was not impeded. To ensure this happened, sufficient time to reach a 
consensus was made available. Time was important, but reaching some sort of 
agreement was always a top priority. 
The formal project status reporting structure extended from the PITs to the ISSC. 
“[The project] gets monitored – there are monthly reports that go to ISSC. 
[These are provided by] the project managers. They get reviewed by me, before 
they go up. They get reviewed by the sponsor as well….The implementation 
team reports regularly to [the CUG] every two weeks, and brings any changes in 
the scope, or issues, to discuss and resolve.” [CIO] 
However important formal reporting is, in terms of project monitoring and 
management, it does not necessarily keep all stakeholder participants fully informed 
about the project. A variety of mechanisms were employed to achieve this. For 
example, informal meetings and discussions frequently occurred between 
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stakeholder groups to help prevent, or reduce, the impact of conflict, before issues 
were considered formally. Even if the issue was then raised with the CUG, the 
participants were generally well-informed for the debate. 
“[Resolving disagreements] is done in a fairly robust sort of way. We do use the 
Clinical User Group to sign off on those things. But then a lot of hard work has 
gone in beforehand, to try and sort that out. There may be some issues as to why 
one project should get put in front of another. It is ultimately presented at the 
Clinical User Group. …I guess we try to follow the courses of fairness, and 
ensure that one group is not getting everything that they want, at the expense of 
another. I think, overall, we try and make it as balanced as we can. Certainly, in 
the sequence that we run projects, we try to ensure that if one group got 
something one month, they may not get something else for several other 
months.”  [Chair of the CUG] 
“Within this organisation, anyway, certainly if there is tension around, it gets 
well thrashed out [within the CUG].” [Chair of the CUG] 
The CUG was also used as a centralised communication mechanism, where most 
stakeholder opinions are freely discussed, keeping others informed on 
developments. 
“[We collected the feedback] verbally. …The feedback is given through the 
project people, and is relayed back, verbatim, to the [PSG], all through the CUG. 
This, through my time, started off with weekly meetings, and then went 
fortnightly. They provided the clinical input and clinical governance into the 
requirements of this, and other, IT projects that were being operationalised at the 
front line.”  [ex-COO, Project Sponsor] 
7.6.5. Anticipated Conflict Outcome 
An array of governance arrangements were put in place, making the most of a 
cooperative organisational culture, and strengthening stakeholder communication, 
feedback, representation and consultation, all supporting the overall objective of 
minimising conflict and maximising an inclusive, cooperative approach to making 
the EMR work. Every single interviewee declared the approach to project 
governance was very successful, inevitably citing the CUG as the linchpin to its 
success. 
This anticipated conflict ‘incident’ was examined in considerable detail, as opposed 
to the other incidents identified in this case study, partly because of its significance 
in laying the groundwork for managing future conflict incidents, and partly because 
it involved the creation of a wide range of project governance arrangements. 
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7.7. Resistance to the EMR Project (#2, 3, 4) 
All three conflict incidents (#2, 3, 4) involved resistance to some aspect(s) of one of 
the EMR projects. They are grouped together because they share many of the 
characteristics of both the environmental elements involved and the effects of 
project governance. This section begins with a brief description of each of the three 
conflict incidents. These descriptions are followed by an examination of the 
common factors involved across all three incidents. 
7.7.1. Receipt and timeliness of lab results (#2) 
Hutt Hospital laboratory (‘lab’) test results used to arrive on paper for doctors to 
check, who would either take further action or sign them off and file them in the 
paper-based patient record. One of the EMR projects required the relevant data to be 
fed into the new computer system. But the receipt of physical lab results served as a 
trigger for the doctor in charge of that patient to check the results and determine 
what should happen next. Furthermore, a sticky label attached to the lab results 
ensured the right doctor received them. Clinicians were concerned about the 
implications of using electronic data instead: 
• How would doctors be alerted that the lab results were now available? 
• How could they be confident the right doctor would be alerted about the lab 
results? 
The IT project team determined the solution would require considerable change to 
current practices across both clinicians and the lab administration staff. Both groups 
were unhappy, and declared they would resist this part of the implementation unless 
they could be satisfied the new lab result system would work and that all users 
would be able to adapt to the new processes. 
“That was a lot of change management right throughout the hospital – because it 
was in-patients and outpatients, it was nurses and doctors, and it was admin staff, 
who all had to change what they were doing. Then, the laboratory system had to 
be changed, to ensure that it could manage those event numbers, and send it 
through into the electronic record, which was reading all that. So, the doctors 
needed to know, and the nurses who looked after the clinics, needed to have the 
right clinic codes in their personal parameters, to make sure that they saw the 
results coming out.”  [Senior Project Manager] 
 229
The PIT, along with the Senior Project Manager worked hard to accommodate user 
concerns by visiting small groups of doctors, nurses and lab administrators, and 
discussing the issues:  
“We spent quite a bit of time around the hospital educating staff about having a 
specific event number coming through with the result.”  [Senior Project 
Manager] 
The PIT also came up with a process redesign solution that incorporated a technical 
interface that was secure, able to be used anywhere in the hospital, and easy to use – 
all by creating the concept of a doctor's homepage. 
Once the PIT had gathered their information, and presented a range of options for 
discussion within the CUG, the decision was eventually reached over both content 
and process. This was very time-consuming, as was the implementation, given the 
high priority attached to the need for accuracy and timeliness of the lab results 
presented to the doctors. “We had to go through all the scenarios, and listen to what 
they said…”  [Senior Project Manager] 
7.7.2. Electronic signoff of patient information (#3) 
One of the features of the EMR was the electronic signoff of diagnostic results and 
information by clinicians, in place of the traditional paper signoff. There was 
resistance over the introduction of electronic signoff, particularly from senior 
clinicians. However, this resistance had been anticipated by the PSG at the project's 
inception, and project governance arrangements, along with pro-active discussions 
with clinicians (see Section 5.6), meant this stage was not a surprise. Even the senior 
clinicians reluctantly accepted these changes must eventually happen, but they were 
anxious about the implications regarding their clinical processes. This was well 
understood by the PSG, as the senior clinicians understood the current paper-based 
system well, and used it to maximum effect – making the uncertainty of the 
electronic version a serious concern. 
 “I think it was identified that there would always be resistance. The concept of 
the electronic medical record was pretty well accepted by the majority. …It was 
just a matter of weaning people off one process, and gaining their acceptance of 
another over time.”  [ex-COO, Project Sponsor] 
The PIT’s patient, accommodating approach to the senior clinicians significantly 
reduced the risk of more serious conflict.  
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“[Even the most resistant senior clinicians] were not putting in major roadblocks. 
…It took a long time, and it took a lot of examples of some departments moving 
faster than others, and why was that? Slowly, acceptance grew. And I think it 
also grew with more and more practices, external to this organisation, utilising 
fully electronic systems – private hospitals, particularly.”  [ex-COO, Project 
Sponsor] 
The CUG proved to be the key mechanism for conflict resolution. 
“[Resolution involved] communication, through the Clinical User Group 
process, through more dialogue, including examples of where it was working 
well, more discussion around the reasons why people were reluctant; keep 
asking the ‘why’ questions.”  [ex-COO, Project Sponsor] 
Although pockets of resistance remained, the PIT was then able to focus its attention 
on those who were still not comfortable with the use of IT in clinical processes. 
7.7.3. A clinical unit resists (#4) 
One particular clinical unit rejected the entire concept of introducing an EMR 
system to their department. They felt that there were risks to their ability to function 
effectively, and that it would require valuable time for training – yet there were no 
perceivable benefits to them. However, the PSG had already determined the absolute 
policy of 100% conversion to the EMR. 
The PIT, in spite of their accommodating efforts, found they were making limited 
progress, and finally escalated the issue to the PSG.  
“I suppose we reflected it as being obstinacy, or just a department being 
difficult, because they wanted to be difficult. It did take some intervention, with 
[the Senior Project Manager] coming in wearing a health professional’s hat and 
interacting with the staff in a non-threatening way, getting underneath the issues 
more. Then it started to become apparent what the problem really was. ... Their 
resistance wasn’t necessarily about the concept, even though that was what they 
were saying; it was really an embarrassment that they had very low IT skills and 
knowledge.”  [ex-COO, Project Sponsor] 
Consequently, led by the ex-nurse Senior Project Manager, the PIT was able to shift 
the emphasis and spend some time helping the unit improve their skills and 
familiarity with IT.  
“I was prepared to accept a slower introduction, or slower utilisation rate, but not 
being part of [the EMR] was not an option. We did have those discussions, and 
some of those were difficult, but we got there. The major impact was really the 
people, at a much softer level, working closely with that department, and those 
people building their confidence and really getting underneath the issue.”  [ex-
COO, Project Sponsor] 
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Even so, the senior members of the unit remained reluctant, and the Project Sponsor 
had to exercise his power as the Chief Operating Officer (COO) to influence their 
thinking. 
“I did apply a little bit of management leverage, if you will. I had to talk to 
several key leaders in that department about my concerns. This wasn’t 
something that was going to stop [by itself].”  [ex-COO, Project Sponsor] 
At the time of interviewing, the unit was still not completely comfortable with EMR 
developments in their area, but the efforts made to gain their ‘buy-in’ resulted in 
sufficient acceptance and cooperation to at least ensure the project could move 
forward. 
“I think that department still struggles – basically older people, with little need to 
have a high level of IT knowledge, and we are trying to drive them to a greater 
utilisation of something from which they could see the benefits, for them and for 
their unit. They have come a long way from there.”  [ex-COO, Project Sponsor] 
7.7.4. Factors common to all resistance-based incidents (#2, 3, 4) 
In all three incidents, overall conflict levels had been reduced or eliminated (see 
Table 7.3). For each resistance incident, each of the three conflict dimensions either 
improved (in the majority) or remained unclear. This is in spite of the recognised 
collective power that clinicians possessed, where both the threat and the act of 
resistance, influenced other EMR stakeholder behaviour considerably (including CI 
#1, as noted in the previous section). This effectively obliged all stakeholders to take 
clinician views into account. 
In response to both the threats and acts of resistance, the IT project teams continued 
to use extensive consultation (typically through the CUG) and collaboration 
(through the PITs) to both meet clinician requirements and to influence how they 
saw each project. Only once was escalation required (#4), but the ‘softer’ approach 
still played a major, ongoing role. In this incident, the CUG was not an effective 
mechanism, because the issue stemmed from an individual clinical unit, which had 
its own culture based on age and inexperience with IT. Historically, the successful 
approach towards controlling resistance can be traced to the initial governance 
arrangements put in place prior to these incidents (#1), including authority (PSG, 
CUG), policy (no exceptions to EMR implementation; escalation), and mechanisms 
(CUG, feedback, communication). 
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Several interviewees also praised the work of the Senior Project Manager. Her 
patient determination to keep the projects moving forward, while working carefully 
through any user concerns, was identified as another significant success factor. She 
encouraged the other project managers to do the same. Critically, her personal 
background gave her a significant additional advantage – she was a nurse for many 
years prior to developing her IT career. This provided her with the sort of insights 
into the issues affecting clinicians that promoted a positive working relationship. 
7.8. Project Prioritisation (#5, 6) 
Both conflict incidents (#5, 6) involved disputes over the prioritisation of different 
EMR projects. This section provides a brief description of each conflict incident.  
7.8.1. Clinician disagreement over prioritisation of alerts system (#5) 
Alerts referred to overriding critical warning systems – something within the 
medical record warning the clinician that there was an urgent note attached about the 
patient that the clinician must read (e.g. a drug allergy). This was done via the paper-
based medical record.  
“The alerts are particularly important in the emergency department. …If 
someone rolls up, it might say that they have a history of violence, if you like, 
towards medical staff. It will tell you if this patient is potentially within a child 
abuse scenario. It will tell you if the patient has a significant drug allergy. It will 
go right down to whether that family live in a home that has a dangerous dog, 
which has been known to harm visitors, such as community nurses, going in to 
give a vaccination. They sound quite disparate, but they represent significant bits 
of information.”  [Chair of the CUG] 
The EMR ‘alerts’ system would involve setting up flags on individual patient 
records that drew the attention of any clinician treating that patient. The original 
design was that alerts would be represented as flashing lights on the computer screen 
as the patient's record was being displayed. The technology was fairly 
straightforward, but the challenge centred on the processes used to collect and 
maintain the currency of the alert information. The conflict was based within the 
clinician community at the DHB, as they could not agree what priority an alerts 
system project should have, given the inherent difficulties with design and 
maintenance.  
Some clinicians saw the system as essential.  
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“There were some concerns from a number of clinicians that this wasn’t being 
given a high enough priority. ...We saw it as a ‘must-have’ – a bit like requiring 
all cyclists to have safety helmets, or everyone should wear seatbelts. I 
personally think that alerts should be a fundamental part of an EMR.”  [Chair of 
the CUG] 
Even so, while they wanted the system up and running, they could not agree on 
specific design issues which involved compromises some were not happy with. Still 
other clinicians felt that, given the project was dragging due to disagreements, there 
were better ways to use the resources by focussing on other projects.  
Extensive, consultative approaches at resolution saw some of the issues resolved. 
This included attempts at reaching consensus through considerable debate within the 
CUG. Those clinicians seeking an agreement collaborated with the IT Department to 
see what technical options were available that might meet the objectors’ 
requirements. “There is constantly a push from clinicians to get it up and running.”  
[Chair of the CUG] 
The PSG were aware that clinician concerns had some validity, as past attempts at 
setting up alerts systems (both nationwide and in other hospitals) were generally 
unsuccessful. 
“There is a national computer system, [where] any hospital in the country can 
log in and see where anyone in the hospital has had an admission. ...Attached to 
that was an alerts system. That alerts system is basically regarded as useless. 
Why is that? Basically, because the information on it is unreliable. So, the whole 
alerts problem has evolved around the question, how do you make an alerts 
system which people trust, and are willing to participate in it?”  [Chair of the 
CUG] 
At one stage, the conflict reached the point where escalation was required. As the 
clinicians saw this as an internal, clinical matter, it was escalated to the DHB 
Clinical Board, as opposed to the PSG. 
“So, that was taken to the Clinical Board, which is a completely different group 
of people, who are basically charged with hospital governance issues, because, 
we saw it as almost more than an IT-related, EMR project issue.”  [Chair of the 
CUG] 
Several major decisions were made by the Clinical Board. 
“The final conclusion that we have come to, is that it must be easy. This has 
been iterated, and discussed, quite a lot at Clinical User Groups, with senior 
medical staff, Head of Department meetings, etc. So, the conclusion was that it 
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had to be reasonably easy to put the data in, but the data must be regularly 
reviewed.”  [Chair of the CUG] 
At the time of interviewing, it was still an ongoing issue. Clearly, many were still 
unhappy with either the system’s design flaws, or its lack of progress. 
“So, that is an issue that we have never really [resolved], from my own point of 
view, and you might say that perhaps I was just not getting my own way, but it is 
not only me…” [Chair of the CUG] 
7.8.2. Senior clinician wants higher priority for ‘pet’ project (#6) 
One senior clinician insisted that a particular project be given greater priority, in 
terms of resources, than it was initially allocated by the ISSC. As an ex-head of 
department, he was used to wielding power, and knew how the system worked. He 
made it clear he did not agree with the priority funding the project received. The 
senior clinician lobbied hard for the CIO to increase funding. Although his tactics 
were not always subtle, they did have some effect. 
“So, he shouted, and stamped, and he certainly had some response out of our 
Chief Information Officer, to the extent that he might have got a little more 
funding than he might have otherwise got.”  [Chair of the CUG] 
It is not clear why the CIO increased the funding, albeit by a modest amount, but it 
may be that the CIO felt prolonging the conflict further would be more trouble than 
it is worth. 
“… it does exemplify the fact that people can move and shake, even in an 
organisation like this, if they really want to.” [Chair of the CUG] 
The formal process was seen as fair, insofar as no other complaints were raised 
about it in the interviews, and the ISSC appeared to be respected for their 
impartiality on IT-related matters. However, the clinician did not accept the outcome 
of the formal process, and changed the result as a direct result of exercising power. 
In this case, the senior clinician's personal qualities (as evidenced by his behaviour – 
highly unusual in this environment) outweigh the impact of the clinician culture he 
belongs to. 
7.9. Issues with the Vendor Orion (#9, 10) 
Both conflict incidents (#9, 10) involved the DHB’s relationship with Orion, the 
software vendor for the EMR project. This section provides a brief description of 
each conflict incident.  
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7.9.1. Orion providing fewer development resources over time (#9) 
Orion is the software vendor for the DHB’s EMR project. Several interviewees 
commented that Orion’s product was of high quality and was well-suited to the 
DHB’s objectives. Once selected from a vendor shortlist, Orion was engaged to help 
implement the package. This meant Orion staff had to work closely with the IT 
Department staff. The relationship started off well, with several early EMR projects 
successfully implemented. However, gradually Orion became increasingly 
unresponsive – in terms of both providing technical resources for development work 
and responding to technical problems raised by the PITs. 
“Very often, [progress] is reliant on our vendor being able to release resources to 
enable us to do our work. We have had, in live applications, problems and issues 
that have arisen within the application, that have had to wait longer than we 
wanted to have resolution. When it comes to implementing the project, we go 
through the stage of developing the functional specifications with them, and with 
our stakeholders here. So, we have a very clear understanding that when we get 
to the end of those functional specifications, and we sign off – that is the 
functionality we expect to be delivered.”  [Senior Project Manager] 
The option to see this apparent neglect as a contractual issue, including penalties, 
was always open to the DHB. On one occasion, frustration levels were such that the 
DHB felt compelled to exercise those penalty clauses. 
“[Orion] are constantly failing to meet deadlines, and they are, consequently, 
penalised legally – well, financially – because of the contractual elements that 
are related. That is, probably, one of our biggest frustrations, in terms of 
timeliness.”  [Chair of the CUG] 
However, this was not the path they wished to take – preferring to find some way of 
bringing Orion back to the level of activity and service they had started with. 
“For myself, as the project manager, it’s time, time, time. It’s [Orion] being able 
to give us the resources that we need at the time to meet our deadlines. That is, 
for me, where the major conflict is.”  [Senior Project Manager] 
As a direct result of the delays, the working relationship between Orion and the 
DHB’s EMR stakeholders went from one of strength to one of tension and 
frustration. This was compounded when it was learned that Orion was using the 
DHB as a 'reference' to facilitate growth.  
“We also felt that they were probably using their experience here to gain further 
contracts. So, we felt a bit miffed, I think, that they were seemingly not as 
responsive to us, as we thought, and that as a key client, they were leveraging 
this relationship to gain further contracts.”  [ex-COO, Project Sponsor] 
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“The availability of [Orion's] resources for us has been a problem over the years. 
I think a lot of it has got to do with the fact that they are a very successful 
company. They have expanded globally - yet they were just a NZ company five 
or six years ago. ...what’s a $2 million contract over ‘X’ number of years, 
compared to a $50 million contract over 12 to 18 months overseas? That is the 
market forces [at work].”  [Senior Project Manager] 
Orion’s Account Manager, overseeing the DHB client relationship, admitted there 
had been problems, but put them down to “structural changes”. 
“There was, for a period of time, certain aspects of the project that had already 
gone live. We went through some structural changes, and got behind in terms of 
our support. So, for whatever reasons, there were a number of support issues that 
were not being resolved as quickly as they should have been. This created a 
backlog of support issues...”  [Orion Account Manager] 
The CIO, who dealt directly with Orion’s Account Manager as the DHB’s 
representative, employed a combination of persuasion and obligation (ethically, 
because they should meet their contractual obligations in good faith, and morally, 
because they are using the DHB as a reference to get new contracts).  
“[The CIO], in particular, spent a lot of time putting our view, and putting our 
concerns to Orion to improve that responsiveness.”  [ex-COO, Project Sponsor] 
While the DHB had legal power to enforce penalties, this did not prevent Orion 
from putting their priorities elsewhere – presumably because it was more 
advantageous for them to do so. The DHB had little power to affect Orion’s 
priorities beyond legal, ethical and moral arguments. 
Negotiations between the CIO and the Orion Account Manager took place on a 
number of occasions to address the deterioration in the working relationship 
between the DHB and Orion staff. The PSG and the CUG were not directly 
involved, but were kept informed. The DHB culture of openness and cooperation 
was reflected by the CIO’s approach. 
“At the end of the day, I can’t think of any specific examples where there has 
been a specifically hidden agenda, or something like that. I think I understand 
people’s motivations and behaviours. ...on the whole, for most of the interactions 
that I have seen, I think that [the DHB’s motivations are genuine and 
transparent].”  [Orion Account Manager] 
“I think that was pretty well managed by [the CIO].”  [ex-COO, Project 
Sponsor] 
The communication mechanisms established between EMR project staff and Orion 
staff were not seen as effective by the DHB. 
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“But, again, it was working with big software vendors, and understanding what 
requirements were needed, and communicating with them, and them 
communicating back, and not understanding some of the specific details that 
were going on.”  [Chair of the CUG] 
Ultimately, the issues were still not resolved, and the CIO felt it necessary to 
formally escalate the issue. 
“There are channels that myself, and [the CIO], can use through our account 
manager, and then further up to their resource allocation people, and to the 
Australasian manager, and those sorts of things. So, we escalate our concerns up 
there, when we feel we are getting a raw deal.”  [Senior Project Manager] 
“The escalation process – well, there was a combination of issues being raised in 
account relationship meetings, and formal escalation through, or semiformal 
escalation through an email, for example, identified the issues, and what needed 
to happen. So we had meetings to resolve those.  [Orion Account Manager] 
Orion’s attentiveness did improve after escalation, but not as much as the DHB 
wanted. At the time of interviewing, it was still an ongoing issue. However, Orion’s 
Account Manager appeared satisfied with the outcome and that they were ‘moving 
forward’. 
“…we worked through [the backlog of issues] and found a way forward. We 
implemented that, to move forward, and caught up on the backlog, and moved 
forward into a more normal project relationship.”  [Orion Account Manager] 
7.9.2. Orion disagrees with DHB over technical problem (#10) 
This conflict incident was a specific example of Orion’s general increase in 
relationship conflict documented above (#9). Specifically, this was the incident that 
finally triggered the escalation process described above. 
One of the EMR subsystems was performing poorly, and end-users were getting 
increasingly unhappy. It was raised as a support issue with Orion, who did not 
initially respond. 
“...it needed resolution, and there were various responses – initially, it stuck 
around for a while, and didn’t get resolved.”  [Orion Account Manager] 
Finally, Orion technical support was made available, but only through the formal 
process, which added to the frustration, as the advice was remotely provided and 
didn’t appear to work. 
“Initially, there were a number of suggestions that [the IT project team] can raise 
through normal support processes, and we [Orion] can give suggestions back as 
to the various things that can be done. There were various attempts to do that. 
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…It eventually got to a point where the IT department felt that they were in 
danger of losing customers (i.e. their users). So, that was a significant issue.”  
[Orion Account Manager] 
While Orion’s delayed response was symptomatic of the broader issue (#9), the 
conflict over their apparent inability to resolve the technical issue was a different 
worrying sign, raising the question as to the quality of the support staff assigned to 
the DHB client. However, the Account Manager insisted there was a good reason 
why the attempted repairs did not work. 
“The fact that both the test environment and the development environment were 
different from the production environment is an issue. It means that, unless you 
can replicate, faithfully, the issues and their resolutions in the other 
environments, it is a stab in the dark as to whether it actually addresses it in the 
production environment. … if you are in a detailed, technical view, then you 
look at the normal day-to-day things that you do to resolve an issue. But, if you 
have got a base problem, then those things won’t solve the problem.”  [Orion 
Account Manager] 
Orion's account manager suggested the problem was not straightforward, but 
accepted (post-escalation) that they had to work more closely with the DHB’s IT 
staff. 
“Tthe end result was that users were unhappy with the system. …[And so] things 
became escalated. We put a hit team in place, with a wide range of expertise. We 
took a few steps back, ensuring that problems could be replicated in their test 
environment. Prior to that, we put a number of fixes in place that addressed 
issues in the test system that turned out not to work in the production system.”  
[Orion Account Manager] 
The escalation process worked in the following way: 
“From our perspective, the regional manager was involved, I was involved as the 
account manager, one of our operations managers was involved – for a particular 
line of business that it was acting on. To ensure that those meetings were held, 
the DHB’s CIO, the Applications Support Manager, and the Senior Project 
Manager [would all attend].”  [Orion Account Manager] 
In hindsight, the Orion Account Manager thought the escalation process was useful 
as it made it clear to what degree the business-as-usual (BAU) processes for 
technical support were no longer working, and that a more focussed approach was 
required to resolve the issue. 
“So, I guess the escalation involves stepping outside of that, and recognising 
what the base problems are [in this case, the differing software environments], 
and working together to resolve those issues, and getting back to business-as-
usual types of issue resolution. …I think it is often useful to have the right kind 
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of framework to enable that to happen. I guess that is a consistent theme across 
most issues that arise. Then most issue resolution comes down to the 
relationship, and being able to work through things together, and sometimes step 
outside, if things aren’t getting solved in the usual way, whether they are part of 
the project or part of support.”  [Orion Account Manager] 
Although the problem was eventually fixed, the relationship conflict between the 
DHB and Orion had been elevated by the need to escalate before the issue was 
addressed. 
7.10. Other Incidents (#7, 8) 
Two conflict incidents (#7, 8) that do not share many characteristics with other 
conflict incidents are examined here. 
7.10.1. Access to surgical performance data (#7) 
There is a long-held tradition of peer review among surgeons, examining reports 
about operations and discussing them. Surgeons collect data on their own surgery 
for this purpose. One of the EMR projects involved the development and 
implementation of an electronic surgical audit system, providing an automated way 
to collect and review surgical data for regular peer review sessions.  
“The surgical service were prime drivers for an electronic audit system, so that 
they could put their operations, and complications, and things like that, into an 
audit system, that they could pull out for their regular meetings where they 
looked at and evaluated their practices, and looked at, maybe, the infection rates, 
deep vein thrombosis rates, or whatever they do following their surgery – it’s 
what doctors do. … The development of that system wasn’t one that I was 
specifically involved in, but it was one that the general surgeons – led by [the 
Chair of the CUG] – were very keen to get up and pilot within the hospital.”  
[Senior Project Manager] 
The surgeons, who proposed the new system, also made it clear that this information 
was for their own internal use, and lobbied to ensure that the system was made 
secure.  
“But a lot of advertising, discussion, and then decision-making, and 
promulgating really, went on to say this is information that is collected by us, in 
our service, for us, and we have the sole right to that information. So, that 
system is a very secure system. The reports are very secure – they go only to the 
surgeons.”  [Senior Project Manager] 
However, DHB administrative departments would have found the information very 
useful as well, but they were barred from seeing it.  
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“Now, from my point of view, with my background, I can see that there would 
be a lot of information in there that could be used by both the Quality and the 
Risk Departments of the hospital – but, as yet, that is not available to them.”  
[Senior Project Manager] 
The surgeons’ main concern was that the data could be used by management as an 
assessment of personal performance. They argued that surgeons would not be as free 
and frank during surgical audits if the data was available to management. However, 
such was the power of clinicians within the DHB, and particularly the surgeons 
among the clinicians, no one (including management) challenged this argument. 
“Just observing in the hospital, it is accepted that that is [the surgeons'] 
information.”  [Senior Project Manager] 
7.10.2. Junior clinicians going it alone with discharge summaries (#8) 
A discharge summary is a document generated once a patient has been discharged 
from hospital. Such medical documents used to be dictated by senior clinicians, and 
then typed through a typing pool. The EMR project changed this, allowing the 
details to be entered into the information system, and a discharge summary 
generated. This enabled junior clinicians to generate discharge summaries without 
involving a senior clinician. Senior clinicians objected to this, pointing out discharge 
summaries were increasingly used by the patients’ GPs to guide them on patient 
treatment.  
“[It] has not been totally resolved. Some people believe that senior medical 
doctors should check every discharge summary, before it actually gets sent out. 
Although, the way that wards and teams work now, that virtually never 
happens.” [Chair of the CUG] 
This was an unexpected consequence, as the new system was already in place, and 
the objecting senior clinicians, concerned about patient safety, were seeking a 
compromise. Senior clinicians used to be in charge of dictating discharge letters, but 
IT had enabled this tradition to be changed through new processes. 
“Essentially, the discharge summary was designed as a sign-out bit of paper for a 
patient to have, as it had their current medications on it, and their instructions 
over the next week or two. It wasn’t designed to be a complex review of their 
inpatient stay. ...[But] because it is now readily available to the GPs, it has 
become a very ready source of material for the GP. ...but it was never designed 
to be that, in the early days. Traditionally, the more senior doctors always used 
to write a discharge letter, not a discharge summary, for all discharges. That 
actually slipped by the wayside a number of years ago. So, you now have house 
surgeons writing documents, which were previously illegible, because of the fact 
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that they were written in triplicate, and the patient normally got the third copy, 
whereas the first copy went in the hospital notes. You now have them writing 
more legibly, but not necessarily as competently, as their seniors might.”  [Chair 
of the CUG] 
The cultural gap between senior and junior clinicians has already been discussed 
(Section 5.6). Essentially, senior clinicians were typically long-term employees of 
the DHB, whereas junior clinicians were often at the DHB on short-term contracts 
for the experience, and were likely to move on afterwards. Further, most junior 
clinicians were regarded as IT literate, whereas the senior clinicians were often 
uncomfortable and unfamiliar with IT – particularly in the workplace. 
“We still have senior medical staff that probably don’t ever really log in to e-
mail, as it is at the moment – although, that has changed significantly over the 
last five years, where we have gone from about a 10%, to an 80%, [usage of 
computers]. ...It’s really an age, and a generational fact. I think a lot of our older 
doctors have never really been brought up with computers.”  [Chair of the CUG] 
The question was whether or not junior staff should be formulating and sending 
complex discharge summaries without them being checked. The CUG had played a 
major role in the search for a consensus decision. 
“So, that particular issue is quite a complex issue, which is debated, not 
infrequently, at many different forums throughout the hospital.”  [Chair of the 
CUG] 
Senior clinicians were certainly aware that the process would benefit the junior 
clinicians as far as clinical experience was concerned. 
“The formulation of [the discharge summary] is not only a technical exercise for 
a young doctor – there is also quite an educational, or learning, component, 
where they are formulating their own thoughts in a new way, which, hopefully, 
is going to benefit them, and be with them, for all their years in training, to think 
about what the problems were, what the issues were, and get it down on paper.”  
[Chair of the CUG] 
But, being ultimately responsible as the senior clinical advisors, they asked how 
would mistakes get picked up, and what risks were there for the patients? 
There were also concerns that management favoured junior clinicians writing the 
discharge summaries, possibly to make the process more efficient and reduce the 
need for a typing pool. 
“As [the discharge summaries] get more complex, we move to the scenario 
where these doctors come on to do the clinics, and there is a pressure from 
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management, potentially, to be pushing them to type [using computers] their 
own letters.”  [Chair of the CUG] 
As a power struggle between two clinical factions (junior vs. senior), the outcome 
had been difficult to predict. Senior clinicians had considerably more power and 
authority than junior clinicians, partly due to age and seniority, and partly due to 
longevity as DHB employees. Even so, with the onset of EMR projects, it was the 
junior clinicians who felt most comfortable with the new IT-based systems. 
In this case, the status quo in terms of the discharge summary and its purpose, 
appear to have changed without formal appraisal. This apparent (albeit unintended) 
fait accompli had put the senior clinicians in a more difficult position, as they were 
arguing for change post-implementation. Furthermore, most of the junior clinicians 
liked the new IT-based system.  
7.11. Regular conflict over EMR project delays (#11) 
Many of the conflict incidents discussed previously led to delays in the various 
project timeframes. But resources were limited and delays could be costly (often 
trading off time vs. money). Furthermore, large projects such as the EMR must be 
reported to the Board. This put a great deal of pressure on the project managers 
involved in the PITs – on the one hand, they were expected to meet their project 
timeframes, but on the other hand, there were many issues beyond their control.  
“We have had issues around the project – generally in the contention for 
resources, either at the software developer’s end, or at our own internal 
programming end, and sometimes with our operations staff, where they are 
unable to meet the [original project] deadlines.”  [Senior Project Manager] 
Particularly challenging was the time required to resolve clinical process issues. The 
clinicians, placing quality of patient management information as a paramount 
concern, preferred less urgency and more caution – including wide consultation and 
debate. However, the policy of collaboration by the IT group, working with the 
clinicians and administrators, meant that, through the CUG, IT advisers could work 
with them in support of their recommendation, so that the necessary resources 
(typically time) could be identified and proposed to the ISSC for approval. 
“We listened to [the clinicians], and we delayed. But also, we were empowered 
by this group to say ‘we delay’, because this group said it was better to delay 
delivery than to deliver a poor quality result  that would have a worse effect on 
[both] them and the organisation as a whole.”  [CIO] 
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Consequently, once the IT project managers were aware delays were likely (they 
received regular feedback), they went straight to the CUG for their views on which 
way to go:  
“It’s over to the Clinical User Group to say, what is the bottom line? What is the 
functionality we must have, to go to pilot with? What can we live without, and 
wait for later development?”  [Senior Project Manager] 
In summary, the process undertaken to manage project delays involved the 
following steps:  
a) regular project feedback alerted the PIT project manager that delays were 
likely;  
b) the PIT project manager reported this to the CUG – who debated the issues 
and eventually agreed upon the best approach, incorporating suggestions from 
the IT advisers;  
c) these recommendations were forwarded to the PSG, who normally approved 
them; and 
d) the PSG finally promoted the recommendations to the ISSC, who made the 
final decision – usually favourable for extending the deadlines or finding more 
resources. 
“So, when we are looking for more extra money, going back to the ISSC, it is 
generally for the ongoing costs of the resources…. Last year, we ran over, with 
some work that we were doing, and it is the same with the project that I am 
doing at the moment … if more dollars were needed, it’s generally for resources 
rather than for software, and rather than for external spending. So, how do we 
deal with that? Because we are continually evaluating where we are, we know 
quite early on, if we are going to be running over, or if we can’t meet the 
functionality for the stakeholders … they are the two things we have to deal 
with. The Clinical User Group is a group that we go to, that I would go to, very 
early on, and say that because of either time, or skills, or availability of [Orion’s] 
time, we haven’t got the functionality that we wanted to go ahead with.”  [Senior 
Project Manager] 
As the entire resolution process typically incorporated a series of opportunities to 
widely consult, in an open and transparent way, persuasion was the dominant 
influence approach. Clinicians drew on their collective professional power, while IT 
drew on their expertise as a source of power. 
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“Part of that may be because of the way that we have approached working with 
that group. And I say that we work with them – we don’t give them information, 
and talk down to them. It’s a joint effort between me, as project manager, a 
project leader, and the members of the Clinical User Group. [The Chair of the 
CUG] is supportive of that process – he will take a lead in that area. Before he 
was the chairperson of the Clinical User Group, it was the Medical Director, and 
he would take a lead role in discussions around where we had come up against 
something that we were unable to solve technically within [budget] and time, 
and we needed to negotiate something.”  [Senior Project Manager] 
In spite of a PIT’s frustrations over delays, the policy of having the clinicians work 
through the issues with IT had been maintained throughout –a direct consequence of 
the personal leadership of, first the CIO, and then the Senior Project Manager, who 
both set the high standards. 
“When I took over the role of project manager, and even when I was leading 
some projects earlier than that, it would be [the CIO] who sets that platform. As 
long as we can identify, exactly, what is the reason, and we’ve taken as many 
steps as we possibly can to mitigate it, or to alleviate a problem that will cause 
the time to blow out. So long as we have done those steps, and we have been 
diligent in doing that, then it is acceptable to him.”  [Senior Project Manager] 
In terms of decision-making, the ISSC, PSG, and CUG all had important roles in the 
process of delay management. 
“I guess one of the things that we rely on [both] the CUG and the PSG [for], is 
how to deal with delays in the project. … Sometimes we have had to go to them 
and say that we are not going to meet this timeframe, what would you like us to 
do?”  [CIO] 
At the time of interviewing,, in spite of considerable, and largely successful 
(according to all the interviewees) progress on the gradual construction of the EMR 
system, there were still critical issues requiring further debate, with further delays 
likely. These were all related to the fundamental question of how best to design, use 
and manage electronic patient records.  
For example, debate had continued over the way in which paper medical documents 
should be represented in the corresponding electronic medical records. Scanning the 
documents would be easier and faster, but entering the relevant data through a data 
entry screen would provide more usable data.  
"That is something in the organisation that we have often debated – to the point 
that we have not actually managed, yet, to get one document scanned into our 
electronic medical record, …One of the reasons that we have resisted it, is that 
we have tried to ensure that any documentation we do have on the EMR, we 
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have it as rich information, so that the data can be queried, or structured in such 
a way that we understand what the data is, and where it is. Whereas, with a 
scanned document, you would fail to have that.”  [Chair of the CUG] 
 
7.12. Conflict Resolution 
The following examines the assessment of the dimensions of conflict, the 
corresponding resolution outcomes, and the primary targets across all conflict 
incidents. Recall that the level of conflict involved in a given conflict incident can be 
accessed through an examination of each of the three key dimensions of conflict: 
disagreement, negative emotions, and perceived interference with objectives.  
Conflict resolution outcomes are determined by comparing the level of pre-
resolution conflict with the level of post-resolution conflict. First, each dimension of 
conflict is assessed for each conflict incident, both before and after resolution. Each 
assessment leads to one of the following allocations: YES (there is clear conflict 
with respect to this dimension); Some (there is evidence of conflict with respect to 
this dimension, but the level is not clear); NO (there is no evidence of conflict with 
respect to this dimension); and Uncert (there is insufficient information to make an 
assessment). 
There are five possible outcomes for each dimension of conflict comparison: E 
(conflict has been eliminated); R (the level of conflict has been reduced); U (the 
level of conflict remains unchanged); T (conflict has been terminated – that is, no 
further resolution attempted); S (the level of conflict has escalated); and ? 
(uncertain). 
For each conflict incident, a positive outcome can be defined as one where each 
dimensional level of conflict is either reduced (R) or eliminated (E). Conversely, a 
negative outcome can be defined as one where each dimensional level of conflict is 
one of: unchanged (U), escalated (S) or terminated (T). A partially positive 
outcome can be defined as one where two dimensional outcomes are positive and 
one is negative. A partially negative outcome can be defined as one where two 
dimensional outcomes are negative and one is positive. 
The primary target of a conflict incident can be any combination of three types: 
task content (conflict over the nature of the task itself), task process (conflict over 
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how the task should be carried out), and relationship (conflict due to an awareness of 
interpersonal incompatibilities).  
For this case study, the assessments of levels of conflict, both before and after 
resolution, along with the corresponding resolution outcomes, are briefly described 
in the summary table found in Appendix G (Table G-1). These results are condensed 
in Table 7.3.  
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Table 7.3: A summary of the changes in levels of conflict after resolution for each conflict incident 
# Incident Target Conflict (Pre-Resolution) Conflict (Post-Resolution) Resolution Outcome 
Disagreement Negative 
Emotions 
Interference Disagreement Negative 
Emotions 
Interference Disagreement Negative 
Emotions 
Interference 
1 Serious resistance from both 
clinicians and administrators 
to EMR 
(anticipated) 
Task (content / 
process) & 
Relationship 
YES Some YES Some NO Some R E R 
2 Resistance over new clinical lab result processes 
Task (Content) Some Some YES Some NO Some U E R 
3 resistance to electronic signoff 
of patient information 
Task (Content) Some Some Some NO NO Some E E U 
4 A clinical unit resisted EMR Task (Content) YES Some YES Some Some Some R U R 
5 Clinician disagreement over prioritisation of alerts system 
Task (Content) YES Some YES Some Some Some R U R 
6 senior clinician wants higher priority for ‘pet’ project 
Task (Process) YES YES YES NO NO NO E E E 
7 Disagreement over access to 
surgeon performance data  
Task (Content) Some Uncert YES NO Uncert YES E U C 
8 junior clinicians going it alone 
with discharge summaries 
Task (Process) YES Uncert YES Some Uncert Some R U R 
9 Orion providing fewer development resources over 
time  
Task (Process) 
[Relationship] 
Some YES YES Some Some Some U R R 
10 Orion disagree with DHB over 
major technical problem 
Task (Process) 
[Relationship] 
Some YES YES NO Some Some E R R 
11 EMR projects suffer delays Task (Process) YES Some YES Some NO Some R E R 
Resolution Outcome: T = Terminated; E = Eliminated; R = Reduced; U = Conflict unchanged; S = Escalated; ? = Uncertain (in terms of direction & 
degree of change) 
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The frequencies of resolution outcome types are related to primary target types in 
Table 7.4. The outcomes of conflict resolution were either positive or partially 
positive on 10/11 occasions, and even the other outcome was only partially negative. 
A success rate of 91% is high and suggests conflict resolution is a strong 
competency of IT project governance in the DHB. The primary targets were evenly 
distributed between task (content) and task (process), excluding the key anticipated 
conflict incident (#1), which focused on all three primary target types. Conflicts over 
task processes were resolved particularly well, perhaps indicating how generally 
satisfied stakeholders were with the way tasks were carried out. 
 
Table 7.4: The frequency of resolution outcomes across all 11 conflict incidents, categorised 
by primary target 
Primary 
Target 
Resolution 
Outcome 
1. 
Relationship 
2. 
Task 
(content) 
3. 
Task 
(process) 
4. 
Task 
(content & 
process) 
5. 
Task (content 
& process) & 
relationship 
 
 
TOTAL 
Positive 
  3  1 4 
Partially positive 
 4 2   6 
Partially negative 
 1    1 
Negative 
     0 
TOTAL 0 5 5 0 1  
 
The inter-stakeholder relationship was the primary target of one incident (#1), 
where the conflict was anticipated. The only relationship conflict to ensue was 
between the DHB and Orion. It is not possible to know to what degree relationship 
conflict would have been a problem if it had not been anticipated, and acted upon, 
from the beginning. Even so, relationship conflict had not been a problem within the 
DHB. 
Drawing from the preliminary findings, the following three sections examine the 
contributions of each of the constructs identified in the research framework. Each 
section focuses on a different research question. 
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7.13. Analysis Addressing Research Question 1 
The first research question focused on contextual, or environmental, effects. 
RQ1: In what way, and to what extent, do environmental elements affect the 
conflict resolution process and its outcomes? 
Each of the environmental elements identified in the research framework (culture, 
power, history, personal qualities) are now examined across the conflict incidents 
identified in this case. A summary appears at the end of this analysis. These effects 
are then considered holistically, testing the framework for completeness, and 
identifying interactive and dominant effects. 
Culture was an important factor in every single conflict incident. Several significant 
cultural characteristics appeared in many incidents: 
• The DHB had an enterprise-wide culture based on internal co-operation, 
transparency and communication between different parts of the organisation. 
[3 incidents] 
• Clinicians, being responsible for patient safety, have a dominant culture 
within the DHB – they generally get their way where clinical issues are 
concerned. [3] 
• IT Department developed a culture of: consultation and collaboration with 
stakeholders, and accommodation of clinical user requirements. [4] 
• Semi-independent clinical units were typically small and had developed their 
own subcultures of the DHB clinician culture. This also applies to other 
subclasses of the clinician group, including surgeons, who were considered 
the most dominant among clinicians. [4] 
• Senior clinician culture based on experience, long service with the DHB, but 
mostly IT illiterate. This includes culture clashes between senior and junior 
clinicians, who are more comfortable with IT. [3] 
The most significant stakeholders in most of the conflict incidents were the IT 
Department and the clinicians. Other conflicts involved either clinical administration 
or subsets of the clinician collective – of which the most significant was the culture 
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clashes between senior and junior clinicians. Table 7.5 describes the cultures of 
these four important stakeholder groups, by applying the four dimensional model 
based on assessing their respective: beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviours.  
When the CIO was appointed, the clinicians’ belief that patient safety overrode all 
other concerns with respect to clinical processes was accepted by the DHB. By 
developing a culture of consultation, collaboration, and communication within the IT 
Department, both the CIO and the Senior Project Manager created a culture that 
meshed, as opposed to clashed, with the clinician culture. Clinicians wanted ultimate 
control, and the IT Department was happy to provide advice and support without 
threatening clinician dominance. Further, the DHB had long had a culture of 
consensus decision-making and transparency in management. The IT Department 
employed the same principles with EMR design and implementation, and earned 
respect from its users. 
There was also cultural variation within the clinician collective. As each clinical unit 
was small and partly autonomous, some still provided pockets of resistance and 
conflict For example, the surgeons were one of the most powerful subgroup of the 
clinicians, and used to getting their own way on surgical issues.  
There were no clear indications provided by interviewees as to what Orion’s culture 
might have been like, or whether or not it had any effect on their actions – 
particularly where conflict with the DHB occurred. 
Culture clashes did occur between the senior and junior clinicians on occasion. 
Senior clinicians felt their views should be accepted, as they were typically 
experienced, long-serving employees of the DHB who would become regular users 
of the EMR system. However, as senior clinicians had not been exposed to much IT 
in the past, they felt uncomfortable and uncertain about bringing IT into their clinical 
processes. Junior clinicians were typically transient in nature, working at different 
hospitals for six months to a year in each to learn and gain experience. As they were 
much younger, they normally felt comfortable with IT use, and supported the 
objectives of the EMR projects. 
In summary, in spite of varying attitudes towards IT and the EMR project, there was 
a strong sense of shared beliefs and values across the internal stakeholders within the 
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DHB which helped drive the consensus decision-making and often successful 
resolution of conflict. 
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Table 7.5: Cultural dimensions and relevant context of each of the IT Department, clinicians, and the clinical subgroups senior and junior clinicians 
 IT Department Clinicians Senior Clinicians (subgroup) Junior Clinicians (subgroup) 
CONTEXT     
ISSC 
Representation 
CIO Appointed senior clinicians Appointed senior clinicians none 
PSG 
Representation 
CIO, Senior Project Manager Project Sponsor, Chair of CUG Project Sponsor, Chair of CUG none 
Project 
Representation 
Senior Project Manager, PIT project managers  Clinician representatives on CUG; 
Clinician representatives on PITs 
Clinician representatives on CUG; 
Clinician representatives on PITs 
Clinician representatives on CUG; 
Clinician representatives on PITs 
Capability Authority to make decisions on IT 
infrastructure; 
CIO authority to make decisions over Orion 
negotiations; 
Power to persuade through IT expertise 
Considerable power to resist EMR changes – a 
defacto authority to make decisions on clinical 
issues 
 
Authority through membership of 
highest decision-making bodies; 
Power to influence decisions through 
seniority and respect 
Power to influence decisions through 
collective action – as demonstrated by 
junior doctor strike (unrelated to 
EMR) at DHB during interviews 
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 IT Department Clinicians Senior Clinicians (subgroup) Junior Clinicians (subgroup) 
CULTURE     
Beliefs Consultation & collaboration with EMR users, 
and accommodation of their requirements 
(subject to funding and technical constraints) 
Patient safety is paramount with regard to 
clinical processes; 
They should always have the final say over 
clinical issues 
See ‘Clinician’ beliefs; 
Also, typically long-term employees 
who want to see the DHB processes 
work well over time 
See ‘Clinician’ beliefs; 
Also, typically short-term employees 
who are focussed on learning and 
gaining experience 
Values  Meeting task and project deadlines; 
Providing the quality clinicians require from 
the EMR systems, and the respect they earn as 
a result 
Clinical processes that work properly all the 
time; 
Respect of their perspectives on clinical issues 
See ‘Clinician’ values See ‘Clinician’ values 
Attitudes Mostly in full support of users and their 
requirements; 
Some frustration at the sometimes lengthy 
delays that occur in individual projects 
Lack of confidence in EMR changes until 
proven both useful and safe; 
Respect for IT Dept as it has developed a 
positive working relationship 
See ‘Clinician’ attitudes; 
Also, distrustful of processes involving 
IT due to own lack of confidence and 
experience with IT  
See ‘Clinician’ attitudes; 
Also, accepting of IT-related changes 
as they are confident with IT use & 
are more willing to trust automated 
processes  
Behaviours Respect clinician work pressures by meeting 
them at places & times they prefer; 
Provide advice to clinicians over technical 
issues (e.g. capability, feasibility, and cost), 
and leave final decisions to them 
Mostly positive support for EMR, but insist on 
full consultation, close collaboration, and 
regular communication, and consensus 
decision-making to determine the outcome; 
Willing to accept delays until consensus 
reached 
See ‘Clinician’ behaviours; 
More likely to resist, or only reluctantly 
cooperate 
See ‘Clinician’ behaviours; 
Less likely to resist 
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Clinician power to influence decision-making was recognised by the CIO before the 
EMR project began. Clinician resistance was seen as the biggest potential threat the 
IT Department was likely to face. While the CIO instituted many measures to 
minimise this threat, it was the CUG that proved most effective. The CUG enabled 
clinicians to weigh up the impact of EMR design and implementation on their 
practices, and listen to IT project managers for advice, before making a joint 
decision incorporating their views and those of other stakeholders. According to the 
ex-Sponsor of the project, the wide consultation and transparency of decision-
making meant that internal politics had “largely been circumvented by the CUG”. 
Even so, the dominant clinician culture and power to resist remained, and was 
regularly exercised to influence decision-making – it is just that it was seen to be 
done in a (mostly) constructive way. 
The CUG was also a powerful group, in the sense that they were not a formal part of 
the decision-making hierarchy in the DHB, and yet most clinicians abided by CUG 
decisions. 
The positive relationship between the IT Department and clinicians was not solely 
due to the IT culture of respecting clinician opinion and accommodating their 
concerns. IT staff also had to provide good advice and gain clinician trust. The IT 
Department was able to wield some power in negotiations based on their IT 
knowledge and expertise. This proved particularly effective given the previous lack 
of exposure to IT in terms of clinician practice. The CIO also had considerable 
power bestowed on him due to the complete backing of the Board and DHB 
executives. For example, he gained executive agreement to institute the policy of no 
exceptions for EMR conversion, which reduced the possibility of absolute resistance 
and consequent escalation to executive levels. 
Orion, an external stakeholder that initially fitted in well with the clinicians and IT 
staff in terms of the DHB’s transparent, consensus decision-making. It was 
presumed that the contract, incorporating penalties for Orion if their performance 
was poor, would reduce their power to neglect or under-resource the development 
and implementation of their software. In practice, Orion’s power in terms of working 
with the DHB, considerably increased once they started achieving more lucrative, 
overseas contracts. This weakened the DHB’s contractual power to the point where 
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Orion was content to accept the penalties rather than increase attention and 
resources. This growing power imbalance was only eased when the DHB found out 
they were being used as a reference for Orion to gain further contracts. 
Consequently, Orion backed down, somewhat, and increased both support and 
resources. At the time of interviewing, the problems with Orion had settled, but the 
CIO (chief negotiator with Orion) remained wary of what may happen in the future. 
The history of clinicians’ paper-based systems, including little exposure to IT, 
presented the CIO with both a problem and an opportunity. The problem was that the 
clinicians were understandably uncertain and suspicious of the likely impact of IT on 
their clinical processes. This made resistance more likely. However, this lack of IT 
exposure meant that clinicians in the DHB also had no pre-existing relationship 
conflict with the IT Department, which provided the CIO with an opportunity to 
build a positive relationship with them right from the outset.  
Occasionally historical practices were changed with unexpected outcomes. Senior 
clinicians had always signed off discharge summaries – partly to check junior 
clinician treatments and recommendations. But with the implementation of 
automated summaries, the senior clinicians were no longer part of the process. More 
broadly, the CIO was also aware that historically, many past attempts at introducing 
an EMR system in other hospitals in many parts of the world had failed, with authors 
of case studies concluding that gaining clinician ‘buy-in’ was the most important 
critical success factor. 
While many individuals were considered instrumental in making the EMR a 
success, two were repeatedly singled out by the interviewees. The first was the CIO, 
who put in place many supportive governance measures for the EMR project 
(without guidelines or direction from the Board or CEO), and had a vision as to how 
the development process might work. He initiated the culture of a collaborative, 
accommodating IT Department, which was promulgated by the Senior Project 
Manager – the other individual receiving high praise. She ensured all the PITs were 
aware of the policy of support for the clinicians, and helped transform it into 
becoming part of their culture. Her nursing background and strong interpersonal 
skills meant she was able to work with the more resistant clinicians, appreciating 
their concerns, and help them understand what was happening. 
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One conflict incident involved an individual clinician who, as head of his 
department, wanted his own EMR project to be given a higher priority in terms of 
resources. As the CUG had already agreed to a set of project priorities, this clinician 
was acting on his own. Acting quite aggressively, he insisted on the reprioritisation, 
and the CIO responded by granting him a small increase. However this was an 
isolated and relatively minor conflict, with clinicians normally abiding by CUG 
decisions. 
The preliminary analyses addressing the first research question are briefly described 
in the summary table found in Appendix G (Table G-2). These results are condensed 
in Table 7.6. 
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Table 7.6: A summary of the impacts of environmental factors on conflict resolution for each conflict incident. 
# Incident Culture Power History Individual Behaviours 
1 Serious resistance from both clinicians 
and administrators to 
EMR (anticipated) 
DHB culture of internal co-
operation and communication; 
Clinicians responsible for patient 
safety – have dominant say on 
clinical processes; 
IT built up trust through 
collaborative & accommodating 
approach. 
Clinicians major power in DHB over 
clinical matters – incl. EMR (can & 
will resist if necessary); 
IT Dept uses power base of IT 
expertise, along with accommodating 
approach, to persuade clinicians; 
Once CUG makes decision, most 
clinicians feel obligated to accept 
outcome. 
Clinicians have resisted changes to 
clinical practices in past, unless 
convinced safe; 
Clinicians had little exposure to IT, 
no prior relationship with IT 
Department; 
Though mostly IT illiterate & 
suspicious of clinical process 
change, no prior relationship 
conflict gave CIO opportunity. 
CIO had vision & leadership to 
build governance arrangements in 
preparation for EMR; 
Senior Project Manager, with 
nursing background & good 
interpersonal skills, also insisted 
on collaborative approach from 
PITs. 
2 Resistance over new 
clinical lab result 
processes 
Dominant culture of clinicians; 
Collaborative approach of IT 
Department 
Clinicians oblige other stakeholders to 
accept their concerns; 
IT Department sought to be 
persuasive. 
Traditional paper-based processes 
trusted to work – leading to clinician 
uncertainty over changes. 
 
3 Resistance to 
electronic signoff of 
patient information 
Dominant culture of clinicians; 
Senior clinicians IT illiterate; 
Collaborative approach of IT 
Department 
Clinicians oblige other stakeholders to 
accept their concerns; 
IT Department sought to be 
persuasive. 
Traditional paper-based processes 
trusted to work – leading to clinician 
uncertainty over changes. 
 
4 A clinical unit 
resisted EMR 
Semi-independent clinical depts.; 
Senior clinicians IT illiterate; 
Collaborative approach of IT 
Department 
Senior management obliged unit to 
accept change; 
IT Department sought to be 
persuasive. 
 Senior Project Manager used 
background (ex-nurse) and strong 
interpersonal skills to help unit. 
5 Clinician 
disagreement over 
prioritisation of 
alerts system 
Semi-independent clinical depts. 
 
Both pro- and anti-alerts system 
factions sought to be persuasive; 
Past attempts at automated alerts 
generally failed (e.g. Health 
Ministry tried for a national alerts 
system) 
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# Incident Culture Power History Individual Behaviours 
6 Senior clinician 
wants higher 
priority for ‘pet’ 
project 
Semi-independent clinical depts. 
 
Senior clinician sought to oblige CIO 
to increase funding priority. 
Historically, individual clinicians 
rarely went against decisions largely 
agreed on among clinicians. 
Senior clinician – acted 
aggressively in pursuit of own 
interests. 
CIO settled quietly rather than 
enforce decision & risk conflict. 
7 Disagreement over 
access to surgeon 
performance data  
Surgeons dominant subculture of the 
clinician culture. 
Administration part of general DHB 
acceptance of surgeon dominance. 
Surgeons applied considerable 
persuasive arguments over data; 
Surgeons also obliged other 
stakeholders to accept their 
uncompromising stance. 
Traditional paper-based surgical 
audits were known to be secure, but 
the ease of electronic access to their 
data worried them.   
 
8 junior clinicians 
going it alone with 
discharge 
summaries 
Senior clinicians (IT illiterate) vs. 
junior clinicians (comfortable with 
IT). 
Senior clinicians sought persuasion 
(not obligation, given system already 
implemented). 
Senior clinicians always did 
discharge summaries, but now 
junior clinicians taken over function. 
 
9 Orion providing 
fewer development 
resources over 
time  
DHB culture of co-operation, 
transparency and communication; 
Orion culture unclear. 
DHB were able to exercise contractual 
power, but effectiveness was limited; 
Orion had power to ignore DHB, by 
accepting penalties & continue to 
focus on more lucrative contracts.  
Originally, before they sought 
overseas contracts, Orion had built a 
reputation with DHB of 
attentiveness and collaborative 
behaviour at the operational level. 
CIO, acting for DHB, negotiated 
with Orion transparently and 
constructively – but was always 
prepared to use escalation & 
penalties if necessary. 
10 Orion disagree with 
DHB over major 
technical problem 
 CIO sought to both persuade and 
oblige Orion Account Manager. 
 CIO tried, first persuasion, then 
escalated to Orion regional 
manager – successfully. 
11 EMR projects suffer 
delays 
Clinicians responsible for patient 
safety – willing to trade time for 
quality. 
Clinicians oblige other stakeholders to 
accept time delays; 
IT Department sought to be 
persuasive, in spite of time delays. 
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The following extends the above analysis by examining the environmental elements 
holistically, as part of a broader, interactive system. This is done by considering, in 
turn, each of completeness, interactive effects, and dominant effects. 
Completeness, in terms of environmental effects on conflict resolution, refers to the 
identification of any significant effects that could not be explained by those already 
identified in the research framework. Orion, as an external software vendor, was 
directly involved in two of the identified conflict incidents. Resolution was sought 
through negotiation between Orion’s representative (the Account Manager) and the 
DHB’s representative (the CIO). This perspective sees Orion as a stakeholder in the 
resolution process. But Orion’s senior management had an impact on the conflict 
and its resolution, without being directly involved (with the exception of escalation 
to the Regional Manager by the CIO on one occasion). Therefore, Orion represents a 
new environmental element to be added to the framework for this case.  
Interactive effects refer to those environmental effects on conflict resolution that 
occur due to the combined effect of two or more environmental factors. The most 
important resolution of all the conflict incidents was the collective actions taken in 
anticipation of clinician resistance against the EMR. Clinician culture was dominant 
on clinical matters, and because they had little exposure to IT in the workplace, they 
were likely to be wary of the uncertainty over changes to practices that could affect 
patient care. But instead of a culture clash, the IT Department was able to create a 
cultural belief that they must be supportive of the clinician perspective at all times. 
There had been no indications of relationship conflict between them over the 
duration of the EMR (up to the point of interviewing). This approach was made 
possible by the fact that prior to 1999, the IT function was small and headed by a 
contractor who simply maintained basic, non-clinical systems. Thus clinicians and 
clinical administrators had little exposure to IT staff. With no prior relationship 
conflict to inhibit the CIO’s approach, the new IT team – established only since 1999 
– were part of the new culture from the beginning. However, the clinicians’ 
historical lack of IT exposure meant it also increased uncertainty over the impacts of 
the EMR. The strong clinician culture was backed up by considerable power within 
the DHB on clinical matters. The IT Department responded with a gentler exercise 
of power through persuasion, typically through either small clinical unit meetings or 
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the larger CUG meetings. Finally, it was the individual actions taken by both the 
CIO and the Senior Project Manager that galvanised the IT Department into 
developing a strong, mutually respectful working relationship with the clinicians. 
This mixture of culture (clinician responsibility, IT Department accommodation), 
power (clinician dominance, IT Department expertise and persuasion), history (no 
past relationship conflict, always used paper-based systems & lack of exposure to 
IT), and individual behaviours (the CIO and Senior Project Manager) appeared in 
most of the other conflict incidents, in various combinations but similar in effect. 
A dominant factor is one that considerably outweighs others in terms of its effects 
on conflict resolution. In this case, dominant factors included not only the cultures of 
the clinicians and the IT Department, but also the pervasive (and historical) 
organisational culture of cooperation and transparency. If clinician culture was the 
basis behind their concerns about the EMR, then their power to carry out effective 
resistance was also a dominant factor. All the other environmental factors covered 
above can be seen as important, including the role of individual behaviours, but it is 
difficult to objectively compare them in terms of the significance of their impact – 
particularly as they also acted interactively. 
7.14. Analysis Addressing Research Question 2 
The second research question focused on control effects, specifically regarding the 
manner in which governance both guides and directs management decision-making. 
RQ2:  In what way, and to what extent, can governance control the management 
of conflict resolution? 
Each of the governance control elements identified in the research framework 
(policy, authority, and mechanisms) is examined in turn across the range of the 
eleven conflict incidents identified in this case. A summary appears at the end of this 
section (Table 7.9).  
The following three policies were set before the project began, partly in anticipation 
of conflict (#1), and were identified by the interviewees as critical to both conflict 
prevention and conflict resolution. 
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• CIO responsible for IT infrastructure; clinicians will own & preside over 
clinical information systems;  
• Issues can be escalated, but only if resolution at lower levels unsuccessful; 
and 
• No exceptions to conversion to the EMR. 
The first clearly delineates responsibilities, and encourages clinicians to get more 
involved in design and implementation. The second encourages collaborative 
approaches to decision-making, seeing conflict escalated only as a last resort. The 
third, right from the start, shifted the question away from “do we have to do this?” 
and towards “how should we do this?”  
Other important policies were developed over the course of the project. 
• Contractual arrangements with vendors will include penalty clauses;  
• Implicit policy to run issues past CUG if clinically-related; and 
• Implicit policy to accept that project delays are preferable to any threats to 
clinical system quality. 
The first was determined before a vendor had been selected. The second grew over 
time, as the CUG developed in size, capability, and finally responsibility. The third, 
while never formally stated, simply became the accepted norm, which helped the 
clinicians remain confident their concerns were considered.  
Before the project began, new authorities were set up to explicitly govern and/or 
manage the information systems in general, and the EMR project in particular. Each 
PIT, led by a project manager, managed operational issues. The PSG governed 
project operations and managed project-level issues. The ISSC governed the overall 
project, and managed project approval and funding. The CUG emerged as the 
decision-making authority managing user-level issues. 
While clinicians and the IT Department are well represented throughout the project 
authority structures, this representation is overlapped at the individual level. Table 
7.7 demonstrates how stakeholder representatives and other key individuals to the 
project are consistently represented at more than one level of decision-making. 
These overlaps of representation range from operational levels up to executive 
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levels, and help ensure a broad understanding and consistency of decision-making 
throughout.  
 
Table 7.7: Key individuals and stakeholder representatives, and their membership of 
authority structures 
Key Individuals  Focus regarding EMR 
Project 
ISSC PSG CUG PITs 
Clinician 
representatives 
Clinical interests; 
Project design & 
implementation 
  X X 
IT Department 
representatives 
IT interests; 
Project objectives 
  X X 
Administration 
representatives 
Administration interests; 
Project design & 
implementation 
  X X 
Senior Project 
Manager 
IT interests; 
Project control 
 X X X 
Chair of CUG Clinical interests; 
Project control 
 X X  
Project Sponsor Clinical interests; 
Project control 
X X   
CIO IT interests; 
Project control 
X X   
Executive 
representatives 
DHB interests; 
Project oversight 
X    
 
Orion, as a major EMR stakeholder, is notable by its absence from Table XXX. In 
fact, there were many times when Orion development staff were represented on the 
PITs, but they had no representation on any of the other management and 
governance structures.  
A variety of communication mechanisms was employed, and these were generally 
of two types: those that provided formal feedback to management, and those that 
kept all stakeholders (particularly at the operational level) well-informed and well-
consulted.   
Formal project status reporting structures were available to all three major 
stakeholder groups, ranging from operational to managerial levels (Table 7.8). 
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However, feedback was not confined to just vertical reporting up the decision-
making hierarchy. As proposals and issues were also raised at an operational level, 
they also received feedback. Similarly, communication was also organised between 
clinician departments, and horizontally between EMR stakeholder groups. The 
majority of this was achieved through the Clinical User Group. As Table 7.8 
demonstrates, the CUG was a centralised intermediary that funnelled different 
stakeholder issues through a broadly consultative process, and reported back to 
operational staff. Once the CUG had made a decision, the outcomes were forwarded 
to the PSG for formal ratification. 
 
Table 7.8: Feedback reporting mechanisms between major stakeholder groups 
Stakeholder 
Groups 
Level of 
Feedback 
Clinicians The IT 
Department 
Administration 
Clinicians Operations Clinicians report 
clinical issues to CUG; 
CUG (forum & report 
back) 
PITs report IT issues to 
CUG; 
CUG (forum & report 
back) 
Administration report 
clinical process 
issues to CUG; 
CUG (forum & 
report back) 
Management CUG reports to PSG CUG reports to PSG CUG reports to PSG 
The IT 
Department 
Operations  PITs report to CIO, 
Project Sponsor & 
Senior Project 
Manager 
PITs report IT issues 
to CUG; 
CUG (forum & 
report back) 
Management  CIO & Senior Proj. 
Manager report to 
PSG; 
CIO reports to ISSC 
 
Administrati
on 
Operations   Administration report 
admin issues to 
CUG; 
CUG (forum & 
report back) 
Management 
 
   
 
There were other mechanisms for encouraging communication between stakeholder 
participants, providing them with opportunities to stay fully informed and respond to 
issues accordingly. For example, informal meetings and discussions frequently 
occurred between stakeholder groups to help prevent, or reduce, the impact of 
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conflict, before issues were considered formally. Even if the issue was then raised 
with the CUG, the participants were generally well-prepared for the debate. 
While the consensus-seeking approach to decision-making was a cornerstone for 
successful conflict resolution within the DHB, it was always understood by 
management that, in some cases, it might have reduced the level of conflict, but not 
necessarily resolved it. Where persuasion alone was not enough, escalation 
processes were always available. They were used in two incidents within the DHB. 
Not all mechanisms were completely successful. The relationship between Orion 
and the DHB was managed jointly by the CIO and the Orion Account Manager. But 
governance of this relationship proved difficult. Neither policy nor authority was 
feasible for the DHB when working with an external organisation. Instead, the DHB 
sought to control the relationship through the key mechanism of the legal contract. 
The contract specified the DHB’s expectations from the working relationship, and 
included financial penalties should Orion fail to meet them. 
While legal contracts such as this were commonplace when organisations contracted 
software vendors, they were not always successful. Initially, Orion worked well with 
the DHB, providing resources for development and good support. Over time, this 
relationship deteriorated to the point where penalty clauses were exercised. 
Unfortunately for the DHB, they discovered Orion had gained more lucrative 
contracts overseas, which increasingly pulled Orion’s resources and support away 
from the EMR project. Orion was finding it easier to simply suffer the DHB’s 
penalties. Escalation to a higher authority (the Orion Regional Manager) did help 
resolve one major conflict, but the DHB remained uncertain over the development 
and support resources Orion would provide in future. 
The preliminary analyses addressing the second research question are briefly 
described in the summary table found in Appendix G (Table G-3). These results are 
condensed in Table 7.9. 
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Table 7.9: A summary of the impacts of governance arrangements on conflict resolution for each conflict incident 
# Incident Policy Authority Mechanism 
1 Serious resistance from 
both clinicians and 
administrators to EMR 
(anticipated) 
CIO will make decisions over IT 
infrastructure, but IT applications to be 
owned & presided over by clinical users, 
with IT as advisors; 
Eventually CUG would more formally 
serve as the user-dominated gatekeeper for 
clinical IT initiatives;  
Issues (including conflict) to be dealt with 
at lowest appropriate hierarchical level, but 
escalation to ISSC & PSG available; 
No exceptions to conversion to EMR. 
Initially, complete delegation of decision-
making to CIO; 
New governance structures (PIT – operational 
issues, CUG - user level issues, PSG - project 
level issues, ISSC - major IS/IT level issues, 
project approval and funding); 
NOTE: CUG was a semi-formal governance 
decision-making body. 
Set up reporting mechanisms; discussion 
forums; presentations; collaboration 
processes; 
CUG was effectively a mechanism for 
communication, consultation, debate & 
discussion. 
2 Resistance over new 
clinical lab result 
processes 
Implicit policy to run such issues past 
CUG, who make the decision. 
CUG most important; 
PSG generally confirmed CUG decision 
formally. 
CUG; 
Reporting mechanisms; discussion forums; 
presentations; collaboration processes 
3 Resistance to electronic 
signoff of patient 
information 
Implicit policy to run such issues past 
CUG, who make the decision. 
CUG most important; 
PSG generally confirmed CUG decision 
formally. 
CUG; 
Reporting mechanisms; discussion forums; 
presentations; collaboration processes 
4 A clinical unit resisted 
EMR 
No exceptions to conversion to EMR. PIT escalated issue to PSG; 
PSG enforced policy. 
Escalation process from PIT -> Senior Project 
Manager -> PSG; 
Reporting mechanisms;  
Direct involvement of Senior Project Manager 
to understand source of resistance. 
5 Clinician disagreement 
over prioritisation of alerts 
system 
 CUG unable to resolve; 
CUG escalated to highest clinical authority 
group (Clinical Board) and not ISSC (seen as 
purely clinical issue). 
CUG; 
Reporting mechanisms; discussion forums; 
presentations; collaboration processes; 
Escalation process from CUG -> Clinical 
Board. 
# Incident Policy Authority Mechanism 
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6 Senior clinician wants 
higher priority for ‘pet’ 
project 
Policy to use formal process for funding. PSG puts up business case proposals; 
ISSC makes funding decisions; 
CIO negotiated appeal decision in this case 
(too small for ISSC involvement). 
Initially, formal funding process; 
Informal negotiations between CIO & senior 
clinician (not escalated). 
7 Disagreement over access 
to surgeon performance 
data  
Implicit policy to run such issues past 
CUG, who make the decision. 
CUG used by surgeons to make position clear; 
PSG agreed with CUG decision. 
CUG; 
Discussion forums. 
8 junior clinicians going it 
alone with discharge 
summaries 
Original clinical policy that senior 
clinicians always sign off discharge 
summaries; 
Original policy (inadvertently) subverted 
by outcome of EMR project. 
CUG, though still unresolved. 
 
CUG; 
Reporting mechanisms; discussion forums; 
presentations; collaboration processes 
9 Orion providing fewer 
development resources 
over time  
DHB's policy to set contractual 
arrangements with penalty clauses. 
Orion staff may be part of some PITs, with 
PIT project managers having operational 
authority; 
Higher level authority structure based on two 
representatives: the CIO, acting for the DHB, 
and the Orion Account Manager; 
Project-specific authorities (PSG, ISSC) not 
involved – Orion not represented on these. 
Communication channels from Orion support 
to PITs of variable quality; 
Escalation process from PIT -> CIO -> Orion 
Account Manager; 
Negotiation (between CIO & Acct. Manager). 
10 Orion disagree with DHB 
over major technical 
problem 
DHB's policy to set contractual 
arrangements with penalty clauses. 
PIT project manager; 
Higher level authority structure based on two 
representatives: the CIO, acting for the DHB, 
and the Orion Account Manager. 
Communication channels from Orion support 
to PITs considered very poor; 
Escalation process from PIT -> CIO -> Orion 
Account Manager; 
Escalation process from CIO -> Orion 
Regional Manager; 
Negotiation (between CIO & Acct. Manager – 
later Regional Manager). 
11 EMR projects suffer delays Informal policy to run such issues past clinician-dominated CUG.  
 
Informal policy that project delays more 
acceptable than threats to clinical system 
quality. 
PIT, CUG, PSG, ISSC. CUG; 
Reporting mechanisms; discussion forums; 
presentations; collaboration processes. 
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7.15. Analysis Addressing Research Question 3 
The third research question also focused on control effects, but in this case, the 
controls are directed towards environmental effects on the resolution process.  
RQ3:  In what way, and to what extent, can governance moderate negative 
effects from environmental elements? 
Each of the environmental elements identified in the research framework (culture, 
power, history, individual behaviours) is now examined with respect to the 
moderating effects of governance arrangements.  
Culture has already been found to have had significant impacts on conflict 
resolution (Section 5.12). It was in direct response to the dominant clinician culture 
that the CIO created policy that encouraged IT staff to be collaborative and 
accommodating, from which their own culture grew. The clinicians were very well 
represented on every EMR project-related authority: 
• ISSC: majority 
• PSG: half 
• CUG: majority 
• PITs: minority 
In this way, governance and management of the EMR project remained firmly in 
clinician control. This reflected (and respected) the clinicians’ culture – if they were 
ultimately responsible for patient safety, then they should have had the final say over 
changes to clinical processes. For example, the policy of no exceptions to EMR 
conversion was agreed to by the ISSC, PSG and even the CUG. This made it very 
difficult for isolated clinical units to resist without collegial support. Even senior 
clinicians, a dominant clinical subgroup, accepted the inevitability of EMR 
conversion – a significant step considering their widespread uncertainty over the use 
of IT. 
Similarly, the mechanisms enabling consultation, dissemination, debate and 
consensus decision-making created an environment of transparency, openness, and 
involvement with the ongoing development of the EMR. These are features that 
clinicians, along with other DHB stakeholders, value and believe in. 
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Consequently, in spite of the immense power held by the clinicians within the DHB, 
there were few attempts to influence conflict outcomes through obligation. Instead, 
each stakeholder group (particularly the clinicians and the IT Department) was able 
to influence through persuasion, making use of the variety of mechanisms that 
encouraged it. The original Project Sponsor, who also held the post of Chief 
Operating Officer at the time, attributed the lack of destructive politics to the 
governance arrangements put in place, singling out the CUG as an excellent 
example, where transparent, representative decision-making processes rendered 
politics both difficult and unnecessary. 
History was an important factor in that, prior to 1999, both the clinicians and 
clinical administrators had virtually no exposure to IT in their work. This made it 
much easier for the CIO, the Senior Project Manager, and others to put in place the 
governance arrangements necessary to encourage a positive working relationship. 
The IT Department policy of clinical accommodation helped diagnose the real issue 
behind one clinical unit’s complete resistance to the EMR – the senior clinicians 
were worried about their historical uncertainty about IT use (what one interviewee 
referred to as their “IT illiteracy”).  
By the time the CIO had been appointed, there were already many published case 
studies detailing the challenges and frequent failures when implementing EMR 
systems in hospitals. Most focussed on the difficulties of IT staff working with 
clinicians and clinical processes, and the importance of clinical buy-in. The CIO 
knew the importance of gaining that buy-in right from the beginning, and acted 
accordingly. 
Individual behaviours stood out in a positive way, with every interviewee 
highlighting strong leadership skills shown by both the CIO and the Senior Project 
Manager. Although many others, including senior clinicians with a belief in the 
EMR concept, helped throughout, it was the CIO who set out to create strong, but 
collectively supported project governance arrangements. Once the Senior Project 
Manager was appointed, she ensured all EMR project managers, and their teams, 
would adhere to the policy of collaboration and accommodation. Her nursing 
background enabled her to work closely with the most resistant clinicians. If there 
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was any negative individual behaviour, it was generally softened by the collective, 
consensus decision-making processes. 
7.16. Discussion 
While eleven separate conflict incidents were identified, the overwhelming 
impression left by every interviewee was that the DHB’s approach to resolving 
internal conflict was generally very successful. The following themes emerged from 
the analysis based on the consideration of each of the three research questions. 
• The critical role of addressing anticipated conflict; 
• The dominance, in terms of both culture and power, of a major, professional 
project stakeholder group; 
• Gaining buy-in through system user ownership and participation, and 
positive leadership; 
• Using project policies to provide management decision-making with both 
boundaries and direction; 
• Using project authority structures to provide both governance and 
management at multiple levels, incorporating a user majority; 
• Using project mechanisms to help create a positive project culture; 
• The key role of the CUG, as both decision-making authority and mechanism 
for user communication and participation; 
• How project governance minimised influence by obligation and maximised 
influence by persuasion, using escalation mechanisms only as backup; 
• Resolution effectiveness can be seen in lack of dynamic relationships 
between incidents; 
• How internal governance practices are not necessarily successful with 
external relationships; 
 
There can be no doubt that addressing anticipated conflict was the single most 
important ‘incident’ identified in this case. Being charged with the long-term goal of 
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implementing an EMR system, the CIO first implemented the necessary IT 
infrastructure over an 18 month timeframe. This minimised the risk of technical 
failure, and the consequent risk of increasing relationship conflict with the 
clinicians, and also gave the CIO time to informally gauge opinion on how an EMR 
system might be received. He was aware, by then, that historically the 
implementation of EMR systems in hospitals was frequently challenged by clinician 
resistance. He also had time to identify a selection of clinicians that could see the 
benefits of the EMR, and they were to form an early version of what was to become 
the Clinical User Group. Finally, the CIO worked with other executives to establish 
the ISSC, and from there worked on governance arrangements for the EMR project. 
The DHB as a whole accepted that clinician culture was the dominant subculture 
within the organisation, and that they had considerable collective power to 
influence decisions involving clinical issues. It was this that concerned the CIO the 
most, and explains why he went to some lengths to prepare for the initiation of the 
EMR project. Many of the governance arrangements put in place were specifically 
designed to accommodate clinician perspectives while still moving the project 
forward. It could be argued that employing such a powerful, well-educated group of 
professionals as front-line staff might be unusual for most organisations. However, 
the concept of treating users most likely to be affected by IT projects as though they 
had a strong culture and collective power could well be applied to many 
organisations.  
As the CIO noted, the critical success factor was gaining clinician buy-in. The CIO 
employed several methods to achieve this. First, he promoted the benefits through a 
series of meetings and presentations, but included warnings about the risks. Second, 
he saw clinician ownership of the system as essential – they were responsible for 
making it work. Finally, he wanted clinicians involved in the design and 
implementation of the EMR projects. The CIO also noted that gaining buy-in was a 
continuous process for each new project. For this reason, both the CIO and the 
Senior Project Manager were singled out by most interviewees as providing the 
necessary leadership skills to preserve a positive working relationship between 
clinicians and IT staff. This serves as a reminder that good governance arrangements 
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need to be backed up by the individual behaviours of competent people in 
governance and management positions. 
There were two key policies set by the ISSC that helped achieve clinician buy-in. 
The first was a formal policy that was in place as the project began, declaring that 
there would be no exceptions to the conversion to an EMR system. This set the 
boundary for debate – almost everything about the new system could be discussed, 
but there would be a new system. The second was an informal policy that developed 
over time. It became increasingly clear that achieving consensus to produce high-
quality solutions tended to delay project delivery. Furthermore, Orion’s increasing 
neglect of the DHB was also causing project delays. Therefore, the ISSC approved 
most requests for increased resources to ensure project completion within a 
reasonable timeframe. This policy reflected the fact that effective conflict resolution 
required time and resources, which was the trade-off senior management were 
willing to make. This provided project managers with direction over project delays. 
The authority structures put in place at the start of the EMR project were clearly 
delineated in terms of governance and management. Each PIT, led by a project 
manager, managed operational issues. The PSG governed project operations and 
managed project-level issues. The ISSC governed the overall project, and managed 
project approval and funding. The CUG emerged later as the decision-making 
authority managing user-level issues, which usually received PSG approval. The 
other feature of note was the way individual stakeholder representatives, particularly 
from clinician and IT groups, were members of authority structures overlapping at 
multiple levels. Whether by accident or design (it was unclear from the data), the 
result was a consistency of understanding across operational and management 
groups about the issues, and there was increased transparency of decision-making as 
a result. Finally, the composition of each authority structure ensured either a 
clinician majority (ISSC, CUG) or a significant percentage (50% of the PSG, 
generally at least two members of each PIT), which was in keeping with clinician 
ownership and participation. 
There were many governance mechanisms that performed well in supporting a 
reduction in the risk of resistance (both the likelihood and the magnitude). Many 
helped create a positive project culture. These included effective communication 
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mechanisms, incorporating both formal feedback to higher management levels and 
information dissemination to stakeholders. There were processes to ensure 
consultation of affected parties, debate, and ultimately collaboration between IT 
staff and clinicians over design and implementation. 
The Clinical User Group was the key mechanism, enabling information sharing 
across all the main stakeholders, debate over issues, and a consensus decision-
making approach. It was outside the formal project governance hierarchy. It was not 
required to make decisions by any set times, it operated according to its own rules, 
and was not answerable to management. Yet it also acted as an authority structure, 
where CUG decisions were mostly rubber-stamped by the PSG. Many issues would 
not move forward without CUG evaluation. Every interviewee commented on its 
effectiveness for resolving conflict and preventing resistance. 
There was a considerable power imbalance between stakeholders, with clinician 
power dominant where clinical issues were concerned. Clinical administrators also 
had a degree of power where clinical processes were concerned. Yet another effect 
of the governance arrangements was the minimisation of negative influence (based 
on obligation) and the maximisation of positive influence (based on persuasion). 
Due to transparent processes and considerable user participation, political activity 
would have been both difficult to hide and probably unnecessary anyway (according 
to the ex-Project Sponsor). Persuasion was the default approach in most conflict 
situations. Only on rare occasions did it fail, in which case the issue was escalated to 
the next highest project authority. Up to the time of interviewing, no conflict had 
been escalated as high as the ISSC. 
With two notable exceptions, there were no dynamic relationships between 
conflict incidents. This is testimony to the successful approaches taken for conflict 
resolution – that there was virtually no negative flow on effects towards new conflict 
incidents. The two exceptions are based on the anticipated conflict before the EMR 
project began, and the long-term effects of successful conflict resolution on project 
timeframes and resource requirements. The governance arrangements put in place in 
anticipation of resistance clearly contributed to the successful resolution of most of 
the conflicts that were identified in the study. These relationships do not appear on 
the Conflict Incident Map (Figure 7.3), as they were positive relationships that 
 273
neither initiated nor exacerbated conflict. On the other hand, resolution of most of 
the conflict incidents led to project delays, which is represented on the Conflict 
Incident Map. These were the only exceptions raised. 
External relationships were a different matter from internal relationships, which 
were mostly very positive. All the DHB stakeholders continued to believe they had 
selected the right vendor, and that the software would work well. Furthermore, the 
working relationship between Orion, the IT Department and clinicians started well, 
with Orion fitting in well with the transparent, participative, consensus decision-
making that the DHB employed. But over time, Orion used the DHB as a reference 
to gain more lucrative, overseas contracts. These bigger contracts drew Orion’s 
development resources and support services away from the DHB’s EMR project. 
The DHB’s governance of their relationship with the vendor was based on 
contractual arrangements. However, in this case, even legal constraints were of no 
avail, as Orion proved willing to pay the penalties. Even so, the CIO, having had to 
escalate once, was determined to keep Orion focussed on their EMR project. It was 
difficult for the interviewees to think of an alternative governance structure that 
might have been more successful in terms of control of Orion’s input and 
commitment. 
In summary, the actions taken by the CIO, and others, to put governance 
arrangements in place before project initiation proved successful in creating a 
project environment where potentially damaging conflict was prevented, reduced or 
eliminated. Governance incorporated effective policies, authority structures and 
mechanisms that were tailored to reflect the project environment, including clinician 
culture and power, and the DHB culture of consultation and transparency. 
Governance effectiveness was demonstrated by consistent interviewee support for 
the policies, authority structures and mechanisms set up and used for conflict 
resolution. Further, there was consistent admiration for the efforts of the CIO and 
the Senior Project Manager for both creating and maintaining the positive project 
culture. The CUG, acting as a semi-formal authority structure and a key 
communication mechanism for stakeholders, was also unanimously supported as a 
unique, innovative group that resolved conflict in a way that avoided relationship 
conflict yet kept the projects moving forward (albeit slowly sometimes). Conflict 
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with the external vendor created more difficulties, as governance based on 
contractual obligations did not prove as effective as the DHB would have liked.  
7.17. Conclusions 
Eleven conflict incidents were identified from interviews with those involved in the 
EMR project at the DHB. Each of the three research questions were addressed in 
turn, determining: 
• Environmental factors such as culture, power and history were all capable of 
negatively affecting the project, up to the point of complete resistance; 
• Project governance was successfully designed and used to control project 
stakeholder conflict; and 
• Project governance was successfully designed and used to moderate the 
potentially negative effects of environmental factors. 
The results strongly supported the idea that project governance provides the 
direction and boundaries of decision-making (through policies), the authorities and 
individuals who must make the decisions (the authority structure), and the means to 
both make and implement those decisions (employing mechanisms). By being aware 
of risk factors embedded in the project context, project governance was also found 
to be successful at moderating potentially negative effects from environmental 
elements. However, this was mostly due to careful design of the project governance 
arrangements so that they would fit well with existing cultures and power structures.  
The CIO had taken the time to understand the nature of the stakeholders and the 
project environment. In a traditionally challenging area of change (an EMR 
implemented within a hospital), combining this sort of knowledge with a long term 
strategy to create and maintain a positive project culture displayed considerable 
vision and leadership. Project governance was the framework that enabled both 
formal project control and encouraged informal project stakeholder collaboration 
and communication.  
The following chapter examines the implications of the findings from the three 
cases, both individually and collectively, for this research. 
 
 275
8. Discussion & Conclusions 
 
The three case studies conducted for this research involved organisations that were 
markedly different in some respects, yet quite similar in others. All were public 
entities. The NZ Fire Service (NZFS) had its head office in Wellington, and fire 
stations geographically spread throughout the country. The projects were focussed 
on HO effectiveness, but the firefighters were involved. Conflict was mostly 
between HO and the frontline staff.  
The Ministry of Health (the ‘Ministry’) had its head office in Wellington, but staff 
outside Wellington were not involved in the project. The project was focussed on 
HO effectiveness, but there were many independent stakeholders within HO. 
Conflict mostly involved various user groups and the IT function. 
The Hutt Valley District Health Board (the ‘DHB’) had its HO at Hutt Hospital, in 
Lower Hutt (a Wellington regional city), and most of its employees were clinicians 
and clinical administrators, also based at Hutt Hospital. The project was focussed on 
clinician effectiveness, but many clinicians were based in small, semiautonomous 
units. Conflict mostly involved clinical frontline staff, HO, and the IT function. 
This chapter examines the three cases as a collective set of data, where the results 
from each case are compared and contrasted in search of more generalisable 
findings. These findings are discussed in terms of their implications for our 
understanding of conflict resolution in an IT project setting.  
The chapter begins with an examination of each of the research questions for the 
aggregated results of the three cases. Patterns and differences from this analysis are 
discussed, and findings are presented as they arise. Finally, the implications of the 
findings are discussed; the limitations of this research are identified; how this 
research can be extended in future is outlined; and the conclusions to this study are 
presented. 
8.1. Environmental Factors 
The first research question focused on contextual, or environmental, effects. 
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RQ1: In what way, and to what extent, do environmental elements affect the 
conflict resolution process and its outcomes? 
Each of the environmental elements identified in the research framework (culture, 
power, history, individual behaviours) are now examined across the results of all 
three cases. These effects are then considered holistically, testing the framework for 
completeness, and identifying interactive and dominant effects. 
8.1.1. Culture  
Culture was defined in Chapter 2 as basic assumptions that people in an 
organisation, or in a subset of that organisation, hold and share about the group they 
are a member of. Those assumptions are implied in their attitudes, beliefs and 
values, and embodied in aspects of patterned group behaviour.  
With both the DHB and NZFS, the major IT project user group was a professional 
collective involved in front-line, core business activities. If the group felt their 
professionalism, including their ability to carry out their responsibilities in a safe 
and effective manner, was under threat from the consequences of an IT project, they 
would resist project implementation. In both cases, the user groups showed they 
were capable of refusing to cooperate, thereby seriously affecting project objectives. 
User resistance was considered the greatest single threat to the project. 
Culture played an essential role in two ways. First, in order to understand the nature 
of user resistance, it was necessary to understand the users themselves, so as to 
anticipate the likely impacts of the project on the users and their ability to carry out 
their work. The CIO of the DHB spent considerable time learning to understand 
clinician values and beliefs and how these shaped attitudes and behaviours, before 
undertaking the EMR project. Conversely, the NZFS head office, and particularly 
those on the project steering committee, were largely ignorant of firefighter culture, 
in spite of incidents of resistance in the past. Only one member of the steering 
committee had been a firefighter. Firefighters believed in and valued safety in 
firefighting, and perceived HO’s actions as a threat to these. 
Not only was the user culture a dominant factor in conflict, but so was the clash of 
cultures between the professional users and the administrative functions of senior 
and executive management. This was less pronounced in the DHB, due in part to the 
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prevalence of senior clinical staff in decision-making bodies. But in the Fire Service, 
the stark differences between the ‘suits’ and ‘uniforms’ in terms of values, attitudes 
and behaviours continued to be problematic, due in part to the lack of senior 
Operations staff on decision-making bodies such as the project steering committee. 
In the case of the Ministry, culture played a less dominant role in the project 
conflict. Culture may well have played a role in at least some of the conflict 
incidents involving different semi-autonomous user groups, but it was the number 
and diversity of these groups that created the biggest challenges. 
Finding 1: Culture is an important factor in conflict and its resolution where 
conflict stakeholder groups possess a strong cultural identity, such as those 
found in professional collectives. 
 
8.1.2. Power and Influence 
At the DHB, clinicians have always had the power to resist IT initiatives. Although 
not unusual for any institution that is made up largely of highly educated, well-paid 
professionals, the threat of resistance was a major factor in most of the conflict 
incidents recorded. Their willingness to use this power was amply demonstrated by 
the junior doctor strike at the DHB during the time of the interviews. However, with 
the EMR project, the CIO and the senior project manager sought to counter the 
potential for negative influence (through obligation) by engaging the clinicians with 
positive influence (through persuasion). This was a strategic approach which slowly 
built on IT’s power base (based on IT expertise) by establishing a reputation for 
cooperation, communication and accommodation. 
Similarly, the power to resist was identified with the firefighters in the NZFS. 
Where the cases differ, is that the use of positive influence (through persuasion) was 
less frequent, haphazard, informal, and less effectual at NZFS. Furthermore, 
possibly due to a fear of upsetting firefighters even more, HO were reluctant to ‘pull 
rank’ and oblige Operations to cooperate. Consequently, HO staff, through the 
steering committee, had neither strategic nor tactical means to comprehensively deal 
with resistance. 
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There was a strong power imbalance between users and IT for the Web 
Consolidation Project within the Ministry. The project steering group were also 
fearful that user power would be used to resist. ITS sought to counter this by 
employing positive influence through persuasion, though obligation (via the need to 
be e-govt compliant) was also used. Unlike the DHB, this was not seen as a 
strategic, but rather a tactical, project-specific approach to see it through. It is worth 
noting that one of the primary reasons for the success of persuasive influence was 
the involvement of two key people in ITS – the project manager and the client 
liaison officer.  
It is important not to confuse the power to resist with the exercise of that power 
(influence). Where other stakeholders are aware of this power, they may act in such 
a way as to avoid resistance occurring. So the mere threat of exercising power may 
be enough to influence outcomes. 
Finding 2: Where user groups have the power to resist, that power will be an 
important factor in conflict resolution. The power to resist does not necessarily 
imply the power has to be exercised in order to influence outcomes. 
 
8.1.3. History 
When conflict arises, the nature of the conflict will not necessarily be dependent 
only on what is going on at the time. Issues from the past may also affect what 
happens now and in the future.  
For example, within the Fire Service, project-related conflict between HO and 
Operations (often in the form of resistance) had occurred several times in the past 
leading up to the events with the AMIS and AVP projects. Furthermore, exacerbated 
by a pervasive culture clash between the main stakeholders, there remained a 
lingering relationship conflict that tended to flare up when contentious issues 
between them arose. The dramatic events from the mid-1990s, in particular, 
generated so much conflict, the reverberations were still felt at the time of AMIS. 
There was also some extant tension between the clinicians and administrators at the 
DHB. However, in this case, the potential for lingering relationship conflict was 
ameliorated by actions such as involving clinicians much more in decision-making, 
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and encouraging them to take ownership of the design and implementation of the 
systems they would be using. 
Finding 3: Historical events, in the form of stakeholder conflict from the past, 
can have a significant effect on conflict and its resolution in the present. In 
particular, relationship conflict between two stakeholders, based on these past 
incidents, may continue to have a confounding effect on resolution attempts in 
future conflict between these parties. 
 
8.1.4. Individual Behaviours 
Interviewees from all three cases referred to individuals who acted in ways that 
could not be directly explained by any of the other constructs. This factor emerged 
from the preliminary analysis and was added as a new construct to the research 
framework as another environmental factor affecting conflict resolution. The 
emergence of this new construct is described later in Section 8.2. 
The differentiation between culturally based behaviour and non-culturally based 
behaviour for an individual has been identified as an issue in recent research: 
“Another challenge in IS-culture research is the assumption that all individuals 
within a given cultural unit will respond in a consistent fashion based on the 
group’s cultural values. …it does not take into account the possibility for 
individual differences within the particular cultural unit that may lead to 
different behavioural outcomes. This notion of individual fit with culture 
suggests …research may need to consider individual disposition as a factor when 
studying the impacts of culture on certain outcomes.” (Leidner & Kayworth, 
2006, p. 381) 
Based on the three cases, individual behaviours that affected resolution outcomes 
were typically of two types. First, there were individuals in positions of authority. 
Interviewees singled out some of these individuals as performing extremely well, or 
poorly, with respect to their responsibilities in relation to the project, including 
conflict resolution. In all cases these behaviours were attributed to the individuals’ 
own personal characteristics, including knowledge, leadership, experience, 
interpersonal skills, etc. These behaviours were not sourced from any cultural group 
that could be identified. Examples were mostly positive, in the sense that the 
behaviours generally all had beneficial effects on their projects. These individuals 
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included the project manager and the client liaison officer for the Ministry project, 
and the CIO and senior project manager for the DHB project. Two examples of 
individuals doing their jobs poorly, with adverse effects for their projects (according 
to the interviewees), included the Comms Manager for the Ministry and the original 
AMIS project manager in the NZFS. These examples illustrated both good, and 
poor, capabilities for making the most of the governance arrangements available.  
Secondly, there were individuals who sought to resist, or even subvert, governance 
arrangements such as policies and processes. Interviewees noted that in these 
situations, the individuals were not acting as representatives of any cultural or 
organisational group, but rather they were acting for themselves. Examples were 
almost all negative, in the sense that there were adverse effects from their actions. 
These individuals included the CTO, the Comms Manager, and the NZHIS Chief 
Advisor (the members of the project steering committee) from the Ministry, and a 
senior clinician at the DHB. 
When an individual decision-maker makes a decision, or has the power to influence 
that decision, there is a need to understand their intention, and what drives their 
thinking. Their behaviour may reflect the culture of the group that they belong to. 
They may reflect past experience – historical events involving similar situations 
and/or stakeholders within the same organisation. There might be a strong rational 
component – perhaps one or more stakeholders have been persuasive.  
But each case included important conflict incidents that were significantly affected 
by individuals whose actions, according to interviewees, were based on either the 
individuals’ ability to perform their jobs extraordinarily well (or badly), or the 
individuals’ intention to achieve personal objectives. A future line of investigation 
could investigate individual behaviours by applying the same framework used to 
assess culture. By evaluating an individual’s beliefs, values, attitudes and 
behaviours, it may be possible to differentiate personal qualities from the broader 
cultural qualities. 
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Finding 4: There are of two types of individual behaviours that affected conflict 
resolution. One was based on authority, and the individual’s ability to carry out 
their responsibilities particularly well, or badly, within the governance 
arrangements. The other was based on personal objectives, and the individual’s 
subverting of governance arrangements to achieve them.  
 
In the DHB, it was the experience, vision, patience and inclusiveness of the CIO that 
enabled and encouraged both senior management and the clinicians to rise above 
historical relationship conflict and cultural differences and work together more 
closely with common objectives, averting resistance. The senior project manager 
also demonstrated positive individual behaviours that encouraged the same level of 
cooperation and commitment at a more operational level. 
In the Ministry, individual behaviours of individuals had both positive and negative 
effects on conflict resolution. For example, the CTO felt it necessary to subvert the 
accepted process for developing a business case, so that his proposal to develop the 
system in-house would be more likely to achieve acceptance. On the other hand, the 
positive qualities of both the client liaison adviser, and the contract project manager, 
were sufficient to avert more serious consequences from conflict. 
In the NZFS, the variability of contribution towards conflict resolution from 
individuals was pronounced. The CEO expected personally preferred IT projects to 
take precedence over others that may have gone through a more rigorous evaluation 
process. Similarly, the CFO wielded considerable power to push through certain 
projects that would help centralise and consolidate the power of Finance. The 
wholesale adoption of ERP is an illustration of this. Yet, the co-option of the 
assistant regional fire manager from Wellington into the project steering committee 
proved to be considerably more helpful to project progress than a token 
representation of Operations. His skills and operational knowledge, combined with 
the respect he had garnered within Operations, enabled him to transcend the poor 
communication channels between HO and Operations.  
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Finding 5: the behaviours of individual stakeholders can affect the outcome of 
conflict resolution beyond any formal authoritative position that they might hold. 
These effects may be positive or negative in terms of the project outcome. 
 
8.2. Complexity and Holism 
In chapter 3, it was argued that one useful way to analyse complexity is to begin 
with a holistic approach. Systems thinking encourages holistic thinking in this study 
by not only examining the processes involved, but also the context within which 
they operate. This emphasis encouraged the application of the three principles of 
holistic discovery through the research framework: completeness, dominance, and 
interaction.  
Completeness, in terms of environmental effects on conflict resolution, refers to the 
identification of any significant effects that could not be explained by those already 
identified in the research framework. It had been assumed that some of these 
‘leftover’ factors would emerge. It had also been assumed that both the number and 
the significance of the leftover factors were unlikely to be high. Both assumptions 
proved to be true, with three notable exceptions. 
First, within the NZ Fire Service, the CIO was sure that a major contributor to the 
decision to finally end the AVP project was a collective ‘weariness’ over the issue. 
As this effect spanned all the stakeholders involved, the only factor was time, 
reflecting the dynamic nature of the conflict resolution process. Time was a factor 
for the Ministry’s web consolidation project, in the sense that the deadline for e-
government compliance was used by the Project Steering Group to persuade 
external users to convert to the in-house system. With the DHB, time was a factor in 
the sense that conflict resolution was allowed to run its course to successful 
resolution, even where deadlines were pushed back as a consequence. However, the 
way time became an issue in each case varied. For the NZFS, time was a 
characteristic of the resolution process itself. For the Ministry, the deadline set was 
an external factor (from the NZ Government), but time taken to resolve external user 
resistance was reduced due to management decision-making, employing the 
opportunity to use the deadline as a tool to aid persuasion. For the DHB, time taken 
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to resolve conflict was an accepted cost from those governing the project. So, in one 
case it was a management issue, in another it was a process issue, and still another it 
was a governance issue. While management and governance are represented in the 
research framework, the concept of time as a process issue that affects all 
stakeholders does not easily lend itself to allocation to existing constructs. 
Second, the aforementioned edict from the NZ Government that all government 
websites will be e-government compliant was an uncontrollable factor that had a 
direct impact on both the stakeholders of the Ministry project, and the conflict 
resolution processes used. This environmental factor was sourced outside the 
organisation, but unlike contractors, consultants and vendors, this factor was also 
independent of the project, in the sense that the edict was made regardless of 
whether the Web Consolidation Project existed or not. This was the only external, 
project-independent factor to emerge from all three cases. As a unique factor, it is 
represented in the research framework as ‘OTHER FACTOR’. 
Third, at an early stage of the preliminary analysis (coding the constructs from the 
research framework and analysing each conflict incident through coding reports) it 
became increasingly clear that there was a construct missing from the research 
framework. Interviewees from all three cases referred to individuals who acted in 
ways that could not be directly explained by any of the other constructs. 
Consequently, a new construct was added to the research framework as an 
environmental factor affecting conflict resolution: individual behaviours (see 
Chapter 4 for more details of the research process used, and Section 8.1 for further 
analysis about this new construct).  
Finding 6: Conflict resolution is a dynamic process, and the effects of time can 
be significant, yet hard to predict. Examples include: the length of time for the 
resolution process to conclude; externally imposed time constraints; and internal 
policy over delays. 
 
Interactive effects refer to those environmental effects on conflict resolution that 
occur due to the combined effect of two or more environmental factors. Not only 
was it common for there to be more than one environmental factor involved in 
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conflict resolution, but there were instances across all three cases where two or more 
environmental factors interacted in some way. 
For example, history and culture had a combined effect on resolution in all three 
cases. The potential for serious relationship conflict within each of the NZFS 
(between HO and Operations), the DHB (between clinicians and ITS), and the 
Ministry (between Comms and ITS) was always there, given the sometimes strong 
cultural differences between the groups. Relationship conflict between two parties 
was frequently based on events of the past. As well as initiating the conflict, further 
events involving the two parties could either attenuate the magnitude of the conflict 
or exacerbate it. 
In the NZFS, events in the mid-1990s created a strongly negative relationship 
conflict. Events since then have done little to ease the magnitude of the conflict. By 
comparison, after the CIO joined the DHB, a series of positive events, where the 
parties worked cooperatively together, appeared to virtually eliminate the risk from 
debilitating relationship conflict. Within the Ministry there was less consistency, as 
one time Comms and ITS would work well together, only to see a negative event 
shortly after. Some relationship conflict continued to exist, with some 
correspondingly negative effects on the project. 
Finding 7: There is a risk that cultural differences between two stakeholder 
groups may lead to relationship conflict. The initiation and development of this 
relationship conflict over time are directly dependent on historical events, which 
may either lessen the magnitude of the relationship conflict (and thus mitigate 
the risk of further conflict), or exacerbate it (and thus increase the risk of further 
conflict). 
Culture also interacted with power in significant ways. For example, where a group 
had both a strong cultural identity and a collective power to influence decision-
making, then cultural differences presented a risk, as that collective power could be 
exercised during a cultural clash.  
Both Operations in the NZFS, and the Clinicians in the DHB, exhibited that risk in 
the form of potential resistance, with the NZFS suffering project setbacks due 
mainly to that risk being realised. On the other hand, the DHB employed 
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considerable persuasive power, directed through both the CIO and the senior project 
manager (using individual behaviours well-suited to this), patiently building a level 
of belief in the project as the clinicians, themselves, became directly involved. Thus 
the risk of negative politics as a result of a traditional culture clash between users 
and the IT function was considerably mitigated, particularly as IT pursued a low-key 
approach when working with clinicians, even within their project teams. 
Finding 8: Where a user group has a strong cultural identity and a collective 
power to influence decision-making, that power may be exercised in the form of 
resistance should culture clashes occur with other stakeholders.  
 
Individual behaviours interacted with power in positive and negative ways. Within 
the DHB, the use of positive individual behaviours (from the CIO and the senior 
project manager) to exercise persuasive power has already been noted. Within the 
Ministry, both negative and positive examples were apparent. The CTO subverted 
the business case evaluation process, without having the authority to do so. Instead, 
his personal determination to make sure his proposal worked saw him exercise 
power derived from being an executive member. No one pointed out he could not do 
that. Yet, the appointments of both the project manager and the client liaison officer 
provided the opportunity to use their personal communication capabilities and 
exercise persuasive power in roles similar to those in the DHB. The NZFS appointed 
a local assistant regional fire officer to fill in a place on the steering committee as 
the sole representative of Operations. What transpired perhaps surprised both the 
HO members of the steering committee, and many of the station chief fire officers. 
He grasped the implications of the IT projects and fully supported their objectives. 
However, he also used his unique position to point out how little many HO staff 
knew about firefighters and what was important to them, and how poorly they 
communicated with them. On the other hand, he also took many of the resisting fire 
stations to task for not being more cooperative, and was prepared to ‘bully’ them if 
necessary. 
Therefore, not only does collective power held by a stakeholder group need to be 
considered, particularly in terms of resistance, but so too does an individual with 
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power. These individual behaviours may be explained by neither the cultural groups 
they belong to, nor any governance or management initiatives. 
Finding 9: Individuals with power over decision-makers may engage in 
behaviours (either persuasion or obligation) to influence decisions. The success 
of the influence process will depend on how much power over decision-makers 
they possess, whether they employ persuasion or obligation as a tactic, their 
interpersonal skills, and their personal intentions. 
 
A dominant factor is one that considerably outweighs others in terms of its effects 
on conflict resolution. In virtually every conflict incident, there were one or two 
dominant environmental factors that had the most significant impacts on conflict 
resolution.  
For example, user power (especially in the form of threatened resistance) featured in 
all of the cases. In the DHB, the professional clinician culture figured prominently, 
as did the professional firefighter culture in the NZFS. In the Ministry, culture was 
less of an issue, as user power was derived more from their semi-autonomous status 
across Ministry functions. 
Finding 10: Where users have a strong cultural identity, user power, in the form 
of threatened resistance, is likely to be a dominant factor affecting the conflict 
resolution process.  
 
8.3. Control Factors 
The second research question focused on control effects, specifically regarding the 
manner in which governance both guides and directs management decision-making. 
RQ2:  In what way, and to what extent, can governance control the management 
of conflict resolution? 
Each of the governance control components identified in the research framework 
(policy, authority, and mechanisms) is examined in turn across the results of the 
three cases.  
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8.3.1. Policy 
In all cases, the projects examined reflected the IT strategy that had been set at the 
organisational levels, but this had not always been filtered down to the IT staff level 
in all cases. At the Ministry, the NZHIS was tasked with the development of an IT 
strategy document. However, a lack of oversight led to its abandonment, in favour of 
using the remaining budget to develop a new system. This may go some way as to 
explain the dearth of policy in terms of IT and IT projects, particularly when outside 
the involvement of the Programme Management Office. Policy is based on strategy. 
By comparison, the CIO at the DHB was charged with implementing an existing IT 
strategy, based around the electronic medical record. On that basis, policy was 
developed to emphasise the importance of clinician perspectives where IT-related 
change occurs. 
The NZFS did not have a working set of policies governing such important 
processes as business case evaluation, project prioritisation, project selection and 
project oversight. Nor were there mechanisms available to manage simultaneous 
projects across the organisation. Consequently, the dedicated steering committee had 
no structure or guidance to work under, and was left to meet each challenge as it 
arose.  
Finding 11: Where IT strategy is missing, incomplete or unclear, it is difficult to 
devise useful and usable policy at the IT project level.  
Some policies were formally stated, others were more informal, yet still reinforced 
and applied. In these three cases, formal policies tended to work best when set 
before the project began – especially where anticipated conflict was considered. 
Informal policies, however, proved most effective when developed and applied 
dynamically to help deal with unexpected issues. 
Finding 12: Formal policies generally work best when they are determined 
before the project begins. Informal policies work best when developed and used 
dynamically in direct response to an unexpected conflict. 
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8.3.2. Authority Structures 
Project-specific authority structures, such as project steering committees and project 
managers are now commonplace with IT projects of any size or complexity, and the 
cases in this study were no exception. Project managers tended to have the same 
responsibilities and reporting channels (e.g. managing project teams, maintaining the 
project plan, reporting to a project steering committee), but the project steering 
committees varied widely in membership, representation, degree of governance vs. 
management activities, and approach to conflict situations. 
With the DHB, the steering committee had mostly delegated the major issues 
involving users (the clinicians) and the IT function to the Clinical User Group, who 
represented the interests of both stakeholder groups in a way that progress was 
always likely. The steering committee generally rubber-stamped the outcomes, 
comfortable in the knowledge this method was both successful and positive in its 
approach. The consensus approach within the CUG, including the IT function acting 
in a senior advisory capacity, meant there were few conflict incidents requiring more 
direct attention from the steering committee. Nevertheless, they would have had to 
act if any conflict was escalated by the senior project manager.  
The Ministry appointed the NZHIS to steer the IT strategy and corresponding 
projects, including control of the budget. They assembled a steering committee of 
three senior managers, representing the interests of the NZHIS (as chair), Comms 
(as the biggest user), and ITS (as the service provider). All had their own agendas, 
and there were no independent members (from a non-stakeholder group, the senior 
management team, or a quality assurance advisor, for example). Where their 
respective agendas clashed, there was debate, but there was also a difficulty in 
achieving consensus. With only three busy members, meetings required all three to 
be present, leading to infrequent committee meetings at times. Oversight tended to 
be haphazard, and occasionally neglectful. They became less involved in strategy 
and governance, and more involved in management decision-making. 
In the Fire Service, the cultural gap between the ‘suits’ and the ‘uniforms’ was 
apparent as the IT project steering committees were always populated with senior 
HO and IT personnel. But then the project steering committee for FMIS co-opted a 
senior Operations manager for a temporary purpose. Having a senior user 
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representative on the steering committee proved so useful, the same person was 
appointed to the AMIS project steering committee as well. HO had never seen the 
need for Operational representation on the steering committees before. 
In each of the three cases, the PSC played a major role in both anticipating and 
responding to resistance-based conflict. While all three accurately predicted 
resistance could become an important issue, the PSC response in each case was quite 
different. At the DHB, the PSC created a more elaborate governance/management 
structure that emphasised stakeholder representation and communication. At the 
Ministry, the three-person PSC were representative of the three major stakeholders, 
but only at a managerial level. Stakeholder conflict was difficult to manage, 
exacerbated by internecine conflict between PSC members, infrequent meetings, and 
poor communication channels – both vertically and horizontally. At the NZFS, the 
PSC was unrepresentative and assumed more of an authoritative role than a 
consultative or collaborative one. Geographical, cultural and hierarchical gaps 
between the ‘suits’ and the ‘uniforms’ meant a PSC stacked with senior managers 
struggled to address firefighter-based conflict. 
 
Finding 13: How effective the IT project steering committee will be is dependent 
on several key characteristics: composition (is the PSC truly representative of 
the major stakeholders?); communication infrastructure (do the PSC 
communicate regularly – both vertically, with senior management and the 
project team, and horizontally, to each of the stakeholder groups?); function 
(how well do PSC members work together? how do they make decisions? How 
often do they meet? 
 
The benefits of running a project management office (PMO) have frequently been 
noted in the literature. Yet, among the three cases, the role of multiple project 
oversight was most successful with the DHB. They had a PMO-like function for 
projects that did not affect clinicians. But both administrative and IT projects had to 
go through the CUG first. This gatekeeper role ensured that complex projects such 
as those making up the EMR programme, were handled at an appropriate rate, with 
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time often becoming the least effective constraint – and yet there was little 
resistance to what was finally implemented. 
The Manager of IT Strategy felt that the NZFS was too small an organisation to 
warrant the expense of a PMO function. And yet, in the opinion of the QA Advisor 
for the FMIS & AMIS projects, there were, at times, simply too many projects 
underway at the same time, stretching resources and in particular, the time of those 
on the various steering committees, who tended to be the same senior managers. At 
the time of interviewing, they had just installed a new process for business case 
evaluation and project prioritisation. 
Ironically, the Ministry had a fully functional PMO in operation, yet the CTO had to 
employ a redefinition of the project to avoid satisfying the criteria for PMO 
involvement. Seeing them as overly bureaucratic, requiring completion of extensive 
templates, and constraining their decision-making processes, the CTO was 
convinced they would do better without the PMO’s involvement.  
 
Finding 14: A PMO function is important where an organisation, with limited 
resources, conducts several projects over the same period. If a PMO is seen as 
bureaucratic and an obstacle to project progress, then it will not be used. The 
products and services offered by a PMO need to be scalable and flexible, 
depending on project size, budget, timetable, resource needs, managerial 
experience, and the nature of the problems that arise. 
 
8.3.3. Mechanisms 
A variety of mechanisms were employed across all cases, to varying degrees of 
effectiveness, but communication was the one that received greatest emphasis. This 
included mechanisms for both vertical (up and down the hierarchy) and horizontal 
(across stakeholders) communication. Specifically, the mechanisms focussed on: 
formal reporting, information dissemination, consultation, and information exchange 
and discussion. 
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In each case there was formal reporting from the project manager to the project 
steering committee. Who the committee reported to was more variable. In the 
Ministry, the steering committee reported to the Deputy Director General, though 
she did not consequently get involved in the project in any way. In the Fire Service, 
the steering committee reported to the CEO, though he also did not get involved at 
any point. In the DHB, the steering committee reported to an IT strategy group, 
which took a strong interest in the project and its progress. Members of the steering 
committees in the Ministry and the Fire Service were very reluctant to escalate 
problems any higher, whereas the steering committee at the DHB was able to 
escalate a major issue (with an external vendor) and put forward requests for further 
resources. 
Dissemination of information down the hierarchy varied considerably across the 
cases. At the Fire Service, Operations were kept poorly informed about the project, 
receiving only edicts from HO-dominated steering committee – there were no other 
communication channels available. At the Ministry, communication channels to the 
main stakeholder groups were available in the form of managerial representation on 
the steering committee. But in practice, there were times when each of the three 
managers did not keep their own groups informed. On the other hand, the DHB had 
the unique Clinical User Group, which was used as a central point for both receiving 
and dissemination information down to each of the semi-autonomous clinical units. 
Consultation of user groups did not occur at all at the Fire Service. At the Ministry, 
only the main user group was consulted, but their recommendations were ultimately 
ignored. At the DHB, the CUG also served as a conduit for relaying user concerns 
and recommendations to each other, to IT, and to the steering committee. 
Information exchange and discussion between stakeholders did not exist in any 
coordinated form at the Fire Service beyond the lone Operations manager seconded 
onto the steering committee. At the Ministry, the sole mechanism for information 
exchange and debate occurred within the steering committee between the three 
managers of the major stakeholder groups. The groups themselves remained 
uninvolved in this activity and often uninformed. Whereas a particular strength of 
the CUG at the DHB was that it served as a discussion forum between clinicians, 
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with IT raising the issues and providing advice. At the DHB, information exchange 
and discussion was seen as critical to gaining user buy-in and system ownership. 
Finding 15: Extensive communication mechanisms for both vertical and 
horizontal information exchange and dialogue are likely to reduce the negative 
effects of cultural gaps, the exercise of power (such as resistance), and the 
unpredictability of individual behaviours, on conflict resolution. Communication 
mechanisms that are uniquely suited to the context of the IT project will be more 
effective. 
Finding 16: Feedback mechanisms such as standard reporting lines, consultation 
processes and information dissemination processes should be developed for both 
vertical and horizontal communication, particularly when anticipating or 
resolving conflict. 
 
8.4. Interaction Between Control Factors and Environmental Factors 
Several interactions across all three cases were identified.  
8.4.1. Governance and Historical Factors 
As noted earlier, historical events had a potential role to play in the progress of each 
IT project. In each case, conflict was anticipated due to these events. The steering 
committee responses were: 
• DHB: anticipated resistance from clinicians, and so set up communication 
channels to conduct vertical and horizontal information exchange, employ 
patient persuasion to bring round clinician acceptance, involvement and 
ownership. All interviewees described these measures as successful, with 
conflict resolution slow but consensus-based. 
• NZFS: anticipated some resistance from firefighters, but created only a few, 
almost token communication channels, with mostly unenthusiastic support. 
In the end, ad hoc approach taken, with strong likelihood history will repeat 
again in the future. 
• Ministry: anticipated resistance from independent user groups, but not from 
Comms (who were meant to be the ‘tame’ users) or NZHIS (who were meant 
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to be co-sponsors). The NZHIS technical staff were dealt with firmly by an 
embarrassed NZHIS chief advisor, but Comms was allowed to drift as it was 
assumed to be their problem. 
The CIO of the DHB spent two years not only setting up the technical infrastructure 
that would be required with an EMR system, but also learning about the 
organisation, the clinicians as the major user group, and their past relationship with 
IT and management. The CIO learned from the DHB’s history of clinician 
behaviour, and the past case studies of other attempts to establish an EMR-based 
system (such as at Auckland’s DHB). A project-oriented infrastructure for 
governance and decision-making was created, and improved over time, to provide 
long-term security from some of the more extreme effects of conflict and resistance. 
However, unlike the Ministry, there was no pre-existing relationship conflict 
between the IT function and the main user groups. Had this not been the case for the 
DHB, the CIO’s job would have been harder, though how much harder is unclear.  
By contrast, the NZFS appeared resigned to the culture gap, with a persistent level 
of relationship conflict and the threat of resistance to projects. Constructive 
dialogues mostly occurred on an ad hoc basis during crises. No formal attempts at 
bridging the communication gap were identified, certainly not before the projects 
began. This issue required consideration at a very high level in the hierarchy, as they 
would be the only ones with sufficient authority to set up new governance and 
decision-making arrangements.  
The Ministry had useful reporting and dissemination structures, but they were not 
always employed, or employed adequately. In the end, two interviewees from the 
steering committee considered themselves very lucky that two individuals were able 
to consult the independent users, and create the necessary (and persuasive) dialogue 
to win their support, as there were no other communication mechanisms available. 
Finding 17: Learning from history means being aware of what has happened in 
the past, understanding why it happened, and determining what governance 
arrangements can help prevent or mitigate the risk of something similar 
happening again. Persistent relationship conflict is frequently an outcome of 
poorly resolved conflict in the past. 
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8.4.2. Governance and Culture 
There were pronounced cultural differences between major stakeholders in both the 
DHB and the NZFS. While it can be argued as to whether an organisational culture 
can be changed or not, it is clear that issues that bring about a culture clash are going 
to be more problematic. However, the solution pursued by the DHB did not intend to 
change cultures, but rather to find ways for them to work together and seek 
consensus on important decisions. It is instructive at this point to recall the summary 
of suggestions put forward by the Fire Service interviewees as to how the culture 
gap could be bridged. The following are grouped according to the governance 
arrangement. 
• Policy: Bringing Operations into the policy-making process; 
• Authority Structures: Placing more Operations people in decision-making 
and governing bodies such as steering committees; 
• Mechanisms: Installing effective communication channels between HO and 
Operations. 
Not only are these recommendations complementary, but they effectively follow 
many of the initiatives undertaken at the DHB.   
Finding 18: Traditional approaches to consultation over system design and 
implementation may not be sufficient in situations where the primary user group 
has a powerful, collective cultural identity that is at odds with other stakeholder 
cultures. Involving them more in policy-making, decision-making, and 
governing, and putting in place effective communication mechanisms, will 
increase the likelihood of gaining acceptance, trust, and cooperation over time. 
 
8.5. Key emergent themes 
For each of the three cases, the data analysis finished with a number of thematic 
results that emerged as the research questions were addressed. The following 
examines how these themes applied to each of the cases, and their implications 
regarding IT project-related conflict, and its resolution, over a broader range of IT 
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project environments. The comparative outcomes across each of the three cases are 
discussed and summarised in Table 8.1.  
Ideally, major stakeholder groups should be represented at operational levels 
(through project teams), management levels (team leaders, project managers and 
steering committees), and governance levels (steering committees, project sponsors, 
and those responsible for IT governance). 
The DHB provided the evidence of functional stakeholder participation at various 
levels, where the majority of each decision-making body was often drawn from the 
major user group – promoting a sense of ownership and control over the project. 
Consequently, communication channels between stakeholder groups were strong 
and conflict could be resolved effectively by the users themselves.  
By contrast, despite evident relationship conflict between HO and Operations, the 
project steering committee comprised exclusively senior staff from HO. Finally, a 
senior Operations manager was co-opted onto the steering committee, but this token 
effort still fell short of effective user participation in decision-making processes. 
Consequently, communication channels between the two major stakeholders were 
weak, and the steering committee struggled to contain and resolve conflict incidents 
between them. 
The DHB was very supportive, even proud, of their approach to resolving conflict, 
but the DHB also conceded that greater stakeholder participation in decision-making 
can slow down the resolution process. Taking into account other perspectives on 
issues implies time will be used for information dissemination, consultation, and 
discussion before a decision can be agreed upon. Consensus decision-making can be 
notoriously time-consuming, particularly where several stakeholder groups are 
represented. Even so, DHB staff generally accepted this as the cost to achieving 
progress with the majority of the clinicians backing the project. 
Emergent Theme 1: To successfully manage conflict risk and conflict resolution, 
major IT project stakeholders need to be represented at multiple levels of both 
decision-making and governance. 
. 
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This study confirms what many other studies have shown in the past that effective 
communication channels between stakeholder groups have a positive effect on the 
resolution of both anticipated and actual conflict. Setting up effective 
communication channels is a task of IT project governance. When it is left to the 
authority structures, such as the project manager or steering committee, there is no 
guarantee they recognise the need for effective communication, or if they do, they 
may not have the will, knowledge or authority to create the channels. The governing 
bodies need to make good use of polices and mechanisms – preferably having them 
in place before the project begins. 
Communication mechanisms employed in cases in this study included: 
• Presentations and newsletters (encouraging information dissemination); 
• Discussion forums (encouraging dialogue); 
• Requirements gathering, design meetings and implementation planning 
sessions (encouraging consultation); and 
• Formal representation in project decision-making and governance 
(encouraging engagement). 
The mechanisms on this list are not unusual in practice, nor is the list 
comprehensive. Yet this raises the question as to how many organisations would 
combine a set of mechanisms such as these, in a coordinated fashion, before the 
project began. Further, would they have the senior management support (including 
resources) to promote and maintain them? 
Policies can also be instrumental in improving stakeholder communication. For 
example, the DHB announced early in the project that there would be no exceptions 
to migration to the new EMR system. This ensured semi-autonomous clinical units 
could not isolate themselves from the project – they had to engage. The DHB’s CIO 
also made use of informal policy for the IT staff involved in the project, requiring 
positive attitudes and behaviours when working with clinicians. As a consequence, 
the often vexed user-IT relationship was, in this case, a positive one due in part to 
strong communication channels between them. 
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Emergent Theme 2: Lack of project-specific policies and mechanisms to support 
communication can hinder successful conflict resolution. 
 
As the DHB case demonstrated, project governance and management can be 
organised at several levels. In that case, a hierarchical structure ensured that each 
level of decision-making authority was governed by the authority immediately 
above it. At each level governance and management responsibilities were clearly 
delineated. This is important for several reasons. 
The primary role of IT project governance is oversight of the project. This means 
putting project-specific governance arrangements in place before the project begins, 
and then monitoring progress over time. For this reason, those that govern must 
remain relatively detached from the project-related issues that will arise from time to 
time, including conflict. In this way, events can be dispassionately observed, 
discussed, and where necessary, acted on. 
Another role of the project governing body is to take on emergency decision-making 
powers if necessary. Escalation is a powerful tool where serious conflict cannot be 
resolved by those managing the project. This can be particularly effective if the 
governing body includes senior representatives of the stakeholders involved. 
Governance arrangements (particularly policy) need to reflect the strategic 
objectives of the IT project. Therefore it is in the governing body’s interest to think 
about issues in terms of long-term consequences. Those in decision-making roles are 
more focussed on the short-term consequences of issues, such as meeting deadlines 
or getting sign-off, and how to resolve them expeditiously.  
In both the NZFS and the Ministry, the governing bodies (a steering committee in 
each case) charged with project oversight were also deeply involved in decision-
making over project-related issues, including conflict. In both cases, few governance 
arrangements were put in place beyond authority structures. A short term focus on 
conflict resolution, often with ad hoc approaches, frequently exacerbated or even 
caused further conflict incidents. There were no escalation points that they felt able 
to use – no one wanted to escalate problems to the CEO at the NZFS, nor did anyone 
get the DDG involved at the Ministry. By confusing their governance and 
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management roles over the project, they ended up providing poor governance (too 
much focus on resolving conflict) and, at times, misguided management (no 
effective policies to guide them and few mechanisms available to help with 
resolution). 
Emergent Theme 3: IT project governance and management responsibilities and 
activities must be clearly delineated. This is particularly true of the IT project 
steering committee who are in a prime position to both (a) govern the IT project, 
including conflict management; and (b) take on a key decision-making role to 
resolve escalated conflict. 
 
Without policy guidance and constraint, and without effective mechanisms for 
making and implementing resolution-based decisions, determining how to address 
conflict is generally left to the project-based authority structures. The less support 
they receive from governance arrangements, the more likely decision-makers will 
employ ad hoc measures.  
In both the NZFS and the Ministry, the IT project steering committees reacted to 
each incident of conflict in isolation, seemingly unable to learn from past conflict 
and unaware of the risk of future conflict. Longer term, underlying issues such as 
relationship conflict, strategic alignment, and communication channels, were left 
unconsidered as the focus was on tactical problem-solving for each conflict. Further, 
the consequences of resolution for each conflict incident, in terms of exacerbating or 
initiating further conflict, were not adequately addressed, as the lengthy chains in the 
conflict incident maps for both cases demonstrated. 
It should be emphasised that the need for governance support for conflict resolution 
does not imply an overly restrictive decision-making environment is necessary. It is 
impossible to predict every conflict incident in advance, and many will involve 
unique contextual elements that will still require a degree of flexibility in resolution 
approach. Too much bureaucracy and restrictive oversight can stifle that flexibility. 
For example, the CTO of the Ministry went to some lengths to redefine a large 
project as a series of smaller ones, so as to avoid the involvement of the template-
based processes of the Project Management Office. Governance should provide 
 299
decision-makers with boundaries, guidance, and a series of mechanisms to support 
broader issues such as communication, escalation, and consensus decision-making. 
For example, the DHB developed a key authority structure (the Clinical Users 
Group, or CUG) that also served as a mechanism for communication (dissemination, 
dialogue, consultation and participation). The CUG operated under a set of policies 
outlining rules for membership, the lack of time restrictions, and consensus-based 
decision-making. However, within this governance framework, the CUG were free 
to debate issues as they saw fit, taking into account any unique features of each 
conflict incident they considered. 
Emergent Theme 4: Ad hoc decision-making increases the risk of exacerbating 
or even causing conflict. 
 
Anticipated conflict was identified as critical to the levels of ensuing conflict in all 
three cases. The act of anticipating conflict and responding accordingly falls within 
the aegis of risk management. 
Risk management involves six steps: risk identification, risk analysis, risk 
prioritisation, risk management planning, risk resolution, and risk monitoring (see 
section 2.8.4). The question was raised as to how these steps could be used to help 
reduce or eliminate the risk of conflict. Based on the analysis of the three cases, this 
question can be addressed, particularly where conflict is anticipated. 
For example, as we have seen from this study, risk identification would require:  
• identification of the project stakeholder groups;  
• an evaluation of their cultures (beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviours); 
• an estimation of their power with respect to the project; 
• identification of historical events and potential relationship conflict;  
• identification of individuals stakeholders (beliefs, values, attitudes and 
behaviours); and 
• prediction over how different conflict scenarios might play out, including the 
potential outcomes. 
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Risk analysis requires two considerations: the likelihood of each conflict scenario, 
and the magnitude of the impact it could have on the project. It is the collection of 
environmental factors, including the way they interact, that must be considered to 
estimate the likelihood of conflict. The inherent complexity can make this estimation 
process difficult, although a focus on dominant factors, along with other factors that 
may reinforce the effects of the dominant factor, may help. The magnitude can be 
assessed on a scenario basis (best case, worst case, likely case). 
At this point, risk prioritisation becomes a more straightforward exercise. Most 
attention will focus on those risks of conflict that are either likely or serious (in 
terms of impact), or most importantly of all, both.  
Having identified the most important conflict risks, a risk management plan is 
required. As this study has shown, IT project governance is particularly important 
here. More is required than simply setting up a steering committee and selecting a 
project manager. It is at this pre-project stage that longer-term policies (reflecting 
corporate and IT strategy) can be combined with effective mechanisms to carry the 
policies out. Should conflict occur, decision-makers have policy to guide and/or 
constrain them and mechanisms to help make and implement resolution decisions.  
Risk resolution refers to decisions made and actions taken to reduce or eliminate 
the likelihood and/or magnitude of the risk. In this study, these actions to ‘resolve’ 
anticipated conflict were, in many ways, analogous to those taken to resolve existing 
conflict. Putting the conflict risk management plan into action would require both 
preparatory work (governance arrangements) and management decision-making 
should conflict arise during the project. 
Risk monitoring refers to regular re-assessments of the risk of conflict. As the 
project progresses, the project context changes, new issues arise, and the conflict 
risk management plan may need to change. This accepts the dynamic nature of 
projects, but requires the above steps to be repeated. New instances of anticipated 
conflict may have arisen, while old ones may no longer pose a risk. The likelihood 
and magnitude of existing conflict risks may have changed. When that happens, 
conflict risks may need to be re-prioritised, requiring a modified risk management 
plan.  
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The key findings of this study can be collectively framed by this six-step risk 
management approach to anticipated conflict. The conflict risk management exercise 
is the responsibility of the IT project governing body, providing management 
decision-makers with the support and tools they need to cope with both anticipated 
and unexpected conflict. The nature of this support must be based on the potentially 
complex relationships between environmental factors and their combined effects on 
conflict resolution. As seen in just three case studies, a variety of governance 
arrangements are available in different situations, and careful selection will help 
moderate the potentially negative effects that environmental factors may have on 
conflict.  
Without this knowledge of the project environment and the stakeholders involved, it 
is difficult to see how appropriate governance arrangements can be put in place. The 
entire conflict risk management process would be, in itself, at risk of 
oversimplifying and/or underestimating the potential problem. This was well 
demonstrated in two of the three cases in this study. 
 
Emergent Theme 5: Addressing anticipated conflict through thorough risk 
management practices, including governance arrangements, will both lower the 
incidence and severity of conflict, and moderate negative environmental effects.
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Table 8.1: Exploring five emergent themes across all three case studies 
Theme Case 1: NZ Fire Service Case 2: Ministry of Health Case 3: Hutt Valley DHB 
Anticipated conflict  Correctly identified, but underestimated and 
considerable conflict ensued; 
Correctly identified in two situations, but 
underestimated in the first – and conflict 
ensued; in the second situation, it was 
‘resolved’ more effectively; 
Correctly identified, evaluated and acted on 
– very little conflict ensued; 
Ad hoc vs. governed 
decision-making 
processes  
Ad hoc resolution processes led to a dynamic 
relationship between resolution outcomes and 
consequent conflict incidents; 
Ad hoc resolution processes led to a 
dynamic relationship between resolution 
outcomes and consequent conflict incidents; 
Multi-level decision-making processes 
employed rigorously, which led to very little 
dynamic relationship between resolution 
outcomes and consequent conflict incidents; 
Stakeholder 
participation in 
decision-making & 
governance 
Main user group: poorly informed, poorly 
consulted and were not well-represented in 
either decision-making or governance; 
Main three stakeholders (IT, the main user 
group, and an external user group) 
represented at both decision-making & 
governance levels by managers – but outside 
these three managers, all stakeholder groups 
remained poorly informed and poorly 
consulted; 
All stakeholders well-informed & consulted, 
and well-represented at various levels of 
decision-making & governance; 
Use of policies & 
mechanisms to 
promote 
communication 
No policies & mechanisms available to 
encourage: dialogue, consultation, or 
participation from primary user group; 
No policies & mechanisms available to 
encourage: dialogue, consultation, or 
participation of different user groups; 
Policies and mechanisms employed to 
encourage: dialogue, consultation, and 
participation from primary user group; 
The boundary 
between project 
governance and 
decision-making 
Both governance & management roles placed 
on same individuals; 
Both governance & management roles 
placed on same individuals; 
Several hierarchical layers of governance & 
management, where each management level 
is governed by the body above; 
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8.6. Contributions of this Study 
The following outlines how this research has contributed to the primary literatures 
outlined in Chapter 2 (Literature Review). Next, other contributions to the broader 
(secondary) IS literature are presented, followed by a description of the theoretical 
contributions to the IS academic discipline. 
8.6.1. Contributions to the literature 
IS research has rightly focussed increasingly on the impact of human behaviour on 
IT project outcomes. But it is argued here that a reductionist approach risks 
oversimplification of the complexity involved. This research aimed to encompass 
complexity through a holistic approach. This argument is outlined in greater detail in 
8.6.3 Contributions to theory in IS. 
Systems thinking for analysis of complex social phenomena 
This thesis has contributed to the use of systems thinking in IS research, by 
presenting a systems-based framework designed to encompass not only the conflict 
resolution process, but its context and control functions as well. This acknowledges 
the fact that IT projects, IT project governance, and the conflict situations that occur 
are complex social processes. Represented below in Figure 8.1, the framework 
provides a number of advantages when investigating the impact of human 
behaviours on IT projects. Specifically, these advantages include: 
• A complete specification of the factors and interactions involved. This 
framework can be adapted to any context and control environment, accepting 
complexity leads to different outcomes in different situations. The initial 
constructs have been drawn from the literature, and were extended as a result 
of this research.  
• The systems framework allows for holistic analysis of the phenomena in 
context, seeking to identify any of: interactive effects, dominant effects and 
missing constructs. This approach is novel in the context of IT project 
governance and conflict resolution research. In all three cases holistic 
analysis revealed further effects that were not explicitly identified by the 
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consideration of individual constructs. This reinforces the value of holism 
when modelling human behaviour. 
• The framework is extensible. An additional contextual factor was added for 
“individual behaviours” as a result of the research. The impact of ‘power’ 
acting directly on the conflict resolution process (without an influence 
process) was also added.  
 
Figure 8.1: The modified research systems framework used for this study 
 
IT Project Governance 
Since the late 1990s, IT governance has been subjected to increased scrutiny in both 
the academic and practitioner literatures. As an area of research, IT project 
governance has often wrongly been seen as a subset of IT governance – it is, in fact, 
a subset of corporate governance. This thesis promotes the focus on IT project 
governance as a separate entity from IT governance, highlighting the unique 
challenges of addressing stakeholder behaviours and their effects on the projects. 
IT project risk management has become a major feature of IT project literature. In 
spite of this, human behaviour-related risks are often mentioned but not explored in 
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much depth. Stakeholder conflict appears increasingly in risk factor lists, but there 
are no ‘best practice’ guidelines for addressing this risk. The concept of ‘anticipated 
conflict’ is introduced in this thesis, and is applied to the challenges of both 
preventing conflict before it occurs and mitigating the effects of conflict once it 
occurs. This research makes a contribution to IT project governance literature, and 
to the design and implementation of IT project governance structures.   
Traditionally research into IT project processes have focussed on management 
decision-making, based on the issues and their context, with little regard to the 
effects, both potential and actual, of IT project governance. This research shows that 
IT project governance acts as a control process that influences the management 
decision-making in projects.  
Conflict 
Large, complex IT projects in medium to large organisations typically involve many 
different groups and individuals as stakeholders in both the conduct of the project 
and its outcomes. Key stakeholder groups generally include: the IT function, senior 
management, and one or more user groups. Key stakeholder individuals generally 
include the project manager, the project sponsor, and representatives of the 
stakeholder groups.  
The greater the number of stakeholders involved the more likely conflict between 
groups and/or individuals will arise. Past research has shown that stakeholder 
conflict generally has negative effects on project conduct and outcomes. Conflict 
escalation is a risk and may increase the magnitude and/or frequency of negative 
outcomes.  
This research found that governance arrangements, when put in place before conflict 
ensued, were relatively successful in terms of moderating the negative effects of 
conflict. Where conflict was anticipated, but little or no governance arrangements 
were established, ensuing conflict proved more challenging to address. Further, 
while environmental effects such as power, culture and history were not under direct 
control of organisational decision-makers, governance arrangements were 
 306
successfully employed to ameliorate the negative effects of contextual factors on 
conflict resolution. 
8.6.2. Contributions to secondary literatures 
Other contributions have included minor innovations and additions to a cumulative 
research archive. The most important of these involves governance. 
Governance 
Although the focus of this thesis was on IT Project Governance, some insights are 
relevant to the wider governance literature.  
The rise in interest in IT governance arose from an increased focus on corporate 
governance, again in both the academic and practitioner literatures, particularly after 
the failure of large corporate institutions, and the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act in the US. However, academically, the concept of governance (and particularly 
IT governance) has been difficult to pin down in terms of: definition, principles, 
governing arrangements, effects of governance, relationship between governance 
and management, and best practice, to name but a few. This research provides a 
more comprehensive perspective on governance that encompasses authority (both 
position and specific appointment), mechanisms (processes to help the management 
function), and policy (drawn from strategy and implemented in the form of guidance 
or requirement for management when making decisions). The elevation of policy to 
become a major governance tool is explained and emphasised in the thesis, and is 
new to the governance literature. The sequential model demonstrating how the three 
components link strategy to action is also new to the governance literature. 
8.6.3. Contributions to theory 
The concept of theory has proven to be difficult to standardise, as demonstrated in 
Shirley Gregor’s seminal work on the nature of theory in IS research (Gregor, 2006). 
Drawing on a wide range of current thinking, particularly in the philosophy of 
science, Gregor created a taxonomy of theory types in IS research. Table 8.2 
provides a brief summary of the five theory types. 
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Table 8.2: A taxonomy of theory types in IS research (from Gregor, 2006) 
A Taxonomy of Theory Types in Information Systems Research 
Theory Type Distinguishing Attributes 
I. Analysis Says what it is. 
The theory does not extend beyond analysis and description. No 
causal relationships among phenomena are specified and no 
predictions are made. 
II. Explanation Says what it is, how, why, when, and where. 
The theory provides explanations but does not aim to predict with 
any precision. There are no testable propositions. 
III. Prediction Says what is and what will be. 
The theory provides predictions and has testable propositions, but 
does not have well-developed justificatory causal explanations. 
IV. Explanation & 
Prediction (EP) 
Says what it is, how, why, when, and where, and what will be. 
Provides predictions and has both testable propositions and causal 
explanations. 
V. Design & 
Action 
Says how to do something. 
The theory gives explicit prescriptions (e.g. methods, techniques, 
principles of form and function) for constructing an artefact. 
 
A summary of the contributions of this research to theory is outlined below, 
expressed in terms of the theory types outlined in Table 8.2. 
One of the broadest contributions is based on the challenge to the IS academic 
community to take a holistic approach to studies of large, complex IT projects where 
human behaviours do not lend themselves so well to reductive research approaches. 
Too many studies have focussed on a limited array of factors, often only one (power, 
culture, and project management are all popular topics in this regard). While they 
provide many useful insights, conclusions drawn must be tempered with caution, as 
they typically put aside the confounding effects of other factors. This is reflected, 
frequently, in relatively low predictive power on the dependent variable. This 
research demonstrated that in all three cases examined, holistic analysis revealed not 
only a wide variety of factors at work, but that some could dominate at different 
times, and that they can either reinforce or counteract the effects of each other. 
Frequently IS research does not fully or consistently address context. Partial system 
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deconstruction through reductive methods risks missing the whole ‘story’ of what 
happened and why.  
In the search for generalisability and causality, this issue of reductionism has more 
recently affected quantitative studies as well. A string of important publications 
examining conflict in IT projects, spanning 20 years and primarily involving 
respected IS academics such as Daniel Robey, Henri Barki, and Jon Hartwick, 
considered many (but not all) of the factors identified in this research, related to 
conflict and its resolution in IT projects, through increasingly sophisticated 
quantitative models. Often their research yielded a few surprising results that 
necessitated further explanation. Quantitative data does not provide descriptions of 
why or how things happened, and so the explanations provided by the authors 
remained plausible conjecture. However, the problem may actually lie with the 
specification of the quantitative model itself. Again, there is a risk that incompletely 
specified models will confound the data and hide other factors at work. It has been 
argued that the dependent variable in quantitative studies is often influenced by 
“experiential residue” that represents unmeasured contextual factors (Tate & 
Evermann, 2009). This, too, could be an explanation for the unexpected results. 
The following describes the theory put forward as a result of cross-case analysis 
described in each of the emergent themes. This places theory development in this 
research as type II in Gregor’s taxonomy of theory types. It provides explanations as 
to why project events occurred the way they did in the three cases.  
Information systems theorists have argued that an understanding of rich context is an 
essential step in information systems theory building. Lee (1991) distinguishes 
between three ‘levels’ of understanding. Understanding at the first level is the every 
day common sense of people acting in a context. Understanding at the second level 
is the researcher’s interpretation of this common-sense understanding. 
Understanding at the third level involves the development of testable and falsifiable 
hypotheses. This research develops understanding at the second level, which can 
potentially be used as a basis for developing novel hypotheses.  
However, we note that operationalising and testing these propositions quantitatively 
is challenging on many fronts. Taking a holistic perspective renders quantitative 
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surveys difficult due to the sheer number of factors to consider, much less the 
difficulty of ensuring that each respondent understands what is meant by the terms 
used. It is also impossible to establish what might have occurred if some actions (or 
inactions) were changed (e.g. ‘prevention’ of conflict).  
Nevertheless, there is predictive value in heuristics derived from this research in 
terms of increased (or decreased) likelihood of predicted outcomes occurring.   
Heuristics to emerge from the cross-case analysis include the following. 
• Successful management of conflict risk and conflict resolution is partly 
dependent on the degree to which major IT project stakeholders are 
represented at multiple levels of both management decision-making and IT 
project governance. 
• Lack of project-specific policies and mechanisms designed to support 
communication between stakeholders can hinder successful conflict 
resolution and result in poor conflict outcomes. 
• Successful conflict management through both prevention and mitigation 
requires IT project governance and management responsibilities and 
activities to be clearly delineated. 
• Ad hoc decision-making within the conflict resolution process increases the 
risk of either initiating or exacerbating stakeholder conflict. 
• Addressing anticipated conflict through thorough risk management practices, 
including governance arrangements, can both lower the incidence and 
severity of conflict, and moderate negative environmental effects. 
• Stakeholder conflict should be considered in risk management practices as 
early as possible, initially at the IT project governance level.  
8.7. Limitations and Future Research 
The benefits of employing qualitative methods such as case study research include 
the opportunity to explore the many constructs, and their interrelationships, within 
the research framework in considerable depth. However, generalisability is limited 
by the fact that only three case studies were considered. All three cases were public 
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entities, increasing the risk that some of the findings may not apply to commercial 
organisations (though such differences were not immediately apparent from the 
study).  
Even so, several results were based on the risks of resistance from a major 
stakeholder group comprising powerful, professional frontline staff with a strong 
cultural identity, such as clinicians and firefighters. Some companies will also be 
faced with similar issues, such as law firms, consultancies, banks, and insurance 
companies. Furthermore, most of the findings that applied to these cases were not 
found to be case-specific in any particular way, and could be applied to other 
organisations, private or public. 
The data collected across the three cases presented limitations in terms of both the 
domain of data collection, through constraints placed on the breadth of the 
interviewee list, and the practicalities of tracking down everyone on the interviewee 
list. For example, members of the IT project teams were not interviewed, other than 
the project manager, in each case (the one exception was the developer representing 
the vendor involved). This was based on the assumption that the project team would 
normally be less involved in stakeholder conflict than the project manager, which 
may not have been true in every conflict situation. 
Secondly, in one case involving two IT projects, both project managers were 
contractors who had moved on from the organisation. Eventually, one was tracked 
down and interviewed, but the other had gone overseas. At the time, having at least 
one external project manager was felt to be sufficient for the case. In retrospect, it 
transpired it was the other project manager who played an important role in the more 
troublesome of the two projects. Based on other interviewees’ collective 
descriptions, there is a sense that her insights may have added to and/or strengthened 
the findings presented. This was the only occasion when a key participant could not 
be interviewed. 
Time was one important factor that could not be easily represented in the simple 
research framework. This is a limitation of the simple systems framework used for 
this study, as it presents a static view of a dynamic process. However, in practice, 
this system ‘snapshot’ can be updated at any time as the project progresses. 
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As the entire research exercise was carried out by one person, there are risks of bias 
that could appear at any (or every) stage of the research process, including data 
collection, coding, preliminary analysis and cross-case analysis. Issues of validity 
and data trustworthiness were considered and appropriate steps taken to minimise 
any inherent bias. 
There are many directions future research could take from this point. Applying the 
framework to a greater range of project types and organisations would help 
determine which outcomes would be more generalisable for different contexts. The 
systems framework could readily be modified to examine other IT project-related 
processes where human-related phenomena may be complex to manage, such as 
designing website-based information systems for consumer use. The entire IT 
project process could be modelled and analysed using the framework. This would 
lend itself to decomposition into subprojects within the framework, and could 
incorporate both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ perspectives of project management and oversight. 
Another area of increasing importance in both practice and research is the realisation 
of project benefits as a measure of project success. This would entail the central 
process being represented as a collection of sub-processes that would be applied at 
different stages of the project (and, importantly, post-project, when the implemented 
system begins to yield the benefits). Input could be project resources and the output 
would be the benefits themselves, including measures of benefit achievement over 
time as feedback to management. Otherwise, the framework would remain 
essentially the same. 
Finally, there are more sophisticated systems-based modelling methods available to 
provide further insights, including systems dynamics and the viable system model. 
Systems dynamics places an emphasis on change over time, employing feedback 
loops and simulation (Sterman, 2001). This would compliment the research 
framework from this study, which did not represent time well as a factor in the 
system. 
The viable system model (VSM) offers significant potential for further 
understanding of the relationship between organisational controls and organisational 
environment (Beer, 1985). The VSM examines how a system is organised to 
 312
determine its viability – that is, how well the system can cope with unexpected 
events. The VSM is sufficiently flexible to model a variety of organisational 
systems, and would be particularly well-suited to IS design (M. Jackson, 1988). Yet 
few applications of the VSM to IT projects have been published (see, for example, 
Kawalek & Wastell, 1999). The VSM emphasises a need to focus on the nature of 
controls before change begins, and ensure control measures are sufficiently 
adaptable to allow for environmental ‘turbulence’ so that the system remains viable. 
(Brocklesby & Cummings, 1996) These are important themes in this research as 
well. 
8.8. Conclusions 
The IT industry has come a long way in terms of grappling with increasingly 
complex IT projects. Not surprisingly, much of the recent progress has focused on 
the issue of working with multiple stakeholders. Failure to do so was seen as a major 
contributor to the frequent problems that occurred with the implementation of major 
integrative systems such as BPR, TQM, ERP and e-Commerce. Change 
management, with its focus on the implications of change for stakeholders, is 
generally considered essential today.  
However, based on analysis of the evidence drawn from the three case studies, it is 
argued that while the advent of change management moves in the right direction, 
they do not go far enough. There is still a tendency to look for silver bullets and one-
size-fits-all solutions, often under the guise of ‘best practice’.  
When there are several important stakeholder groups involved in an IT project, their 
collective human behaviour can be complex and unpredictable. This can leave 
management with difficult decisions to make as the project progresses when issues 
such as stakeholder conflict arise. Organisations put a great deal of faith in 
methodologies, but if they are engaged in a prescriptive manner, project managers 
and project steering committees are left to fend for themselves when conflict occurs. 
This places a greater emphasis on the individual behaviours of those in positions of 
authority. Some individuals will cope better with complexity than others. Many try 
to reduce complexity to a few variables to consider. 
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Complexity does not always lend itself to simplification processes. It is argued here 
that complexity needs to be embraced. By accepting that integrative systems are 
complex, and that the stakeholders involved will make the project conduct more 
complex, senior management in organisations can use time before the project begins 
to perform stakeholder analysis, to anticipate any likely conflict, and to put in place 
governance arrangements that will help either prevent or mitigate the conflict.  
This is well-illustrated by the three cases in this study. With the NZFS, preparation 
for IT project governance was poor, conflict ensued, and the negative impact on the 
project was commented upon by all interviewees. Conversely, the DHB laid the 
groundwork for effective IT project governance, with positive impact on the project 
also unanimously agreed upon by interviewees. The Ministry was more complex, 
with few IT project governance arrangements in place by the time the project began. 
The main project requirements (deadline, budget and functionality) were ultimately 
met, but the first part of the project was abandoned, and not all stakeholders were 
happy at the end. Comments on the effects of ensuing conflict varied according to 
the perspective of the interviewee. 
Project success is difficult to define (see Section 2.2), and so to what degree the 
effects of conflict contributed to overall project success or failure was not assessed.  
This research concludes the following: 
• Simplification of a complex environment into what are seen as key 
components has been shown to be beneficial in many, but not all cases in the 
literature. The risk of oversimplification is that many important effects may 
be missed in the process, particularly: 
o those effects that reside outside the research framework;  
o those effects that dominate others in terms of impact; and  
o those factors that interact in complex ways to produce effects 
that would not be apparent if either were considered 
independently.  
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• Holistic tools, such as systems thinking and systems modelling, should be 
employed to ensure a complete picture of what is going on is available. 
Either general, or slightly specialised, templates can be used to model the 
unique features that every particular organisation and/or IT project has in any 
given case. 
• It has been shown that anticipation of certain types of risk issues (in this 
research, conflict), based on likelihood and magnitude, provides an excellent 
opportunity to prepare the way with the introduction of governance 
arrangements. A holistic understanding of the complex IT project 
environment would provide a solid basis for risk management and 
mitigation. 
• Close attention needs to be paid to the selective mix of policy, authority, and 
mechanisms that make up the governance arrangements for IT projects. 
Having established an understanding of the complex IT project environment, 
governance arrangements should be selected and tailored to closely fit the 
nature of the project environment. There will be common elements across 
most IT projects, both within and across different organisations. But there 
will inevitably be unique differences between IT projects, again both within 
and across different organisations. It is these other factors that methodologies 
and other mechanisms are likely to miss. 
There is never a guarantee that any approach will be successful. For example, 
systems thinking and systems modelling are techniques that require some skill and 
experience to use successfully, though expertise can be readily found. But it is 
argued that by embracing complexity, seeking better understanding, even while 
accepting not all is knowable (or necessarily relevant), IT project risk management 
and mitigation will be significantly enhanced precisely in those human-related areas 
that traditional project oversight struggles to achieve. 
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Appendix A – Brief Summary of Exploratory Findings 
 
Detailed notes (as opposed to actual transcripts) were made from each interview and collated 
under a series of headings as follows.  Note that a number in bold at the end of any particular 
statement below indicates how many consultants made the observation (for example, [x3] 
indicates three consultants made that observation). 
Conflict/political issues that arose: 
i) Project managed by IT Dept, who focus on the technical issues more than the 
business issues;   [x 2] 
ii) Seeing the project as an opportunity to increase personal/departmental power; [x 2] 
iii) Separation of project funding from project delivery, management & responsibility; 
iv) An operational unit doesn’t see any benefit for themselves (eg. current practices 
seem more than adequate for their needs; it has taken a long time to get the current 
system working well; threat of staff losses; loss of power in organisation); 
v) Turf wars over project control; and 
vi) External consultants (and sometimes outsourcing firms) whose actions primarily 
serve those paying the money, rather than the enterprise as a whole. 
Political tactics employed: 
i) Imposing centralised technical standards inappropriately, to delay & frustrate 
project progress; [x 2] 
ii) Operational resistance by withholding information necessary to design new 
processes; [x 2] 
iii) Withholding or reallocating budget unless project direction aligned with budget-
holder’s agenda; 
iv) Setting project deadlines based more on political agendas than available resources; 
v) Using the Sponsor’s power to achieve private agenda objectives (without 
necessarily having to supply a detailed rationale!) 
Source of conflict issue: 
i) IT Dept vs Operational Units; 
ii) Project funder vs project manager; 
iii) Build vs package vs outsource; 
iv) Local vs centralised benefits; 
v) Task management vs people management; 
vi) External vs internal; and 
vii) IT development vs IT operations. 
Consultants’ observations on cases: 
i) Government projects are potentially better candidates for study, as they may be 
more open, they are typically large organisations, and their projects are rarely 
straightforward. 
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ii) Government projects also have an added layer of political complexity – the 
Government itself (Treasury providing the budget; the State Services Commission 
overseeing progress; the Minister reporting to Cabinet and the media; and external 
influences such as elections). 
iii) There is no real difference between public and private organisations in terms of IT-
related politics. [x 2] 
iv) However, one suggested there is a difference: in private organisations, the Sponsor 
has far more power (and can, for example, subvert the governance model), whereas 
in public organisations, the reverse needs to be seen to be true.  For example, many 
large, private firms in NZ have head offices overseas, and consequently must adhere 
to the governance model inherited from the offshore parent. 
v) E-commerce applications are particularly problematic: 
(1) There is no prescriptive way to develop them (other than to build and refine) – 
making traditional project constraints such as budget, deadlines, and quality 
very difficult to sensibly apply. 
(2) They dramatically change the way business is done – realigning the power 
structures. 
(3) Consequently, it may be best to find proven, experienced developers and to 
focus mostly on the functionality. 
Recommended practice for handling conflict: 
i) Ensuring stakeholder involvement such that all voices are at least heard:    
(1) typically via project-specific steering committee; [x 4] 
(2) a federalist approach where senior operational managers are expected to reach 
consensus on major issues before they become serious;  [works well, 
apparently] 
(3) hierarchical review meetings used to identify and resolve issues (and to 
disseminate) – they involve relevant stakeholders at each level, with issues 
raised at the lowest level, but going higher up the chain until finally resolved; 
[works well, apparently] 
ii) Engage the support of a strong project sponsor; [x 4] 
iii) Business units must take responsibility for their own projects (perhaps reflecting the 
shift away from infrastructure projects and over to business value-added projects); 
[x 3] 
iv) Good project management skills (and experience) essential – less, these days, on 
task management and more on people management & understanding of the business 
(ie change management skills?); [x 3] 
v) Employ external bodies to decrease conflict of interest (either elsewhere within the 
organisation, eg a QA body, or outside the organisation, eg consultants) – though 
they do become stakeholders as well; [x 2] 
vi) Perform risk assessment at earliest stages of the project to assess potential ‘barriers 
to change’, by assessing nature of power structures amongst stakeholders, and 
winning over the powerful and influential; [x 2] 
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vii) Reduce uncertainty at the earliest stages by: using good communication structures 
involving all stakeholders, explaining the business vision, identifying priorities; [x 
2] 
viii) Use two project sponsors – one representing the clients, the other the 
developers; 
ix) Ensure stakeholder representatives are: knowledgeable about the business 
objectives, respected within the organisation (so that they cannot only represent 
interests and disseminate information, but also inspire!) and closely involved with 
the project (to quickly identify & resolve issues at the local level); and 
x) Move CIOs more into general management, as they are required to spend more time 
facilitating agreement amongst the operational managers anyway. 
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General Observations: 
i) Outcome uncertainty breeds politics – for the larger projects, no one knows for 
certain what the changes will finally look like once the new system has settled 
(staffing, skill sets & training, work practices, culture, morale, power); [x 4] 
ii) Projects affecting the core business functions (typically embedding IT into them) 
appear more likely to engender conflict – they involve too many stakeholders and 
often mean profound changes to the organisation (and hence its power structures); 
[x 2] 
iii) Project health measures such as functionality, scope, quality, and even deadlines 
ultimately depend on budget constraints; [x 2] 
iv) Endemic change (restructuring, mergers, other projects, etc.) breeds conflict and 
politics (probably because they lead to uncertainty); [x 2] 
(1) stable organisations generate fewer change management issues for an IT-related 
project;  
(2) parallel activities (staff reapplying for jobs, new infrastructure, changing 
procedures, budgetary reallocations) place a lot of pressure on the stakeholders; 
v) Turf wars arise from: 
(1) lack of ownership resolution (eg. systems integration); [x 2] 
(2) projects crossing several unit boundaries (eg CRM systems); [x 2] 
(3) lack of knowledge about the application type (eg. E-Commerce); [x 2] 
(4) conflicting objectives and lack of priority setting; 
vi) Outsourcing is another common source of politics – either the threat of it (with loss 
of staff) or the management of it (where a new, external stakeholder has appeared); 
[x 2] 
vii) Governance structures in organisations often seem to support those affected by the 
changes more than those who are implementing them; 
viii) New finance systems often lead to conflict and political activity – possibly 
because so many stakeholders are involved, and also everyone wants access to the 
financial information! 
ix) While project deadlines, budget and scope are common political issues, 
functionality only becomes an issue when the IT Dept specifies more of it than the 
users!  Quality may also be a problem. 
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Appendix B – Participant Information Sheet and Consent Form  
 
 
 
Information Sheet 
 
My name is David Johnstone, and I am a Lecturer in Information Systems, in the School 
of Information Management, Victoria University of Wellington. Prior to teaching, I 
spent 10 years working in the IT industry. I have embarked on this research project with 
the intention of completing my doctoral (PhD) studies in Information Systems. 
About the Research Project 
It is not unusual for large organisations to engage in significant, complex IT projects. 
Typically, the projects affect many different parts of the organisation. As a result, there 
are a number of stakeholders who have an interest in the way the project is conducted, 
including: end user groups, IT developers, senior management, the project manager, the 
project steering committee, the project office, vendors, and consultants. 
It is almost inevitable that such interests will not always be the same amongst the 
different stakeholders. Sometimes these differences may lead to issues of disagreement 
and conflict. I am interested in finding out how different organisations deal with the 
issues as they arise.  
In particular, I am investigating the effects IT project governance may have on the 
resolution of the issues. By governance, I mean the combination of three things: 
• the formal authority to make decisions on relevant issues; 
• the policies that guide and control their decision-making; and 
• the procedures, processes, tools and methodologies used to help both their 
decision-making and the implementation of their decisions. 
Research Approach 
Phase 1 of this project involved interviewing a number of experienced project managers 
working for major consultancies in Wellington. The collected experiences provided the 
basis for the line of questioning in Phase 2. 
In Phase 2, a pilot study was conducted, involving one-hour interviews with a range of 
stakeholders of a significant IT project in each of two different organisations. This more 
in-depth investigation lead to the refinement of the IT project governance framework 
developed for this study. 
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Currently, Phase 3 involves an extension of the Phase 2 pilot study, with further IT 
project-related interviews across a range of organisations. 
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Procedure 
There are two parts to the interview process. 
1) Research Interview 
a) Introduction to the researcher and the research project; 
b) Explanation of confidentiality & anonymity; signing of consent form; 
c) Questions on recent events with respect to the IT project are asked; and finally 
d) Wrap-up (interview to be completed within 60 minutes of start). 
2) Post-Interview 
a) Transcription of taped interview is made & checked by interviewee; 
b) Material drawn from the interview is aggregated with material from other 
interviews; 
c) At the end of Phase 3, a summary of aggregated research results will be provided 
for all participants, along with an examination of the IT project governance 
arrangements at the interviewee’s organisations. 
Note that research involving interviews of this type are subject to approval from 
Victoria University’s Human Ethics Committee.  
Confidentiality and Anonymity 
Research interviews are carried out with the understanding that the following applies: 
1) Confidentiality of Material – Sensitive material obtained from the interview will be 
considered confidential – that is, no one except the principal researcher (David 
Johnstone) and his PhD supervisors (Prof. Sid Huff & Dr. Beverley Hope), all at 
Victoria University, will be permitted to see it. 
2) Security of Material – Interview tapes and notes will be kept in a locked filing 
cabinet. The tapes and notes will be destroyed within two years after the completion 
of the research project. No copies will be made. 
3) Anonymity of Participants – Though material from the interviews may contribute to 
academic publications, it will not be possible to identify either participants or 
organisations that have taken part in the study.  
Finally 
At this point I would like to thank you for your contribution of time and knowledge 
towards this research project. It is my hope that this study will contribute to a better 
understanding of how complex IT projects can be handled and increase the likelihood of 
a successful outcome. 
If you have any queries about the research project, or your participation, please contact the 
principal researcher: 
David Johnstone 
Lecturer in Information Systems 
School of Information Management 
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Victoria University of Wellington 
Telephone:  (04) 463-5877 (direct line) 
Email:  david.johnstone@vuw.ac.nz 
 
 
 
 
Consent Form 
 
The following outlines what the interview participant consents to in terms of both their 
involvement in the research project, and the subsequent use of the interview material. 
Please read the following statements, then sign and date the form before the interview 
begins. 
 
1) “I have been provided with adequate information relating to the nature and objectives of this 
research project, I have understood that information, and have been given the opportunity to 
seek further clarification or explanations.”   
2) “I understand that I may withdraw from this study at any time within one month of my 
receipt of the interview transcript for checking, without providing reasons.”   
3) “I understand that if I withdraw from the project, any data I have provided will either be 
returned to me or destroyed.”  
4) “I understand that any information or opinions I provide will be kept confidential and 
reported only in an aggregated and/or non-attributable form.”   
5)  “I understand that the information I have provided will be used only for this research 
project and that any further use will require my written consent.”   
6) “I understand that the information obtained will be destroyed within two years of the 
completion of the project.”  
I therefore agree to take part in this research.  
 
 
 
Signed   ……………………………………………………….    Date   ………………………. 
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Appendix C – Data Collection Interview Protocols  
 
 
IT Manager Interview Schedule 
Objectives 
A. To gain endorsement of the study and consequent access to organisational staff and material 
for use in my research; 
B. To identify an IT project, and corresponding key stakeholders, that satisfy the selection 
criteria for this study; and 
C. To gain an agreement to an interview about general aspects of the project (with a focus on 
context). 
Part 1 – Introduction (FACE-TO-FACE) 
1) Who I am (business card) 
2) What I am doing (information sheet)  
a) I will have sent them an information sheet in advance, but will provide one if they don’t 
have one immediately available. I will ask if they have had a chance to look at it. If not, 
I will be happy to explain the main features. 
b) Either way, ask if they have any questions about it. 
3) Why it is important – organisations such as theirs will gain insights into guidance and 
control of complex IT projects. 
4) How they can help 
a) Become involved in the study by supporting the project; 
b) More specifically, help identify a suitable project for the study; and 
c) Help me identify suitable stakeholder representatives for interviews. 
5) What they can expect in return – I will provide: 
 a summary of the combined organisational study results; and 
 a specific evaluation of their IT project governance arrangements currently in use. 
 
 
Part 2 – Identifying: Project / Stakeholders / Authority Structures  
(FACE-TO-FACE, structured) 
1) Show Interview Information Sheet and explain structure of interview (times are 
approximate, and step 6 may not be feasible if earlier steps require more time): 
2) Complete Consent Form. 
a) May need to clarify some of the statements; refer back to details in Study Information 
Sheet if necessary. 
3) Has your organisation been involved in a major, IT-related project in recent years?  
a) [If so] Tell me about it.  
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i) time period, purpose, etc. – test if project selection criteria met 
[[ie. relatively recent / large & complex / several end user stakeholders + 
others]] 
[[NOTE: typical multi-stakeholder projects include: intranet, e-commerce, ERP, 
BPR, systems integration]] 
ii) how they were involved – test if they know enough about the project to identify 
stakeholders & suitable representatives … may have to ask if unclear 
[[NOTE: may need to ask if someone else would be better to talk to about this, eg. 
if IT manager wasn’t involved at the time]] 
b) [If not] Can you think of any other major IT-related projects in recent years?  
i) If so, back to (a) 
ii) If not, apologise, explain what kinds of projects are required for the study, thank 
them for their time, and end the interview. NOTE: if a project only narrowly misses 
the criteria, in many cases it may still be worth doing. 
c) Confirm project meets criteria, and we can continue. 
4) Complete Project ID Form. 
a) NOTE: much of it will have been filled in from information provided earlier. 
b) Ask if they will check it. 
5) Complete the Stakeholder ID Form. 
a) First, ask them to go down the first three columns, identifying the stakeholder groups 
and types, and their level of interest in the project. 
 [[NOTE: It is important that the identified stakeholders include: 
• The Project Manager 
• At least two major end user groups 
• At least one IT function group (internal or external) 
• At least one other major stakeholder 
b) Then ask them to identify important representatives for each group, and whether or not 
they would be suitable for interviewing. 
[[NOTE: that is, do they still work there, and are they likely to be 
amenable to be interviewed? … particularly if I have the support of the 
IT Manager!]] 
6) Complete the Authority Structure Form. 
a) Do they have any preprepared hierarchy structures, or other documents which help 
explain? 
b) Start with diagram of general decision-making structure, add characteristics 
c) Then move on to more specialist, IT- or project-related (directly or indirectly) structures 
(eg. steering committees, project committees, etc.) – and add characteristics. 
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7) Obtain any documents outlining policies (including rules, guidelines) that would affect 
decision-making within the project context (including corporate, IT-specific, and project-
specific levels). 
a) This is based on the working definition of governance that involves the simple test of 
determining whether or not written policy exists.  
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Part 3 – Exploring governance and conflict resolution 
(optional, FACE-TO-FACE, semi-
structured) 
8) Do you mind if I record the remainder of the interview? 
a) Remind them (if necessary) of: 
i) Confidentiality & anonymity 
ii) The consent form 
iii) The return of the transcript for checking 
b) Otherwise, must take notes, which I will write up and return to them for checking. 
9) Can you recall an instance of a disagreement between two of the major stakeholders that 
the parties themselves could not satisfactorily resolve?  
a) If necessary, one party can be a minor stakeholder. 
10) Tell me what happened.  
a) Focus on key events, including outcomes. For each key event, story must include: 
i) How did the event unfold? 
(1) Progress of conflict, conflict resolution, & decision/influence processes. 
ii) Who was involved? 
(1) Groups/individuals 
(2) Was there politics? (power structure) 
iii) Why did it happen? 
(1) Why did the conflict and/or conflict resolution processes lead to this event? 
(2) What effects did organisational moderators have on this event? [focus on: 
authority structures, policies, procedures; but include: methodologies, culture, 
power structures, etc.] 
iv) When did it happen? (possibly in absolute month/year, but more useful if in context 
of project status) 
v) Where did it happen? [optional] 
b) May need to prompt if too much of the above remains unclear; 
c) How would you rate the conflict resolution outcomes overall, in terms of their effects 
on the project? Why? 
i) How satisfied were those involved with the outcomes? … the resolution process? 
11) Wrap-up 
a) Thank them for their time and participation, give them their rewards, and remind them I 
will see them next to provide the transcript for checking and if necessary, clarify some 
of the facts. Note that the results may take several months to emerge! 
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b) Finally, ask if they would be willing to participate in the brief survey I will be 
conducting later this year. 
Stakeholder Interview Schedule 
 
Objectives 
To interview the stakeholder about the selected project, specifically: 
• Key conflict events as the project progressed; and 
• General aspects of the project (primarily contextual matters). 
Part 1 – Introduction (FACE-TO-FACE) 
1) Who I am (business card) 
2) What I am doing (information sheet)  
a) I will have sent them an information sheet in advance, but will provide one if they don’t 
have one immediately available. I will ask if they have had a chance to look at it. If not, 
I will be happy to explain the main features. 
b) Either way, ask if they have any questions about it. 
3) Why it is important – organisations such as their’s will gain insights into guidance and 
control of complex IT projects. 
4) How they can help 
a) Allow me to interview them to explore the way project-based stakeholder conflict was 
handled. 
5) What they can expect in return – I will provide: 
 a summary of the combined organisational study results; and 
 a specific evaluation of their IT project governance arrangements currently in use. 
 
 
Part 2 – Exploring governance and conflict resolution 
(FACE-TO-FACE, semi-structured) 
12) Explain structure of interview (times are approximate): 
 
1 5 min About the research project (completed) 
2 5 min Complete Consent Form 
3 20 min Describe events surrounding a project issue (1) 
4 20 min Describe events surrounding a project issue (2) 
5 5 min Questions on context [OPTIONAL] 
6 5 min Wrap-up 
13) Complete Consent Form. 
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a) May need to clarify some of the statements; refer back to details in study information 
sheet if necessary. 
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14) Do you mind if I record the remainder of the interview? 
a) Remind them (if necessary) of: 
i) Confidentiality & anonymity 
ii) The consent form 
iii) The return of the transcript for checking 
b) Otherwise, must take notes, which I will write up and return to them for checking. 
1st Critical Incident 
15) Can you recall an instance of a disagreement between two of the major stakeholders that 
the parties themselves could not satisfactorily resolve?  
a) If necessary, one party can be a minor stakeholder. 
16) Tell me what happened.  
a) Focus on key events, including outcomes. For each key event, story must include: 
i) How did the event unfold? 
(1) Progress of conflict, conflict resolution, & decision/influence processes. 
ii) Who was involved? 
(1) Groups/individuals 
(2) Was there politics? (power structure) 
iii) Why did it happen? 
(1) Why did the conflict and/or conflict resolution processes lead to this event? 
(2) What effects did organisational moderators have on this event? [focus on: 
authority structures, policies, procedures; but include: methodologies, culture, 
power structures, etc.] 
iv) When did it happen? (possibly in absolute month/year, but more useful if in context 
of project status) 
v) Where did it happen? [optional] 
b) May need to prompt if too much of the above remains unclear; 
c) How would you rate the conflict resolution outcomes overall, in terms of their effects 
on the project? Why? 
i) How satisfied were those involved with the outcomes? … the resolution process? 
2nd Critical Incident 
17) Since you regard the last example to be successful/unsuccessful, can you recall an 
instance of a disagreement between two of the major stakeholders that was resolved in 
a(n) unsuccessful/successful manner?  
a) If necessary, one party can be a minor stakeholder. 
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b) If not, then they can still discuss another incident. 
18) Tell me what happened.  
a) Focus on key events, including outcomes. For each key event, story must include: 
i) How did the event unfold? 
(1) Progress of conflict, conflict resolution, & decision/influence processes. 
ii) Who was involved? 
(1) Groups/individuals 
(2) Was there politics? (power structure) 
iii) Why did it happen? 
(1) Why did the conflict and/or conflict resolution processes lead to this event? 
(2) What effects did organisational moderators have on this event? [focus on: 
authority structures, policies, procedures; but include: methodologies, culture, 
power structures, etc.] 
iv) When did it happen? (possibly in absolute month/year, but more useful if in context 
of project status) 
v) Where did it happen? [optional] 
b) May need to prompt if too much of the above remains unclear; 
c) How would you rate the conflict resolution outcomes overall, in terms of their effects 
on the project? Why? 
i) How satisfied were those involved with the outcomes? … the resolution process? 
19) Wrap-up 
a) Thank them for their time and participation, give them their rewards, and remind them I 
will see them next to provide the transcript for checking and if necessary, clarify some 
of the facts. Note that the results may take several months to emerge! 
b) Finally, ask if they would be willing to participate in the brief survey I will be 
conducting later this year. 
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Appendix D – Operational Code Definitions  
 
 
Coding Structure 
 Construct Operational Definition 
1 INPUT 
  
IT project Issue A project-related issue that involves disagreement between stakeholders as to 
what should happen next.  
  
Issue Stakeholders The project stakeholders who are involved in the ensuing conflict - either directly (in the dispute) or indirectly (in its resolution). 
2 PROCESS 
  
Conflict Evaluation Where the issue involving stakeholder disagreement undergoes a formal process 
identifying, recording, and evaluating the dispute requiring resolution. 
  
Conflict Resolution The process used to make decisions about the dispute, once formally recorded. 
  
Decision One of the decisions facing the decision-maker as part of the conflict resolution 
process. 
  
Decision-Maker The issue stakeholder responsible for making a decision as part of the conflict 
resolution process. 
  
Influence A process used by individual, or groups, of issue stakeholders to manipulate the 
way the conflict evaluation, and conflict resolution, processes are carried out. 
3 OUTPUT  
  
Resolution Outcome The results of the decisions made during the conflict resolution process. 
  
Process feedback Formally collected information reflecting the status of the conflict evaluation and 
conflict resolution processes, at either predefined or ad hoc intervals, based on 
pre-set performance measures. NOTE: While it is feasible that feedback could 
also apply to Influence processes, it is unlikely in any formal way. 
4 CONTEXTUAL FACTORS  
  
Individual Behaviours Individual-level behaviours affecting processes 
  
Power Structure Power represents the capacity to influence decision-making - outside normal 
authority. The power structure represents the distribution of non-authoritative 
power throughout the organisation. 
  
Culture Collective beliefs, attitudes and values within the organisation that affect decision-
making. These are not officially recorded, yet remain understood and accepted by 
most in the collective group. 
  
Other Other organisational factors (outside power, culture, and governance) that may 
affect decision-making within the organisation. 
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5 CONTROL  
  
Policy Officially recognised, and recorded, statements from higher levels of authority 
that seek to control decision-making, and consequent actions, through constraint 
and guidance. 
  
Authority Structure Officially sanctioned responsibility for making decisions over pre-defined 
functional areas. Such decisions may, or may not, be controlled by policy. 
  
Mechanism Officially sanctioned processes, procedures and practices for making and/or 
implementing decisions. Policy may, or may not, require their use. Authority may, 
or may not, dictate that they will be used. They may be pre-defined or ad hoc. 
6 HISTORY 
 
History Past events relevant to the current issues. 
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Appendix E – New Zealand Fire Service Summary Tables of Conflict Incidents  
 
 
 
Table E-1:  Conflict Incidents 
      
PRE-RESOLUTION CONFLICT POST-RESOLUTION CONFLICT 
CI# Brief Description Primary Target  Disagreement Negative Emotions Interference Disagreement Negative Emotions Interference 
1 Relationship conflict between Operations & Head Office - it has been suggested there is ongoing tension 
between Ops & HO, primarily based on historical distrust 
and vast cultural differences. However, whether or not it 
has an effect on a project depends on the degree both 
parties are involved. For example, the FMIS had little 
trouble because it did not involve front line staff much. 
"People have talked about the tension, but I haven’t 
experienced it myself." [EM, the PM of FMIS] 
Relationship Seen by Ops as, yet 
again, all responsibility 
with little authority: "...the 
sponsor of the project 
[PC] was very much the 
manager of the policy 
area, whereas the 
operational people were 
expected to implement it. 
So, it’s the old conflict 
between accountability 
and responsibility." [FS] 
 
[YES] 
Both Ops and SC were 
increasingly fed up with 
exercise; 
 
Also, original PM had 
trouble getting on with 
station staff. 
 
[YES] 
The relationship 
conflict was a direct 
contributor to the 
issues encountered. 
 
[YES] 
Ops suspicion & 
mistrust towards HO 
has not significantly 
improved. 
 
[YES] 
uncertain 
 
[Some] 
The potential for 
interference again, as 
the exercise continues 
is high. 
 
[YES] 
2 Resistance by Operations to AMIS [ANTICIPATED] - the SC were under no illusions that regions may take issue with 
aspects of AMIS in general and AVP in particular, and 
sought measures to reduce the effects through increased 
consultation and participation. 
Task 
(process) 
anticipated resistance 
 
[YES] 
anticipated negative 
emotions from Ops 
 
[YES] 
anticipated resistance 
likely to interfere with 
project goals 
 
management 
enforcement likely to 
engender interference 
of internal station and 
regional goals (through 
additional work with 
little benefit; and 
changes to established 
regional systems, 
respectively) 
 
[YES] 
resistance still 
apparent 
 
[YES] 
increasing frustration 
from both Ops and HO 
(via SC) 
 
[YES] 
dual interference 
remains an issue 
 
[YES] 
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PRE-RESOLUTION CONFLICT POST-RESOLUTION CONFLICT 
3 Resistance by Operations to AVP - Although all fire stations felt obliged to participate in the AVP, many did not 
give timeliness or accuracy as high a priority as HO would 
like them to. As a consequence, several rounds of 
collection were necessary - with corresponding costs & 
delays. 
 
The underlying issue is that while HO do have accurate 
figures at a national level, how those assets are distributed 
across 430 individual fire stations is where the figures are 
less certain. Physically fixed assets (property, buildings, 
etc.) are straightforward, but many assets are moveable 
and may (for many reasons) end up at different stations (eg 
breathing apparatus, fire hose, etc.). An AMIS objective is 
to enable the tracking of these, so that maintenance 
records can be stored and accessed. So, data collected 
from stations should all add up to the national figures. But 
the differences were, in fact, so significant that further data 
collection was required. The stations were not always 
providing accurate data. 
Task 
(process & 
content) 
Many stations did not 
agree with HO over 
priority for AVP. 
 
[YES] 
Pre-existing relationship 
conflict meant many 
stations suspicious of HO 
intentions. 
 
[YES] 
"Some of the regions, I 
think, had better 
systems in place, and 
felt comfortable with 
existing systems. " [EB] 
 
Similarly, the need for 
accurate data meant 
repeated data 
collection rounds - 
seriously affecting the 
AVP & AMIS 
deadlines/budgets. 
 
[YES] 
Basic disagreement 
unresolved even after 
AVP finished 
 
[YES] 
Some suspicions and 
frustrations remained 
as data still not 
completely right, but 
conflict terminated. 
 
[YES] 
AVP delays costly to 
AMIS. 
 
[YES] 
4 AMIS project manager becomes AVP project manager as well: The project manager for AMIS (Jo) was also put in 
charge of the AVP once that started getting into trouble. As 
she spent more time on the AVP, AMIS was making little 
progress and falling behind schedule. Worse, the AVP 
continued to be problematic anyway (see #1, #3). "The 
issue was essentially allowed to drag on. … and it wasn’t 
until it became a crisis, that they decided to sack the project 
manager  partly because of conflicts …". [FS] 
 
"How much time should Jo Thompson  who was the AMIS 
Project Manager  spend doing this? … rather than getting 
the system, the conference room pilots that I talked about 
before, and all the testing and so forth. There was conflict 
there about how much time she should be spending on this. 
Was this part of her responsibility or not? Inevitably, getting 
the assets records correct is a pre-requisite for using AMIS  
in the sense that it was intended. The more time she spent 
doing that, it was time she was not spending on other 
things. And there were conflicts within the team because of 
that." [PC] 
Task 
(process) 
"During the AMIS project, 
there was a significant 
disagreement with the 
project manager, who 
then left. … or, who was 
asked to leave." [FS] 
 
[YES] 
Many Chief Fire Officers 
(of stations) did not get 
on with the AMIS PM. 
She was either unaware 
of the relationship conflict 
between Ops & HO, or 
felt unable to do anything 
about it. 
 
[YES] 
The station CFOs saw 
AMIS as being of little 
value to them, and yet 
forcing more work upon 
them due to the AVP. 
 
The AMIS PM saw 
these station CFOs as 
the direct cause for 
delays and poor quality 
data. 
 
[YES] 
[NO] [Some] [NO] 
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PRE-RESOLUTION CONFLICT POST-RESOLUTION CONFLICT 
5 SC faced with slippage in AVP deadlines - "There were known to be very large discrepancies between the original 
asset lists and reality. The AMIS project involved a very 
large data collection exercise of information about assets 
that were in Eugene - the predecessor system - that had to 
be brought across to the main JD Edwards system as part 
of the asset register. ...there were many attempts to do 
this..." [PC]  This was the AVP - a subproject of AMIS. 
 
"This was done, and supposedly all the asset lists were 
then to be signed off by all the regional managers as being 
accurate. And we never got that done successfully. ...I 
suppose we could argue that there were arguments, 
discussions, … about how did we know when we had 
finished? How do we know when we’ve got that degree of 
accuracy?" [PC]  
 
"We reached 100% accuracy asymptotically, as it were. In 
other words, it will never be absolutely accurate. ...We did 
not have any objective basis for saying 'it’s now accurate 
enough', because you simply can’t establish one. You can 
never say 'I now know that it is 97% accurate.' You can 
never know that." [PC] 
 
"I would say the biggest issue for AMIS was asset register 
correctness." [PC] 
Task 
(process) 
Some members of the 
SC (esp. those with 
financial background) 
were worried about 
costs, and wanted to end 
AVP sooner. 
 
Other SC members were 
worried about accuracy 
of asset data, noting that 
AMIS would only be used 
if the data was true, and 
so wanted AVP to 
continue longer. 
 
[YES] 
"So there were 
disagreements, lengthy 
discussions, uncertainty, 
unhappiness at the 
Steering Committee ...I 
think we were all 
unhappy about different 
aspects of it. How many 
times did we have to do 
it? How much money did 
we have to spend?" [PC] 
 
Eventually, everyone 
became "weary" of 
repeated efforts to 
improve data quality. 
 
[Some] 
Financial interests 
were worried about 
effects on budget & 
deadlines; 
 
Non-financial interests 
worried about quality & 
likely use of AMIS 
system if data 
untrustworthy; 
 
[YES] 
Eventually agreed 
(consensus) asset data 
accurate enough & 
AVP can finish. 
 
[NO] 
Collective "weariness" 
meant relief for many 
when AVP ended. 
Even so, RK remained 
unhappy over lack of 
accurate data. 
 
[Some] 
RK still sees AMIS at 
risk. "No, it’s absolutely 
not accurate. I would 
have thought that the 
capture of the data was 
a key issue, a critical 
issue in terms of the 
implementation of the 
new asset 
management system.  
You can’t avoid that. 
You can’t maintain 
tests and get critical 
information of the 
assets, and know 
exactly what you’ve 
already got, … and we 
didn’t do that." [RK] 
 
[Some] 
6 Control over AMIS data entry - "Now, that’s all pretty straightforward, and that’s how government departments 
pretty much do it. It’s in good order, all this stuff, and 
everything’s okay.  I’m happy with our processing.  But 
when we purchase the asset  that’s when the conflict starts. 
[Say] we purchase a new fire engine.  Who puts it in the 
new asset management system is a real area of conflict 
that we have never resolved. Now that sounds very simple  
that when you buy a fire engine, you put it in the asset 
management system.  But I put my hand up and say hang 
on, I want to do it, because I want to associate that new 
truck, the fire engine, with all it’s standard tests, and its 
pump tests, and all the compliance issues that surround [it]  
I want to be able to associate this new truck with all that 
stuff.  The financial people say: ah, any purchase has got a 
financial implication, and we want to do it.  And when we’ve 
done it, you can do your stuff.  Well I don’t want to do it like 
that.  I want to put it in and then I want them to do their 
stuff." [RK] 
Task 
(content)  
 
NB. The task, 
in this case, 
is to design 
the process 
for updating 
the asset 
management 
system. The 
conflict is 
over the 
content of 
this design. 
[YES] Ops have considerable 
resentment over this 
issue, as they perceive a 
loss of control over their 
own assets to fit into a 
system that is designed 
to support financial 
interests at HO. 
 
"It smacks of big boy 
control!" [RK] 
 
[YES] 
Ops worry about the 
transfer of control of 
their assets to 
centralised Finance. 
 
Finance worry about 
the risk of failure to 
capture all of the 
relevant financial data. 
 
[YES] 
impasse 
 
[YES] 
frustration on both 
sides 
 
[YES] 
unchanged 
 
[YES] 
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PRE-RESOLUTION CONFLICT POST-RESOLUTION CONFLICT 
7 SC faced with slippage in AMIS deadlines: "As far as deadlines, there was slippage in the AMIS project, for 
various reasons. But it didn’t give rise to any heated issues 
at Steering Committee level. [It] resulted from a 
combination of several factors. One, we undertook what we 
call an asset verification of all asset data at every location. 
This was done by a group of individuals that were separate 
from the project team. We had to have that done by June, 
2001." [GM]  
 
Essentially, the slippage represents the culmination of 
effects from the other conflict issues. Note FMIS went to 
schedule without many problems. 
 
"What we underestimated with that, and the flow-on effect 
into the AMIS project, was how long it would actually take 
to upload all the verification data. There was a group of 
people who visited every single fire station around the 
country. We underestimated how long it would take to 
upload that data into our asset register  which obviously 
formed the basis [AMIS]. It took about four to five months to 
actually upload that data. As a result, there was a bit of an 
overlap between the AMIS project, trying to achieve its 
deliverables, not having the right data in there, and the 
[AMIS] project manager at the time was sidetracked, 
somewhat, into working with the asset verification data. 
That’s when the delays started, and it affected the project. 
The Steering Committee was aware of this pretty much all 
the way through. Unfortunately it was just one of those 
things we were committed to doing, and we just had to let 
the verification data run its course … and let the impact of 
that, on the AMIS project, take its course as well." [GM] 
Task 
(process) 
FS (the external QA) 
repeatedly warned the 
SC of the risks to AMIS 
by creating a 
dependency on finishing 
AVP first, rather than 
treating them as 
separate projects. It 
seems the SC did not 
appreciate this, and kept 
trying to fix AVP instead - 
draining further 
resources (including the 
PM) from the AMIS 
budget. 
 
[YES] 
[NO] SC thought they were 
in control, and so saw 
the QA's warnings as 
potential interference; 
 
[YES] 
SC finally understood 
what QA was warning 
about 
 
[NO] 
[NO] [NO] 
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Table E-2:  Influence and other environmental factors 
CI#   INFLUENCE ENVIRONMENT 
  
Brief 
Description Persuasion Obligation Culture History Individual Behaviours 
1 Relationship conflict between 
Operations & 
Head Office 
"So, depending on what sort of 
asset it was, it was good sense to 
purchase it centrally  and we can’t 
use that word ‘centrally’, because 
there’s a huge hang-up about that 
out in the regions. Centrally, 
calling it central purchasing sort of 
implies that the control is central.  
So we call it coordinated.  So we 
don’t bruise their egos, we call it 
coordinated purchasing. If it was 
appropriate to buy through a 
coordinated approached - through 
the National Office - we would, … 
or if it was better to purchase 
through here, I had to delegate it 
so that we could go and purchase 
it. Now, that’s all pretty 
straightforward, and that’s how 
government departments pretty 
much do it. It’s in good order, all 
this stuff, and everything’s okay.  
I’m happy with our processing." 
[RK] 
"Now we’ve brought in [the] Property 
[system], … and I’ve got to say that the 
Property people have probably 
provided the best accurate information 
on the property that we have in New 
Zealand. Now we’re linking that to 
planned repairs and maintenance 
programmes - this is what it’s all about.  
But again, the property people at 
National Office have designed a 
programme that, in some people’s 
eyes, see the capture of the power and 
the control about spending the money 
on buildings for National Office, rather 
than delegating the authority locally, … 
to where it should be spent. Again, I 
link that back to, … there’s no point in 
having these really good projects, no 
matter how well designed, how well 
the timelines [are set], whatever 
software package [was chosen], and 
people surrounding the project 
management, unless you’re focused 
on outcomes and implementation." 
[RK] 
"The operational people say: “We need 
to do this.” There was the operational 
manager’s staff, who were being used 
with the policy - because they had this 
policy/operational split … again, it 
relates to too many projects on the go 
at once.  
 
"So, they were going to do it on 
another range of assets.  Oh, well, 
write a letter to them - they have to do 
it.  And that’s when I said you weren’t 
committed with the first instruction, you 
wouldn’t do any follow-up, as it all got 
too hard. Don’t do it again, because all 
you do is consistently destroy your 
credibility. Because, the people out 
there think these people in National 
Office, in the main, they’re just a bunch 
of wankers, you know? … particularly 
because they wear a suit - they don’t 
wear a uniform. So I introduced the 
concept of the people that work at the 
National Office - that work for me - 
they wear a uniform to work.  Let’s see 
if we can break through the cultural 
divides there." [RK]city of the staff to 
adopt change is very low …especially 
IT-related change. In some areas, any 
change, because they had this long-
standing industrial dispute with the 
firemen." [FS] 
"[Ops were resistant to change], especially IT-related 
change. In some areas, any change, because they had 
this long-standing industrial dispute with the firemen 
[back in the 1990s when businessman Roger Estall was 
made CEO of the NZFS]. The outcome, … the final 
effect from that is still apparent, and certainly affected 
the project. For example, at one stage, not on that 
project, but another, it actually affected their ability to roll 
out their HR system. The firemen were using refusal to 
carry out tasks as an industrial weapon. The union was 
involved. So, they basically said ‘No, we will not do 
online …’. My memory may be wrong in terms of the 
task, but it was: ‘We will not put our timesheets directly 
into the computer terminal. You cannot direct us to do 
that. There is an industrial dispute, so we are holding 
you to ransom. You meet our demands, and we’ll use 
your system’ sort of thing. It was part of the industrial 
relations, a negotiating tactic." [FS] 
 
"There is a culture within the organisation, and there has 
been for many years, through industrial disputes, of a bit 
of mistrust … between management and, I guess, front-
line staff … both in the paid [and volunteer ranks]. 
[There was an] exercise that happened many, many 
years ago, in the volunteer ranks, where people have 
been known to go around fire stations with a truck, and 
go and do an asset count, and then actually take assets 
away from them that they didn’t think the station 
needed, because they thought it was surplus. So, you’ve 
got all this history, where people come into someone’s 
fire station and want to count your assets  there are all 
these misconceptions about what the purpose of it is. 
You tell them there is no sinister, hidden purpose … 
we’re not trying to take your assets. We’re just trying to 
get a fair reflection of what they actually are. Then 
everyone delves back into the past, and their memories 
are [long]… because people in this organisation [have 
been] around for a very long time. So there is that 
RK: Although very sympathetic to 
Ops general plight when dealing with 
HO, he is also very pragmatic: 
 
"Now when I sit, surrounded by 
National Office people, I mean, 
there’s no point in having the 
systems if they become, … if regions 
and districts can really choose 
whether they use the system or not.  
The organisation has made a 
decision to have a national system, 
and whether you come on board or 
not, … it’s really not discretionary, 
it’s all part of the implementation 
plan." [RK] 
 
RK: "So, it’s better to influence and 
modify the way we do things, and 
perhaps there’s a brief bit of one-on-
one, let’s have the cards on the table 
stuff, right?  I’ve been here for 32-33 
years, and I know how it works. The 
reason I’m involved is, yes, they do 
put me out front, because I’ve got 
credibility in all the other regions 
nationally, … and, yes, if I tell them 
it’s okay, most of them will believe 
me.  So, I work really hard to make 
sure that it doesn’t destroy me, and 
my credibility as well.  And why do I 
get involved?  Well, I just figure that 
if I don’t get involved, if I’m going to 
stand back, I won’t criticise anybody 
else.  And I have no personal 
statement, I’m not impressing people 
for promotion or exalted positions.  
I’m where I’m at, and that’s where 
 351
general mistrust." [GM] I’m going to stay, because I want to 
stay here." [RK] 
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2 Resistance by Operations to 
AMIS 
[ANTICIPATED] 
"People’s lives are at stake with 
breathing apparatus. So the 
people whose job it is to maintain 
them, and service the equipment, 
and so forth, are very 
conscientious. That is why it was 
chosen as the first piece of plant 
and equipment to be put into the 
system. We knew that the users, 
around the people who maintain 
the service and BA equipment are 
very conscientious. We knew they 
would want to maintain good 
records. So, we chose that 
equipment accordingly … for that 
reason." [PC] 
 
GM echoed this: "I guess the 
biggest driver, in reality, is health 
and safety." 
"So, with that experience, when they 
set up the asset management 
information system, I was coerced to 
be involved in it - and I have got to say 
I was really reluctant to get into that, 
after my experience with the financial 
system.  But I agreed." [RK] 
 
For the next anticipated round of 
conflict: "there was a view that if 
people at the senior level in the 
organisation wrote to people at regions 
and districts, and said if we don’t do it 
this way, we won’t fund you.  I think 
that’s really good, but like people say, 
the policy says this is how you do 
things.  If you don’t do them, maybe I’ll 
need to raise performance issues 
about whether you want to work in the 
organisation. " [RK] 
"Because, the people out there think 
these people in National Office, in the 
main, they’re just a bunch of wankers, 
you know? … particularly because 
they wear a suit - they don’t wear a 
uniform. So I introduced the concept of 
the people that work at the National 
Office - that work for me - they wear a 
uniform to work.  Let’s see if we can 
break through the cultural divides 
there.  But, I digress, … so, they were 
the sort of governance issues that I 
was alluding to before.  So, [we have] 
still got a way to go, but I’m confident, 
quite optimistic, that we’ll do it." [RK] 
Past resistance (see HR system for most recent 
example) means SC take potential resistance to 
AMIS/AVP seriously. 
RK: Fortunately, he demonstrated 
sufficient knowledge, skill and 
interest to lead the design of the 
asset class system. "By the time I 
came on line for this, financials were 
well off, … well advanced about 
getting wired up and implemented.  
And so I came on board and had the 
opportunity to wire up the hierarchy 
of asset needs, and their relationship 
to the maintenance and testing and 
how they could relate to the 
financials  that sort of internal wiring 
and functionality." [RK] 
3 Resistance by Operations to 
AVP 
Attempts by the AVP teams to 
persuade each Fire Station to 
provide good quality data did not 
always prove successful. "In 
practice, there are still some 
issues. We’ve got over 430 fire 
stations … different people have 
different attitudes to these things. 
Those who pay more attention to 
detail, are very conscientious - 
fantastic results, even and correct, 
100% accurate. Those who are 
more laissez faire in their 
approach to the assets, are 
perhaps a bit more secretive, if 
you want to use that word. It may 
not be the correct word to use, but 
they’re into their little fiefdom - 
that’s the Chief Fire Officer - 
especially in some volunteer 
brigades. [They] would probably 
not wish to be so cooperative, 
also, or reveal all their assets, for 
whatever reason they’ve got. But, 
as I say, a lot of that is apparently 
back to history." [GM] 
Regional managers were obliged to work 
with the AVP data collection teams, but 
there was little benefit for them. "...we 
were pushing for accuracy, and this is 
work for all the regional people, who have 
to all go off and check their assets again … 
for purposes for which, in principle I think 
they would agree with, but it falls on their 
shoulders. They don’t see any immediate 
gain - it’s just an extra burden for them. 
After all, what we asked them to do is, in a 
sense, burdensome to them because they 
don’t get any …". [PC] 
 
"...you impose a new system on 
everybody, and impose the obligation to 
use it, in order to capture this information - 
information that is of importance and 
value to the Head Office people who make 
these policy decisions. … but not to the 
people on the outside who are actually 
going to do all the work." [PC] 
 
However, the RMs do have the power to 
resist. For example, "it would just be done 
late … and skimpily. We would get figures 
down that were not trustworthy. [It became 
a] low priority task. And, very quickly, 
probably after a deadline had been passed, 
phone calls were being made, and it had to 
External contractors did not really 
understand Ops culture, and 
consequently struggled. "The outside 
people who did it, didn’t do it 
particularly well." [PC] 
 
NB. Interesting the way GM, part of 
finance, continually refers to the fire 
stations as "business units" and the 
corresponding CFOs "business unit 
managers". He notes that "Most 
people probably don’t understand 
managing the assets - which is 
important for the organisation. There 
are issues, I guess, trying to get the 
ownership down to the individual 
business unit managers, be it a Chief 
Fire Officer, or someone from the fire 
station. We’ve been reliant on paper-
based systems for so many years. ... 
We’re trying to change the whole 
culture within the organisation 
[regarding both] its assets, and how it 
manages its assets - at an individual 
level, as opposed to just globally how 
we manage our asset portfolio." [GM] 
 
"There is a culture within the 
organisation, and there has been for 
many years, through industrial 
"[There was an] exercise that happened many, many 
years ago, in the volunteer ranks, where people have 
been known to go around fire stations with a truck, and 
go and do an asset count, and then actually take assets 
away from them that they didn’t think the station 
needed, because they thought it was surplus. So, you’ve 
got all this history, where people come into someone’s 
fire station and want to count your assets - there are all 
these misconceptions about what the purpose of it is. 
You tell them there is no sinister, hidden purpose … 
we’re not trying to take your assets. We’re just trying to 
get a fair reflection of what they actually are." 
 
Then everyone delves back into the past, and their 
memories are [long]… because people in this 
organisation [have been] around for a very long time. So 
there is that general mistrust. The key idea of asset 
verification was, they were going to each station and 
they would identify the asset they saw when they were 
there. They weren’t hunting for assets, they weren’t 
looking for assets … what they saw, they counted and 
identified. They then fed back the results of that, what 
they actually physically saw, plus what the asset register 
actually said they had  all got fed back manually  for 
them to then come back and tell us [about] any 
corrections, any changes, etc. Then they effectively 
signed them off to say “yes, these are the assets we 
had.” They had full involvement in that. 
RK - was seen (by PC) to be a good 
rep of regional viewpoints on the SC. 
"Ray Kennedy is the Emergency 
Assistant Fire Regional Commander 
for the Wellington [Arapawa] region. 
So he is locally available, and he’s 
got heaps of, if you like, trench 
warfare type experience. Knows all 
the problems, and what goes right 
and what goes wrong....front line 
stuff. He was on [the SC], and knows 
perfectly well about all the problems 
of getting the information accurately 
checked." [PC] 
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be got out of the system … got out of the 
way, so people were put in [situations 
where they made] low quality decisions." 
[PC]  
 
In other words, the final decision on CI#1 
had the unexpected consequence of forcing 
the submission of poor quality data. In 
some cases, this led to a few RMs resisting 
by not signing the asset count off as 
correct, even when there was pressure to 
do so. 
disputes, of a bit of mistrust … 
between management and, I guess, 
front-line staff … both in the paid [and 
volunteer ranks]." [GM] 
 
"...the Fire Service was a very 
politicised organisation - those regions 
were like separate governments. It 
seemed to me that they were run on 
their own, and here we were - we were 
going to have an integrated system 
and we were going to put everything in 
one place. I think that was probably 
the cause of most issues, at the start, 
until someone said this is the way we’ll 
do it." [EB] 
4 AMIS project manager 
becomes AVP 
project manager 
as well: 
unknown unknown "Because they got another project 
manager … I didn’t wish to do the next 
stage of the project, for my own 
reasons. I suggested that they get 
another project manager who could 
relate, specifically, to the firemen. Not 
meaning to sound sexist, but I thought 
it would be better done by a bloke. But 
there just weren’t any suitable blokes 
available … and they ended up with 
another woman!" [EM, discussing 
AMIS after she was PM for FMIS]. 
 
"Well, I did get a feeling that some of 
the Fire Service managers out in the 
field had trouble relating to me - and I 
had assumed it was because I am a 
woman. There were some that I got on 
very, very well with. But they’re very 
focused on the knowledge of the fire 
appliances and techniques used. I felt 
that maybe a man would be able to 
relate to them better." [EM] 
 
AMIS Proj Manager: "I suspect one 
of the [problems] was that they put 
the wrong person in charge of Asset 
Verification from the beginning, 
which didn’t help. When it was clear 
they weren’t the right person, nothing 
was done about it." [FS]  
 
She was responsible for sorting out 
issues with a number of fire stations. 
"we would have weekly status 
reports, etc. I mean, we have got a 
reasonable methodology there to 
handle conflict. [By that I mean 
PeopleSoft's approach to conflict 
resolution], although I’m thinking 
really that the project manager was 
an ex-employee of PeopleSoft … 
she used to work with me. She was 
a consulting colleague - so I knew 
her personally." [EB] 
 
"Jo could be quite a difficult person, 
actually. ...you can have conflict with 
the project manager easily, too. 
[However], I tend to say “well, I'll give 
you my opinion” … but the customer 
is ultimately right. You can only push 
it so far. You have got to trade off 
your own views with the fact you are 
working in a client relationship." [EB] 
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5 SC faced with slippage in AVP 
deadlines 
in spite of strongly held opinions, 
SC members eventually reached a 
consensus - both to continue for a 
while, and to eventually stop 
further data collection. 
 
SC with Financial Interests: attitudes 
and behaviours consistent with a focus 
on cost minimisation. Even so, they did 
work to achieve consensus, but cost 
was the basis for their arguments. 
"From a purely financial point of view, 
the material assets are land, buildings 
and fire appliances. Everything else on 
our $300 million asset portfolio is, sort 
of, rats and mice. So, we know those 
assets, we know where they are, their 
values … and they’re very accurate. 
We start to get into length of hose, 
level two suits, and a whole lot of other 
rescue equipment, portable pumps, 
etc.  a raft of assets, and we’re talking 
large quantities, but very small value. 
We’ve got over 100,000 assets on our 
asset register. So, it’s extensive … 
we’re an asset rich organisation. From 
a materiality point of view, we’re 
always going to be accurate with the 
dollars, but it’s just some of the finer 
detail - that’s where you get the 
hassles." [GM] 
  
6 Control over AMIS data entry "This has been debated, and argued, and we’ve reached an 
impasse...". [RK] 
RK makes it clear that he has the 
option, if necessary, to "bully" resistors 
in the end. But it had not come to that, 
and RK was still optimistic. 
While the Financial group understand, 
at least in broad terms, front-line 
firefighter have important needs in 
terms of safety and effectiveness, they 
nevertheless still see the data as being 
fundamentally financial in nature.  
 
Similarly, while many Ops understand 
that financial and accounting systems 
are important, they see it as yet 
another HO function that places what 
should be a support system has more 
important than firefighting. They see 
the data as representing the 
firefighting equipment, and they wish 
to see each of these assets 
characterised correctly before any 
financial implications are considered. 
 
" In my experience, working with 
people like financial accountants - not 
management accountants, but 
financial accountants - is rather a 
different experience for people like me 
who start life as a firefighter, and in 
fact, end up working in an area like 
this. We don’t have a lot of exposure to 
the historical tension between Ops and HO is also 
apparent in this conflict. 
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people with great academic accounting 
experience and the way they manage 
the things at a high level. It’s quite a 
challenge for us to be able to work with 
people like that." [RK] 
7 SC faced with slippage in AMIS 
deadlines: 
QA unable to persuade the SC of 
the risks 
 
Decision-making style: "the 
Steering Committee was very, 
very consensus orientated. A very 
convivial approach. There were no 
authoritarian or dictatorial 
approaches. It didn’t seem to be a 
blame culture, either. Which is 
quite different from other places." 
Strong reference to office politics 
based on regional turf wars. "There 
was some fairly low-level staff politics - 
a bit of stabbing people in the back." It 
was at a sub-SC level, and had a 
major impact on AMIS by prolonging 
the AVP. The politics were "Oh, fairly 
corrosive, yes. The relationships broke 
down." [FS] This was mainly due to the 
stress brought on by the project not 
working. 
 
The majority of the politics observed 
were protective (turf wars) rather than 
opportunistic, vote the latter did occur 
on occasion. Frequently the politics 
were based on historical relationships, 
particularly as the Regional Fire 
Commanders all grew through the Ops 
ranks over a considerable length of 
time. This made it difficult to 
understand what was going on. 
"...also, it was never clear to me what 
some of the organisational politics 
were, because there were managers 
who had their own turfs that they were 
protecting." [FS] 
The inability of the SC to appreciate 
the QA's warnings highlight the naivety 
noted by EB as well. "Interestingly, the 
biggest issue that they had was the 
amount of effort that was required for 
Asset Verification … they never really 
appreciated the amount of work, and 
the complexity. It actually caused the 
[AMIS] project to blow out in terms of 
time and budget. They actually failed 
to grasp that properly. When it was 
brought to their attention that they had 
an issue, they actually tried to do 
everything that needed to be done to 
bring it back on track. But that was 
based on a misunderstanding about 
just how difficult it was. The issue was 
essentially allowed to drag on. … and 
it wasn’t until it became a crisis, that 
they decided to sack the project 
manager..." [FS] 
 
"But QA people are treated like 
Jeremiahs." [FS] 
 
"...It didn’t seem to be a blame culture, 
either. Which is quite different from 
other places." [FS] 
see issues raised elsewhere 
 
Also, lack of history in terms of experience with these 
types of projects - and doing so many at once. Lack of 
experience, for example, was instrumental in SC 
missing warnings about AVP/AMIS dependency. 
Project Manager (Jo): "I suspect 
one of the [problems] was that they 
put the wrong person in charge of 
Asset Verification from the 
beginning, which didn’t help. When it 
was clear they weren’t the right 
person, nothing was done about it." 
[FS] She tended to "rub people up 
the wrong way". 
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Table E-3:  Management and Governance 
CI# Resolution Management Feedback Decision Decision 
maker Policy 
Authority  
Structure Mechanisms 
1 Essentially nothing was done to deal with the relationship conflict in itself. Instead, the SC 
focused on proactive and reactive measures 
with the intention of minimising its effect on 
the projects. 
This conflict must be 
recognised by most in 
the NZFS senior 
management. But it is 
not formerly identified 
as an issue needing 
resolution. 
How best to 
reduce the 
relationship 
conflict between 
Ops & HO? 
At this stage, 
no one, though 
SC had to find 
temporary 
measures to 
get project 
through. 
”There was the operational 
manager’s staff, who were being 
used with the policy - because they 
had this policy/operational split … 
again, it relates to too many 
projects on the go at once." [FS] 
RK sees HO as ducking responsibility when 
things go wrong: 
 
"Well, when something goes wrong, that’s 
my problem, or the region’s problem, or the 
district’s problem, when we talk about asset 
management.  We’re responsible and 
accountability rests here, … [it] ultimately 
rests with the person called the District 
Commander, but he’s quite insulated from 
us.  But if we have a serious mix up, 
because a piece of equipment malfunctions, 
we have the responsibility here." [RK] 
Apart from limited representation 
on the SC, there do not appear to 
be any mechanisms designed to 
facilitate Ho and Ops working 
together on a more cooperative 
basis. 
2 "All the processes were there to make sure we got the best data that we could. We had 
the buy-in at senior management level. There 
was input from every single business unit 
manager [the Chief Fire Officers?], 
effectively, with the opportunity to sign these 
sheets and return them back to us. So, in 
theory, we should have got full cooperation 
and really good data out of it." [GM] 
 
"For the asset management part of the 
system, the implementation plan was worse.  
First, there was a need to go out there and 
capture all the data surrounding what assets 
we actually owned in each of the fire stations, 
right today. They hired a group of people to 
come and do it, and they came to me and 
said “will you tell us a way of how to do it, and 
then we’ll send them to a fire station, and 
they can make a start”.  Now they never had 
a clue. I sent four of these people, well 
qualified, highly paid consultants.  They went 
to a fire station and came back and said “oh, 
that’s really good, we’ve captured everything 
at the fire station, except the stuff on the fire 
engine, we will do that tomorrow”. 
 
Well, about a week later, they said “oh, this is 
just too hard, it’s hopeless - there needs to be 
some hierarchy of asset classes, and have 
them all put together. So, I had to sit down 
Discussions & 
agreements at high 
levels kept SC well-
informed. But little was 
done to inform station-
level Ops, or gain their 
buy-in, which did not 
seem to be reported 
back. 
Given anticipated 
resistance from 
Ops, what should 
be done in 
advance to 
prevent, or at 
least minimise its 
effects on the 
project? 
SC "...there was a view that if people 
at the senior level in the 
organisation wrote to people at 
regions and districts, and said if we 
don’t do it this way, we won’t fund 
you.  I think that’s really good, but 
like people say, the policy says this 
is how you do things." [RK] 
 
"Or, should we say, if you don’t do 
it the way I’ve said, I won’t approve 
the bills, you know? This is how 
we’re going to manage poor 
performance.  Are we going to use 
this project to manage poor 
performance? … or are we going 
to look at the policies that surround 
it?  Whereas, they sent out of one 
of those ‘do as I say’ instructions to 
all the regional managers, not that 
we listen to the instructions, 
frankly.  " [RK]  
RK is also a member of the Operational 
Function Group (with senior representatives 
from each of the eight regions). The SC 
presumed that RK would bridge the gap 
between Ops and HO through this link. [as it 
turned out, this link was not sufficient - both 
because the members of the OFG are highly 
political, making consensus difficult, and 
communication at this level was no 
substitute for direct communication to the 
stations, where the data was held]  
 
"So, that group is a key buy-in to enlist the 
support throughout the regions. “Hey, this is 
when we are coming to your region, this is 
what we are trying to achieve.” So 
everybody has known about it. Ray Kennedy 
was on that group, so I guess we had all the 
right people to keep the communication, and 
keep everybody throughout the organisation 
informed about what is going on." [GM] 
“There was not a great 
communication line to tell people 
what they were doing, to 
encourage them to help, and so 
the data they brought back was, 
frankly, compromised. " [RK] 
 
RK was also seen as an important 
mechanism to bridge the gap 
between what the accountants 
want, and what each station can 
provide. This gap was to be 
bridged in two ways: first, by 
providing the SC with insights into 
the Ops context, and vice versa 
(essentially to gain buy-in); and 
second, by devising (with the new 
PM) onset of asset classes to 
enable ready identification and 
classification. Thus, RK was seen 
both as a communication 
mechanism between the two major 
stakeholder groups, and as a 
technical consultant. In the end, he 
was also given the role of trouble-
shooter. 
 
"What’s important for, I guess, the 
asset register, is what appears on 
there - and I guess this is what is 
critical about the AMIS project: 
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with a group of people and design how we 
were going to capture all these, what we call, 
operational assets, into some hierarchy, 
because we’ve got thousands of assets … 
serious money assets - a fire engine, and 
what’s on the fire engine.  So, these people 
went around all the fire stations in New 
Zealand, including the volunteer stations.  
There was not a great communication line to 
tell people what they were doing, to 
encourage them to help, and so the data they 
brought back was, frankly, compromised.  
And then we tried to match what they brought 
back to our old records, and then take the 
result of that into the new system. It was utter 
chaos.  And to date we haven’t finished it 
yet." [RK] 
what appears on there has got to 
be what the fire fighters recognise 
the piece of equipment as. They 
have to understand what it is. 
...Now, as accountants, we focus 
on paying the bills, recording the 
assets, but we don’t necessarily 
know all this, sort of, inner detail, 
and what terms mean. ...that’s why 
we had a [field data collection] 
team of two - operational and non-
operational people. [GM] 
3 "We did the best that we could to collect the data. We teamed up - we didn’t just have 
accountants going out counting the data. We 
didn’t just have contractors counting the data. 
We had teams of two people - one, an 
operational Fire Service person, and one, 
external, non-Fire Service person. The idea 
was that the two working together would be 
able to then clearly identify the assets, know 
the uniqueness of a Fire Service asset, and 
what it is called - to get consistency of data." 
[GM] 
 
"I remember sitting at a meeting there where 
there were fairly senior people present, that 
were brought to Wellington.  ...I can 
remember different points of view coming 
through. ...There was Auckland, and there 
was Southland … there were seven or eight 
regions.  And those guys were pretty much at 
loggerheads about whether they needed a 
new system.  There seemed to be a lot of 
naivety about new systems as well. ...This 
was really to get buy-in, I think. This was the 
buy-in meeting." [EB] 
The PM and RK would 
report back to SC how 
AVP is going. SC, who 
normally met monthly, 
were now meeting 
fortnightly due to crisis. 
How to get the 
station CFOs to 
make accurate 
data collection a 
higher priority. 
SC High level policy that asset 
management will be centralised as 
part of overall information 
centralisation strategy. 
There is only one Ops rep on the SC. The 
external contractors (QA & PM) are the only 
other non-HO members.  
 
"Whereas, when you’ve got a CEO at the 
top, and an IT department that understands 
implementation (or has done it before) … 
just in general business, I think you are more 
geared up for that kind of major change  big 
projects that involve doing it differently … 
maybe change management may be 
handled differently as well. Managing people 
through change is often a sign that 
organisations are showing less naivety." 
[EB] 
 
[SEE AMIS DELAYS] 
EB thought there were bad 
communication lines between HO 
and the regions/stations. 
 
"I don’t think [they had an 
implementation plan], no. It was 
just “let PeopleSoft do it” and 
putting people in place - like Ray - 
to bring it all together. It was a very 
ad hoc approach. “I’ll ring up Bob 
down in Christchurch … he’ll be 
fine.” Or “There’s a lady in the 
regional office … we’ll grab her ... 
she’ll know how this is done.” [EB] 
 
[SEE AMIS DELAYS] 
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4 Once the issue of the AVP dragging on and delaying AMIS became a "crisis", they fired 
the external contract project manager (Jo), 
 
"...the situation deteriorated to the point 
where they made a clear decision that they 
decided to replace the project manager, and 
increase the number of staff." [FS] 
 
"They then put a new person in charge - who 
was actually the Head of Operations - who 
appointed some people to look after each of 
the streams. [I can't recall his name, but he 
designated] one person in charge of fleet, 
one person in charge of breathing apparatus, 
and one person in charge of property - to 
bring the project to a conclusion." [FS] 
Feedback from the 
AVP teams suggested 
AVP was going badly, 
with communication 
between fire stations 
and project manager at 
a low level. "When it 
was clear she wasn't 
the right person, 
nothing was done 
about it. That was 
partly because, for the 
first part of the project 
they were able to say, 
well, asset verification 
is somebody else’s 
problem. It’s not part of 
the scope of Phase 1, 
therefore let’s put it 
aside. So, it wasn’t 
recognised … it wasn’t 
dealt with. And 
because they 
misunderstood the size 
of it, they simply made 
it part of the scope of 
[AMIS], where, in fact, 
that project was 
completely consumed 
trying to deal with 
something that actually 
wasn’t their problem." 
[FS] 
The AVP, and 
consequently 
AMIS, have fallen 
further behind 
and are now in 
crisis. The PM is 
not coping and in 
too much conflict 
with Ops CFOs. 
What should be 
done? 
SC none SC has authority to fire external contractors 
based on performance. New PM put in place 
(and more successful) 
New PM divided AVP into broad 
asset classes (fleet, breathing 
apparatus, property) and placed a 
knowledgeable internal manager in 
charge of each. While cutting back 
on much of the promised 
functionality by not collecting some 
asset data, it did at least bring the 
project to a conclusion. 
5 "I think, by forms of refusal to sign off … and re-checks and so on and so forth, I think 
there were … probably three attempts made 
… before it was agreed that it was as 
accurate as we were going to get it. ...So 
there were disagreements, lengthy 
discussions, uncertainty, unhappiness  at the 
Steering Committee about how much time we 
were going to have to go on spending  … 
getting asset data printed out, corrected, and 
put back in again, recoded, and so on and so 
forth. It took ages and ages. " [PC] 
 
"[It was resolved] by giving it more time and 
money." [PC] Even so, moderate resistance 
and consequent inaccuracies remained, but 
the Steering Committee basically decided 
that they would live with any potential errors 
like that. 
Formal feedback from 
those collecting data in 
the field. Also, direct 
feedback from regional 
managers - are they 
willing to sign off on the 
data? 
 
"[It was] an issue of 
confidence. At what 
stage did they believe 
they had done it often 
enough, got enough 
sign-offs, to make the 
judgment that the asset 
data was accurate 
enough...? [These 
judgments were made] 
in terms of the signals 
At what point 
should the asset 
data be deemed 
good enough and 
the AVP finally 
closed down 
Formally, SC; 
 
Actually, it was 
SC members 
Brett & GM 
"... the policy was, that there would 
be a single national system, for all 
the station management, and that 
all the replacement policies, that 
were going to be revised, should 
be uniform. And there was 
information talked about that was 
required to be collected in order to 
embark upon the development of 
uniform asset management 
strategies. So, if you like, the entire 
project was an instrument of policy 
for this information." [PC] This 
appeared enough to ensure 
everyone cooperated - but not 
necessarily enthusiastically (Ops). 
Technically, HO (including SC) has authority 
over Ops, but chose not to exercise it 
beyond making it clear the AVP was 
compulsory. Some fire stations seen as 
"fiefdoms", resisting spirit of HO desires. 
Communication mechanisms - 
poor between SC & project 
manager, and fire stations; little 
provided by way of (a) explanation 
about what is happening and why; 
(b) encouragement to support the 
data collection teams. 
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coming back from the 
regions, as to whether 
or not it looked as if it 
was accurate enough." 
[PC] 
6 "This has been debated, and argued, and we’ve reached an impasse…". [RK] 
 
RK set out to break the impasse. "I’ve got one 
of our fire fighters in Wellington who has a 
talent for systems and processing, and he’s, 
in fact, taken over as the JD technical person 
for the whole country.  And he now sits in the 
National Office.He has a real talent in those 
areas, and in fact he’s now seconded, 
working up here for a year or two. Stefan and 
I were working on some sort of work, or 
compromise, about finding a process that 
suits all our needs, without any areas of 
conflict. So, one of the challenges I’ve got as 
project manager of the implementation 
issues, is to identify all the critical issues, and 
look at the change issues that surround 
those, and mapping them out and managing 
them in a manageable way.  So that’s the 
challenge for me." [RK] 
Proposals, minutes of 
meetings, etc. are 
circulated. 
"...it’s very 
important we 
have some clear 
processes about 
who has the 
ownership to put 
it in, and then 
who has 
responsibility 
associating the 
financial records 
around it." [RK] 
By consensus 
 
NB. Ultimately, 
HO have the 
authority to 
decide. 
"One of the underlying problems, 
in my view, is that we have a 
whole range of people developing 
policy for the organisation in 
isolation. People in the Finance 
Division will develop finance policy 
that has an impact across assets 
that we manage, without 
consultation [with] us.  Now people 
in the organisation will debate that 
fire region managers, like the guy 
who is my boss, serve at the 
executive level in the organisation, 
and have input into those policies.  
But when you see the make-up of 
the senior management team it’s 
weighted towards the people who 
manage the business at National 
Office. … and the Chief Financial 
Officer, … we’ve got quite a 
diverse group that develop a whole 
range of policy, and they look after 
data management, project 
management, a whole range of 
stuff, and those people drive the 
policy as well." [RK] 
    
 360
7 Everyone pretty much took the same view in terms of how to handle the situation. "[There 
wasn't really much conflict] - the individuals 
personally involved … we were all committed 
to the outcomes of the project. There were no 
certain individuals with vested interests in 
certain areas or certain outcomes. So, as a 
unit, as a collective Steering Committee, we 
operated well as a discrete team. We 
understood the need for the system. We 
understood the need, the imperative, to have 
the data right for the system to be acceptable 
to the organisation." [GM] 
 
"the situation deteriorated to the point where 
they made a clear decision that they decided 
to replace the project manager, and increase 
the number of staff …" [FS] However, things 
improved after that. "Plus, by that point they 
had already got through a lot of the nasty 
issues. They were sort of poised to get back 
on track. … it gave the impetus to get back 
on track. They had reorganised the project 
plan …". [FS] 
"...and I said: increase 
the number of visible 
milestones, so that you 
can track it on a 
fortnightly basis." [FS] 
 
In the end, QA 
feedback proved 
effective, but key 
issues raised were not 
understood. 
How to deal with 
the slippage in 
time & budget for 
AMIS. 
SC "The management culture is very 
slow at making decisions, and 
there is a separation of policy from 
operations. " [FS] 
 
No policy on change management: 
"That comes back to the project 
governance, where the low 
capacity to absorb change really 
wasn’t fully taken into account." 
[FS] 
 
"The sponsor of the project was 
very much the manager of the 
policy area, whereas the 
operational people were expected 
to implement it. So, it’s the old 
conflict between accountability and 
responsibility." Because Ops were 
accountable for implementation, 
with management given formal 
responsibility, "... there were 
potential turf wars between [the 
different regional offices].  They 
weren’t quite aligned, possibly... 
The operational people were told: 
“We need to do this.” There was 
the operational manager’s staff, 
who were being used with the 
policy - because they had this 
policy/operational split … again, it 
relates to too many projects on the 
go at once." [FS] 
"...for the first part of the project [the SC] 
were able to say, well, asset verification is 
somebody else’s problem. It’s not part of the 
scope of Phase 1, therefore let’s put it aside. 
So, it wasn’t recognised … it wasn’t dealt 
with. And because they misunderstood the 
size of it, they simply made it part of the 
scope of the Asset Implementation project 
(AMIS), where, in fact, that project was 
completely consumed  trying to deal with 
something that actually wasn’t their problem. 
Even at that point, they still didn’t do 
anything about it. They said, “oh well, yes, it 
isn’t really a deliverable for this project, but 
we are still going to put all the project’s 
resources into solving the problem.” 
Because they saw it as … “We have to solve 
this before we can implement.” [FS] 
Lack of change management 
mechanisms. 
 
Lack of programme management 
mechanisms: "And there appeared 
to be too many projects on the go. 
...Not actual IT projects, but when 
you have lots of projects on the go, 
it becomes difficult to focus the 
type of resources to actually make 
the project a success. When the 
new CEO came in, he wanted to 
put in a new station management 
system. They were rolling out parts 
of their new HR system. They were 
rolling out their new financial 
system. They were rolling out the 
asset system. There were other 
things that were happening. [For 
an organisation that is not used to 
change...], and where the key staff 
are very computer-illiterate, and 
are difficult to raise up. I pointed it 
out, and they sort of acknowledged 
it might be an issue …". [FS] 
 
"They had reorganised the project 
plan …" [FS] 
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Appendix F – Ministry of Health Summary Tables of Conflict Incidents  
 
 
 
Table F-1:  Conflict Incidents 
      
PRE-RESOLUTION CONFLICT POST-RESOLUTION CONFLICT 
CI# Brief Description Primary Target  Disagreement 
Negative 
Emotions Interference Disagreement 
Negative 
Emotions Interference 
1 Anticipated conflict between ITS and Comms - most stakeholders were aware that there was tension between 
Comms (who are heavy users of IT for their publishing work) 
and ITS (who provide IT support). This tension is based on 
the way ITS prioritises and develops web-related changes for 
Comms. They are intermittent (with months, even years 
between developments) and run on a service desk call basis, 
where the change request disappears into the ITS system, 
and Comms won't hear of the outcome for some considerable 
time, when it is suddenly announced that ITS have finished. 
Frequently, because it is not run as a project, the dveloper 
does a little testing and throws back to the client "to find all 
the bugs  - not ideal!" 
 
ITS have not run a project for Comms before, so this was to 
be a first. Comms were a critical user for this system, so the 
anticipated conflict had to be dealt with. 
Relationship ITS only has two web 
developers. "The 
Ministry's web 
presence is a very 
low priority [to ITS]. 
In fact it is zero!" 
[JW] Comms clearly 
feel their work is 
more important than 
that. 
 
[YES] 
Comms feel 
frustrated that they 
cannot provide a 
better publishing 
service when they 
have to use Lotus 
Notes and cannot 
get adequate 
support from ITS. 
 
[YES] 
Comms are unable 
to achieve their 
objectives of good 
service based on 
reasonable 
workload for them. 
 
[YES] 
Comms admit the 
new toolset is a big 
improvement, and 
they appreciated 
the attention from 
JA & PP during the 
project. But nothing 
has changed in 
terms of their ITS 
priority once back 
to the service desk. 
 
[YES} 
Less frustrated with 
the better toolset, 
but suspicious that 
things are unlikely 
to get better 
overall. 
 
[Some] 
The threat to their 
workload & abilities 
to cope remains. 
 
[YES] 
 362
2 Original web strategy too expensive - Originally, the project was about establishing what the Ministry's web 
presence should be ("to drive a web strategy for the Ministry" 
[BK]), including its governance and management. Although a 
budget had been allocated at the executive level, the project 
languished until the DDG of CID appointed the NZHIS to both 
sponsor and oversee the project. A project manager was 
appointed (Ian Kemp), who was charged with first producing 
a web strategy document that could then be discussed by the 
project governing body - the PSG.  
 
Considerable time was spent putting this document together - 
too much time, it was felt by many. A huge consultation 
exercise was required, as there were many parts of the 
Ministry (including Comms, NZHIS, ITS and external users - 
many of whom have their own web specialists). The strategy 
proposal horrified the PSG as the costs were clearly too high 
("...approximately three times the available funding!" [BK]). 
Furthermore, the deadline for e-govt compliance was 
approaching. 
Task 
(content) 
It is unclear to what 
degree the 
disagreement 
remained once the 
PSG expressed their 
concerns, but there 
was certainly a 
disagreement over 
the nature of the 
strategy. 
 
[YES] 
Unclear, though the 
PSG were taken 
aback by the 
budget disparity.  
 
[Some] 
Clearly the strategy 
document would 
interfere with the 
goals of the project, 
given the budget 
disparity. 
 
[YES] 
The strategy was 
abandoned and the 
web team leader 
dismissed. 
 
[NO] 
Unclear if there 
were lingering 
emotions amongst 
PSG members, 
who were now 
operating under 
more stressful 
constraints. It is 
difficult to see how 
the web team 
leader would not 
have felt negative 
emotions given he 
was removed from 
the project, but 
there is no direct 
evidence about his 
perspective. 
 
[uncertain] 
The strategy was 
abandoned and the 
web team leader 
dismissed. 
 
[NO] 
3 Risk of Lotus Notes based CMS (Pre-decision) - "[One of the biggest issues is that] the internal regard for our base 
platform Lotus Notes isn’t particularly high. There have been 
folk who are quite concerned that the functionality they would 
get, and how usable it was, would be much less than they 
could get by going out and buying a package content 
management system." [BK]  
 
"So, there has been a lot of product mistrust. There have 
been people who have desperately wanted to go out and 
purchase other content management systems - and there has 
been one group who have, which I am quite disappointed 
about, because I think it is a case of organisational prejudice 
overriding good judgment." [BK] 
 
Essentially, Comms were concerned they would end up with 
another clumsy, awkward Lotus Notes system, instead of a 
proven commercial product. ITS believed they could do it, but 
risked having to pay for the project if they failed; BK of 
NZHIS, on the other hand, was less concerned - budget only 
spent if ITS meet requirements; they have a contingency 
(direct budget to a pre-evaluated commercial product); and if 
compliance deadlines not all met, responsibility would rest 
with ITS! 
Task 
(content - 
choice of 
Lotus Notes) 
 
Task 
(process - 
Comms feel 
poorly 
represented) 
 
Relationship 
(between ITS 
& Comms) 
"between the three of 
us, there was 
probably a point in 
time when two of us 
were very, very 
sceptical about 
Warwick’s stated 
position - that he 
believed that the 
Lotus toolset could 
do the job. It really 
was a ‘put up, or sit 
back, and we will 
make some 
decisions for you, on 
your behalf’ type 
situation. And he put 
up, and in the end he 
delivered. We 
certainly weren’t 
three Lotus Notes 
sycophants, sitting in 
a room, saying it will 
be Lotus, by God, or 
it will be nothing! 
There were two of us 
who were very 
sceptical of the path 
that Warwick was 
promoting." [BK] 
 
[YES] 
There was plenty of 
contention. "Oh 
yes! Particularly the 
choice of Lotus 
Notes platform - it 
was quite an 
anguished, and 
extended debate." 
[BK] 
 
"the internal regard 
for our base 
platform Lotus 
Notes isn’t 
particularly high. 
There have been 
folk who are quite 
concerned that the 
functionality they 
would get, and how 
usable it was, 
would be much 
less than they 
could get by going 
out and buying a 
package content 
management 
system. " [BK] 
 
[YES] 
Both JW and BK 
were worried the 
new system would 
incorporate many 
of the more 
frustrating features 
of their old Lotus 
Notes systems. 
 
[YES] 
BK and JW have 
agreed, and the 
PSG have made a 
formal decision.  
 
[NO] 
None apparent 
among PSG 
members. 
 
[NO] 
Concern about 
usefulness & 
usability remained, 
but BK had a 
backup if ITS could 
not meet the 
commitment, as 
there would be no 
project cost 
involved. WS, 
however, now 
faces a serious 
threat to their goals 
if they lose a large 
piece of their 
operational budget. 
 
[Some] 
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4 First business case abandoned - JA, as the new project manager, was contracted to oversee the development of a 
more realistic business case based on the remaining funding 
available. A team was put together, with representation from 
key parties, and a business case was developed. 
 
However, after the decision to develop a Lotus Notes-based 
CMS within ITS, the CTO (WS) became personally involved 
by refusing to sign approval - insisting that the ITS 
representative was not sufficiently representing ITS interests. 
task 
(content) - 
based on 
source of 
CMS; 
 
task 
(process) - 
WS overruled 
ITS' own rep. 
A major component 
of the business case 
saw the need to 
purchase a CMS 
package. WS had 
successfully argued 
at PSG level that this 
was not possible with 
this budget. 
 
[YES] 
[uncertain] The normal 
approval process 
was followed, yet 
WS was seeking to 
directly interfere 
with the outcome. 
 
[YES] 
Business case 
team reluctantly 
accepted reworked 
business case (a 
better than nothing 
view), but 
disagreement over 
changes remained 
- at least from 
Comms. 
 
[Some] 
The members of 
the business case 
team were 
unhappy with the 
abrupt interference 
with the process, 
and the fact the 
emphasis moved 
away from many of 
the aspects that 
supported their 
own work. 
 
[YES] 
The process had 
been dramatically 
interfered with. The 
content had 
changed 
significantly, 
stymying the goals 
of all but ITS 
amongst the 
stakeholders. 
"...some of the 
goals that NZHIS 
and Comms 
certainly had seen 
as being major 
deliverables from 
the project were 
very much pushed 
to a secondary 
level of objectives." 
[JA] 
 
[YES] 
5 Comms losing control over web content - "At present, [Comms] are doing the three main processes, which are: 
entering content, approving, and publishing. The aim [of the 
project] is to separate those three roles.  ...Comms was quite 
keen on having content owners entering their own content, 
but then got nervous about what the implications were for 
that." [PP] This emerged as ITS (through PP) collected user 
requirements from Comms.  
 
Specifically, Comms were concerned about content approval. 
There were fewer issues over entering content (that could fall 
to the users) and publishing (that would remain with Comms). 
Although content approval could still be allocated to Comms 
under the new system, it was expected that many external 
users might retain this role. "Of course, they could see the 
benefits, and they wanted it - they wanted the content 
creation side - but they really weren’t too keen on the fact that 
they would lose control on this. ...This came down to Comms 
saying they wanted to be the publisher and the approver. And 
other people saying, well maybe you shouldn’t be." [WS] 
Task 
(content) 
Comms disagreed 
with ITS creating 
possibility of losing 
control over content 
approval. 
 
[YES] 
Comms were 
"nervous" about 
implications of 
losing control over 
content approval. 
AP has a strong 
sense of not being 
listened to by 
decision-makers. 
 
[Some] 
Comms sees the 
future role 
diminished, 
including own web 
technical 
designers. 
ITS had clear idea 
of how new CMS 
would work - 
Comms objections 
would threaten 
that. 
 
[YES] 
eventually, albeit 
reluctantly, 
Comms accepted 
the new role 
flexibility 
 
[Some] 
Comms more 
accepting, but still 
not completely 
happy. 
 
[Some] 
Once settled, 
interference with 
Comms future no 
longer an issue. 
 
[NO] 
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6 Control over Ministry web presence - in both the original web strategy document, and the first draft of the business 
case that followed, there included an argument (from 
Comms) in favour of greater centralisation of web 
management and processing. This included "upgrading the 
websites altogether", ensuring content was consistent and 
consistently presented - "rather than all of these disparate 
sites, with a variety of branding, a variety of navigation, a 
variety of search engine. ...we were looking for some 
consistency between the websites, among the websites, and 
a common platform for content management." [AP] 
 
This proposal mostly disappeared with the second version of 
the business case, with the emphasis shifting to the 
technology required. Consequently, Comms feel the issue of 
web governance & management remains unresolved. AP/JW 
felt this meant they remained defacto managers - effective 
responsibility without resources to match. 
task 
(content) 
Comms felt that 
governance & 
management of the 
Ministry's web 
presence was the 
critical issue - both 
for the Ministry (who 
need centralised 
control) and for 
Comms (who are 
burdened with the 
task without 
recognition or 
resources). The PSG 
do not seem to 
understand this - 
they assume Comms 
are only concerned 
about the workload,  
pointing out that the 
new toolset will 
actually ease the 
Comms workload. 
 
[YES] 
Comms (AP in 
particular) bitter 
and frustrated - 
feeling helpless 
that after several 
proposals and "5 
years of 
complaining" they 
still leave her in 
charge 
unresourced. 
 
[YES] 
Comms/AP have 
goals of 
centralisation of 
publishing process, 
with formal (and 
resourced!) 
governance & 
management. ITS 
(through WS) have 
interfered with that.  
 
[YES] 
Situation 
essentially the 
same, with Comms 
being left in charge, 
and a promise of 
future 
improvement. 
 
[YES] 
Comms continue to 
be frustrated, 
though more 
resigned to what 
they see as 
inevitable - more 
work now, hope of 
improvement in the 
future. 
 
[YES] 
Comms goals 
remain sidetracked. 
ITS know there is a 
genuine risk the 
autonomous 
external users may 
do their own thing 
again, if web 
governance not 
addressed. 
 
[YES] 
7 Web resources for Comms - While Comms have been complaining of being under-resourced for some time, it came 
to a head during the project. They appreciate the new toolset, 
but the workload generated by the project, on top of a major, 
special website being developed for the National 
Immunisation Register project, and all coming out of 
business-as-usual (BAU) funds.  
 
"We were already stretched; it is already an impossible task. I 
have to write the service specifications, review them, and 
review each test - each time there would be something to do, 
we have to test it - but we didn’t get any backfill....we were 
always under pressure, because the project kept going on 
and on, because it took us so long to give them the feedback, 
because we didn’t have any time!" [AP] 
task 
(process) 
Comms feel they are 
under-resourced, but 
the PSG feel it isn't a 
project issue. 
 
[YES] 
Comms are 
frustrated as the 
project-related 
work mounts. They 
feel under-
appreciated. 
 
[YES] 
user requirements, 
testing and writing 
specifications for a 
CMS all had to be 
done in normal 
time - even as 
more and more 
sites migrated.  
 
[YES] 
While the future of 
Comms resourcing 
is still uncertain, 
the additional 
resources over the 
difficult period has 
eased the 
pressure. 
 
[Some] 
Lingering 
frustration over 
future. 
 
[Some] 
Future uncertain, 
but immediate 
objectives seem 
more achievable. 
 
[Some] 
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8 owner of the project - The business owner of a project is not the same as the sponsor (DDG & NZHIS/BK), though they 
can reside with the same people. The sponsor drives the 
project at higher levels, while the owner (normally) provides 
the funding and is responsible for the implemented system. 
An early PSG meeting agreed to JW being business owner, 
"as he controls the group that does the publishing for the 
main Ministry website." But he "was very uncomfortable" with 
this. The implication for JW was (a) he had no direct control 
over the budget, and (b) he would end up with more 
responsibility, but without adequate resourcing. However, the 
other PSG members held that he had agreed to be owner, 
and that was the end of it. 
task 
(content) 
In spite of PSG 
decision, JW does 
not wish to be 
business owner, but 
BK & WS continue to 
believe he is. 
 
[YES] 
JW is quite cynical 
about being 
business owner, 
and its negative 
implications in this 
case. Feels NZHIS 
are trying to "duck 
shove" the 
responsibility 
elsewhere. 
 
[YES] 
JW (and AP) feel 
that more 
responsibility 
without adequate 
resources will 
further jeopardise 
their ability to fulfil 
their main function. 
 
[YES] 
JW continues to 
disagree about 
ownership, though 
BK & WS are either 
unaware or don't 
care. 
 
[YES] 
JW remains 
cynical, and sees 
involvement with 
the project as a 
tacit admission of 
responsibility ("It's 
a trap!")  
 
[YES] 
Still major concerns 
about 
responsibilities & 
resources when the 
project completes. 
 
[YES] 
9 Risk of Lotus Notes based CMS (Post-decision) - After decision made, conflict remained essentially unchanged. The 
one major difference is that now many external users, who 
also dislike Lotus Notes, are concerned about being drawn 
back into using it. Comms, as the biggest user group, 
remains very concerned. 
As above Unchanged for 
Comms & external 
users. 
 
[YES] 
Unchanged for 
Comms & external 
users. 
 
[YES] 
Unchanged for 
Comms & external 
users. 
 
[YES] 
Finally, 
disagreement 
mostly disappeared 
only once a 
successful system 
was developed. 
 
There are still 
some issues. "... 
[the new CMS] is 
still totally unlike 
anything, anywhere 
else in the public 
sector. So it is still 
such that people 
cannot walk in off 
the street and 
publish a 
document." [JW] 
 
JW sees major 
issue around 
pandemic planning 
- where the website 
should be seen as 
a major 
communication tool 
(to avoid people 
congregating or 
seeking medical 
help during 
pandemic). But if 
only two people 
can publish 
material on the 
main MOH website 
- what happens if 
they get sick or do 
Eventually, they 
accepted new CMS 
does work in the 
end, in spite of 
Lotus Notes 
platform, but some 
degree of 
relationship conflict 
lingers. "... [my 
staff] are scathing 
of it - just in terms 
of the sheer effort 
of getting 
publications up on 
the websites. The 
IT people have 
done their best by 
developing a new 
content 
management 
system for the 
people - but it is 
still totally unlike 
anything, anywhere 
else in the public 
sector." [JW] 
 
Note the use of JA 
& PP went some 
way to reduce 
relationship conflict 
between ITS, as 
they felt better 
consulted. 
 
[Some] 
Concerns only 
diminished once 
new system 
implemented. But 
being Lotus means 
still stuck with ITS 
for support! 
 
[Some] 
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not wish to travel to 
work? he suspects 
the DDG of CID 
would be aware of 
this, but doubts 
other executives 
are. 
 
[Some] 
10 A common approach to project management and governance - The Ministry has a Project Management Office 
(PMO), run independently out of the CID, that supplies 
templates to be used when a significant project is underway. 
This centralisation of project governance is meant to ensure 
that there is consistency in the way projects are managed 
and reported. However, the CTO - who is trained in a variety 
of IT and project governance methodologies (eg COBIT and 
ITIL) - has been pushing to move away from templates, and 
replace them with the guidelines and structures described in 
PRINCE2 (an increasingly popular commercial project 
management and governance methodology). PRINCE2 was 
employed, instead of the PMO's templates, for this 
project."[For example,] now you are a Project Board member 
- so, you are going to get a project brief. Here are the eight 
things that it should contain ...Whereas, [the PMO] people 
would say, this is the wrong template. ...But we’re not talking 
about content, we are talking about form again. We have got 
the wrong end of the stick." [WS] The emphasis should be on 
reporting structures and what they are telling decision-
makers. 
task 
(process) 
The PMO are 
committed to using 
their template 
approach, while WS 
is refusing to use 
them because he 
feels they do not 
work well.[YES] 
WS suggests it is 
all about "pride and 
professionalism" 
from the 
PMO.[Some] 
WS refused to use 
the PMO templates 
because he felt 
they would not lead 
to a successful 
project - and this 
one was important 
to him. The PMO 
may see a refusal 
to use a centralised 
method of project 
control as a 
challenge to their 
methodology (but 
no direct evidence 
to support 
this).[YES] 
Resolution is 
ongoing, but the 
fact that both 
parties are working 
together to come 
up with new 
policies for project 
governance is a 
positive 
sign.[Some] 
[uncertain] The threat of 
interference 
appears more 
remote, as clearly 
WS will continue to 
avoid using the 
templates, and the 
PMO have agreed 
to address his 
concerns with more 
flexible 
policy.[mostly NO] 
11 User resistance (Anticipated?) - BK, JW explicitly rated it as one of biggest issues.Each of the Ministry user groups 
who run a website are required to adopt the new CMS, so 
that their website maintenance is consistent with others, and 
the need to comply with the e-government standards will be 
handled for them centrally.However, not all groups want to 
migrate to the new CMS. At least one group bought their own 
CMS. Some had put a lot of work producing a good quality 
site of their own, sometimes employing their own staff for web 
development. Some simply didn't want to be associated with 
the centralised Ministry, preferring to set up their own 'brand', 
with only links to the MOH site.There was also the risk of 
abandoning existing service contracts and depend totally on 
Ministry for support - JW thinks the workload will fall on 
Comms (contrary to WS thinking). 
Task 
(content) 
potential for 
task 
(process) 
depending on 
approach 
taken 
PSG promoted 
Lotus-based CMS as 
the solution, but 
many were likely to 
disagree (based on 
past experience with 
ITS & Lotus) - 
suspecting poor 
functionality & 
usability;[YES] 
users already have 
poor regard for 
both product & 
developers[Some] 
Many external 
users saw this 
centralisation as 
interference with 
their own site 
objectives ("...they 
didn’t want to look 
like the Ministry. 
They wanted 
individual 
branding.") In 
practice, it was the 
NZHIS who proved 
to be most resistant 
in this way, fearing 
loss of control over 
their primary 
function (analysis & 
distribution of 
information).[YES] 
Most external users 
won round, but a 
few still resisting. 
PSG think they will 
eventually come 
round.[mostly NO] 
many suspicions 
based on past 
experiences 
appeared to 
evaporate once 
new system 
trialled, then 
implemented.[mostl
y NO] 
For those who 
agreed to migrate, 
external users 
generally found 
system supportive 
of what they want 
to do - no longer 
seen as 
interference. Even 
NZHIS won 
round.[mostly NO] 
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12 specifying a new CMS - "right from the very beginning, when we were having to write out the specifications for the 
content management system, it was ludicrous because none 
of us had ever worked with content management systems. 
We had two web publishers, and me, who had never worked 
with a content management system, trying to write the 
specifications for it!" [AP] 
 
Without the services of an experienced business analyst, 
preferably with knowledge/experience of CMS, Comms felt 
like it was the "blind leading the blind".  
 
"It is like going to a mechanic and saying I want a car, and he 
might say, OK, you tell me what sort of engine you want and I 
will build it. But, no, I just want to buy it off-the-shelf, and you 
can tell me which parts are optional." [AP] 
task 
(process) 
Again, Comms felt 
under-resourced, as 
they needed the 
services of an 
experienced BA, 
which ITS did not 
supply. 
 
[YES] 
Feelings of 
frustration (lack of 
resources) and 
uncertainty about 
how they should 
specify the CMS. 
 
[YES] 
Comms wanted the 
CMS to happen, 
but felt there was a 
genuine risk they 
may not specify 
this one well. 
 
[Some] 
Although not the 
BA they wanted, 
both prototyping & 
PP eased their 
concerns. 
 
[NO] 
No apparent 
lingering negative 
emotions. 
 
[NO] 
In the end Comms 
were happy with 
the CMS that was 
built. 
 
[NO] 
13 Looking for a website conversion champion - having decided the best way to deal with anticipated resistance is to 
"pick them off one by one", the next question is to determine 
what order would be best. Originally, the PSG had hoped that 
they could do five or six sites themselves, and then use the 
successful implementations as a lever to convince the rest to 
convert. That is, by successfully converting those sites 
already managed by Comms (as a project cost), it was 
assumed that Comms would then champion its success to 
the external users, and that the latter would also pay for the 
conversions. 
 
But Comms remained doubtful - not so much over the 
product or ITS' ability to convert - but what the implications 
would be over their future roles (see #3). "...in fact, they were 
still dithering... around this whole [workload/governance] 
issue … They were good at saying that this is a really good 
process for the user. But they weren’t very good champions 
for the whole process, because they were happy about one 
bit, but weren’t very happy about the other bit." [WS] 
task 
(process) 
There was 
disagreement over 
the prioritisation list 
(JA/PP report vs. 
PSG business 
perspective). 
 
[YES] 
Initial frustration felt 
by ITS (over 
Comms proving to 
be a poor 
champion), and 
Comms (over ITS 
apparent 
unconcern over 
workload/website 
governance 
issues). 
 
[YES] 
Comms' reluctance 
to champion the 
project has 
interfered with PSG 
strategy for one-by-
one conversion. 
Comms see the 
project as 
backtracking on 
original objectives. 
 
[YES] 
The prioritisation 
list was resolved 
through a PSG 
decision. 
 
[NO] 
The mutual 
frustration felt by 
ITS and Comms 
may have 
remained, but no 
longer mattered to 
ITS as they had 
found a new 
champion. 
 
Maori Health 
became frustrated, 
and was "scathing" 
of ITS, who 
seemed to 
abandon them 
(again!) However, 
ITS apologised, 
and Maori Health 
became a strong 
advocate. 
 
[NO] 
Again, Comms' 
concerns were less 
important now. 
Once a new 
champion was 
found, ITS was 
able to meet its 
objectives.  
 
[NO] 
14 ITS fail to keep promise: IP addresses - as an example of ITS "not delivering on its promises", the PM described a 
small, but frustrating incident. Several months earlier, a 
request had gone to the ITS service desk to set up IP 
addresses for the new websites once they have migrated to 
the new system. He was told it would take 2 weeks, and yet 
still isn't done. This became an issue when new Ministry 
websites were ready to go 'live'. As a result, '...I have got a 
project that is maintaining, in effect, two versions of websites  
one waiting to go live, and the other already live using the old 
URLs." [JA] 
task 
(process) 
There is 
disagreement over 
the priority given to 
this task. 
 
[YES] 
Clear frustration on 
JA's part. 
 
[YES] 
Clear (and 
unnecessary) 
delays in project 
progress. 
 
[YES] 
Task still not 
complete, but JA is 
confident 
escalation will work 
(it has before) 
 
[YES -> NO?] 
Frustration should 
dissipate once task 
completed. 
 
[YES -> NO?] 
Project should 
continue after task 
completed. Note: 
unclear how task 
completion will 
affect ITS 
objectives. 
 
[YES -> NO?] 
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Table F-2:  Influence and other environmental factors 
CI#   INFLUENCE ENVIRONMENT 
  
Brief 
Description Persuasion Obligation Culture History Individual Behaviours 
1 Relationship 
conflict between 
ITS and Comms 
(anticipated) 
Not until ITS took over the project 
& appointed JA & PP did genuine 
cooperation between ITS & 
Comms occur at the operational 
level. This proved more 
successful. 
Appointing NZHIS as sponsor & 
budget holder was meant to put 
pressure on both ITS & Comms 
to cooperate better (as 
demonstrated by the PSG). This 
had only limited success (mostly 
at the PSG level). 
Comms - sense of being victims 
remains, in spite of successful 
project collaboration. 
 
ITS - culture of client disinterest 
largely unchanged at operational 
support level. Comms claim this 
will change with better 
governance. 
No history of any project work, only 
piecemeal requests to ITS, with 
frequently disappointing results. 
No client focus. Relationship 
conflict developed over time & 
many experiences. 
JW - passive commitment to project 
& poor communication left Comms 
team with little representation and 
understanding; Primary governance 
issue still left unresolved. 
 
PP/JA - made enormous contribution 
to helping Comms cooperate and 
help design the new CMS, by doing 
what ITS service people don't - 
communicate regularly and be 
sensitive to client concerns. 
2 Original web 
strategy too 
expensive 
none apparent. none apparent. Not apparently relevant given 
nature of stakeholders. 
not relevant. Web Team Leader (IK) - "...he was a 
virtual web team leader. He wasn’t 
the right person for the job. He didn’t 
get on with people very well - he 
tended to rub them up the wrong 
way, quite easily, and that sort of 
position, where you don’t have any 
reporting lines, but people are 
supposed to work together. ...You 
have got to be a special person [to 
achieve this], and he wasn’t that sort 
of special person. He got everybody 
offside … and left. " [AP] 
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3 Risk of Lotus Notes based CMS 
(pre-decision) 
Some external attempts to 
persuade PSG member; 
considerable debate within PSG. 
"A large number of people did 
not want the Lotus Notes 
platform - that was one where we 
started a long way behind the 
starting line, in trying to push that 
one through. There was a lot of 
politics around that." [BK] [NB. 
He could be referring to 
persuasion as well] 
 
WS did use power of 
membership of decision-making 
body to present a reasoned 
case, but this was not sufficient 
to secure a good 'deal' in order 
for the proposal to be accepted. 
ITS has a strong Lotus Notes 
culture - that is, their technical 
expertise and experience have 
been based on a Lotus Notes 
platform. They value working with 
a toolset they understand; they 
work faster and more confidently; 
 
this culture has helped perpetuate 
the continued use of Lotus Notes. 
"I guess we have just gone too far 
down that path. It would be a major 
redevelopment to move away from 
Lotus Notes, now. I think it goes 
back to: if it ain’t broke, you don’t 
need to do anything." [JW] 
"A large number of people did not 
want the Lotus Notes platform - 
that was one where we started a 
long way behind the starting line, 
in trying to push that one through." 
[BK] Also, historical distrust of ITS 
due to poor service desk 
experiences.  
 
"Most staff in the Ministry do not 
like Lotus Notes. They never have, 
right from the day that it was 
introduced." [JW] He argues that 
Notes is an 'orphaned' system - 
few other government departments 
still use it, so that a few would 
want apparently redundant skills. 
"It was a star on the rise ten years 
ago, but it seems to have fallen by 
the wayside, now. And from what I 
hear, IBM don’t support it 
anymore." [JW] 
  
4 First business 
case abandoned 
One benefit of the changes saw JA 
transferred from NZHIS to ITS in 
terms of reporting lines: "...in 
effect, it has meant that NZHIS 
have taken a back seat. Comms 
have always had this relatively 
passive role, and Warwick has 
driven the project. So, … if it 
seems like a good idea, and if 
Warwick is convinced, then I can 
run with it.  I can be fairly confident 
that there won’t be issues from the 
other parties." [JA] 
The business case team felt they 
had little option but to accept the 
significant changes: "there was a 
recognition that this might 
provide them with some benefit, 
but it might not give them 
everything they wanted. But if 
they didn’t sign up to this, then 
they were back to square one." 
[JA] 
Not apparently relevant given 
nature of stakeholders. 
not relevant. JA convinced that WS' personality 
played a major role in his decision-
making and approach to conflict 
resolution. He has "strong opinions 
strong opinions as to how the project 
should be run" and felt "that the 
Ministry had invested heavily in 
Lotus Notes as a platform product." 
So, "if there are lessons to be 
learned, with hindsight, then you 
would take more notice of 
personalities within the Ministry, and 
know which ones can influence 
things, and which ones can’t." [JA] 
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5 Comm losing 
control over web 
content 
ITS (through PP) went some way 
to assuage Comms' concerns, by 
gaining their confidence - 
inappropriate material will not be 
published in the end. The workflow 
system ensures "there will always 
be a last review". WS also had to 
"step in" at one stage to point out 
Comms' fears are unfounded and 
will find the flexible publishing 
system better. 
Resistance from Comms was 
expected, but not to such a 
degree. 
 
Anticipated resistance - "...we 
thought [Comms] would have big 
concerns about how we are 
disenfranchising them from their 
core knowledge, which was 
actually detailed web technical 
design. Lucky for us, they lost 
both people - they resigned and 
left the Ministry. Not as a result 
of our project, but simply as a 
result of normal attrition." [WS] 
Comms values the work they do, 
but they also consistently feel 
under resourced and 
underappreciated (attitude) and 
have taken many opportunities to 
make their case (behaviours), but 
to no avail. They feel they are the 
only point of protection and advice 
on ensuring Ministry websites will 
remain acceptable in terms of 
content, which WS thinks is 
"paternalistic". 
 
Non-centrist corporate culture - 
Responsibility ultimately lies with 
the DDGs of the 8 directorates. 
Comms don't have a mandate for 
Ministry-wide content approval. 
Ministry much less centralised than 
many organisations. Corporate 
services (eg ITS & Comms) are 
not necessarily policy makers. 
Comms had originally requested 
(and had the expectation of) an 
increase in resources to cope with 
heavy (and increasing) workload, 
based on the consultations from 
the first iteration of the business 
case. Instead, they see an attempt 
at decreasing workload by 
removing key roles from their 
group. 
  
6 Control over Ministry web 
presence 
Comms attempt at persuasion 
through formal channels 
(proposals via web strategy 
exercise & first draft of business 
case) were not successful; 
 
PSG did feel that this was an 
issue, but not part of project. There 
is some evidence to suggest 
communication of this from JW to 
AP was not complete. 
Comms were expected to oblige 
with the changes and trust to the 
future (resistance did not appear 
to be an option). 
 
In spite of Comms insistence that 
they will not become responsible 
for the web without resources, 
the presumption from other 
parties that they will slowly go 
that way as more external users 
migrate will effectively oblige 
Comms to do so. 
Comms' culture appears to be 
undergoing a change, with the loss 
of their two technical staff, a 
greater cooperation with ITS, 
increasing responsibility with 
accompanying (its is claimed by 
WS) reduction in workload with 
new processes. 
 
Difficult to predict, but current 
value of hard, important work may 
only mean changes further 
undermine attitude that they are 
underappreciated and overworked, 
and not listened to. 
Ministry's web presence went 
through a "structural review" 4-5 
years ago, and "against 
everybody's advice" the 
responsibility for managing its 
growth went to NZHIS, and 
independent business unit within 
the Ministry. They had little to 
show, apart from an abandoned 
web strategy document, and had 
allowed the web presence to grow 
randomly. JW feels they should 
now take that responsibility on - 
AP points out they have the 
expertise (eg BK, and their own 
web team). 
AP - felt that if Comms had effective 
responsibility to manage the web 
presence, then she, as publishing  
team leader, would end up defacto 
manager. She did not feel she had 
the personal qualities (or formal 
recognition) - her background is in 
editing - I am an editor. 
7 Web resources for Comms 
Once JA helped Comms put 
together a formal request for, the 
PSG were persuaded that extra 
resourcing was warranted. 
Even if Comms find funds to hire 
help themselves, ITS has 
indicated they will not grant them 
access to the system! 
ITS - "... the problem is 
demarcation. The IT people don’t 
want to let control of the system 
go, or give anyone else outside 
their own little area access to the 
system. It’s a command and 
control sort of mentality." [JW] 
Traditional tensions (and past poor 
service) have contributed to 
Comms' sense that help is not 
available. 
JA sensitivity to Comms plight led 
him to help AP put together a formal 
request to the PSG that was 
ultimately successful. 
8 Business owner of the implemented 
system 
It is not clear on what basis JW 
was originally convinced, but no 
evidence of persuasion was 
presented (even though there is an 
argument) 
Certainly once the agreement 
was made, JW was completely 
obligated to remain the owner. 
not relevant not relevant. WS/BK - "... I think the decisions 
were always made [collectively by 
the PSG], but it’s just that a strong 
personality, and strong views, may 
affect which way people are going to 
vote, I guess." [WS] 
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9 Risk of Lotus Notes based CMS 
(post-decision) 
PP & JA both worked hard while 
collecting requirements, testing, 
etc. to keep internal users 
(Comms) well informed and 
listened to. This had considerable 
success at gaining cooperation 
and smoothing the path for 
implementation. 
Some users "desperately wanted 
to go out and purchase other 
content management systems". 
[BK] 
As above. As above. WS personally committed to seeing it 
through successfully; 
 
Personable approaches of JA & PP 
helped pave the way for acceptance 
of the new system. 
10 A common 
approach to 
project 
management and 
governance 
Both WS and PMO strongly 
believe in the importance of a 
Ministry-wide approach, but the 
difference lies with what that 
approach should be.  While both 
are currently in discussion, only 
WS has put his viewpoint across in 
this research. 
A certain degree of obligation to 
review the way projects are 
governed, given WS went ahead 
and used PRINCE2 anyway. 
ITS has had a culture of focussing 
on the technology, and not the 
clients. While it may take some 
time to change these behaviours, it 
is clear that the adoption of the 
principles embodied in PRINCE2 
has encouraged greater 
communication between ITS and 
their clients. Compared to the past, 
there was "more focus and more 
transparency to the business ... 
There is much more collective 
ownership. ...So, with IT there has 
definitely been a change of focus 
about what we were prepared to 
do, as well. " [PP] 
ITS has a history of focussing on 
the technology, and not the clients.  
WS - formally trained in IT  
governance methodologies 
(including COBIT & ITIL) and is very 
enthusiastic over PRINCE2 as a 
project governance and 
management methodology. 
11 User resistance (anticipated) 
Anticipating resistance, the PSG 
had no authority over the semi-
autonomous website owners, nor 
was there any policy available. 
Therefore, they determined to 
exert influence on their decision to 
migrate. Persuasion was the 
primary approach, based on an 
early 'road show' to each user 
group outlining why it would be 
advantageous to them (makes 
publishing easier & clearer & 
handles e-govt compliance - but 
doesn't threaten their individuality 
much). Because each group was 
different, it was decided to 
approach each individually. This 
was largely successful. 
 
NZHIS were particularly resistant, 
but this appeared to be largely 
based on miscommunication, and 
was later rectified. 
 
"Once we actually started talking to 
people we needed to, it was fine." 
Trust had to be regained (see 
Maori Health as prime example). 
Where persuasion has failed to work 
(a minority of cases), their 
obligations to meet e-govt 
compliance were emphasised, and 
that they would have to ensure it 
happened themselves. Sometimes 
this was forcefully done ("I tend to 
turn the acid up on them fairly 
thoroughly" [BK]). 
 
Even though NZHIS were 
compliant, pressure was brought on 
them to migrate as they were a 
major user and also the sponsor of 
the project!  
Many external users valued their 
own brand and did not want to lose 
their own sense of identity by 
being swallowed up by the 
Ministry. Semi-autonomy enables 
strongly independent attitudes in 
some cases. BK sees the group 
that bought their own CMS as "...a 
case of organisational prejudice 
overriding good judgment." 
 
BK also sees many of them as 
having poor understanding of what 
is involved in maintaining a web 
presence. The implication is that 
this ignorance has encouraged a 
(misplaced) attitude of confidence 
over their own abilities. 
 
ITS appear to value technical 
quality over customer satisfaction. 
Many spoke of their attitude (a 
seeming indifference to customer 
issues) and behaviours (poor 
service - eg an inability to prioritise 
customer issues, and too many 
"broken promises"). 
External users built up their own 
sites, often using their own web 
developers, and certainly using 
other technologies. However, 
previously poor experiences with 
ITS service (e.g. Maori Health), 
and frustration working with Lotus 
Notes, has meant many were 
suspicious of this new Lotus-based 
CMS from ITS.  
Personalities have made "a huge 
difference". Both PP and JA 
emerged as key project personnel 
successfully bridging the gap 
between ITS (whom they 
represented) and the external users. 
While their roles were seen as 
important, success was attributed 
considerably more to their 
personalities and the ways they were 
able to first, persuade, and then 
collaborate with the users. They 
were able to handle the "cultural 
diversity" and the politics 
 
Gentle, persistent, never threatening. 
Seen as a mixture of good 
appointment and good luck that the 
project had them both. BK suggests 
had the PSG members done it, it 
would have been disastrous. The 
NZHIS are good example of resistors 
who were won round by PP & JA. 
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12 Specifying a new CMS 
PP employed a prototyping 
approach, which persuaded 
Comms that a good CMS could 
emerge this way. 
Comms were obligated to specify 
the CMS, but then received 
considerable support through 
PP. 
Comms - attitudes & behaviours of 
being victims of under-resourcing 
were to the fore until prototyping 
through PP brought out a more 
positive outlook. 
 
ITS - culture of client disinterest 
still there, but largely circumvented 
through good project discipline and 
involvement through prototyping.  
Comms' under-resourcing has 
been an issue for them for some 
time. Having to specify the CMS 
seemed like yet another example 
to them. 
PP - her qualities both as an 
effective communication channel 
between ITS developers and 
Comms, and as the facilitator of the 
prototyping exercise, made good use 
of her interpersonal skills & technical 
knowledge. 
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13 Looking for a 
website 
conversion 
champion 
The PSG strategy was based on 
using conversion successes in 
general, and a champion in 
particular, to help persuade other, 
more reluctant external users to 
convert. Initially unsuccessful 
(Comms), but eventually worked 
once Maori Health brought round. 
No real way of obligating even 
Comms (who have a rep on the 
PSG) , much less others, to 
become a champion for the 
project. 
It is possible Comms may not have 
proven a good champion anyway, 
as they belong to the CID, as do 
ITS, and could be seen as "all 
brothers in arms". 
 
ITS were more determined to be 
customer focussed, but unable to 
completely shake culture of 
technology focus - inadvertently 
neglected Maori Health over some 
time after making promises. 
Maori Health, like many others, 
found ITS to have a "really bad 
track record" in terms of support. 
This had to be overcome if Maori 
Health were to become the project 
champion. 
In spite of Maori Health finding ITS 
difficult in the past, they chose it as 
their potential champion partly 
because of the woman who was 
running the website. She was "well-
connected, well-respected, and very 
articulate", and would be perfect as 
the 'personal champion'. 
14 ITS fail to keep promise over IP 
addresses 
none apparent. It seems ITS are resistant to 
obligations (eg to keep promises, 
communicate status, or meet 
deadlines). 
"Everything is done through the 
Service Desk, ...[which] is staffed 
by people who have recently come 
to the Ministry, and they are not 
paid very much - they are junior 
people, in general. And they don’t 
understand the Ministry’s website. 
They don’t understand about 
service. So, they log the call, and 
often a lot of time goes by before 
they even find out who the right 
person to channel it to is. And then 
that person already has a queue. 
And there is nobody following up 
on it ... it’s all just done as a series 
of calls." [AP] 
 
ITS culture is apparent through 
their service desk - highlighting 
indifference and poor 
communication. They have a 
reputation for failing to deliver on 
promises. Deadlines are often 
treated as unimportant. 
pre-project there had been many 
incidents of poor response to client 
needs, with ITS taking little 
apparent responsibility for ensuring 
action or providing effective 
communication channels. For 
example, a job would remain 
undone, until one day it is 
completed, and only then are the 
users told. 
none apparent. 
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Table F-3:  Management and Governance 
            
GOVERNANCE 
CI# Resolution Management 
Resolution 
Driven By: Feedback Decision 
Decision 
maker Policy 
Authority  
Structure Mechanisms 
1 1) aware of relationship conflict, DDG appointed NZHIS as project co-
sponsors (with her) and holder of 
budget - they were seen as 
independent of ITS & Comms; 
 
2) NZHIS appointed web team leader to 
"pull together the Communications and 
IT people together"; 
 
3) Then Comms involvement altered as 
the project changed into a technology 
project. Once Comms felt shunted 
aside by ITS in project, the latter hired 
JA & brought in PP - the latter to gather 
requirements and liaise between ITS 
and Comms 
DDG; 
PSG; 
WS 
1) Although appointing 
NZHIS to govern the 
project at the strategic 
level, no apparent 
feedback channel used; 
 
2) Although web team 
leader appointed by 
NZHIS, no feedback 
channel used until 
strategy document 
appeared almost a year 
later; 
 
3) JA & PP provided 
both Comms & PSG 
with regular feedback 
How can the 
relationship conflict 
between ITS and 
Comms be 
mitigated so that 
they can work 
together effectively 
on this project? 
DDG (first); 
PSG 
(second); 
WS (third) 
An informal policy of flexibility 
(it was a small project) enabled 
PP & JA to step outside their 
roles and take on testing and 
training as well - which they 
feel significantly improved both 
Comms relationship & the 
product itself. 
Formal governance - PP does 
not think formal structures and 
mechanisms would have been 
sufficient. Having good project 
management combined with 
an iterative approach (involving 
Comms all the way) made the 
difference. 
"Actually bringing a proper 
project discipline to it has been 
much more effective, because 
you can see the progress week 
by week, and it is much more 
transparent about what is 
happening..." [PP] 
2 Resolution through decisive decision-making. Little evidence of discussion 
with document author - instead simply 
dismissing the strategy and the author. 
 
Then, PSG deliberated before finally 
agreeing to pursue ITS-written CMS. 
PSG Poor feedback 
mechanisms used - 
PSG did not monitor the 
project in this phase. 
The final strategy 
document left 
opportunity for early 
redirection lost. 
What should be 
done with project 
now that the 
strategy document 
is seen as far too 
expensive to 
implement? 
PSG There is basic policy of 
operating within budgetary 
constraints, but major driver is 
having to meet e-govt 
compliance requirements. 
Web team leader had very little 
authority, whereas PSG, 
negligent at first (effectively 
handing authority to the team 
leader), they took full control 
when the strategy document 
was presented. 
none used. 
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3 "We piloted. Basically, Warwick took a development risk decision, and turned 
his Lotus Notes developers loose to 
develop the toolset, almost on a pure 
commercial basis. In other words, if it 
was not good enough, and wasn’t 
accepted, he wouldn’t get paid. So, 
effectively, he took an internal 
commercial risk." [BK] 
PSG drove 
process to 
reach the 
decision, but 
once proposal 
to use Notes 
was put forward, 
WS drove the 
proposal as a 
solution, with 
ITS support WS 
WS did not commit to 
writing a CMS without 
first seeking feedback 
and advice from senior 
members within ITS. 
 
Strategy document led 
WS to argue budget 
insufficient for quality 
CMS package (which 
led to his proposal). 
to meet the critical 
system 
requirements of 
having both an 
effective content 
management 
system and having 
it within a tight 
deadline, should 
ITS write the 
system based on a 
Lotus Notes 
platform, or should 
an external product 
be used? 
PSG No policy apparent for decision 
process to be used, or what 
that decision should be based 
on. PSG's internal debate to 
reach decision appears to be 
mostly ad hoc deliberation. 
Some consultation occurred, 
for example, but it was 
assumed that the 3 PSG 
members adequately 
represented the views of the 
main stakeholders (excepting, 
perhaps, the non-Comms 
users), rather than any kind of 
organisational requirement. 
PSG made difficult decision to 
have ITS develop product.  
 
As chair of PSG and project 
sponsor (controlling budget 
through NZHIS), BK held more 
formal authority but 
,consensus approach to PSG 
did ultimately prevail.. 
PSG is seen as the formal 
mechanism to make the 
decision, with PSG 
membership used as an 
indirect mechanism for 
consultation. For example,  
 
"So, we, at IT, sat down and 
brainstormed some ideas 
around this, and we actually 
came up with the concept that 
we could do this in-house, 
using some reusable 
components that we have got, 
and using Lotus Notes. ...we 
have got a development team 
that can do this." [WS] 
4 Having already decided at PSG/ITS levels that ITS would build the CMS, 
WS discovered the direction of the 
business case exercise only when it 
was presented for approval. He 
immediately stepped into the process, 
replacing NM, and insisted on 
reworking the business case. "...[that] 
happened relatively quickly. Because 
Warwick was very much driving …". JA 
was also moved from NZHIS (who were 
now uninvolved) to ITS. 
WS There appears to be a 
lack of oversight of 
either the team in 
general, or at least of 
NM by WS. This would 
not have been a 
surprise if there had 
been an adequate 
feedback mechanism, 
both formally (through 
team reporting) and 
informally (between 
team representatives 
and their managers). 
What to do about a 
business case that 
promotes a solution 
contrary to what 
has been decided 
by the PSG? 
WS - though 
it is all the 
PSG 
members 
who 
ultimately 
sign off on 
the document 
The development of the 
business case was "run as a 
mini-project", and thus followed 
the standard approval process 
set out by the PMO. 
The PSG had overall authority 
over the business case. The 
team developing it had 
representation from the same 
groups that the PSG were 
drawn from. Therefore, the 
managers of each group were 
required to sign off. That this 
was achieved post-resolution 
is testimony to the formal 
support WS received. 
As noted under policy, there 
was a standard approach to 
developing and approving 
business cases, which was 
followed pre-conflict. The 
formal sign-off process for the 
business case required 
physical signatures from: WS 
(ITS), BK (NZHIS) and Peter 
Abernathy (Comms). JA had to 
go around to each and get the 
signatures. 
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5 1. Persuasion employed by ITS through both PP & WS. 
 
2. It came down to a PSG meeting with 
both web team leader (AP) and 
knowledge manager (PP) invited, with 
extensive debate until consensus was 
reached. "We actually had it all open." 
[WS] 
 
3. After the decision, much was done 
(with ITS) to help Comms adjust - new 
business processes, technologies, etc..  
Comms Initially, feedback was 
indirect through 
reporting lines (eg. from 
AP -> JW ->PSG 
(perhaps); PP,JA -> 
WS-> PSG] 
 
But, once PSG had 
more consultative 
meetings including other 
affected parties, direct 
feedback proved more 
effective [for example, 
AP didn't think JW 
represented her team's 
interests very well]; 
where should 
responsibility for 
web content 
approval lie? 
PSG have 
final say, but 
in the end, 
decision was 
based on 
consensus 
across "all 
the affected 
parties". 
"The problem that we have in 
the Ministry, in terms of 
assisting Comms to do their 
job, which is about oversight 
and maintenance of the 
content, and what is going out 
of the Ministry’s web sites, is 
that policy is a bit lacking. 
There is process and 
procedure, but there isn’t 
something that says though 
shalt do this, in this way." [WS] 
While preserving ultimate 
authority for decision-making, 
the PSG agreed to expand, if 
not membership, then at least 
participation within the 
meetings of the stakeholders 
such as AP, PP, JA. [WS 
thought this was key to 
resolution] 
user requirements collection 
- Comms concerns able to be 
openly presented through this 
process (Comms supplied bulk 
of user requirements for new 
CMS). 
 
expanding the PSG forum: 
"So, we were actually able to 
have quite good discussions 
around, what was the model 
that we were trying to achieve? 
Does that model need to be 
consistent across the Ministry? 
Or would it emerge over time, 
before we reached that end 
state?" [WS - consensus 
decision-making] 
6 The PSG discussed the need for web governance, and determined (a) it 
should not be part of the project; and 
(b) it should be "parked" until after the 
project - particularly as each PSG 
member had a differing perspective on 
how web governance should be carried 
out. 
 
There is also a presumption that 
Comms will continue to control the web 
presence where sites have been 
converted. This was not a PSG 
decision, as JW does not appear fully 
aware of the defacto responsibility (not 
just content). 
 
There was a strong sense of agreement 
that the issue really needs to be tackled 
at a higher level - the executive team in 
particular. 
Comms Comms have made their 
views known via formal 
proposals and JW's 
representation. 
However, these 
deliberations do not 
seem to have been well 
disseminated through 
Comms or ITS. 
What should be 
done about the lack 
of any formal 
governance 
measures 
regarding the 
Ministry's web 
presence? 
PSG - in the 
first instance 
they are 
responsible 
for the project 
scope; in the 
long term, it 
might be the 
executive 
team 
There is no policy on web 
management - that is part of 
the governance issue. Nor did 
the PSG want to begin drafting 
policy at this stage. 
NZHIS are nominally in charge 
of the web presence, but took 
a back seat once ITS 
undertook the technology 
development. This left the PSG 
to determine what should 
happen, but were unable to 
decide, and so left it. Post-
project, the presumption is that 
Comms will then be 
responsible, though it is 
unclear how well disseminated 
this is, nor is it clear what that 
'responsibility' entails. Many 
saw the executive team as the 
right place to consider these 
issues. 
Even though it is generally felt 
that the executive team should 
consider this issue, it is not 
clear what the mechanism for 
setting this in motion is. The 
PSG have indicated they might 
look at it later - but how, when 
the PSG will be disbanded 
once the project is complete? 
JW says a formal proposal to 
the DDG is required, but he 
won't do it, as he fears he will 
end up with greater 
responsibilities, but no 
commensurate resources. 
7 1) Initially Comms employed someone out of their own budget - but this was of 
limited help. 
 
2) JA offered to help AP draw up a 
proposal to petition the PSG for more 
resources out of the project budget. 
This was presented to the PSG by JA, 
and was successful. 
JA Comms' struggles did 
not elicit a response, in 
spite of JW being on the 
PSG. It was JA who 
finally helped AP draft a 
proposal - generating 
the formal 'feedback' 
required by the PSG to 
act. 
Should extra 
resources be made 
available to 
Comms, and if so, 
how much? 
PSG not relevant Executive team  
Lack of any formal feedback 
mechanism, as well as 
someone with overall 
responsibility, has meant the 
executive team does not fully 
appreciate the web's growing 
popularity within the Ministry, 
and the issues that go with 
that. Because Comms has 
been able to provide patches 
and workarounds to keep it 
Poor communication 
mechanism  
until JA became involved, 
there was no formal 
mechanism to relay Comms' 
increasing project-related 
burden - with the exception of 
JW residing on the PSG (but 
he appeared to do nothing). 
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going, JW feels they remain 
ignorant, and will continue to 
be that way until someone 
raises it formally. 
 
PSG - decision-making body. 
8 As the conflict did not seem to be formally recognised, nor was the issue 
of resourcing seen as a project issue, 
no resolution process was engaged. 
 
Instead, JW responded by withdrawing 
interest from the project - essentially 
distancing himself from the project 
governance function within the PSG 
(though he did attend meetings). As WS 
had effectively taken over the project, 
he appeared content to abide by WS' 
decisions. 
JW It is unclear to what 
degree BK & WS were 
of JW's concerns, and if 
they were, they clearly 
felt attention was better 
spent elsewhere. 
Should JW be 
made the business 
owner for the 
project without 
more resources? 
PSG 
(decision 
already 
made, but JW 
would like to 
revisit it). 
Policy required that there be a 
business owner for the project, 
but it does not specify who 
must fill the role. 
Unexpected positive outcome: 
JA, the project manager, was 
initially worried about the 
reporting line to the PSG, 
populated by representatives 
"with very different agendas", 
leading to "three bosses". But 
once the project shifted in 
direction, BK "essentially took 
a back seat", and JW was 
reluctant and passive, so that 
WS effectively took control. 
Consequently, JA moved base 
from NZHIS to ITS, and had 
one reporting line at an 
operational level. He still 
reported regularly to the PSG, 
who always made key 
decisions jointly, though BK 
and JW won't have been 
involved in the proposal 
development. 
Feedback mechanisms - not 
always employed well: "I think 
there were, probably, a couple 
of times when we just let it drift 
along for a bit longer than it 
needed to. Letting it just 
meander along, as I said, we 
adopted that pretty much as a 
deliberate strategy, because 
we had the capacity to do so, 
and it took a lot of the stress 
out of the clients. Even so, 
there were a couple of times 
that we could have been a little 
bit sharper around our 
controls." [BK] 
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9 "So, we have had to show them that we have thought about this pretty well, and 
that we have been quite tough on our IT 
people to deliver good practice 
software, based on the Lotus Notes 
platform, and that that has been 
achieved."  [BK] 
 
"The first iteration didn’t get accepted, 
but it was close enough that we could 
see they would get there. So, if we 
hadn’t been happy with the toolset, or 
happy enough with the toolset, we 
would have rejected it, and he wouldn’t 
have got paid. ...I did have a plan B, 
and that is that we had actually 
evaluated an alternative toolset." [BK]  
 
But it was seen to be better working 
with an existing toolset and existing 
skills. 
PSG took formal 
responsibility for 
making it work, 
but WS & ITS 
drove the 
project to 
resolve people's 
concerns. 
Regular reports from 
project manager (JA) 
and, sometimes client 
liaison (PP). 
 
PSG directly involved in 
evaluating "first 
iteration" of project. This 
enabled them to, if 
necessary, swing in 
Plan B with time to 
install it before the 
deadline. 
Should ITS 
continue to develop 
a CMS in Notes, or 
should an external 
product be used 
while there is still 
time? 
PSG As above - no high level policy 
applied to reach this decision. 
 
Project control conducted 
partly through use of formal 
MOH Programme Office policy, 
and partly through project 
governance functions of 
PRINCE 2, as employed by 
WS, who is trained in this 
product. 
BK became less involved as 
project sponsor. JA transferred 
from NZHIS to ITS control. BK 
relinquished 'ownership' to JW, 
arguing Comms major user 
(publishing Ministry material). 
And BK transferred project 
governance to WS ... 
 
"I think that that whole process 
caused NZHIS to say, right, 
well, OK, now we recognise 
that we have some compliance 
issues. We are dicking around; 
we have wasted a whole lot of 
time. You, ITS, have made 
some promises now, that you 
have got an infrastructure that 
can provide the solution that 
we are looking for, and 
resolves compliance issues. 
Okay, we don’t care what the 
solution is, just as long as it 
works. Go ahead and do it! 
From a project sponsorship 
point of view, for a long time 
they took a step back, and said 
right  deliver!  
We have been backed into a 
position where we are having 
to fund this project … so, give 
it to us! You are telling us what 
it is going to be on. You are 
telling us how it is going to 
happen. You have told us it 
can happen within the right 
timeframe." [JA] 
The PSG employed a strategy 
of dealing with each user one 
by one. "...it probably cost us a 
lot of time, but we chose to 
absorb that time. We remained 
within program budget, 
because we had a couple of 
lucky wins, really, and that has 
enabled us to actually stretch 
the time to take this fairly low-
key approach. I think that has 
probably enabled us to not 
have to bring out some of the 
other mechanisms - which is 
kind of nice. It means there are 
no bodies on the path behind 
us, really." [BK] 
 
Project control conducted 
partly through use of formal 
MOH Programme Office 
mechanisms and partly 
through project governance 
functions of PRINCE 2, as 
employed by WS, who is 
trained in this product. 
10 Although outside the project, WS has been "working assiduously for the last 
two years" to (a) bring together the 
three project governance bodies in the 
Ministry (ITS, PMO, and Public Health); 
and (b) agree on flexibility in the use of 
methodologies for different types of 
projects, including PRINCE and its 
'sister' methodology Managing 
Successful Programs. These involve 
the creation of a joint policy document 
which will "go out and become Ministry 
policy". 
WS Through joint 
discussion. 
What should be 
done to 
standardise project 
governance across 
the Ministry, and 
what should it look 
like? 
Joint (based 
on 
consensus):  
ITS, PMO, 
Public Health 
joint creation of a policy 
document to become Ministry 
policy about project 
governance. 
although an apparently 
consensus-based approach to 
policy creation is discussed, it 
is not clear if the policy must 
be checked by the executive 
team, given its importance to 
the entire enterprise. 
The policy created will "set the 
mechanisms by which we are 
going to manage projects and 
programs going forward." For 
example, in this project, WS 
was able to provide a 
dedicated project manager and 
client liaison, who ensured 
things didn't slip. "Probably, 
that is why the project has 
been successful." 
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11 Anticipating resistance, PSG decided strategy would be "softly, softly" & 
"more open, less demanding". 
 
Accompanied a good product with 
considerable persuasive discussion 
between JA/PP and external users - 
one at a time. Only occasionally did 
PSG members have to get involved. E-
govt compliance primary lever - take 
worry away (persuasion) or they will 
have to do it themselves (obligation). 
PSG / Project 
team 
One-on-one sessions 
with each user provided 
feedback specific to 
their context, enabling 
customised responses. 
Most feedback from 
Comms staff, who look 
after many external 
users. 
For each external 
user "...the 
decision, really, is 
around whether to 
migrate to the 
consolidated 
infrastructure, or to 
pursue an 
individual path…" 
[BK] 
Each user 
had the 
autonomy to 
choose NOT 
to use the 
CMS & 
centralisation 
on offer. 
Enterprise-level policy 
available through structures 
like PMO, but PSG decided 
this project was different (due 
to autonomy of users) and so 
devised project-specific policy.  
 
1) Project would enable future 
complete centralisation of 
website management, but that 
would be unwise to pursue 
now (higher risk of resistance). 
2) Government-level policy (e-
govt compliance) employed 
directly as critical lever to 
combat resistance. 
3) CTO (WS) chose to develop 
CMS with minimal involvement 
of users (except Comms), to 
sell actual product, not just 
proposal. 
The PSG were able to employ 
some authority through 
individual managerial 
membership (both Comms & 
NZHIS were major website 
clients, the latter providing 
most serious resistance, 
requiring the most direct use of 
authority). No authority over 
external users - nor did PSG 
feel escalation to executive 
management was a viable 
option. CTO (WS) also exerted 
authority over project team to 
ensure developers met 
expectations negotiated by PP 
& JA. 
1) strategic mechanism to first 
canvas Comms (using 
prototyping approach) to help 
design system, then approach 
external users one by one, 
promoting result & educating 
on web management & 
persuading / obligating 
migration. 
2) JA & PP proved very 
effective communication 
channels between ITS and 
users. 
12 "I ended up being a liaison person, more with ITS, so it is just making sure 
…[we are] liaising with the business as 
well, and having enough knowledge to 
understand what Comms wanted - 
because they weren’t that good at 
enunciating what their requirements 
were." [PP] 
 
ITS used the quick turnaround time that 
a Lotus Notes platform offered, and 
used a prototyping approach (facilitated 
by PP, who is well liked by Comms). "... 
that worked really well, because we 
actually had something to show them 
quite quickly (unlike the old ITS 
approach of disappearing until it was 
finished)." [PP] Comms felt very 
involved as a result, and gained in 
confidence over the specification 
exercise. 
ITS/PP Key to prototyping 
approach is it provided 
Comms with regular 
feedback through direct 
involvement. 
Should a business 
analyst be brought 
into the project to 
help Comms 
specify the CMS? 
WS Informal policy of not involving 
users in development broken 
to great effect here. Will this 
new approach become formal 
policy? Hard to tell, given 
unique features of project. 
Interesting that it was ITS (esp. 
WS & PP) who instigated the 
successful approach, with no 
apparent involvement of JW as 
rep for Comms on PSG. 
Project management discipline 
- "Actually bringing a proper 
project discipline to it has been 
much more effective, because 
you can see the progress week 
by week, and it is much more 
transparent about what is 
happening, which has been 
really good." [PP]  
 
ISD mechanism - prototyping 
an ideal approach in this 
context. 
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13 1) Additional budget was approved by the DDG to do more external user 
conversions within the project, to help 
avoid resistance. 
2) JA/PP met with every external user 
and proposed a priority list for 
conversion. PSG overturned these and 
followed their own list. 
3) Maori Health Directorate was 
identified as key, with a woman who 
was "well-connected, well-respected, 
and very articulate" that would be ideal 
as a 'champion'. 
4) ITS made promises to Maori Health, 
then appeared to neglect them, then 
apologised to them, produced a 
successful conversion, and she became 
an excellent advocate. 
PSG The initial report from 
JA/PP provided the PSG 
with useful information 
about each of the 
external users and their 
contexts. 
Once it was clear 
Comms would not 
be a suitable 
champion for the 
conversion, where 
can one be found? 
PSG Not relevant. The PSG represent the key 
structure in both driving and 
resolving the conflict, in order 
to carry out the one-by-one 
strategy they determined. They 
did escalate to the DDG of CID 
at one point to increase 
resources. Their membership 
enabled "a better 
understanding of what was 
going on in the Ministry" - 
leading to their re-prioritisation 
of the external user 
conversions. They had no 
authority over the external 
users, including Maori Health. 
1) strategic mechanism to 
convert external users one by 
one has to be operationalised 
at this point. 
2) tactical mechanism of 
finding an early convertee that 
will serve as a reference, or 
"champion", for others to 
follow. 
14 ITS inaction is typically "resolved by escalation, eventually, and ultimately 
getting some resource brought on to do 
what they promised would be a two-
week turnaround job. This particular 
one is not yet resolved, but it will be." 
[JA] 
JA Major issue is the lack of 
feedback from ITS about 
almost anything to do 
with the task. 
Should resources 
and priority for the 
task be significantly 
increased to 
ensure the job is 
done ASAP? 
As JA has no 
direct 
authority over 
ITS staff, the 
decision-
maker will be 
the highest 
level of 
escalation 
necessary. 
There does not appear to be 
any policy outside ITS 
governing their approach to 
work requests - it appears to 
be at the discretion of ITS 
itself. It is not clear whether 
ITS has internal policies 
governing practice. 
Neither party has authority 
over the other, nor are there 
communication channels 
available for negotiation or 
consensus decision-making. 
Resolution through escalation 
is often seen as the only 
recourse. The "escalation 
points" are: (a) Client liaison 
(PP); (b) the ITS person 
allocated to the job; (c) the 
manager of the allocated ITS 
person; (d) the CTO (WS); and 
finally, the project sponsor 
(BK). 
The internal task prioritisation, 
person allocation, and 
communication processes are 
seen as unhelpful and 
frustrating. Escalation and 
PSG reporting are the only 
mechanisms for resolution 
available. 
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Appendix G – Hutt Valley District Health Board Summary Tables of Conflict Incidents 
 
 
Table G-1:  Conflict Incidents 
      
PRE-RESOLUTION CONFLICT POST-RESOLUTION CONFLICT 
CI# Description Primary Target  Disagreement Negative Emotions Interference Disagreement Negative Emotions Interference 
1 Serious resistance from both clinicians and administrators over EMR 
[ANTICIPATED] 
 
a) CIO given significant strategic budget & 
told to find a way to implement it, with a 
focus on the EMR; 
b) many administrators won't want it, 
preferring incremental improvements to 
the paper system; 
c) some clinicians apprehensive about IT; 
some prefer the benefits of new medical 
equipment; many are worried about the 
stability patient management. 
 
Under these circumstances, the CIO 
determined that there was a genuine risk 
of serious conflict over the introduction of 
the EMR, unless some form of action is 
taken. 
Task - 
process; 
although the 
others are 
also possible. 
(a) one or both of the 
clinicians and 
administrators may 
not support the project 
going ahead, possibly 
preferring incremental 
improvements to the 
paper system; 
(b) the CIO (with the 
backing of the Board) 
wants to see the 
project going ahead. 
 
The assumption is that 
the level of 
disagreement is likely 
to be. 
 
[YES] 
a) administrator 
indifference to what IT can 
achieve may lead to 
frustration over their 
proposals being rejected in 
favour of an IT-based 
approach; 
b) clinicians are likely to 
be angry if they perceive a 
genuine threat to the 
stability of patient 
management; as well as 
the use of significant 
funding [TC] "there have 
been people who have 
asked why are we 
spending all this money on 
this, when we could be 
spending it on replacing 
our medical equipment?" 
c) CIO knows the 
consequences if the EMR 
project does not succeed 
[TC] "well, if I don’t get 
people to jump on board, 
then I am out of a job!" 
 
As the relationship 
between users and IT have 
been indifferent in the past, 
it is difficult to assess the 
likely level of negative 
emotions that could ensue, 
but it is likely to be at 
least... 
 
[Some] 
All parties appear keen to 
see clinical system 
improved (the 'task'), but: 
(a) administrators have 
developed ideas for 
improving the current 
paper system, and see the 
EMR as a needless threat 
to their safer, incremental 
improvement objectives; 
(b) clinicians fear 
disruption to their work 
practices, with an uncertain 
outcome; feel comfortable 
with current system and 
may see EMR as threat to 
their insistence on stable 
patient management 
systems; 
(c) CIO is concerned that 
above attitudes may lead 
to resistance once EMR 
project is initiated. 
 
as this is a very high level 
issue, the level of goal 
interference amongst the 
stakeholders is 
correspondingly very high 
 
[YES] 
a) as a direct result of the 
accommodating 
approach to managing 
the anticipated conflict, 
the CIO and senior 
project manager (along 
with, eventually, other IT 
project leaders) gained 
considerable buy-in from 
both clinicians and 
administrators, who now 
work with IT in a mode of 
collaboration. 
Consequently, 
disagreement over how 
best to improve the 
patient management 
systems has all but 
vanished, and the focus 
has shifted to how best 
implement the EMR. 
 
[Some] 
as the clinicians and 
administrators have grown 
increasingly 
knowledgeable about IT 
and how it could help 
them, and had seen the 
benefits from some early 
subprojects, they are now 
more comfortable the 
broad concept of an EMR.  
 
As debate shifts to lower 
level discussions around 
EMR requirements and 
implementation, high levels 
of negative emotions about 
the EMR did not eventuate. 
 
[NO] 
clinicians are generally 
satisfied that if done 
properly, the 
implementation of an 
EMR does not 
necessarily lower quality 
of patient management, 
and in fact may improve 
it; 
 
similarly, administrators 
no longer see their 
paper-based 
improvements as the 
best approach in the long 
run. 
 
consequently, there is no 
longer a perception of 
interference (in broad 
terms) with each other's 
goals. 
 
[Some] 
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2 Resistance over new clinical lab result processes 
 
a) Hospital lab results used to arrive on 
paper for doctors to check, and either take 
further action or sign them off and file 
them in patient record;; 
b) now they get fed into computer system 
- but how to replicate the functionality 
where the paper results served as a 
trigger that the results were ready be 
checked? 
c) Worse, there was a genuine risk that 
the electronic system would send the 
results to the wrong doctor (unlike the 
original sticky label system); 
d) other issues included the need for 
doctors checking lab results to add notes; 
e) the IT project team determined the 
solution would require considerable 
change to current practices across many 
stakeholder groups. 
Task content 1) clinicians won't 
accept the new system 
unless they are 
assured that the right 
lab test results will 
reach the right people; 
clinicians are also 
reluctant to change 
processes that they 
know work well. 
 
2) IT proj team state 
that to meet the 
concerns of the 
clinicians in terms of 
lab test results, they 
must accept that the 
system will change in 
many significant ways. 
 
the level of 
disagreement is not 
clear from the brief 
description, but the IT 
project team have been 
consistently respectful 
of the clinician bottom-
line. 
 
[Some] 
no indication of negative 
emotions suggested for 
any of the parties involved. 
 
[Some] 
a) clinicians fear for the 
quality of their systems - in 
this case, the return of lab 
results; 
 
the potential for 
interference with clinical 
objectives is high. 
 
[YES] 
once IT had gathered 
their information, and 
presented a range of 
options for discussion 
within the CUG, the 
decision was eventually 
reached over both 
content and process. In 
spite of the time-
consuming implications, 
the IT project team 
agreed to take it on. 
levels of disagreement 
are unlikely to have got 
worse. 
 
[Some] 
[NO] IT project team 
objectives are to move 
the project forward while 
still meeting clinician 
requirements. This has 
happened. 
 
Clinician objectives are 
based on their concerns 
over the quality and 
functionality of the 
system. These have 
been met. 
 
[Some] 
3 resistance to electronic signoff of patient information 
 
one of the features of the EMR is 
electronic signoff of results and 
information by clinicians, in place of the 
long traditional paper signoff. There was 
resistance from some clinicians - 
especially the senior ones - as they 
proved unwilling to make a change.  
 
this resistance was anticipated, and 
measures to resolve it began before the 
conflict occurred. 
task-content even senior clinicians 
reluctantly accept the 
changes must 
eventually happen 
 
[Some] 
resisting clinicians anxious 
about changes and their 
implications, but not so bad 
as to be "putting in major 
roadblocks". 
 
[Some] 
resisting clinicians see 
moderate threat to the 
quality of the signoff 
system, because they 
understand the current 
paper-based system well, 
and can use it to maximum 
effect - as opposed to the 
uncertainty over the 
electronic version 
 
IT project team see 
resisting clinicians initially 
as moderate threat to their 
objective of implementing 
the electronic signoff 
system. Post 
communication and 
discussion, this threat is 
only mildly realized 
 
[Some] 
[NO] [NO] less than before (as 
more and more resistors 
are won round) 
 
[Some] 
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4 A clinical unit resisted EMR 
 
One particular clinical unit resisted the 
system completely. At first, the IT project 
team though they were being obstinate, 
but it emerged (over time) that they had 
had very little exposure to computers at 
all.  
task-content this unit does not 
accept they have to 
use the new system, 
even though the IT 
project team says they 
do. 
 
[YES] 
there is an implication that 
the unit is anxious and very 
reluctant 
 
[Some] 
the unit feel that there are 
risks to their ability to 
function effectively, and 
require valuable time for 
training etc, yet there are 
no perceivable benefits to 
them. 
 
The IT project team see 
the resistance as a threat 
to their poicy of 100% 
implementation. 
 
[YES] 
sufficient improvement to 
implement the new 
system, but not everyone 
finally agreed. 
 
[Some] 
after considerable, and 
difficult, discussion, 
followed by attentive 
training, this has improved, 
but anxiety remains 
 
[Some] 
some members of clinical 
unitwill still perceive this 
as interference with their 
own objectives, but the 
IT project team have, 
nonetheless, 
successfully 
implemented the system. 
 
[Some] 
5 Clinician disagreement over prioritisation of alerts system 
 
alerts refer to overriding critical warning 
systems - something within the medical 
record warning the clinician that there is 
an urgent note attached about the patient 
that the clinician must read. With the 
coming of the EMR, the intention was that 
alerts would be represented as flashing 
lights on the computer screen as the 
patient's record was being displayed. 
"they are particularly important in the 
emergency department" [SP] - see quote 
in notes. 
 
[SP] "There were some concerns from a 
number of clinicians that this wasn’t being 
given a high enough priority. ...We saw it 
as a ‘must-have’ - a bit like requiring all 
cyclists to have safety helmets, or 
everyone should wear seatbelts. I 
personally think that alerts should be a 
fundamental part of an EMR." 
 
however, the delays in getting this 
subproject implemented centered mainly 
on the design and management of these 
alerts. citing the national computer system 
covering hospital admissions, their alert 
system was abandoned because the 
information became unreliable. the data 
needs to be easy to enter, and yet 
regularly review for accuracy as situations 
change - yet how is this latter process 
carried out in any practical way? how 
does one ascertain that what was entered 
is accurate, and is still accurate later? 
task content considerable 
disagreement amongst 
different clinicians on 
some aspects of the 
issue 
 
[YES] 
uncertain, but some 
frustration would be likely  
 
[SP] "there is constantly a 
push from clinicians to get 
it up and running." 
 
[Some] 
there are conflicting goals 
amongst the different 
clinicians - with the net 
result that no one is getting 
the system they want, 
because they cannot 
agree. 
 
[YES] 
some improvement, but 
still not totally resolved 
 
[Some] 
frustration will have grown 
as they still have no alerts 
system, in spite of the fact 
that virtually all clinicians 
want it 
 
[Some] 
some of the conflicting 
goals have been 
resolved, but clearly not 
all. 
 
[Some] 
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6 senior clinician wants higher priority for ‘pet’ project 
 
[SP] "there is one of my colleagues who is 
very keen to have a certain computer 
system up and running. He used to be 
Head of Department, and he was very 
keen to get this particular aspect of this 
data base up and running. " 
 
The trouble was, he felt this subproject 
was not given sufficient resources being 
by the IT project team. 
task process disagreement over 
project resourcing was 
particularly vigorous 
from this clinician 
 
[YES] 
apparently strong emotions 
expressed by this clinician 
 
[SP] "… he shouted, and 
stamped, …" 
 
[YES] 
he saw insufficient funding 
as likely to inhibit the 
success of this system that 
he wants 
 
it is unclear to what degree 
the increased funding 
would affect the IT project 
budget. 
 
[YES] 
[NO] none apparent (over the 
conflict, not the resulting 
system) 
 
[NO] 
[NO] 
7 Disagreement over access to surgeon performance data  
 
a) surgeons collect data on their own 
surgery for the purpose of peer review 
and general patient analysis. They insist 
(bottom-line) that this data remain 
available only to the surgeons; 
b) other parts of the DHB (e.g. risk 
management) would find some of this 
data extremely useful, but cannot have 
access to it; 
Task content in spite of what 
appears to be a 
fundamental clash of 
information ownership 
and use, the level of 
disagreement appears 
quite low, as 
administration do not 
appear to question the 
surgeon's right to 
restrict access. 
 
[Some] 
unclear, but seems unlikely 
to be high - as Paula 
noted, the administrators 
may not have been 
completely aware of how 
useful this data could be. 
 
[Uncert] 
administrators in the 
quality and risk 
departments would find the 
surgeon audit data very 
helpful to their work, but 
the surgeons have 
prevented this. 
 
[YES] 
(1) unclear how much 
debate specifically 
between stakeholders 
took place - but there 
was plenty of general 
'discussion' & 
'promulgation' about it. 
 
[NO] 
unclear - as Paula noted, 
the administrators may not 
have been aware of how 
useful this data could be. 
 
[Uncert] 
lack of awareness on the 
part of the administrators 
meant surgeons would 
do what they want 
[really, this is an example 
of 'interference as 
interpersonal conflict'] 
 
[YES] 
8 junior clinicians going it alone with discharge summaries 
 
as a direct consequence of the increasing 
pervasiveness of IT within the medical 
environment, a new issue has developed 
between the long serving senior staff (who 
make up the majority of non-IT users) and 
the more temporary junior staff, who are 
generally younger and more IT literate. 
the concern from senior staff is that junior 
staff are spending more time on the 
computer, and less time directly involved 
with medical activities. 
 
the example given here is the production 
of the discharge summary ("the document 
that is produced when the patient leaves 
the hospital as an inpatient" [SP]) - see 
quotes in notes 
 
the concern is that these now complex 
documents, used by GPs as a diagnostic 
and treatment record, are being 
formulated and sent unchecked by senior 
staff. 
task process disagreement over a 
number of issues: 
a) should junior staff be 
typing the documents 
themselves, when 
there is a typing pool 
for that? 
b) more importantly, 
should junior staff be 
formulating and 
sending complex 
discharge summaries 
without them being 
checked? it is 
educational for them to 
do so, but how do 
mistakes get picked up, 
and what risks are 
there for the patients? 
 
[YES] 
unclear, none mentioned,  
though the senior clinicians 
clearly felt anxious about 
this 
 
[Uncert] 
junior clinicians see a 
threat to their autonomy 
(especially with computer 
use) and learning 
experiences 
 
senior staff feel excluded 
from the educational 
experience, and concerned 
about risk to patients. 
 
[YES] 
no apparent change 
 
[Some] 
uncertain, though 
frustration is likely to have 
increased as lack of 
resolution continues 
 
[Uncert] 
no apparent change 
 
[Some] 
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9 Orion providing fewer development resources over time  
 
Orion are the software vendors for the 
EMR - it is regarded as a very good 
quality product. Once selected from other 
vendors, they were engaged to help 
implement the package. Initially this was 
fine, but they have gone on to become 
internationally successful, with many 
clients significantly larger than HVDHB. as 
a result, they are putting increasingly less 
effort into freeing up resources and 
resolving issues. 
 
although it can be seen as a contractual 
issue, including penalties, this is not the 
sort of outcome desired by HVDHB, who 
would prefer to make progress: 
 
[PC] "For myself, as the project manager, 
it’s time, time, time. It’s {Orion] being able 
to give us the resources that we need at 
the time to meet our deadlines. That is, for 
me, where the major conflict is." 
Relationship 
(& task 
process); 
unclear, but rather than 
disagreeing with 
HVDHB, Orion 
appeared to be fudging 
 
[Some] 
HVDHB became 
increasingly frustrated over 
the delays caused by 
Orion's lack of attention 
 
HVDHB, as a direct result 
of the delays, went from 
having a very strong 
working relationship, to 
one of tension and 
frustration. This was 
compounded when it was 
learned that Orion was 
using HVDHB as a 
'reference' to help land 
bigger clients overseas. 
even so, they have 
continued to work together 
and make progress at the 
project team level. 
 
[WF] "We also felt that they 
were probably using their 
experience here to gain 
further contracts. So, we 
felt a bit miffed, I think, that 
they were seemingly not as 
responsive to us, as we 
thought, and that as a key 
client, they were leveraging 
this relationship to gain 
further contracts." 
 
[YES] 
clearly HVDHB have 
suffered delays to their 
objectives as a direct result 
of Orion's increasing 
distraction elsewhere. 
 
[YES] 
Unchanged 
 
[Some] 
Still an issue, but less so 
 
[Some] 
Improved, but still 
present 
 
[Some] 
10 Orion disagree with DHB over major technical problem 
 
a specific subsystem was performing 
poorly, end-users were getting 
increasingly unhappy. It was raised as a 
support issue with Orion, who did not give 
it the attention HVDHB felt it deserved. 
 
[CS] "...it needed resolution, there were 
various responses - initially, it stuck 
around for a while, and didn’t get 
resolved." 
 
then the technical fixes applied by Orion 
did not work properly, because of (Orion 
claims) differences in software 
environments: 
 
Task process 
(& 
relationship) 
unclear - did the IT 
project team agree with 
Orion that there were 
differences in the 
software 
environments? 
 
[Some] 
See CI#5 above. 
 
[CS] ". It eventually got to a 
point where the IT 
department felt that they 
were in danger of losing 
customers (i.e. their users). 
So, that was a significant 
issue…". 
 
[YES] 
an example of CI#5: clearly 
HVDHB have suffered 
delays to their objectives - 
an important operational 
system is not performing 
properly - as a direct result 
of Orion's perceived 
inattention and inability to 
resolve the problem. 
 
[YES] 
[NO] initially still high, but 
reduced significantly 
(possibly eliminated) 
 
[Some] 
immediate threat to 
system performance was 
finally alleviated (possibly 
eliminated) 
 
[Some] 
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[CS] "The fact that the test environment, 
and the development environment, were 
different from the production environment, 
is an environmental issue. It means that, 
unless you can replicate, faithfully, the 
issues and their resolutions in the other 
environments, it is a stab in the dark as to 
whether it actually addresses it in the 
production environment. That involved 
working through a series of  - well, if you 
are in a detailed, technical view, and you 
look at the normal day-to-day things that 
you do to resolve an issue, well if you got 
a base problem, then those things won’t 
solve the problem." 
11 EMR projects suffer delays 
 
a) occasionally, IT projects suffer from 
delays (vendor problems; insufficient 
resources; ambitious timeframes) 
b) clinical staff want to slow the project 
down, so as to preserve quality (so 
important with clinical systems) 
c) however, management may think 
differently, having undertaken to the 
Board to deliver the system on time 
 
[PC] "we have had issues around the 
project - generally in the contention for 
resources, either at the software 
developer’s end, or at our own internal 
programming end, and sometimes with 
our operations staff,  where they are 
unable to meet the [original project] 
deadlines." 
Task process (1) Clinicians (and 
CIO, who supports 
them) want quality over 
time; 
(2) senior 
management want 
time over quality. 
 
Difficult to gauge level 
of disagreement, as 
this is a generic 
evaluation. However, 
the gravity of this 
conflict suggests high. 
 
[YES] 
no indication of negative 
emotions suggested for 
any of the parties involved. 
 
[Some] 
a) clinicians fear for the 
quality of their systems; 
b) senior management 
are concerned project 
deadlines are not being 
met; 
 
[YES] 
In TC's specific example, 
and Paula's generic 
examples, the 
recommednations from 
the clinicians via the 
CUG for delays are 
accepted by the ISSC. 
The task process 
disagreement has been 
settled. 
 
[Some] 
[NO] The decision has 
essentially allowed 
clinician objectives to 
overrule senior 
management objectives. 
 
[Some] 
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Table G-2:  Influence and other environmental factors 
CI#   INFLUENCE ENVIRONMENT 
  
Brief 
Description Persuasion Obligation Culture Power History 
Individual 
Behaviours 
1 Serious resistance from 
both clinicians 
and 
administrators 
over EMR 
[ANTICIPATED] 
because clinicians, and to a 
lesser degree administrators, 
have considerable power over 
this issue, the CIO and senior 
project manager need to 
convince them that the 
benefits of the EMR would 
outweigh the risks and costs. 
There are applying the power 
of IT expertise.  
 
[PC] "... to shout softly is what 
we do. There is a certain 
amount of purposive 
personality, purposive 
approach, certain amount of 
soft skills that I, actually, 
personally use to influence 
staff to move along, to get 
going." 
 
The CIO did this by 
juxtaposing implications of 
two options: further 
enhancements to the paper 
system, or full commitment 
into the EMR. [TC] "The first 
thing I did, is I gave a talk to a 
large audience of a variety of 
clinicians and clerical people 
from all around the place  
about where we were going, 
… where we could possibly 
go, with some of the 
technologies for clinical 
information systems. ... If we 
go down this [EMR] path, we 
face a number of risks, but we 
have the potential to do the 
there is always the threat of 
resistance, and both the CIO 
and the senior project manager 
were aware of it.  When asked 
what measures she thinks the 
clinicians would take if they 
were very unhappy with the 
way the project was 
developing: 
 
[PC] "That measure would be 
to vote with their feet, and not 
use the system. So, for us, that 
would probably be the bottom 
line. If someone says, if that 
goes ahead, we will not use it, 
then we go back and look at 
the circumstances around that. 
We haven’t, yet, had that. But, 
what we have had, is very, 
very slow pickup of the system 
by some senior medical staff  
very, very slow. People have a 
private practice, as well as 
their public practice, and they 
come into the public system for 
two or three sessions a week - 
in which time they will be 
operating, or they will be in 
outpatient clinics, and validly or 
invalidly, they are reluctant to 
log in and use our electronic 
system; they keep relying on 
the paper." 
Clinicians & Administrators:  
[TC] "There was [prior to EMR] 
probably a culture of IT being an 
overhead, about IT not really being 
relevant - that is probably the best 
way to describe it. What does IT do? 
… “it provides computers, that’s all. It 
doesn’t really have any strategic 
significance to me”." 
CIO used a source of power 
(expertise & knowledge in IT) to 
promote the benefits of the EMR; 
 
clinicians were, collectively, very 
powerful - it is likely they would 
(successfully) resist any change 
likely to threaten patient 
management. CIO wanted to tap into 
that power, by ensuring they took 
ownership and made the important 
decisions. [TC] "We went through an 
evaluation process [of software 
vendors] - my evaluation team had 
10 people: three doctors, three 
nurses, three IT people, and one 
manager. The key thing there, was 
that the clinical people could outvote 
the so-called administration side of 
things. But I really worked it as a 
team." 
 
Administrators wield a collective 
power similar to clinicians, only less 
so. 
It seems past indifference 
towards IT was reinforced by 
the outsourcing of most of the 
IT function - which appeared 
more involved with maintaining 
current systems, than 
exploring new ones. 
It was the planning, and 
consequent actions, of the 
CIO that led to a change in 
organisational culture 
(specifically the clinicians 
and administrators, in terms 
of their beliefs and attitudes 
towards IT) and ultimately a 
new and successful project 
governance regime. 
 
Both the CIO and the senior 
project manager were initially 
accommodating, and then 
moved into collaboration. 
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things that we could never do 
on paper. To me, that was 
just to get the buy-in to the 
concept of moving forward. In 
other words, a zero 
assumption on what you want 
to do. Because then, people 
jump on board, they start to 
own it, and say “yes, we want 
to go down this path”, rather 
than me, as IS manager - 
because I obviously have a 
bias in that area ..." 
2 Resistance over new clinical lab 
result processes 
The IT project team had to go 
to considerable lengths to 
persuade: 
 
a) clinicians that the new 
system will perform up to 
acceptable standards; 
 
b) clinicians and 
administrators that new 
processes can be adopted 
successfully to use the new 
system; 
none referred to, either directly 
or indirectly; 
clinician focus is very much along 
the lines of: ‘yes, IT is great, we can 
see it is going to improve a lot of our 
record-keeping, and access to 
information that we need, but the 
bottom line is: safety comes first.’ 
So, if that means a lot of laborious, 
or lengthy intermediate steps, before 
we get there, then so be it.  
 
See CI#11 
clinicians - see CI#1. power 
exercised through CUG. 
 
IT group - power exercised through 
IT expertise, but only at the level of 
advice (except in terms of IT 
infrastructure); also, there is power in 
knowledge, in this case the 
cumulative knowledge acquired by 
the IT project team about all the 
affected stakeholders and their 
requirements; 
See CI#11 See CI#11 
3 resistance to electronic signoff 
of patient 
information 
See CI#11. 
 
[WF] "[resolution involved] 
communication, through the 
Clinical User Group process, 
through more dialogue, 
including examples of where it 
was working well, more 
discussion around the 
reasons why people were 
reluctant, keep asking the 
‘why’ questions. " 
none referred to, either directly 
or indirectly; 
See CI#2.  but some (esp senior) 
clinicians are still not comfortable 
with IT, and are unsure whether to 
trust systems based on it. 
 
[WF] "I think it was identified that 
there would always be resistance. 
The concept of the electronic 
medical record was pretty well 
accepted  accepted by the majority. " 
See CI#2.   
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4 A clinical unit resisted EMR in this case, the CUG appeared less useful, as they 
had already supported the 
new system. However, the ex-
nurse senior project manager 
was able to communicate 
enough to uncover their 
anxiety, and increase their co-
operativeness. 
 
[WF] "We did have those 
discussions, and some of 
those were difficult, but we 
got there. The major impact 
was really the people, at a 
much softer level, working 
closely with that department, 
and those people, building 
their confidence and really 
getting underneath the issue." 
some necessary, in 
combination with persuasion, 
to convert the clinical unit 
leadership.  
 
[WF] "I did apply a little bit of 
management leverage, if you 
will. I had to talk to several key 
leaders in that department 
about my concerns. This 
wasn’t something that was 
going to stop." 
this clinical unit, including a 
considerable number of senior 
clinicians, are very uncomfortable 
with IT. 
 
[WF] "I think that department still 
struggles - basically older people, 
with little need to have a high level of 
IT knowledge, and we are trying to 
drive them to a greater utilisation of 
something from which they could see 
the benefits, for them and for their 
unit. They have come a long way 
from there, ..." 
initially, PSG all the clinical unit 
behaviour was wilful, but the power 
to persuade inherent in someone 
who has both a medical and IT 
background was highly instrumental 
 
[WF] "I suppose we reflected it as 
being obstinacy, or just a department 
being difficult, because they wanted 
to be difficult. It did take some 
intervention, probably by Paula 
Campbell, coming in wearing a 
nurse’s, or a health professional’s, 
hat, and interacting with the staff in a 
non-threatening way, getting 
underneath the issues more" 
 Paula Campbell was unable 
to employ her unique 
background (see power). 
5 Clinician disagreement 
over prioritisation 
of alerts system 
as usual, there were plenty of 
the tends to sway opinion 
amongst the clinicians during 
the discussions and debates. 
uncertain while it is accepted that the clinician 
perspective is dominant, this is of 
little help when the conflict is 
scattered amongst different clinicians 
sees stakeholder assessment setting up alerts systems as 
part of an EMR is not new, and 
has been problematic in other 
health systems outside the 
HVDHB, and the clinicians are 
aware of this. 
 
[SP] "There is a national 
computer system, [where] any 
hospital in the country can log 
in and see where anyone in 
the hospital has had an 
admission. ...Attached to that 
was an alert system. That alert 
system is basically regarded 
as useless. Why is that? 
Basically, because the 
information on it is unreliable. 
So, the whole alerts problem 
has evolved around the 
question, how do you make an 
alerts system which people 
trust, and are willing to 
participate in it?" 
none apparent 
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6 senior clinician wants higher 
priority for ‘pet’ 
project 
presumably, initial entreaties 
would have tried to persuade 
the CIO - if so, it didn't work 
rather obvious tactics to 
influence the CIO's thinking: 
 
[SP] "...he was very keen to 
get this particular aspect of this 
data base up and running. So, 
he shouted, and stamped, and 
he certainly had some 
response out of our Chief 
Information Officer, to the 
extent that he might have got a 
little more funding than he 
might have otherwise got." 
See CI#11 for the IT project team 
 
note that while this is only one 
clinician, he still would have 
accorded some of the respect and 
attention that clinicians generally 
receive. 
sees stakeholder assessment uncertain in this case, the senior 
clinician's personal qualities 
(as evidenced by his 
behavior - highly unusual in 
this environment) outweigh 
the impact of the culture he 
belongs to 
7 Disagreement over access to 
surgeon 
performance data  
[PC] "a lot of advertising, 
discussion, and then decision, 
and promulgating really, went 
on to say this is information 
that is collected by us, in our 
service, for us, and we have 
the sole right to that 
information." 
possibly - the administrators 
may have preferred to know 
the full value of the audit 
information, but the senior 
project manager felt obliged to 
avoid getting involved outside 
her brief. 
 
[PC] "It is not something that I 
have gone over and said to 
them 'Hey, there is lots of 
information there, why don’t 
you see if you can get it?' It is 
not my role." 
surgeons - in this case, it could be 
argued that limited access to the 
data would not directly affect patient 
management in the short term, and 
could benefit patient management in 
the future. Instead, surgeons see it 
as management infringement on 
their personal performance data - 
which could, in theory, make them 
less willing to be free and frank with 
their audits (which would affect 
patient management). 
 
yet, such is the power of the 
surgeons, that there is a culture 
throughout the organisation about 
the priority of their needs. 
See CI#1 n/a n/a 
8 junior clinicians going it alone 
with discharge 
summaries 
[SP] "So, that particular issue, 
is quite a complex issue, 
which is debated, not 
infrequently, at many different 
forums throughout the 
hospital." 
uncertain - senior staff could 
argue that there's an obligation 
to minimize risk to patients; 
junior staff could argue that 
there is an obligation to realize 
the benefits that IT can offer 
(and does offer at many other 
hospitals). 
senior clinicians - while their 
concerns may be legitimate, there is 
also an element of ignorance about 
IT; 
 
[SP] "We still have senior medical 
staff that probably don’t ever really 
log in to e-mail, as it is at the 
moment  although, that has changed 
significantly over the last five years, 
where we have gone from about a 
10%, to an 80%, [usage of 
computers]. ...It’s really an age, and 
a generational fact. I think a lot of our 
older doctors have never really been 
brought up with computers." 
 
junior clinicians - not only feel 
comfortable with the use of IT, but 
feel it is important to incorporate it 
into their medical activities: 
 
[SP] "Whereas our junior staff would 
sees stakeholder assessment in this case, the status quo in 
terms of the discharge 
summary and its purpose, 
appear to have changed 
without appraisal. This 
apparent (albeit unintended) 
fete accompli has put the 
senior clinicians 'on the back 
foot' and has hindered effective 
resolution to some degree.  
 
although unrelated to this 
issue, a recent strike by junior 
clinicians both highlighted their 
collective power, and 
increased tension between 
them and senior clinicians, 
who had to increase their 
workload to absorb the extra 
work. 
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probably complain if they didn’t have 
access to the Internet. They are 
probably tapping on their computers 
all day long." 
9 Orion providing fewer 
development 
resources over 
time 
More successful than the 
contractual route - TC worked 
employed a combination of 
persuasion & obligation. 
 
[WF] "TC, in particular, spent 
a lot of time putting our view, 
and putting our concerns to 
Orion to improve that 
responsiveness." 
See 'Persuasion' at left. In this 
case, Orion's reputation is at 
risk (esp. if HVDHB is to be 
used as a reference). They are 
'ethically/morally' obliged to 
meet their commitments. 
[SP] "There had been a huge 
problem identifying where, or why 
the server wasn’t working. That was 
quite a big crisis point. But, finally the 
problem was solved, and the whole 
thing got up and running. [It was a 
technical issue,] ...but, again, it was 
working with big software vendors, 
and understanding what 
requirements were needed, and 
communicating with them, and then 
communicating back, and not 
understanding some of the specific 
details that were going on." 
Orion - in this case, they are in a 
strong position, as they are 
seemingly able to choose where to 
put most of their energies, and are 
willing to endure contractual 
penalties and a certain degree of 
opprobrium from HVDHB.  
 
HVDHB - in this case, there seems 
little that HVDHB can do, as they 
only have the contract available. 
n/a n/a 
10 Orion disagree with DHB over 
major technical 
problem 
See CI#5. 
 
[CS] "at the end of the day, I 
can’t think of any specific 
examples where there has 
been a specifically hidden 
agenda, or something like 
that. I think I understand 
people’s motivations and 
behaviours. ...on the whole, 
for most of the interactions 
that I have seen, I think that 
[the HVDHB's motivations 
are, collectively, genuine and 
transparent]." 
See CI#9. See CI#9 - it is possible the quote 
refers directly to this conflict incident. 
See CI#9. n/a n/a 
11 EMR projects suffer delays as the entire resolution process incorporates a series 
of opportunities to widely 
consult, in an open and 
transparent way, persuasion 
appears to be the dominant 
influence approach. Clinicians 
draw on their collective 
professional power, while IT 
draw on their expertise as a 
source of power. 
none referred to, either directly 
or indirectly; 
Transparency and accountability of 
processes carried out by these 
various authority structures, has 
encouraged a culture of 
communication, understanding and 
trust.  
 
[PC] "… people are very realistic 
about IT. " 
 
The concern for patients can backfire 
on the project sometimes ... 
[TC] "[At ISSC level] there have 
been people who have asked why 
are we spending all this money on 
this, when we could be spending it 
on replacing our medical 
equipment?" 
clinicians - see CI#1. power 
exercised through CUG. 
 
IT group - power exercised through 
IT expertise, but only at the level of 
advice (except in terms of IT 
infrastructure) 
because the mechanisms that 
have been set up to enable 
communication, 
understanding, debate, and 
ultimately, clear, realistic 
recommendations are still fairly 
recent, historical factors are 
based on the evolution of this 
new approach into a set of 
formal processes that are 
generally recognized as 
effective across the board. 
while the personal qualities 
of the leaders and 
representatives of the 
various stakeholder groups 
will be important at various 
times, they seem largely 
subsumed into the broader 
process. 
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Table G-3:  Management and Governance 
          
GOVERNANCE 
CI# Resolution Management Feedback Decision 
Decision 
maker Policy 
Authority  
Structure Mechanisms 
1 initially it is the CIO who is responsible for managing 
the resolution process 
(having initiated it in 
response to anticipated 
conflict). Once the 
decision is made to 
proceed with the project, 
conflict management 
typically operates at lower 
levels. 
a) responses to TC’s 
meeting/presentation 
provided him with 
sufficient feedback to 
decide on the follow-up 
processes 
b) the creation of a 
representative group to 
select the appropriate 
package provided 
further opportunities for 
user representatives to 
help shape their own 
system. 
should the EMR 
proceed or not? 
 
[TC] "The 
organisation had to 
weigh up: was it 
better to invest in a 
hundred more filing 
clerks, or are we 
going to go down the 
way of using 
electronic systems to 
organise data, and 
do away with paper?" 
decision effectively 
made by the 
collective clinicians, 
on an informal 
consensus basis; 
a special 
(representative) 
committee was set 
up by TC to select 
the actual vendor: 
[TC] "We went 
through an 
evaluation process  
my evaluation team 
had 10 people: 
three doctors, three 
nurses, three IT 
people, and one 
manager. The key 
thing there, was 
that the clinical 
people could 
outvote the so-
called 
administration side 
of things. But I 
really worked it as 
a team." 
[IT/PROJECT]: formal policy did not 
appear to be a factor in the decision-
making. However, there appeared to be 
informal policy - from the CIO and the 
senior project manager, through to the 
other project members of the IT group - 
that IT will act in an advisory capacity (with 
the exception of IT infrastructure), will 
endeavour to accommodate those user 
representatives who find it difficult to 
participate, and will collaborate with them 
in terms of establishing user requirements, 
system design, and system 
implementation - leaving the final decision 
to the users. 
 
[PROJECT]: once the project related 
authority structures were in place, policy 
was to deal with any conflict at the lower 
levels first - where those most directly 
affected have an opportunity to be 
involved in the resolution process. there is 
a policy of escalation where conflict cannot 
be resolved in this way. 
[IT/PROJECT]: complete delegation of 
decision-making to the CIO level - this 
provided TC with the freedom to select 
appropriate mechanisms. 
 
[PROJECT]: This, in turn, led to the 
creation of a series of project 
governance authority structures, which 
in combination with communication and 
mechanisms involving representatives of 
all stakeholders, discourages 
relationship conflict, and generally 
confines task conflict to the lowest 
feasible levels in the hierarchy. 
escalation policy is clear, if required. 
 
[PROJECT]: interesting that the CUG 
does not have any formal decision-
making authority, and yet policy dictates 
that no important decisions that will have 
an impact on clinicians, for example, will 
be made without clear direction from the 
CUG. 
[PROJECT]: communication mechanisms 
enabled TC to: a) have an opportunity to 
influence their thinking; (b) ensure that 
their perceptions of the new system are 
faced on informed considerations; c) help 
them accept that this is their system - they 
need to own it; d) convince the director of 
medicine to become a key project 
champion at the executive level. these 
mechanisms included the use of 
presentations, debates, and meetings. 
 
[TC] "The first thing I did, is I gave a talk to 
a large audience of a variety of clinicians 
and clerical people from all around the 
place  about where we were going, … 
where we could possibly go, with some of 
the technologies for clinical information 
systems." 
2 issue raised, discussed, and resolved within the 
CUG. No escalation 
required. 
 
The IT group appears to 
be driving the resolution 
process.  
a) IT project team 
collects requirements 
from all relevant 
stakeholders, and 
presents results with 
options to CUG 
At what point should 
the internal paper 
system be scrapped 
and electronic signoff 
of lab test results 
become the new 
system? 
CUG See CI#11 (a), (b) project - While the CUG is the key 
structure in terms of the final outcome, it 
is not a formal authority structure. In fact, 
while the PSG is technically the 
governing authority, in practice it tends 
to "rubber stamp" many of the decisions 
and recommendations put forward by 
the CUG. 
See CI#11 
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3 the two-step process involved: 
* issue raised, discussed, 
and mostly resolved within 
the CUG. No escalation 
required. 
* remaining resistors 
collaborate with IT group 
and are slowly won 
around. 
The IT group appears to 
be driving the resolution 
process.  
a) IT project team 
collects requirements 
from all relevant 
stakeholders, and 
advises the CUG 
accordingly 
 
b) then, feedback from 
individual groups of 
resistors are taken into 
account 
At what point should 
the internal paper 
system be scrapped 
and electronic signoff 
of results and 
information become 
the new system? 
a) CUG 
b) individual, or 
small group users 
See CI#11 (a) project - While the CUG is the key 
structure in terms of the final outcome, it 
is not a formal authority structure. In fact, 
while the PSG is technically the 
governing authority, in practice it tends 
to "rubber stamp" many of the decisions 
and recommendations put forward by 
the CUG. in this case, however, it 
appears that it did not need to go to the 
PSG. 
See CI#11 
4 essentially the process involved: 
* escalation to the PSG 
* influence (obligation) on 
the clinical unit leadership 
by the project director 
* influence (persuasion) 
by the senior project 
manager 
* final (albeit reluctant) 
acceptance by the clinical 
unit 
 
the IT group 
a) IT project team 
collects requirements 
from all relevant 
stakeholders, and 
advises the CUG 
accordingly 
 
b) then, feedback from 
individual groups of 
resistors are taken into 
account 
At what point should 
the resisting clinical 
unit finally agree to 
take on the new 
system? 
The PSG agreed to 
enforce the policy - 
clinical unit must 
adopt the new 
system, but also 
agreed the 
enforcement would 
be gentle and/or 
indirect; 
 
then most of the 
clinical unit 
eventually made 
the decision to 
adopt as well 
corporate/project - a major policy decision 
was made (by the ISSC and approved by 
the Board) that there was to be a 100 
percent conversion rate, and that this 
conversion may be slow in some cases, if 
it is to be successful. in this case, it was. It 
was clearly applied here at the PSG level. 
 
[WF] "We had to make a decision that 
within this organisation, we were going to 
have all the clinical departments utilising 
the system. There wasn’t an opt-out 
option. I was prepared to accept a slower 
introduction, or slower utilisation rate, but 
not being part of it was not an option. We 
did have those discussions, and some of 
those were difficult, but we got there. The 
major impact was really the people, at a 
much softer level, working closely with that 
department, and those people, building 
their confidence and really getting 
underneath the issue." 
project - the PSG exercised its authority 
in enforcing the policy, but selected a 
gentler mechanism; 
 
project - the project director was able to 
exercise power, through the fact that he 
was also the chief operating officer 
a) escalation - up to PSG level, from IT 
project team; 
 
b) discussion & debate between 
stakeholders 
 
NOTE: these done in conjunction with 
influence tactics 
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5 the process involved: a) discuss and debate the 
nature and priority of the 
alerts system, and how it 
would work in practice, 
using forums like the 
CUG, head of department 
meetings, etc. 
b) with no agreement, 
escalate the issue to the 
non-IT related Clinical 
Board 
c) however, final 
resolution has still not 
been reached, and the 
system is still not in place. 
 
appears to be driven by 
the clinicians 
as usual, debate, 
discussion, and 
negotiation led to 
refinement of the 
argument 
[SP] "how do you 
make an alerts 
system which people 
trust, and are willing 
to participate in it?" 
initially, clinicians 
themselves 
 
than escalated to 
the Clinical Board 
no policy appears to help in this case it is interesting that the clinicians chose 
to bypass the usual authority structures 
for an IT project issue, escalating 
instead to a higher clinical authority. 
discussion, debate and negotiation, 
followed by escalation 
6 the process involved: a) as standard funding 
process being applied to 
the project, with 
appropriate resources 
allocated 
b) probably, the outcome 
was appealed by the 
clinician, who attempted 
to persuade the CIO 
c) then, overt appeals 
were used to oblige the 
CIO 
uncertain should this project be 
granted increased 
funding, and if so, 
how much? 
the CIO the policy to use the formal process was 
initially invoked, but then this case became 
an exception 
it is not clear to what extent formal 
structures like the CUG, PSG & ISSC 
were involved, but as the CIO made the 
final decision, it seems likely the project 
was not a big one (or perhaps the 
amount of the funding increase was 
sufficiently small that higher powers 
were not required). 
formal funding process 
7 plenty of debate, and the decision is made unclear whether or not to allow limited access 
to surgeon 
performance data 
unclear, but likely 
to be CUG 
again, unwritten policy of surgeon priority probably no higher than CUG or EMRSG discussion and communication and 
mechanisms 
8 uncertain, but the process appears to be driven by 
the senior clinicians. 
as usual, debate, 
discussion, and 
negotiation led to 
refinement of the 
argument 
in what way, if any, 
should the process 
used to create, and 
the content of, the 
discharge summary 
change? 
uncertain - still 
appears to be 
locked in 
negotiation 
between the two 
stakeholders 
there was a policy (although how formal is 
unclear) outlining what should be in the 
discharge summaries, and how they 
should be processed; 
 
this policy has inadvertently been 
subverted, and needs to be revisited 
 
there does not appear to be any policy to 
help achieve resolution in this case, 
beyond the measures already taken 
while there is no clear authority referred 
to in terms of the final decision, there 
have been some authority impacts: 
 
[SP] "As [the discharge summaries] get 
more complex, we move to the scenario 
where these doctors come on to do the 
clinics, and there is a pressure from 
management, potentially, to be pushing 
them to type their own letters." 
the usual discussion, debate, and 
negotiation - through the CUG, and other 
forums as well "throughout the hospital". 
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9 once escalated from project managers, CIO 
managed the resolution 
process through 
negotiation with Orion's 
account manager, and on 
at least one occasion, 
escalated further to 
Orion's regional manager. 
 
It became a contractual 
issue, and penalties were 
involved on at least one 
occasion. 
reporting through the 
escalation process 
(1) when will Orion 
provide the 
necessary resources 
to stop delays in the 
project? 
 
(2) should HVDHB 
demand contract 
penalties, or should 
they continue to try 
and persuade/oblige 
Orion to provide 
resources? 
(1) Orion 
 
(2) HVDHB 
Orion's policy towards clients is unclear; 
 
HVDHB's policy towards handling vendors 
is based on a combination of contractual 
arrangements and collaborative practices, 
with clear communication channels 
(including those used for escalation). 
as it is a software vendor, the CIO was 
given the job of overseeing, and 
ultimately conducting, the resolution 
process, with full support from other 
project stakeholders. 
 
Note that in this project, the steering 
committees (EMR & IS) are not directly 
involved: 
 
[CS] "For this project, we don’t attend 
the steering committee meetings, 
whereas in some other projects I do. 
But, for the Hutt, we don’t." 
communication and escalation channels 
 
[PC] "There are channels that myself, and 
TC, can use through our account 
manager, and then further up to their 
resource allocation people, and to the 
Australasian manager, and those sorts of 
things. So, we escalate our concerns up 
there, when we feel we are getting a raw 
deal." 
 
[CS] "The escalation process - well, there 
was a combination of issues being raised 
in account relationship meetings, and 
formal escalation through, or semiformal 
escalation through an email, for example, 
identified the issues, and what needed to 
happen. So we had meetings to resolve 
those." 
10 See CI#5 feedback provided by IT project team and 
system users, directed 
to Orion; 
 
post escalation, Orion 
brought in their own 
technical "hit team" to 
resolve the issue, who 
then also provided 
feedback about counter 
issues like SD 
environment; 
when, and to what 
degree, should Orion 
get involved in the 
resolution of this 
system problem? 
See CI#9 - through 
negotiation and 
contractual 
requirements; 
Orion appear to have a policy of dealing 
with issues raised by system users, or the 
IT project team, through a business-as-
usual approach. This is fine, up to a point, 
but there also needs to be guidance on 
how to recognize stakeholder salience 
(esp. legitimacy and urgency) and escalate 
the problem internally, so that more of 
Orion's resources can be brought to bear. 
 
For HVDHB, see CI#9. 
See CI#9 [CS] "If, for example, there were resource 
conflicts with our resourcing between 
Hutt’s projects, and Orion’s projects, then I 
would expect TC to use the tools at his 
disposal to ensure that Hutt Valley’s best 
interests were kept at heart. If that involves 
an escalation e-mail to me, and ‘cc’ it to 
my CEO, then that’s what I would expect." 
11 ISSC makes ultimate decision, in this case, but 
smaller impact issues are 
handled at the CUG and 
PSG levels. 
 
The PSG appears to be 
driving the resolution 
process. 
a) IT project team 
reports to CUG 
b) CUG reports to PSG 
c) PSG reports to ISSC 
d) project manager 
reports to senior 
project manager / CIO 
e) CIO and/or senior 
project manager 
present to ISSC 
What mix of delay, 
increased budget, 
and loss of 
functionality/quality is 
best, given the 
current status? 
ISSC, as they 
ultimately control 
project parameters 
such as timeframes 
and budget 
a) project - implicit (possibly explicit) policy 
to run such issues (such as project delays) 
past the clinician dominated CUG.  
 
b) Project - implicit policy set by CIO, 
corresponding to clinicians concerns, that 
delays are more acceptable than threats to 
quality: 
 
[PC] "When I took over the role of project 
manager, and even when I was leading 
some projects earlier than that, it would be 
TC who sets that platform. As long as we 
can identify, exactly, what is the reason 
we’ve taken as many steps as we possibly 
can to mitigate it, or to alleviate a problem 
that will cause the time to blow out. So 
long as we have done those steps, and we 
have been diligent in doing that, then it is 
acceptable to him." 
project - The ISSC, PSG, and CUG all 
have important decision-making/advisory 
roles. 
 
[TC] "I guess one of the things that we 
rely on [both] the Clinical User Group 
and the EMR Steering Group [for], is 
how to deal with delays in the project. … 
Sometimes we have had to go to them 
and say that we are not going to meet 
this timeframe, what would you like us to 
do? " 
project - reporting mechanisms; discussion 
forums; presentations; collaboration 
processes 
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Appendix H – Code Structure for Data Analysis 
 
PRIMARY & SECONDARY CODES FOR CONFLICT INCIDENT #n 
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PRIMARY & SECONDARY CODES FOR GENERAL ORGANISATIONAL INFORMATION 
 
 
 
 
